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ABSTRACT 
 
POWERLESS IN MOVEMENT: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS INFLUENCE, AND FAIL TO INFLUENCE, 
AMERICAN POLITICS AND POLICY 
 
Matthew Patrick Mongiello 
Adolph Reed 
 
Much of the literature on social movements centers on cyclical theories of political opportunity. 
While such work lays an important foundation for understanding contentious politics, it fails to 
fully integrate movements as actors in the American political system and public policy process. 
As such, the ways movements exercise power in the American political system, and the ways 
that power is constrained, are often not clearly conceptualized. This dissertation argues that 
movements exercise political power in the US in three distinct but overlapping ways; pluralist 
interest group power, plebiscitary opinion power, and disruptive contentious power. Through 
public law and empirical analyses, it shows that opportunities to exercise these types of power 
are limited by three patterns of American Political Development; insiders building structural 
constraints such as tax and campaign finance laws, political inflation caused by the expansion of 
political resources such as campaign spending, and institutional thickening that commits 
government resources to existing issues and limits slack resources for new issues. Case law 
analysis shows that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrines on tax law, campaign 
finance law, and time, place and manner restrictions disadvantage movements. Empirical 
analysis of nonprofit tax filings shows that movements have increasingly relied on apolitical 
organizational forms such as charities. Analysis of protest news reports shows that policing 
policies have reduced confrontations between police and protesters in ways that lower this 
visibility of movements. Analysis of congressional hearings and public laws shows that an 
increasing share of government activity is devoted to administering existing policy 
commitments. The dissertation concludes that emerging constraints increasingly limit 
movement power in the future of American politics. As such, this project suggests that declines 
in social movement influence since the 1960s may not be a cyclical phenomenon, and that 
political outsiders must learn to adapt to a closed political system. Movement cases considered 
include LGBTQ Rights, Animal Rights, Disability Rights, and Antiabortion. 
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“It only takes one Person to make a 
change,” you are often told. This is a 
myth. Perhaps one person can make a 
change, but not the kind of change that 
would raise your body to equality with 
your countrymen. 
-Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me 
 
[P]opular insurgency does not proceed 
by someone else’s rules or hopes; it has 
its own logic and direction. It flows from 
historically specific circumstances: it is a 
reaction against those circumstances, 
and it is also limited by those 
circumstances. 
-Francis Fox Piven & Richard Cloward, 
Poor People’s Movements  
 
[W]ill the social movement be absorbed 
and institutionalized into ordinary 
politics, as were the strike and 
demonstration in the nineteenth 
century? Or will the sheer volume of 
contention submerge the routine 
processes of electoral and interest 
group participation in a turbulent sea of 
unruly politics? 
-Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement 
 
Chapter 1: Rethinking Social Movement Power 
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 Early on in my graduate study, I was talking with one of my professors about possible 
political theory dissertation topics. She was listening patiently as I outlined a project surveying 
the place of animals and nature in the canon of modern political thought. I thought it was an 
interesting proposal that built on important political theory traditions and filled holes in the 
literature. Specifically, I wanted to explore how the role of “human nature” in the work of 
Hobbes Locke, Rousseau, Marx and others is predicated on versions of a “man vs. beast” 
dichotomy. I still think it was an interesting proposal. But my professor didn’t think interesting 
was enough, or rather, she didn’t think it interested me enough.  She pushed me to consider 
why I’d entered graduate school in the first place and what political questions kept me up at 
night. Before long I found myself talking—and talking and talking—about the issue of social 
movement institutionalization. In particular, I was fascinated by disagreements over whether 
building large national advocacy organizations was a path to power or to cooption. Many of 
these organizations—such as the Humane Society of the United States and the Human Rights 
Campaign—were near and dear to my heart, but I took seriously critiques of these groups by 
more radical activists and scholars. After I’d gone on about these issues for about ten minutes 
my professor stopped me and said this was the most passionately she’d ever heard me talk 
about political science, and I’d clearly found my topic, one that spoke to me on a personal and 
professional level. That was the day I became an Americanist and the day I embarked on this 
dissertation project. I like to think what follows shows that I made the right choice. 
 My core motivation in writing this dissertation is my desire to better understand how 
social movements can best achieve their goals. A number of contemporary movements 
champion political causes near and dear to my heart, while other push causes that I find wholly 
repugnant. Still other movements fight for causes largely removed from my personal politics, yet 
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I still find myself compelled by the ardency and devotion with which they press their claims. The 
fate of movements matters. In my view, movement activism is a central piece of active 
citizenship and democratic politics. Activism is necessary for justice and the key method by 
which a democratic polity can carve out political space for marginalized groups.  
  The stakes in social movement politics are as high as they come, and yet it remains 
notoriously difficult to determine if and how activists impact politics and policy. As political 
outsiders, activists are not the ones making decisions, and decision-makers have every reason to 
avoid attributing their decisions to the actions of the disaffected, lest they encourage further 
outsider challenges to the status quo. Consequently, activists and movement scholars are largely 
left to speculate on how activists can best impact the political system, and this speculation often 
produces harsh disagreements. Advocates of confrontational protest and direct action accuse 
the organization builders of “selling out.” Nonprofit CEOs accuse the fringe of “poisoning public 
opinion” against the cause. In many ways these tactical disputes within movements are harsher 
than the rhetoric directed at movement targets, and they can eventually sap the morale and 
resolve of activists. 
 In response to growing conflicts over movement strategy there have been “can’t we all 
just get along” entreaties, which argue that movements should “let a thousand flowers bloom” 
and embrace diversity of advocacy approaches. While I’m sympathetic to such calls, and they 
may indeed be correct concerning the internal diversity of movements, I believe a reflexive 
dismissal of these serious issues is mistaken. What if there is one best way to advance social 
justice causes, or at least more and less productive ways? Do we not owe it to our causes to not 
simply fight, but fight effectively? Valuing amity over justice seems anathema to political activity 
that by definition seeks to shake up the status quo. We need to understand how movements 
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effectively exercise power if we are going to make intelligent judgments about how to best 
make use of our political resources, as well as judgments about the health of American 
democracy. With that in mind, this dissertation focuses on two major questions.  
 
Question 1: How do social movements exercise power in the American political system?1 
 I’m hardly the first person to ask and answer this question, though I like to think my 
answer is particularly complete and accurate. As discussed in Chapter 2, I draw heavily on a rich 
social movement literature in sociology and political science, and I am particularly indebted to 
political opportunity theories that consider both movement tactics and the constraints of the 
political system. I draw on literatures in American political development and American public 
policy that seek to explain how power works for actors across the American political system. So 
what’s unique about my answer to this first question? My project aims to blend the insights 
from these various literatures by adapting the political opportunity theory to the specific 
mechanisms by which power is exercised in American politics and policy. While there is a 
temptation to address movement politics as an entirely separate animal from the mainstream 
political system, I argue that movements are simply political actors with different resources and 
constraints from more powerful mainstream political actors. 
 My approach recognizes that movements employ “contentious politics” with a 
regularity and ferocity uncommon to other political actors, and pays close attention to what I 
call “disruptive power” (Piven F. F., 2006). However, I also engage with an American politics 
                                                           
1 I’m not uninterested in comparative questions of movement power, but my approach is premised on a 
belief that understanding movement power in a polity requires a precise understanding of the political 
culture and institutions of that polity.  
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literature that takes elections, lobbying, and litigating to be the major sources of influence, what 
I “pluralist power” (Neustadt, 1991) (Truman, 1971) (Dahl, Who Governs?, 2005). In addition, I 
draw on political scientists who in recent decades have argued that media and public opinion 
are the real drivers of the political process, addressing such avenues of influences as 
“plebiscitary power” (Kernell, 2006). And with each type of power, my approach draws on the 
policy process literature, which generally holds a more nuanced picture of agenda setting and 
agenda implementing mechanisms than does the standard political science literature.2  
 Like other political opportunity theorists, I pay special attention to the constraints 
placed upon movements by the system’s dominant political institutions, which serve to limit the 
exercise of movement power (Tarrow, 2011) (Amenta, 2006). An aspect of my work that 
differentiates it from most of the literatures I draw on is that I pay special attention to the ways 
in which the American political system is dynamic and ever-changing. Thus the second major 
question of my project is as follows: 
 
Question 2: How do dominant political actors and government institutions work to constrain 
movement power, and how do these constraints change across time? 
  
 Most political opportunity theorists believe that the system moves from periods of 
constraint to periods of vulnerability in a cyclical fashion (Tarrow, 2011) (Meyer & Minkoff, 
                                                           
2 My approach is heavily indebted to agenda setting approaches including Baumgartner & Jones’s 
punctuated equilibrium model and John Kingdon’s multiple streams model (Baumgartner & Jones, 
Agendas and Instability, 2009) (Kingdon, 1995). I Also draw on heavily on the bureaucracy and 
implementation literature, especially the organizational theory of James Q. Wilson (Wilson, 1973).   
 6
Conceptualizing Political Opportunity, 2004).3 For example, the civil rights movement is seen as 
having struck major legislative victories in the 1960s because it was acting during period of 
political openness—and civil rights was an “early riser” in this open period—an environment 
which created opportunities for movements of all kinds. This perspective suggests that since the 
1960s the system has steadily grown less vulnerable to challengers, but most political 
opportunity theorists take for granted that the current trough in the cycle will soon give way to 
a new peak of opportunity. However, a half century after the last peak, as we wait patiently for 
the next peak in the cycle of political opportunity, I am struck by the lack of serious evidence for 
the cyclical assumption.4 Observers of political opportunity cycles seem to take for granted not 
just the existence of the cycle but also the proximity of new opportunities.5 By contrast, instead 
of beginning with an assumption of cyclical constraints, I have taken a more systematic 
American political development approach that examines patterns of change across time. Those 
patterns may be cyclical, but they may also be constant, progressive, or something less orderly. 
                                                           
3 To be clear, I consider myself a political opportunity theorist, though I am skeptical about the concept of 
cycles of contention.  I don’t consider the cyclical dynamic to be essential of the perspective and believe 
the two ideas are wedded together in large part because Sid Tarrow’s foundational work argues for both. 
4 The situation strikes me as reminiscent of waiting for the second coming of Christ: not only do most 
Americans assume Christ will eventually return to earth, but a 2010 PEW Research Center Survey found 
that 47% of the faithful (equal to 41% of Americans) assumed his return will happen in their lifetimes. 
There is a natural bias to assume we live in special times and it is difficult to project important positive 
events into the distant future (conversely, it is easy to project negative events such as global warming into 
the distant future). If all we are saying in the language of cycles is that eventually in the next century or 
two we are likely to see a period of heightened protest, then perhaps such a theory offers us little traction 
for understanding contemporary movement politics.  
5 Tarrow essentially argues that contention spreads like a fire, as information, tactics, and frames spread 
across activists of various movements, but eventually burn out as activist elements become 
institutionalized and/or exhausted and the broader society increasingly desires a return to order. The fuel 
burned away in the conflagration and a new peak relies on a new generation of activists and organizations 
(Tarrow, 2011, p. Ch.9). But nothing in this explanation predicts that new waves of contention will 
emerge. They are assumed as something of a natural political phenomenon, which runs counter to the 
basic spirit of political opportunity theory. It seems reasonable to me that a political system might very 
well fall into a pattern of controlled burns that undercut rise and fall of contentious politics and leave a 
more steady and enduring environment of political constraints. 
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 In this project, I have identified three patterns of political development that seem to be 
present across American history. The first is a constant pattern of building structural constraints, 
which use laws, rules, and norms to restrict movement activity. The second is a cyclical pattern 
of political inflation, in which new types of power are innovated by movements but gradually 
coopted and absorbed into mainstream politics. The third is a progressive pattern of increasing 
institutional thickening, in which the growth of government renders policy more entrenched and 
less dynamic. These three trends are observable across time, and taken together suggest 
growing constraints on movement power that are largely not cyclical.  
 My general answer to both above questions is that social movements can and do 
exercise political power of three distinct types, and that movements maximize their influence 
when the types of power are employed in synergistic ways. However, while well-managed 
movements still have opportunities to achieve the policy goals, I find that these opportunities 
are increasingly limited by the three patterns of political development.  
 My research suggests that we should expect movements to innovate new forms of 
power in the future, as they have previously done with pluralist and plebiscitary power. At the 
same time, I raise significant doubts that the American political system can be opened up to 
change to the degree it was in the 1960s. Social movements are facing a constrained future and 
I would suggest they hone their power strategies to make the most of those realities.  
 
 The remainder of this dissertation is laid out as follows: 
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 Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical groundwork of the project, beginning with a look at 
the concept of “power” in the political theory literature, with special attention to the American 
tradition of democratic theory from Madison to Rawls. I adopt an approach to power that draws 
heavily on Robert Dahl and Bachrach & Baratz, arguing for a definition of power as the exercise 
of force and/or agenda control over political opposition. After defining power, I move on to 
argue for my three types of power framework—pluralist, plebiscitary, and disruptive—showing 
how they build on literatures in social movement theory, American politics, and policy process 
theory. Finally, I draw on the American political development literature to argue for three 
patterns of institutional development—the constant pattern of structural constraints, the 
cyclical pattern of political inflation, and the progressive pattern of institutional thickening—that 
together increasingly constrain movement opportunities. 
 Chapters 3-5 address disruptive, pluralist, and plebiscitary power respectively, with each 
chapter considering structural constraints, political inflation, and institutional thickening. In each 
case I use empirical data covering the broad spectrum of contemporary movements, combined 
with system wide analysis of public laws and Supreme Court cases. I argue that disruptive power 
is especially impacted by structural constraints like police procedures and anti-terrorism law, but 
resistant to political inflation because status quo forces have difficulty coopting disruptive 
tactics; plebiscitary power is especially vulnerable to political inflation because of the increasing 
flood of information across various media sources; and pluralist power is heavily subject to both 
structural constraints like IRS regulations and political inflation like increases in the cost of 
political campaigns. I show that institutional thickening impacts each type of power in similar 
ways because it reduces the spare time and resources policymakers have to address new issues. 
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 Chapters 6 & 7 apply the power framework to four important contemporary social 
movements: LGBT Rights, Anti-Abortion, Disability Rights, and Animal Rights. For each 
movement, I analyze the power strategies used across different periods of movement activity, 
paying special to the three patterns of political development and interactions between the three 
different types of power. I draw a number of ancillary conclusions about how movement power 
functions, including that different types of power can be employed in ways that are either 
synergistic or in conflict with one another. Successful movements tend to avoid conflicts, 
particularly disruptive and plebiscitary tactics that undercut movement messaging or 
organizational reputations. Importantly, I also show that LGBT and Anti-Abortion activists 
maximized their power resources in ways that Disability and Animal Rights activists have not. 
Thus we see that while all movements are significantly constrained by institutional trends, 
organizational agency still plays a large role in determining movement success or failure.  
 Chapter 8 concludes by summarizing the previous chapters’ findings, speculating on 
future developments in movement power, and laying out future avenues for research. In 
particular, I consider the cyclical nature of the political inflation pattern, which predicts that the 
cooption of plebiscitary power by political insiders heralds the development of a new type of 
political power. In all likelihood, the seeds of such development are already in play, and I 
consider a few potential contenders, chief amongst them are the use of international coalitions 
within causes that magnify movement strength by pitting global activists against national 
institutions and domestic alliances across causes that seek to gain control over major party 
nominations. 
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“To assume that this country has remained 
democratic because of its Constitution seems to 
me an obvious reversal of the relation; it is 
much more plausible to suppose that the 
Constitution has remained because our society 
is essentially democratic.” 
-Robert Dahl, A Preface To Democratic Theory 
 
“[T]he strong do what they have the power to 
do and the weak accept what they have to 
accept.”  
-Thucydides, The Melian Dialogue 
 
“Innovations in form and method can provide 
political advantages to otherwise disadvantaged 
groups. Initial advantages may flow from the 
capacity of new forms of organizing to disrupt 
taken-for-granted procedures or from tactical 
innovation that exploit new opportunities or 
help to mobilize new resources.” 
-Elizabeth Clemens, The People’s Lobby 
 
Chapter 2: Theory 
 
 This dissertation wears many hats. At times it fits squarely into the core “how do 
movements matter?” social movement literature, which is mostly a political sociology literature. 
At others it seems clearly a work of American political development, identifying patterns of 
institutional change. And in yet other sections it engages First Amendment doctrine in sustained 
public law analysis. Each of these characterizations is a key piece of the whole. But at its heart 
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this is a work of democratic theory. It is a work about how political power is exercised in 
American democracy and how changes in power distribution impact the health of American 
democracy. While the subsequent chapters attempt to be descriptive in addressing the 
normative claims of particular movements, and avoid taking sides in substantive debates, the 
foundation of my work is the normative view that social movements play an essential and 
valuable role in the operation and maintenance of democracy, and specifically American 
democracy.  
 I see this project as part of a rich tradition in American politics and political science of 
intertwining normative democratic theory and empirical institutional analysis, reaching back to 
the American Revolution and beyond. Most notably, The Federalist Papers and the writings of 
James Madison are considered to be both an authoritative account of the design and function of 
the US Constitution, as well as a theoretical account of the meaning of American democracy. 
“Madisonian democracy” has become shorthand for institutional designs that seek enduring 
solutions to the fundamental political conflict between the right of majorities to rule and the 
right of minorities to be secure in their fundamental liberties. It is a democratic theory that 
recognizes political equality and individual liberty must be balanced, and that institutional 
design is at the heart of maintaining and cultivating that balance.  
 Mine is a Madisonian project, a project that asks how we can maximize the will of the 
people without falling victim to the tyranny of the majority. Mine is a project that asks, what fills 
the space between acquiescence and revolution? What is the recourse of minorities that judge 
political institutions to be unbalanced in favor of the majority? What are the minorities to do 
when their essential interests are denied by the casual (or spiteful) preferences of the majority 
(Dahl’s “problem of intensity of preference”)? The Madisonian project has struggled to 
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articulate stable solutions to such perennial issues. My contention is that the solution is to be 
found in healthy social movements with ample and varied sources of political opportunity.  
 But what constitutes ample and varied sources of movement opportunity? It’s a 
question not easily answered. Some guideposts we may find helpful are previous historical 
periods where strong pushes for social and political change were met by relatively open or 
closed political systems. For America’s most enduring subject of social conflict, race, we can 
consider the antebellum years running up to the civil war, and the era of civil rights reform in 
the 1950s and 1960s. I would suggest that in the years preceding the Civil War, America lacked 
openness to minority contention, leading to a breakdown in commitment to the political 
system, and ultimately to rebellion.6 Dahl stresses that “the constitutional system did not work 
when it finally encountered, in slavery, an issue that temporarily undermined some of the main 
social prerequisites” that tied together the pluralist forces of American democracy (Dahl, 1956, 
p. 143).7 Conversely, I believe the 1960s represent a period of openness when dramatic and 
largely peaceful change was possible.8 It seems clear to me that a political system that invites 
change, like we saw in in the 1960s, is preferable to one that produces rebellion and revolution, 
                                                           
6 For example, the Gag Rule in Congress prevented consideration of abolitionist petitions. Southern states 
banned advocacy of abolition in speech, press, and through the mail. The Missouri Compromise 
attempted to permanently shelve the issue of slavery by removing the principle venues of activist 
contention: decisions over the status of new States and territories. And most notably, the Taney Court’s 
Dred Scott decision sought to remove issues of black citizenship from all democratic control.  
7 Dahl further makes the interesting claim that the ante-bellum United States is perhaps history’s clearest 
example of social agreement on core social principles except for on the question of race and slavery. This 
is perhaps overstated to the extent that disputes over federalism contained an element independent of 
the slavery question, but the point I wish to make is that failure to resolve the challenge of minority 
oppression is perhaps the greatest threat to the health and survival of democracy. 
8 The 1960s are generally held up as the principle modern example of openness in the American politics. 
See Tarrow’s account in the ch. 9 of Power in Movement (Tarrow, 2011). “Largely peaceful” is a relative 
phrase, which I contrast to episodes like Bloody Kansas and the Civil War itself. The civil rights movement 
was a period of significant turmoil and contestation that nevertheless avoided war, rebellion, or the 
breakdown of governing institutions and broader rule of law. There were certainly riots and violence 
against activists, but the polity bent without breaking and made concessions to avoid revolution. 
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and I will argue that we should aim toward a system that either offers regular robust 
opportunities for movement influence or less regular but more dramatic opportunities. The 
absence of both types of opportunity is a threat to democracy and to stability. This is both a 
moral and practical argument about what we should value as a democracy. 
 The political environment today appears to be somewhere between the two extremes 
of being ideally open and unacceptably closed, as most observers would agree that movement 
influence in American politics has substantially declined since the heyday of the 60s & 70s (Piven 
F. F., 2006) (Tarrow, 2011). But does this decline in influence constitute a democratic deficit for 
outsiders? Is it temporary or cyclical? Is it driven by institutional patterns, or is it simply the 
result of fewer outsiders with less pressing social and political grievances? This dissertation 
seeks to answer these questions, concluding that opportunities for movement power are indeed 
closing, and there is good reason to worry about the long term future of dissent in American 
democracy. I believe the institutional space for effective dissent is not simply at the low point of 
a cyclical process, but instead, the evidence suggests an increasingly constrained future. By 
understanding how movement power functions and what developmental trends limit it, we can 
better prepare for these changes and make informed decisions about institutional reforms that 
support the vital role of outsider politics in our democracy.  
 
 In the rest of this chapter I look first at theories of democracy, including the work of 
Locke, Madison, Calhoun, Dahl, Rawls, and Iris Young. I argue that Dahl’s emphasis on the social 
prerequisites of democracy is critical, but that these social conditions are mediated by 
institutional factors. In the case of marginalized minority interests, I argue that in a functional 
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democracy those institutional factors need to be sufficiently open to the influence of intense 
minorities seeking change.  
 I next consider the concept of power, focusing first on the three faces of power—face, 
agenda control, and ideology—and explaining why I limit my analysis to the first two faces. I 
argue that a combination of analytic (force) and social (agendas) approaches to power is the 
most useful for considering movements in the context of American political institutions. While I 
also briefly consider more postmodern perspectives on power, I ultimately find them interesting 
but untenable in this analysis. In addition, I consider whether power should be viewed as 
conflictual and/or consensual, as well as in terms of exercise and/or capacity. I opt for a view 
limited to the former choices. In doing so I end up with a definition of power as the exercise of 
force and/or agenda control over political opposition.  
 From here, I consider a typology of movement power, identifying three types of 
power—disruptive, pluralist, plebiscitary—that I argue provide a solid framework for 
operationalizing our theoretical understanding of outsider power. I explain how my framework 
draws inspiration from the work of Stephen Skowronek and the broader presidential power 
literature, as well as how my approach fits into the social movement literature. Social 
movement theory is not always the most contiguous area of study, but one of its basic questions 
is: do movements matter, and if so, how? I argue that the literature on this topic often lacks 
specific mechanisms of movement influence, in part because so little of movement literature 
considers American political institutions and the policy process. My approach seeks to remedy 
that weakness.  
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 Finally, I consider movement power in terms of political opportunity theory. I argue that 
instead of a cyclical approach focused on cycles of contention, movement opportunities are best 
understood as constrained by three patterns of American political development—enduring 
structural barriers, political inflation, and institutional thickening—which frame the most 
important conclusions of my project. I argue that these patterns identify “durable [shifts] in 
government authority” that have profound repercussions for social movements and American 
democracy (Orren & Skowrone, 2004). In addition, I argue that my insights about social 
movements should reshape our views on American political development and what drives major 
changes in how political power is exercised in American political institutions. My contention is 
that movements develop new power strategies and resources that are then co-opted by the 
system’s major institutional players. As such, movement innovation should be a key focus for 
those of us interested in how American institutions may undergo significant transitions. I return 
to considering potential current and future institutional shifts in the dissertation’s final chapter.  
 
Democracy and Social Movements 
 On the face of things social movements are not democratic forces.9 Rather, they are 
sustained pushes by the losers in the democratic process to reverse social and political 
outcomes. They are the recourse for groups who have lost through traditional democratic 
channels and feel unfettered democracy is oppressive, or at least not liberating. In some part, 
                                                           
9 The obvious exceptions are cases where powerful elite minorities dominate the social and political 
landscape, as was the case in some southern states during slavery and Jim crow, or in cases where 
minorities utilize super majoritarian rules to block change. In these cases social movements may 
represent the interests of a majority of citizens. In such cases movements are democratic forces because 
they are struggling against undemocratic government. 
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they are a corrective to democracy. Of course, few political theorists would suggest that “best 
democracy” and “most democratic polity” are the same things. There is a long tradition of 
handwringing in political theory over the excesses of democracy. Aristotle famously classified 
democracy as the degenerate form of republican government, in which the numerical majority’s 
unfettered power breaks down the limits imposed by constitutional government, itself a less 
than idea form of government for Aristotle (The Politics, Book V). This fear of democratic excess 
carried through to the framers, who largely shunned the word “democracy” when advocating 
their new republic in works like the Federalist Papers.10 
 But what exactly is the problem with rule by an unfettered popular will? It begs the 
question to simply call it “unbalanced” or “excessive.” From Aristotle to Madison, the real heart 
of this fear of democracy has been worry over the abuse of the rich at the hands of the 
numerous poor. In his most well know work, Federalist 10, Madison stresses that “the most 
common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of 
property.” However, Madison’s Federalist 10 does also address sectarian religious passions and 
in doing so opens up consideration of more modern and progressive concerns over “tyranny of 
the majority.” That is to say, Madison offers some consideration to the problem of social or 
cultural majorities oppressing marginalized minority groups.11 And more generally, Madison’s 
abstract formulation of the problem of minority rights, regardless of the social divisions that 
most concerned him, is so well stated that it continues to resonate today with students of 
                                                           
10 Madison refers “pure democracy” as having a number of failings, but most centrally having “no cure for 
the mischiefs of faction.” 
11 Of course Madison’s willful avoidance of racial oppression in this context should be noted. 
 17
democratic theory and American Constitutionalism. In Federalist 51, Madison states bluntly, “If 
a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”12 
 An argument can be made that Madison’s work, particularly Federalist 10 & 51, provides 
the ideal mix of theory and practice in considering how a democratic polity can pursue both 
justice and stability. Madison’s approach recognizes that the concept of democracy contains an 
inherent conflict between equality and liberty, and that these values can be balanced in a 
number of theoretically acceptable ways. Instead of seeking some ideal mix of liberty and 
equality (democracy), Madison essentially argues that how those concepts are balanced should 
be decided largely in favor of producing stability.13 That is to say, in facing questions of justice in 
which there is no single abstract best answer, Madison points out that pragmatic theorists and 
statesmen should side with political and social institutions that shield democracy from 
corruption, degeneration, and decay.14 Institutions that prevented democracy from sliding into 
tyranny can thus be seen as the best democratic institutions, regardless of whether they tip the 
scales slightly toward liberty or toward equality. In this vein, Madison considers not simply the 
constitutional design of the institutional separation of powers and checks and balances, but also 
innovative ideas like expanding the geographic size of a polity.  
 Madison believed that the size and diversity of the American nation would fragment 
“factions” into manageable sizes and prevent their coalition into stable majorities capable of 
sustaining the systematic exploitation of minorities (Federalist 10). The importance of “a large 
                                                           
12 And realistically, to the challenge of fitting our values to the institutional designs produced by politics 
and compromise. 
13 By contrast, John Locke’s approach in his Second Treatise on Government seeks a more exact 
formulation by attributing certain liberties to God given natural law, asserting that they must be accepted 
in an acceptably just society, and rendering all other matters subject to majority rule. 
14 In addition to Federalist 10 & 51, see also Federalist 37 on the practical difficulties of balancing different 
virtues at the Constitutional Convention, Federalist 63 on the decline of Sparta, Rome and Carthage.  
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republic” in Madison’s thought should not be underestimated because while checks and 
balances might prevent degeneration of the nation’s political institutions, they did not in 
themselves prevent a permanent occupation of the seats of power by the same unified majority 
interest. Of course the development of national political parties and improvements in 
communication technology (like roads) quickly rendered Madison’s limited social checks defunct 
by allowing diverse American social groups to form stable and enduring political coalitions. The 
idea was innovative, brilliant and ultimately wrong.15 Still, Madison’s focus on designing and 
nurturing social checks on institutional power is perhaps the defining contribution of his political 
thought. 
 The practical failings of Madison’s theory and design for the social control of factions 
gave direct rise to the political theory of John C. Calhoun and the crisis of nullification.16 
Calhoun’s Disquisition on Government follows Madison’s work as the major modern political 
theories produced by American thinkers, arguing that Madison’s scheme to control factions was 
doomed to failure, because the existence of government itself inevitably “[divides] the 
community into two great classes” (Calhoun, 1992). Calhoun’s arguments in many ways 
anticipated Marx’s work on class, but in Calhoun’s America politics was fundamentally divided 
between the interests of the free soil industrialist North that clashed with those of the slave-
                                                           
15 It is worth noting that Madison’s theory of the large republic cut sharply against the tradition of 
democratic theory, most notably Rousseau and Montesquieu, but including virtually all 
democratic/republican thought. I point this out to stress how truly revolutionary Madison’s position (and 
the founding of the American republic) truly were, but also to stress Madison’s willingness to consider 
more intricate interactions between social and institution design.  
16 Notably, Calhoun’s doctrine of nullification is substantially similar to Madison’s support for “State 
interposition” in his Virginia Resolution of 1798, as well as Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution of 1798. 
Calhoun praised Madison’s support for State’s rights in refusing to enforce the Adam’s administration’s 
Alien and Sedition Acts, and was dismayed by Madison’s refusal to extend this support to the broader 
doctrine of nullification later in life. 
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holding agrarian South.17 Calhoun’s proposed solution to this problem was to alter constitutional 
mechanisms to give a decisive advantage to the minority, or as he called it, the “concurrent 
majority.” Calhoun proposed giving the minority a negative, a veto, over all policymaking 
decisions. In practice, he proposed the States be the vehicle of this theory, embracing the 
concept that states could “nullify” federal policies within their borders, an idea first floated by 
Madison and Jefferson in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799. 
 Calhoun’s theory is a clear theoretical heir to Madisonian democracy—he “out-
Madisoned Madison” in Dahl’s words—but an heir rendered illegitimate by its thinly veiled 
allegiance to perpetuating the slavery of millions of African-Americans, a minority conveniently 
ignored in Calhoun’s calculus of two great national interests.1819 Like Marx after him, Calhoun's 
                                                           
17 Richard Hofstadter calls Calhoun “The Marx of the Master Class” and stresses that Calhoun’s 
disquisition emphasizes a basic economic division in society between those who extract value and those 
from whom value is extracted. Calhoun asserts that this basic division cannot be eliminated so long as the 
State exists, and therefore majoritarian democracy will always be reduced to a kind of group (class) 
warfare. Hofstadter calls Calhoun the Marx of the master class because Calhoun argued that 
contemporary US policy extracted from southern agricultural interests, which were dominated by the 
southern slavocracy. Thus while the logic of the arguments are similar, Marx and Calhoun identify with 
classes that are fundamentally at odds. 
18 A Preface to Democratic Theory (pp. 29-30). Dahl asserts that Madison is America’s greatest democratic 
thinker, but that his fear of mass democracy and majority tyranny lead to Calhoun as their purest 
expression. Dahl writes that that Calhoun identifies “a fundamental element in American ideology” (FN35, 
p29). However, Dahl laments this element as Madison’s fundamental blunder, and notes that Calhoun’s 
“doctrine of concurrent majorities seems to me prone to all the weaknesses of the Madisonian system, 
which in many respects it parallels” (FN37, p30). So to clarify, while Dahl is no fan of Calhoun, he 
recognized the centrality of Calhoun’s theory to American political thought.  
It is interesting to note that Dahl’s pervasive concern with “pseudo-democratization” in works like How 
Democratic is the US Constitution? is rhetorically very similar to Calhoun’s critique of the “numerical 
majority” (Union and Liberty, 25, 35). Dahl argues that contemporary plebiscitary politics give the false 
appearance of being more democratic than representational democracy, but fails to fulfill the underlying 
principles of democracy. Of course he rejected the concurrent majority or consociational democracy as 
reasonable solutions. 
19 Race is only alluded to in two sections of the Disquisition. First, Calhoun makes the claim that freedom is 
only a good for those with the character to make use of it. He writes, “No people, indeed, can long enjoy 
more liberty than that to which their situation and advanced intelligence and morals fairly entitle them.” 
(p.42) For “ignorant, degraded, and vicious” peoples like barbarians and black slaves, Calhoun claims too 
much freedom invites self-destruction and anarchy. Following Aristotle and the “Great Chain of Being” 
tradition, Calhoun asserts that only likes should be treated alike, as least in terms of liberty. Then, without 
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unwavering commitment to a political world defined by a single divide simply does not seem to 
capture our modern pluralist world, where class, race, gender, religion, disability, and other 
identities create significant social and political cleavages. However, Calhoun's basic insights 
about the justice of giving minorities a constitutionally proscribed veto remain theoretically 
powerful. Indeed, Iris Marian Young reformulated this approach to minority rights as “deep 
democracy” in Justice and the Politics of Difference, arguably the most significant contribution to 
late twentieth-century democratic (and/or feminist) theory. Young's call for special 
representation for minority groups, and specifically a veto over policy concerning each group, is 
in many ways a progressive pluralist version of Calhoun's philosophy.20  
 The Calhoun-Young response to Madison rejects the idea that social forces alone can be 
harnessed to prevent majority tyranny, and doubles down on the goal of building institutional 
protections for minorities into the checks and balances of constitutional design. While I have a 
healthy respect for this approach, I believe it suffers from some serious flaws. First, the 
multiplying of vetoes threatens to further choke a political system that arguably already lacks 
sufficient democratic responsiveness.21 It's difficult to get much done in the American system, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
discussing how it is to be accomplished, Calhoun asserts that such populations must be paternalistically 
prepared for greater freedoms, but that “the progress of a people rising from a lower to a higher point in 
the scale of liberty, is necessarily slow.” (p.43) Calhoun’s point is not difficult to grasp: slavery is best for 
the inferior black race, and we should not expect that to change anytime soon. Why continued slavery will 
bring uplift, and not further degradation, remains unexplained. 
20 In his recent book Calhoun and Popular Rule, Lee Cheek notes that theorists concerned with minority 
rights and power have repeatedly returned to Calhoun, and offers the example of Stokely Carmichael 
reading the Disquisition approvingly from a black power perspective (p.22).  Yet Cheek is unable to offer 
an example that is either more contemporary or more systematic. Indeed, I have not uncovered any 
political or social thinker of minority rights invoking Calhoun. Most interestingly, neither Lani Guinier nor 
Iris Young engage with Calhoun in developing their own democratic theories, which both advance rights 
of minority veto or group representation.  
21 America’s bifurcated legislature and independent executive are undeniably less democratically 
responsive than parliamentary systems like the UK’s. Throw in federalism, staggered elections, the 
filibuster, and an independent Supreme Court exercising judicial review, and it’s easy to see why the US 
system is often considered a recipe for gridlock. Today’s political polarization and relatively even support 
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and it seems likely that new veto points might produce unrelenting gridlock. Second, the 
institutionalization of these protections for newly recognized groups seems to presuppose those 
groups have already mustered the influence to assert their status. Certainly one might prescribe 
mechanisms for identifying deserving minority groups and the policy issues germane to their 
interests, but it seems such issues of recognition and ownership are inevitably reducible to 
exercises of power.22 And third, this focus on institutional representation inherently favors 
negative power when most minorities groups are generally looking for positive change. The 
ability to stop new policies that abuse one's group is of limited value when status quo public 
policy already abuses one's group. These three reasons—more than for the blanket complaints 
over the "practicality" of such complicated constitutional designs—lead me to favor a second 
heir to the Madisonian tradition. 
 Robert Dahl is unquestionably one of James Madison's biggest fans, but at the same 
time, one of his harshest critics. In his Preface to Democratic Theory, Dahl stresses that 
Madison's writings were brilliant political polemics that birthed and sustain America’s political 
culture, but as political theory he finds Madison’s work somewhat lacking in rigor and clarity. He 
writes, “as political science rather than ideology the Madisonian system is clearly inadequate” 
(31). Indeed, he points out that Madison's Federalist 10 & 51 persuasively argue against the 
efficacy of written constitutional prohibitions in checking the growth of tyrannical factions, yet 
his large and diverse republic provides an undertheorized solution that was patently false. He 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for the two parties only serves to highlight the check points built into the US system. See Mann & 
Ornstein, 2016 for a front row seat of how this process is playing out in Congress and American politics. 
22 Indeed, I would argue that feminist political theory has become mired in unproductive battles over 
voice and representation, with Marxists like Nancy Hartsock and liberals like Susan Okin and Martha 
Nussbaum attempting to represent “women’s” interests while intersectional and postmodern theorists 
like Judith Butler seek to problematize the category of “woman” (and increasingly all subcategories like 
“black women” “gay women” “third world women” etc.).  
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argues that Madison’s system ultimately fails because “tyranny” remains an ambiguous term (7), 
faction has no coherent meaning (25), and the separation of powers and institutional checks 
have proven neither necessary nor effective in protecting minorities (22). The conflict between 
equality and liberty remains unsolved. But where Calhoun sought to bolster Madisonian 
institutions, Dahl sought to shed new light on the social prerequisites of democracy that relies 
on “social checks and balances” and a “social separation of powers” (83).  
 In Dahl’s view, even the best constitutional system is dependent on the commitment of 
the citizenry to participate and respect the results of the institutional process. Democratic 
institutions work when all the major social and political players value liberty and equality, but 
moreover, they work when those players believe that working through the system offers them 
opportunities to win. A functional democratic system must “adapt to fit the changing social 
balance of power” and incorporate new groups, as Dahl argues the US system did successfully 
with Jacksonian expansion of suffrage (143). The social focus argues that one could not simply 
transplant a functional constitution like that of the United States to a nation like Iraq or 
Afghanistan and expect it to function in the absence of democratic norms and traditions. 
Conversely, one could expect that American democratic norms and traditions would be strong 
enough to sustain a functional democracy under any number of constitutions. An ancillary 
conclusion based on the first two, is that America’s constitution may be far from optimal, a 
conclusion Dahl has pressed in works like How Democratic is the US Constitution? (spoiler: 
Dahl’s answer is not democratic enough).23 
                                                           
23 The social prerequisite view appears to draw support for comparative studies of democratization, which 
have found that countries without strong democratic commitments and an educated citizenry almost 
universally fail to sustain democratic transitions. See Mansfield and Snyder’s Democratic Transitions, 
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  Dahl’s view of democracy finds that a constitution errs when it “[distributes]…benefits 
and handicaps to the wrong groups.” Constitutional rules are at their best when they preserve 
and strengthen the preexisting social harmony between social groups, and at worst when they 
subvert the commitment of citizens to the "normal American political process" (143). The later 
happens when rules stack the deck for the “wrong groups” whose influence is already outsized. 
For Dahl, democratic social harmony is based upon broad agreement between the various 
segments of society over basic core values, institutions, and policies. The Constitution and a 
society’s political institutions best serve democracy when they don't overly advantage the 
strong and disadvantage the weak, insuring "a high probability that an active and legitimate 
group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of 
decision (145)." Indeed, Dahl concludes that the American system's main virtues are that its 
diffused power and multitude of policy venues do a remarkable job allowing most interests a 
foothold in the policymaking process, and moreover, that the America "is not a static system" 
and has evolved to offer new institutional avenues to accommodate the growing strength of 
previously marginalized political elements.24  
 Here is the point were Madison and the Framers, Dahl's polyarchical social democracy, 
and my own work come together. All of us believe a—if not the—main function of an effective 
democratic system is to channel conflict into political channels that produce peace, justice, and 
stability. As movement theorist David Meyer puts it in The Politics of Protest,  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Institutional Strength, and War (2002) for a perspective that seems increasingly correct in the wake of the 
failures of the Arab Spring.  
24 Dahl's major work on American pluralism, Who Governs?, documents the political coalitions that 
dominate discrete policy areas in New Haven Connecticut, and is essentially an extended argument that in 
America any group with a passionate interest in a specific policy area can, and often do, have an outsized 
role in policymaking on their core issues. 
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In essence, the Madisonian design was all about institutionalizing dissent, bringing 
political conflict into the government in order to confine the boundaries of claims that 
activists might make and to invite partisans to struggle using conventional political 
means rather than taking up arms or opting out of the system. The Theory was that 
conflict inside government is preferable to conflict between the government as a 
whole and dissenters (Meyer, 19). 
 
While Madison and Dahl are primarily concerned with the inclusion of "legitimate" political 
players in the political process, Dahl also notes that the system should insure that groups 
"excluded from the normal political arena by prohibitions against normal activity may 
nevertheless gain entry (138)." Dahl notes that these groups may employ "abnormal" political 
activity, such as violence, "threaten to deprive groups already within the arena of their 
legitimacy" or "acquire legitimacy" themselves and become incorporated into the mainstream 
political system (138). Notwithstanding, there is a significant  parallel between Dahl's three 
options and my own three sources of movement power. Violence can be disruptive, plebiscitary 
appeals are certainly tied to the legitimacy of opponents, and pluralist power is a 
straightforward attempt to join the normal political process.  
 Dahl is especially concerned with how the system adapts to incorporate new interests, 
as it did when the Jacksonian revolution in the franchise brought masses of unpropertied males 
into the system. Such institutional shifts are, in Dahl's mind, crucial for the maintenance of 
democracy. But Dahl only skirts this topic briefly, saving most of his concerns for "legitimate" 
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social interests. In this respect, my project attempts to flesh out part of the democratic system 
already addressed in the canon of American democratic theory, but addressed incompletely. My 
contention is that to secure peace, justice, and stability a democratic system must offer effective 
political opportunities for marginal interests to impact policy and eventually become 
incorporated into the mainstream political process. And to the extent that those opportunities 
are not present, a democratic polity risks its legitimacy, prosperity, and security. Before I can 
argue that America has seen a troubling closing of such opportunities in recent decades, I first 
need to ask by what standard we might judge a system too closed. 
 The first response, one I touch upon at the beginning of this chapter, is that we may 
consider openness and closeness as relative terms within the spectrum of American historical 
experience. Specifically, we might consider the late antebellum period to be unacceptably 
closed to outside challengers and the 1960s as successfully open to contentious challengers. The 
basic idea here is that the former period failed to secure peace, justice, or stability for the 
nation, resulting in a bloody civil war. By contrast, the 1960s saw movements for race, gender, 
peace, and environmental justice accommodated and pacified by a system that bent instead of 
breaking. Perhaps a more closed system could have weathered those challenges equally well, 
but I find it far more compelling to view the period as successfully resolving both long simmering 
grievances of race and gender, as well as emerging new social problems like pollution and 
nuclear proliferation. In each case, movements found homes in the political parties and US 
bureaucratic structures, which were able to adapt and stabilize in more inclusive arrangements. 
In this light, more openness seems the healthier social option.25 
                                                           
25 Conversely, the rise of Nixon's "silent majority" and the push for law and order politics could be judged 
as evidence that the system was too open to minority challengers, resulting in a less-than-optimal 
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 It is interesting to consider if a political climate more open to political challenge than 
that of the 1960s might be detrimental to peace, justice, and stability. On its face, I'm inclined to 
say, yes, at some point a political system too open to challenges by outspoken minorities would 
likely become volatile and erratic and vulnerable to mass support for authoritarianism and/or 
demagoguery. However, a major premise of this study is that American democracy is by design, 
and by happenstance, resistant to policy change.26 That is to say, America’s standing bias toward 
its radical elements is largely conservative, making the question of a “too open” system more 
theoretically interesting than a practical normative concern. 
 The second response is to consider more abstractly what standards of openness our 
institutions should meet. A useful starting point for such inquiry is John Rawls’s Original 
Position.27 Rawls famously argues that a just set of political institutions are those that would be 
agreed to by a citizen placed under a “veil of ignorance” that prevented her from knowing her 
place in society (Rawls, 1999, p. 118). That is to say, a citizen unaware of her race, class, gender, 
and so forth, would chose a distribution or rights and privileges she viewed as fair to any 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sequence of progressive leaps and regressive retrenchment. Or alternatively, the conservative perspective 
might legitimately accuse me of silently inserting progressive values into this analysis, and might argue 
left forces can and should have been more fully repressed. However, I have argued that accommodating 
changing social norms is among the greatest virtues of a democracy. It’s a normative claim I embrace 
openly.  
26 This has been a major strain of critique running through American political science from mid-century 
calls by the American Political Science Association to adopt strong parliamentary style parties, to 
persistent concerns over divided government and party polarization, to longstanding criticisms of Senate 
representation, the Electoral College, the filibuster, and other anti-democratic elements of the American 
political system. As mentioned earlier, Dahl’s How Democratic is the US Constitution? sums up many of 
the perennial issues, and it is a basic assumption of most introductory undergraduate texts on American 
Politics. But see also the policy literature, such as Pressman and Wildavsky’s work Implementation on 
federal economic development policy in Oakland, which argues it is a miracle that our system 
accomplishes any of our policy goals Invalid source specified.. 
27 One reason I favor Rawls, as will be made clear later, is that his normative theory of justice is routed in 
the social contract tradition in a way that minimizes the idea of an actual historical contract, while still 
incorporating the idea that we might not cooperate with a supposedly democratic polity if we woke up in 
it and assessed it to be organized by unfair principles. In a sense movements are composed of individuals 
who have “woken up” or as they often say had their “eyes opened.”   
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particular citizen, because that citizen might be her. Rawls himself argues that two principles 
would be chosen to guide the design of just institutions. First, basic rights would be universally 
protected, and second, institutions would be arranged to maximize the welfare of the least well 
off (TJ, 53). Enough ink has been spilled over whether Rawls’s two principles would actually be 
chosen in the original position, and I won’t seek to resolve the long-standing debate in a few 
paragraphs. That said, it seems to me both Rawls’s thought experiment, and the principles he 
believes follow, have special purchase on the topic of minority politics.  
 Consider from the perspective of the Original Position that you might be an advocate 
against abortion, for animal rights, for LGBT rights, or for disability rights, but that you may also 
support the status quo on any or all of these issues. What principles might you think an 
acceptable foundation for a just democratic polity? Certainly not, “the minority always gets its 
way, including a general veto on public policy it opposes.” That was Calhoun’s answer, but it is 
one that seems incompatible with the idea that one might be a member of the majority in a 
democratic polity. Such a system defeats the core goals of collective action highlighted by the 
social contract tradition. At the same time, one would presumably not choose a system of pure 
majority rule, in which the issues most central to one’s social and political identity were 
completely vulnerable to the whims of 51% of voters. It seems a middle ground would be 
preferable, but just what middle ground? 
 Rawls’s two principles give us a good place to start. The first principle states that all 
citizens (and groups of citizens by extension) are to have the same basic rights, including rights 
of speech, assembly, voting, due process and access to the courts (TJ, 53). These rights protect 
the basic contours of the democratic process by ensuring that everyone can participate in the 
marketplace of ideas and can make use of electioneering, lobbying, and litigating. This first 
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principle provides an excellent starting point, but as Rawls himself recognized, the first principle 
still allows for institutions and policies to be set up in ways that allow for arbitrary advantages, 
which can then be leveraged to create greater and greater inequalities (TJ, 63).28 Consequently, 
Rawls proposes a second principle, the difference principle, in which society’s major institutions 
are designed to promote equality, except where inequality is to the advantage of the least well 
off. In economic terms this principle translates into some form of welfare capitalism or 
democratic socialism (or specifically for Rawls “property owning democracy”).29 The argument 
here is that the masses are better off (that is richer, as Rawls is primarily interested in economic 
justice) in a society that harnesses the productivity of free markets by allowing individuals to 
pursue extra wealth, than they would be in an economy where all financial incentive for 
entrepreneurship is taken away.30 
 So are these two principles adequate in helping us decide the ideal distribution of power 
resources between majorities and minorities? In particular, does the second principle transfer 
from a focus on economic institutions to a focus on political opportunities? For the most part, I 
think both principles apply. The first principle, equal basic rights, is an easy fit. But I think the 
second principle also has a lot of purchase for the distribution of power resources. Power 
                                                           
28 See John Gaventa’s devastating account of the “accumulation of bias” across generations of 
Appalachians for how small inequalities can grow into a near caste system if left uncheckedInvalid source 
specified..  For Rawls, this natural and accumulated wealth is morally arbitrary, and thus unfair. 
29 Rawls introduced the idea of “property-owning democracy” in his revisions for the French edition of A 
Theory of Justice, noting that his ideas had come to be identified with welfare state capitalism, but that he 
really favored a system in which human capital like education was widely dispersed as a way of 
distributing opportunities for wealth, lessoning the need to redistribute wealth to the poor. See Rawls’s 
Preface to the French Edition of TJ (1987) for an explanation of the differences between different 
economic systems (Rawls, 1999). 
30 For example, in terms of taxation, if you raise top tax rates from 70% to 90%, there is arguably reduced 
incentive to work and tax funds plunge below the 70% level, thus less funds are available to redistribute 
to the lower classes. This is not an endorsement of the infamous “Laffer Curve,” which uses this basic 
argument to make specific claims about tax rates and revenue that have not been supported by empirical 
research, and which have been abused politically by advocates of lower and lower tax rates. 
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resources are not evenly distributed across the population, including resources like wealth and 
talent, but extending to social status, legal standing, bureaucratic representation, and other 
institutional areas. It seems reasonable that these resources should be distributed in ways that 
help the weak, but which do not render the system unworkable to the detriment of everyone. 
Calhoun’s concurrent majority system fails the second part of the test by ensuring unrelenting 
gridlock.31 Of course, this brings us to the sticky question of just how we determine whether 
institutions of power are more unequal than they need to be to function well for majority and 
minority alike. It is the kind of question that is troublesome for the original position exactly 
because it is difficult to answer from the position of ignorance. There is likely no easy abstract 
answer. 
 I would argue that the question of minority dissent is one of the most difficult, not 
simply for Rawls, but for social contract theory more generally. Going all the way back to Locke 
and the beginnings of democratic social contract theory, we find the ideas of consent and 
dissent uncomfortably deployed. In his Second Treatise on Government, Locke explains that the 
populace in any democratic state gives their “tacit consent” to the social contract structuring 
their state in three main ways. First they make use of the security, roads, and other public goods 
provided by the state. And second, they decline to exercise their right of exit and leave the 
state; in other words, they vote with their feet. And finally, they don’t overthrow the 
government and dissolve the contract.32 Now, by most accounts these are pretty weak 
                                                           
31 Rawls always stresses that his principles are “lexically ordered” and that the First Principle has primacy 
in cases where the two principles conflict. It should also be stressed that Calhoun’s system offends Rawls’s 
First Principle with respect to the basic political equality of citizens. It might also be noted that comparing 
our principles to our considered convictions on the concurrent majority is a good use of Rawls’s process of 
reflective equilibrium.  
32 At least the second stage of the contract where it the basic agreement for common governance is 
translated into a specific constitutional form. Tacit Consent, Ch. 8, Sec. 119-122. The agreement to form 
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arguments. Using public goods is unavoidable in democracies and dictatorships alike. Exiting a 
state requires abandoning one’s social, cultural, and economics supports and having an open 
and superior international landing spot. And revolution is hard, often bloody, and reliant upon 
significant support from other dissidents. So clearly Locke cannot mean that these three 
conditions are sufficient for showing the social contract is just, and I don’t think he does. Rather, 
Locke leans heavily on his understanding of God-given natural rights as the real standard for 
separating just from unjust societies.33 Such a standard is inevitably messy in application. 
 So from Locke to Rawls we see social contract theory producing strong abstract 
standards for judging a just democratic society—most importantly protections for individual 
liberty and democratic participation—but we see little in the way of procedural safeguards for 
numerical minorities. In practice there seems to clearly be a large gray area where society is not 
irredeemably tyrannical but also not adequately just. That is to say, we get little guidance for 
judging our democratic institutions in the borderline cases where revolution may not be 
warranted, but justice remains elusive. In such cases, I propose that where a minority feels 
public policy is persistently unjust but the constitutional system is overall reasonably just, 
opportunities for effective political action outside majoritarian politics are warranted. These 
opportunities should inflict costs on the majority to maintain the status quo and reward intense 
                                                                                                                                                                             
society, and the tacit consent to join an existing society, are by all accounts irrevocable, but the form of 
the commonwealth may be dissolved if a majority of citizens judge it perverted against the ends for which 
society was originally formed, namely the protection of all citizens’ natural rights.   
33 Locke’s majoritarian bias is magnified by the unique two-part design of his contract. Arguably, 
majoritarian political institutions are “smuggled” into Locke’s theory when he separates the contract to 
form society (stage 1) from the contract that creates government (stage 2). Stage 1 is based on consensus 
norms, and only once society exists as a purely voluntary (but binding) entity does the majority have the 
power to create government (on its own terms) in stage 2. The minority of society is then presented with 
a choice to obey the majority’s government or to (unjustly) revolt and become the enemy of society (and 
God).  In essence, they give up all their leverage by joining society before the rules of government are up 
for discussion. See Ch.8 Sec. 98-9 of The Second Treatise. 
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and sustained effort by dissenters, but they should also leave majorities with the tools to sustain 
policies that are broadly and deeply popular.  
 While these goals may seem a tall order, I believe their practical expression amounts to 
rules that provide dissent a privileged First Amendment position, facilitate political organizing 
and activity by non-nonprofit interest groups, and increase access to America’s major policy 
venues. The Court’s First Amendment doctrine provides a good example of the possibilities. 
Legal theorist Steven Shiffrin has long advocated a “politically centered conception of the First 
Amendment” that takes “dissent, as opposed to content neutrality” as the core value that 
should be protected in free speech cases (Shiffrin, 1999, pp. 10-11).34 Such a stance would shift 
the Supreme Court on many of the cases I deal with in later chapters, but would generally leave 
constitutional jurisprudence intact. For example, a dissent focus would further protect speech 
by movement nonprofits from IRS regulation, while at the same time pushing the Court to 
reverse course on Citizens United and allow greater FEC campaign finance regulation of 
corporations. A second interesting example concerns civil disobedience, which is a classic 
outsider method that imposes severe costs on dissenters, but rewards intense opinions. Police 
policies that both allow and punish civil disobedience create ideal conditions that prevent over-
use of the tactic while enhancing its dramatic impact. By contrast, “safe spaces” and faux-
detainments serve mostly to diffuse conflict and render civil disobedience low-cost and easily 
ignored.35   
                                                           
34 Schiffin argues convincingly that the First Amendment is a cornerstone of American political culture, 
and that a commitment to dissent in our understanding of free speech would ripple throughout our 
political institutions and behavior.  See also Cass Sunstein’s work on dissent, the First Amendment, and 
our political culture Invalid source specified.. 
35 See Rawls on Civil Disobedience, TJ Ch. 6, “Duty and Obligation.” I think his take on it is astute, and I like 
his phrasing of, “dissent at the boundary of fidelity to law” (TJ, 322). I think civil disobedience is important 
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 Favorable conditions for political dissenters do not threaten majoritarian policy when 
the majority is unified, motivated, and attentive, but it opens room for influence when 
majorities are small, fragmented, or largely apathetic. An open system is still one in which the 
majority usually wins, and wins easily, but also one where intensity of opinions matters.36  
  So where does this commitment to minority dissent leave us? What does it look like 
expressed in the terms of democratic theory? It seems unlikely that we’re going to find specific 
institutional solutions between outright majoritarianism and the concurrent mechanism of 
Calhoun and Young. What we are left with are general principle that state: 1) All citizens should 
be guaranteed equal basic social, political, and economic rights, and 2) institutions should be 
structured in ways that facilitate minority power and reward intense dissent, but still allow 
stable majorities to govern.  
 In this project we will encounter many such instances in which such general axioms are 
applicable. As noted, IRS restrictions on political speech by nonprofits clearly do not favor 
minority dissent. In order identify just where and how minority dissent can be facilitated we 
need a broader view of both minority political power and patterns of American political 
development. And this brings us to the theory of power that animates much of this project.  
 
Power 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to social contract theory because it serves as a kind of marker or commentary about the limits of the 
social contract. That is to say, individuals and groups could be interpreted as saying that they would rather 
be in the state of nature than agree to a social contract that included the terms they are protesting. If 
they are willing to give up safety and liberty in their protest, then it seems they might very well reject the 
goods of political society that ground the political community.  
36 See Dahl’s Preface on the problem of intensity. It’s essentially a restatement of the problem of 
minorities, which Dahl struggles to solve. 
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 If there is a core theoretical concept that underlies the discipline of political science, it is 
likely the concept of power. It is a pervasive term used across the subfields of the discipline and 
is a concept more at home in departments of political science than in philosophy, economics, 
sociology or law. Realist political scientist Hans Morgenthau writes, “The concept of interest 
defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into 
the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible”  
(Morgenthau, 1985, p. 5). Morgenthau is suggesting that a common language of power can keep 
political scientists from talking past one another, which is a persistent problem in many fields. 
But as with many widely used terms, power is often an amorphous and undertheorized notion, 
and there is little agreement on Morgenthau’s realist formulation. 
 My own project takes its title “Powerless in Movement” from Sidney Tarrow’s classic 
work Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. One main point I make is 
that Tarrow, and the social movement literature that builds upon his work, does not clearly 
theorize a concept of power or the mechanisms by which it works.  
 A strength of my approach is that it draws on insights from multiple literatures that I 
view as complementary but which are rarely in dialogue with one another. My theorizing of 
power draws on theories of American pluralism and the policy process, as well as a broad 
political theory power literature. This complements a movements literature steeped in 
historically grounded theories of political sociology and American political development. 
Altogether, I feel I construct a theoretical approach that captures both the dynamics of 
contemporary movement politics and explains previous shifts in those dynamics across 
American history. And while I am hesitant to oversell the predictive ability of my theoretic 
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model, I do believe I offer some purchase on the question of what the future holds for the 
power of political outsiders. 
 There are many theoretical issues surrounding the concept of power. Is power present 
in the capacity for influence, or must it be exercised to exist? Is power necessarily conflictual, or 
can it be cooperative and consensual? If you convince someone to change her mind and agree 
with you is this no longer a power relationship, or is it the ultimate power relationship? If your 
ideological commitments are shaped by large social structures, is power being exercised upon 
you and are you powerless if you seek influence based on your false consciousness? These and 
other questions about power are vast and can be maddening because they generally lack 
objectively true answers. But gaining conceptual clarity does make the work of democratic 
political science more practical and impactful. Thus my goal is not to find out what power really 
means, so much as find out what I mean by power.37 
 Beginning with a basic analytic approach to power, such as Dahl’s, we can start by saying 
that A exercises power over B when A makes B act in a way she would not otherwise. When my 
behavior controls your behavior, directly or through the construction of public policy, I am 
powerful and you are weak. We are talking here about power as force, and this is very close to 
                                                           
37 My relationship with the power literature is an odd and conflicted one. When I put on my political 
theorist hat I find myself gravitating to Marxist social theories of power as ideology, including its more 
contemporary feminist and critical race theory offshoots. By contrast, when I put on my Americanist hat, a 
more analytic approach to power seems a far more useful way to describe how the American political 
system functions, or how it should function. Floating in the background are the postmodern approaches, 
which are theoretically somewhat interesting, but which offer minimal practical leverage. At least on the 
surface, it strikes me that seeking a more “complete” understanding of power may be at odds with 
developing a “useful” concept of power. 
 In settling on a definition of power, it seems to me the object is to balance richness with 
usefulness, and to settle on a definition that is honest and transparent. A rich definition of power is 
important because narrow definitions can mask subtle forms of power that serve to normalize the 
oppression of marginal populations. On the other hand, definitions of power with a heavy focus on the 
internalization and normalization of ideas tend to be more useful in critiquing institutional arrangements 
than in understanding how those institutions evolve and how political players navigate them.   
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our commonsense lay use of the term. This is our basic definition of power and it is undeniably 
useful for understanding much of American politics, particularly issues that appear prominently 
in elections and lawmaking. Any view of power that abandons and muddles this core view of 
power as force is likely to be unacceptable for our purposes. But there are approaches that 
usefully expand upon the concept of power as force without undermining it. Here I am thinking 
first and foremost of Bachrach and Baratz’s Two Faces of Power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). 
 The second face of power critique, specifically aimed at Dahl, argues that while the 
exercise of force is clearly an important form of power, there is a second face of power that is 
less easily observed. Bachrach and Baratz remind us that those who favor the status quo can win 
power struggles by simply keeping them off the agenda. That is to say, A exercises power over B 
when B would be able to control A’s behavior in a choice situation, but A prevents that choice 
situation from occurring. By keeping vulnerable issues off of the political agenda, a dominant 
political coalition can win issues they otherwise might lose in a popular vote. Simply put, agenda 
control is a separate and important facet of power that is clearly built into our political 
institutions and processes. By considering both faces of power, force and agenda control, we 
can paint a richer picture of power in the American political process.38 
 Beyond the second face of power we encounter more Marxist traditions and what Lukes 
dubs the third face of power (Lukes, 1974). The third face is ideological power, or what Marxist 
called false consciousness.39 This approach argues that power is pervasive not just in the 
                                                           
38 Agenda focused models of the policy process are increasingly prominent in the field of policy studies. In 
particular, multiple streams models (Kingdon, 1995) and punctuated equilibrium models (Baumgartner & 
Jones, Agendas and Instability, 2009) have made a compelling case that periodic shifts in attention and 
issue framing are responsible for the most interesting moments in American politics.  
39 While Marx never explicitly used this phrase, it captures an important dimension of his work on 
ideology, specifically the claim that the proletariat’s socialization under the given means of production 
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operation of political institutions, but in the way social and political institutions shape our 
individual beliefs and desires. Our acceptance or endorsement of the policy status quo, it is 
argued, is not so much our own free choice as it is a choice forced upon us by the social 
structures that permeate our lives. The Foucaultian tradition extends the third face to 
epistemology and our basic concepts of what counts as legitimate sources of truth and 
knowledge.40 The postmodern tradition extends the third face to language and the way the very 
building blocks of our thoughts lead us to accept beliefs as given. These are powerful 
approaches, and social movements and the social movement literature rightly focus heavily on 
the contestation over ideas, knowledge, and language.41  
Unfortunately, the third face often suffers from a reliance on underlying comprehensive 
claims about truth and morality. Classic Marxist variants posit class interest as the absolute 
                                                                                                                                                                             
indoctrinates them with ideas of property rights, meritocracy, and other ideological contracts that 
buttress the capitalist system. These assertions depend on Marx’s stark views of class and class interest as 
tangible products of history that can be objectively observed. I find much attractive about Marx’s 
approach and the label of false consciousness, but primarily as a speculative and rhetorical concept. I 
remain uncomfortable classifying broad segments of society as brainwashed and asserting their true 
interests and unadulterated beliefs from my personal vantage point.  
40 For example, Foucault’s most famous work, Discipline and Punish, argues that modern surveillance 
leads prisoners (and citizens) to internalize the gaze of authority, which may or may not be on them at 
any given time Invalid source specified.. This concept is extremely interesting concerning movements, 
where activists are often cowed by the idea that law enforcement, tax auditors, or other officials may be 
monitoring their words and deeds. Indeed, it is commonplace for executives at SMO to tell employees, 
“don’t write anything you don’t want the FBI or IRS reading.” This control of behavior extends beyond 
times when the state is not watching, to times when the state is never watching. In the broader public we 
have adapted to the idea that the NSA is observing all our communications when the available evidence 
simply doesn’t support that belief. “Could observe” has become “does observe,” and public behavior and 
discourse is constrained by those beliefs. 
41 For example, the animal rights movement is at its heart engaged in a struggle over the boundaries of 
inclusion in our moral theories. The charge of “speciesism” attempts to shift this boundary by pointing out 
prejudiced logic in peoples’ worldviews. Similarly, these activists challenge our dependence on human 
rationalistic perceptions of the world to judge truth and value, pointing out that other ways of being in 
the world, such as relying on a deeper and less filtered sensory experience, are not necessarily lesser ways 
of being. Finally, the teleological bias of language like “farm animals” is pointed out, as is the denial of 
subjectivity in the use of the pronoun “it” to describe an animal. All these points of contention have 
importance in long term movement goals, but they blur the concept of political power in ways that may 
hinder our understanding of major forms of political activity.  
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divide, while Marxist gender theorists like Nancy Hartsock add gender interest into the dynamic, 
and still others focus on race, sexuality, or other identities (Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power, 
1983). Such theoretical approaches quickly run into charges of essentialism and of prioritizing 
some divisions over others. In response, intersectional and postmodern theorists have 
attempted to multiply or abolish the group dynamic approach. In doing so they empower 
individual perspectives at the expense of our understanding of group struggle.42 For an analysis 
like this one, which takes democratic pluralism as the essential core of American political 
struggle, both essentialist and postmodern approaches end up distracting us from attending to 
the groups that are actually struggling to influence public policy. The heart of my project is part 
of the group theory tradition of American political science popular in the mid-20th century, and 
consequently I am committed to viewing social groups as fluid but real and important.43 Thus 
while ideological power is a critical element of social transformation—or the lack thereof—this 
project confines itself to the first two faces of power.44 
So I consider power in terms of agenda control and force, or put another way, the ability 
to control public attention (and issue framing) and the ability to secure desired policy decisions 
and implementation.45 We should also consider the question of whether our definition of power 
                                                           
42 Judith Butler jumps to mind. Her work Gender Trouble does a brilliant job problematizing the category 
of “woman,” particularly in terms of the essentiallization of sexuality, but in deconstructing the idea of 
group power Butler does little to replace it with anything constructive Invalid source specified..  
43 (Dahl, Who Governs?, 2005) (Truman, 1971) 
44 I would also stress that fighting for and making policy change is arguably the best way to shift public 
ideology on an issue. The fight over policy is a fight for legitimacy and recognition, and the fight for public 
attention is also a fight over the framing of that attention. One might argue that adding a focus on 
ideological power would be “double counting” or would introduce endogeneity problems. 
45 These aspects of power correspond to the three basic parts of the policymaking process as represented 
in the American public policy literature; agenda setting, decision making, and implementation. For my 
purposes, policymaking remains the benchmark for movement influence because movements rarely see 
their work translate into direct electoral victory or control over governance. So our theory of power 
should ideally address each point of the policy process where players might exert leverage to cause or 
stymie change, and force and agenda power satisfy this standard. Some policy scholars might take issue 
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should include only the active exercise of influence, or should it also consider the capacity for 
influence. Dahl tends to use the term power interchangeably to mean both exercise and 
capacity, and some have criticized this usage as inexact (Haugaard, 2002). I think we can be 
generous to Dahl here and assume he considered it obvious that both exercise and capacity are 
expressions of power (as force). But there is also reason to question whether such a move is 
warranted. Certainly we would consider an actor powerful who never exercises force, but 
always gets her way because her capacity for force deters challengers. Conversely, we might not 
wish to call an actor powerless, who loses a battle because she chooses to conserve her 
expansive resources for other contests (this observation seems to support viewing capacity as 
power). On the other hand, talking about capacity saps some precision from our efforts because 
the potential for influence is always an assumption until we can empirically observe it in action. 
Such claims rely on dubious assertions of what actors really want and their prospects for 
winning if they acted. It seems to me the solution here is to reserve the term power for the 
exercise of influence, but at the same time allow for the identification of power resources that 
we may reasonably assert are necessary or useful to the exercise of power. This also prevents 
confusion over “double counting,” in which resources are viewed as a type of power both when 
accumulated and when used. Power as exercise seems the safe route, and one that does not 
limit our ability to discuss movement capacities. 
A final point to consider is that power may be considered both zero-sum and non-zero-
sum. That is to say, power may be viewed as conflictual, with the exercise of power only present 
in cases where one party produces a result contrary to the efforts of another party. Or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
with my reliance on the “outdated” policy cycle model, but I am not making claims about policy 
proceeding through these three phases in an orderly linear fashion. I feel strongly that the policy cycle 
model continues to function as a useful heuristic, as argued by Peter deLeon Invalid source specified.. 
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alternatively, power could also be viewed as consensual, when different parties work together 
to produce an outcome all parties favor. Conflictual power is typically how we view policy 
decisions where different interests line up behind different alternatives or behind the “for” or 
“against” sides of a particular bill. This is typically the case for regulatory and fiscal policy 
because costs and benefits are rarely distributed evenly. Taxes redistribute from payer to public. 
Clean air laws charge industry (and their customers) to clean the air for the broader public. Even 
when everyone gets clean air, not everyone pays equally. This is why Harold Laswell famously 
described politics as “who gets what, when, how” (Laswell, 1936). Consensual power is about 
empowerment through collective action. If three parties all want to lift a boulder, but none can 
alone, lifting together increases all of their power at the cost of none. Consensual power 
advocates argue that often all groups involved in an issue are dissatisfied with the status quo 
and can collectively empower themselves to produce a new policy norm that all sides endorse. 
Everyone achieves their goal and nobody loses. We might think consensual power is confined to 
flag day proclamations and other symbolic goods, but consider also the near unanimous support 
for entering WWII following the bombing of Pearl Harbor or national projects like the Apollo 
Space Program.46 Might one argue that these are clearly collective exertions of power? 
 Some feminist theorists have made a compelling case that conflictual theories of power 
justify and entrench the oppression of vulnerable groups (Hartsock, 1999). If politics is a zero-
sum game, then the exercise of political power inherently subordinates the losing side, and 
oppression can be normalized as part of the political process. By contrast, consensual power 
seems to offer alternatives in which everyone can be powerful and oppression can be 
                                                           
46 I suppose one might argue that rapists are an identifiable group that loses in this situation, but I think 
it’s reasonable to note that in such situations it is not uncommon to have no identifiable interest publicly 
oppose a policy. As noted previously, our understanding of power focuses on the exercise of power and 
requires a group to act is some recognizable way, even simple public discourse. 
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stigmatized and condemned. I am sympathetic to this critique because power is clearly used to 
oppress vulnerable minorities and competitive language, even the language of democratic 
competition, can be used to normalize oppression. However, I prefer to frame the call to avoid 
conflictual power as simply a call to avoid the exercise of power all together. Working together 
to achieve common goals is something we could use more of in the governance process, but for 
our purposes I will refrain from calling this power. And in cases where a vulnerable population is 
“empowered” by consensual politics, what we are really seeing is the withdrawal or absence of 
power from actors that might otherwise push for oppressive alternatives. I think this 
observation further confirms that we are correct not to consider capacity for influence as 
power, because the act of not exercising that capacity creates significant opportunities for 
cooperation in the absence of power politics. 
 To summarize, in this project I use the term power to mean, the exercise of force and/or 
agenda control over political opposition. This use is far from the only legitimate interpretation of 
power and I freely admit that it excludes theoretical perspectives that are valid and important. 
However, this definition seems to me to present the best combination of theoretical breadth 
and practical applicability, at least for my topic.  
 
Movement Power, Political Opportunities, and American Political Development 
 With a definition of power in hand we can turn to constructing a framework for how 
that power is wielded by social movements in the American political system. What does it look 
like in action and application? Asking this question pushes us to consider both the broad 
dynamics of power in the American system and the space inhabited by movements for change. 
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My starting point for understanding power in American politics is perhaps not intuitive given my 
subject, but I nonetheless draw heavily on Stephen Skowronek’s analysis of presidential power 
in The Politics President’s Make (Skowronek, 2002). While Skowronek’s focus on the single most 
powerful person in the world may seem to offer little insight into the struggles of political 
outsiders, a deeper look at his framework reveals a number of insights that can be appropriated 
for social movement studies. Specifically, Skowronek shows that power in the American system 
consists of multiple resources that emerge and diffuse across different parts of the system in 
recognizable patterns. Moreover, while Skowronek identifies the presidency as the institution 
driving patterns of power innovation for the whole American system, I will argue that 
movements are in fact the overlooked element that is the actual first mover behind the 
innovation power resources.47 Finally, Skowronek’s suggestion that the cyclical pattern of 
political development he identifies may no longer by functioning has heavily shaped my own 
arguments challenging the continued relevance cyclical models of political opportunity for 
movements. 
 Skowronek stresses that power comes in a number of types that function in distinct, but 
interacting ways. He counters a political science tradition where scholars compete to show “the 
real source” of institutional power, be it the patrician reputations of great men, partisan 
patronage, bargaining and persuasion (Neustadt, 1991), public appeals (Kernell, 2006), or direct 
action (Howell, 2003) (Meyer K. , 2001). By contrast, Skowronek acknowledges that all these 
types of influence can be at play and we need not subsume one form of power under another 
(52). I begin my own analysis by considering the type of power Skowrownek sees at play in the 
                                                           
47 In fairness, Skowronek notes that the development of power resources by the presidency “tracked 
secular changes in the nation more generally” (52). Basically he argues that presidents build with the 
materials present in society, such as the growth of national television viewership. I am making a bolder 
claim about who first develops these social trends into political power resources. 
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system. Of course, we don’t want to simply adopt these forms of power, as the President is in a 
unique position to wield influence as the head of her political party and a figure with 
independent constitutional prerogatives. Movements cannot simply make policy with the stroke 
of a pen. Conversely, the President bears special burdens as the Chief of State and executer of 
our laws, and these roles limit a president from engaging in actions that may be open to 
marginal populations. Despite these limitations, there are some clear overlaps, specifically 
pluralist and plebiscitary power. 
 Skowronek argues that pluralist power developed along with the capacity of modern 
bureaucratic state, and involves bargaining between relatively autonomous “centers of power in 
the expanding Washington establishment” including the President, Congressional committees, 
the Court, the bureaucracy and the major client groups in society (54).48 Of course, Skowronek 
analyzes this type of politics from the vantage point of the presidency, which looks somewhat 
different from that of marginalized interest groups. Still, the idea of power as a negotiation 
between interests inhabiting and seeking control over various institutional venues is 
fundamentally akin to the way I seek to use the concept. Movements clearly are players in this 
interest group game, engaging in lobbying, electioneering, and litigating along as players in 
Washington games of horse trading and alliance building.  
 Many social movement scholars argue that adopting the institutional forms and 
practices of mainstream interest groups is the key to movement power, arguing that 
institutionalized movements can best sustain mobilization over long periods of time and engage 
with policymakers. This perspective is most clearly associated with John McCarthy and Mayer 
                                                           
48 See also his work Building a New American State (1982) on the relationship between the state’s 
bureaucratic capacity and the growth of organized interests. 
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Zald’s classic 1977 paper “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory” 
According to Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), movements gain power by adopting the tools 
of the powerful (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Formal organizations become repositories of 
experience, skill, and money, sustaining movements during ebbs in public interest and rallying 
participants during flows of public concern. In sociologist William Gamson’s language, 
movements best succeed by maintaining their resources in a “combat ready” state of perpetual 
mobilization (Gamson, 1990). From this perspective, politics is a marathon and challengers need 
to organize to participate in the pluralist process over the long haul. While RMT is no longer at 
the center of theoretical debates about movement theory, that is in large part because its 
conclusions have been accepted as background assumptions in theoretical debates over political 
opportunity theory and other contemporary topics.  
 Skowronek describes plebiscitary power as developing alongside the growing 
importance of mass media in politics, and consisting of efforts by the president to “cultivate a 
direct political relationship with the public at large” allowing her to shape and leverage public 
opinion against other institutional actors (55). The president is, of course, in a unique 
institutional place to shape the public agenda. When she speaks, the nation listens and her party 
falls in line (generally speaking). But shaping public opinion on policy controversies is hardly the 
sole province of the chief executive. Movements clearly seek to harness public opinion to force 
the hands of policymakers. Activists often assume the role of the nation’s conscience, 
identifying and defining problems in ways that demand public redress. For Skowronek, 
plebiscitary power is the most recent power resource to come to dominate the political system, 
with pluralist politics developing prior. Thus it should be unsurprising that these central types of 
influence are two of the three types of power I see as central to movement politics. These 
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resources are the prime currency of the modern political system, and all political actors trade in 
them in one form or another, including movements.  
 The movement literature doesn’t use the term “plebiscitary,” but many scholars have 
long considered media based appeals to be the central power resource of activists. Most 
notably, Michael Lipsky argues that activist protests mainly exercise power by appealing to 
sympathetic observers who already occupy traditional positions of power in the system (Lipsky, 
1968). Importantly, the mechanism here is more about attention than it is about persuasion. 
Plebiscitary power is about using media to put issues on the public agenda framed in ways that 
favor a movement’s views on the nature of the problem and the appropriate solution. Media 
appeals are generally accepted as an important source of influence, but movement scholars 
often simply classify media access as another resource to be mobilized, which can undercut a 
deeper appreciation for the unique role of plebiscitary agenda setting. 
 The third type of power I identify in my framework, disruptive power, has little 
relationship to the resources of the presidency and is not grounded in Skowronek’s work.49 In a 
way, the focus on disruptive power harkens back to political science views that saw protest as 
incoherent expressions of rage, but reframes this activity as a reasonable and effective power 
strategy.  In contrast to the RMT approach, and to a lesser extent media-focused approaches, 
disruptive power is found in leveraging non-cooperation with political and social institutions to 
force political concessions. Essentially movements undermine key institutions through protest, 
                                                           
49 Skowronek addresses presidents as disruptive actors, but does not claim this is a power resource. It is 
simply a pattern of behavior. Though it is worth pointing out that the candidacy of Donald Trump raises 
the distinct possibility of a President using disruptive tactics punitively against his opponents. One can 
picture the Donald shutting down government or using federal police and security forces to sow discord 
and increase his cult of personality. Such approaches have been unthinkable for politicians building power 
through party unity, interest group coalitions, and messaging with broad public appeal. It is unclear that 
these constraints would hold in a Trump presidency, as they do not seem to in a Trump candidacy.  
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strikes, riots, etc. until they are appeased. This view is most closely associated with the work of 
Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, prominent critics of the RMT tradition (Piven & Cloward, 
Poor People's Movements, 1979 [1964]). According to Piven and Cloward, structural barriers 
prevent socially and politically disadvantaged groups from marshaling the resources to compete 
in electoral and interest group politics. So for Piven and Cloward, advising the politically 
disenfranchised to mobilize resources is like advising the hungry to mobilize food. It is unhelpful 
advice that distracts from the institutional sources of power inequality. So disruptive power 
complicates the picture by suggesting that movements must choose a power strategy, which like 
with the presidency literature, has pushed debates towards finding the “true” source of 
movement power. 
 My position is that the three types of power—pluralist, plebiscitary, and disruptive—are 
not incompatible with each other. Rather, they can be employed independently of one another, 
in support of one another, or in conflict with one another. This means that movements need to 
develop power strategies that maximize the synergy between power resources, reduce conflicts 
between them, and that simple either-or and all-of-the-above approaches are likely to squander 
movement potential. This position finds support in the four cases laid out in chapters 6 &7, and I 
think it improves upon movement scholarship that stresses a single power approach at the 
expense of the others. 
 The power dynamics discussed above are by no means static, and a proper 
understanding of them requires looking at how institutions change across time. One reason I 
began with Skowronek is that he places this dynamism at the heart of his model, and I try to 
follow suit. Skowronek offers an American political development perspective that seeks to 
explain how types of power arise and how they change across time. Specifically, he posits a 
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pattern in which Presidents occupy the most dynamic position in the system because “the 
presidency is a governing institution inherently hostile to inherited governing arrangements” 
(20). He argues that the ambitions of, and expectations placed upon, the president generally 
outstrip the powers available to the office, which lead officeholders to innovate new forms of 
political power, and cultivate those pioneered by their predecessors.50 It is this focus on the 
innovation of power resources that attracts my attention. 
For Skowronek, the presidency occupies a unique position to drive the development of 
power resources because of its unique capacity and need for more power. But just as 
importantly—I would argue more importantly—the nature of the American pluralist system 
means that other political actors can and will adapt and adopt successful presidential power 
strategies for their own use. And as power resources diffuse amongst the system’s political 
actors, they cease to be a unique advantage of the office that pioneered them, sapping 
presidents of power relative to their institutional competitors.51 Extending and refining power 
strategies that are widespread in the system offers decreasing marginal returns, eventually 
pushing presidents to innovate new power strategies. In this way, Skowronek describes the 
institutional development of power as cyclical, though he stresses it is an “emergent” pattern in 
that the cycle adds new resources on top of older power strategies, which continue to function 
as pieces of the president’s repertoire (52-54).  
                                                           
50 It should be noted the Skowronek differentiates between authority and power, stressing that Presidents 
often do not have the authority to use the full powers of the office due to political constraints. He finds 
patterns of authority are a major factor driving power innovation, but for our purposes we can simply 
note a lack of usable power (30). Since we are not principally interested in the institution of the 
presidency, I find focusing on the language of power sufficient for our purposes, especially as functional 
plebiscitary power seems to involve an element of moral authority.  
51 Some of this is not altogether well fleshed out in The Politics Presidents Make, but is more centrally 
addressed in the later book, Presidential Leadership in Political TimeInvalid source specified.. Perhaps the 
clearest example is President Clinton’s plebiscitary mojo being hijacked by the rise of Speaker of the 
House Newt Gingrich and his Contract with America. This specific example of the diffusion pattern is even 
more clearly articulated in Kernell’s work (Kernell, 2006). 
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This pattern of innovation and diffusion is essential. It organizes much of my thoughts 
about how American political institutions develop and function across time. Where I take issue 
with Skowronek’s characterization, and where I find a foothold to advance my own work as a 
broad theory of American political development, is with the idea that presidents are the central 
innovators of power resources. I contend that power innovation is, in fact, tied most closely to 
the powerless. Social movements are constantly at a power disadvantage and their commitment 
to their causes presses them to constantly seek influence in new and unexpected places.52 And 
where the president remains bound by certain standards of decorum, movements are free to 
seek power in behaviors broadly seen as illegitimate by the ruling classes. It is outsiders who 
have the room and motivation to make radical shifts in their power strategies, and the 
multiplicity of movement causes and groups makes this institutional position the mostly obvious 
source of political innovation. As movements innovate, Presidents observe and interact with 
challengers—as Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon did with the media strategies of civil rights and 
other protesters—and stand ready to coopt successful strategies for their own purposes. 
So do the empirics bear out this twist on Skowronek’s logic? I think they do. At the most 
basic level we simply need to see movements developing types of power resources at earlier 
movements than presidents. This is a relatively easy lift. A more demanding standard is finding 
something closer to a causal connection showing that presidents and other institutional actors 
did not simply develop similar power strategies at later moments independent from movement 
examples. This is the kind of historical sleuthing that requires thick tomes by scholars in 
American political development and political sociology. Fortunately, at least one such study 
                                                           
52 Notably, there is a structural similarity here to the way Skowronek describes presidential psychology. 
But both the need and the willingness to take risks is greater with true political outsiders desperate to find 
some leverage on the political system.  
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exists in a form that seems custom built to support the movement-first hypothesis. Elizabeth 
Clemens painstakingly researched book, The People’s Lobby, offers us a thoroughly convincing 
account of how social movements developed (public) interest groups during the Progressive Era 
as an alternative to a system of partisan political power, from which they were largely shut 
out.53 As Clemens beautifully puts it, 
Those who felt disadvantaged, ignored, or oppressed by the parties sought to 
dismantle the party system in the hope that this would usher in a more responsive, 
democratic government. In the Process, they institutionalized new opportunities for 
political access and new models for political organization, but they secured a 
monopoly over neither. Innovation led to imitation, and many onetime insurgents 
found that they were increasingly defeated in a game whose rules they had helped to 
invent” (Clemens, 1997, p. 13). 
Clemens’s account shows not merely that the modern interest group system grew out of 
movement organizing, but that the diffusion of pluralist interest group politics undercut the 
ability of movements to leverage the organizational forms they pioneered. In sum, we find 
perfect case study support for our theory of innovation and diffusion in terms of pluralist power, 
one of our major types.  
Pluralist power traces its initial development to the organization of labor, prohibition, 
and other progressive era movements, with Teddy Roosevelt and subsequent presidents quickly 
recognizing that that interest groups formed independent sources of power in a system of 
                                                           
53 Or rather, movements found organizing as single issue minor parties was increasingly a dead end 
political strategy, and nonparty political organizations offered new leverage on the political process. 
Essentially, activists found they could wield more interest by having Democrats and Republican compete 
for their votes than by seeking to compete directly with both parties. 
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weakening political parties. Similarly, we can clearly see plebiscitary politics becoming a major 
source of political power exercised by the black civil rights movement and other protesters 
before Nixon and his “silent majority” made public appeals a cornerstone of presidential 
governance on issues like drugs and crime.54 Civil rights protesters were able to use the 
spreading medium of television to grab the public agenda, including international eyes, and 
shame President Kennedy into pushing forward a civil rights legislative agenda, which was 
completed by Johnson. This moment changed the power dynamics of Washington politics, and 
presidents quickly became ringmasters of the media circus. And in both power cases we have 
seen these types of power spread throughout the political system, leaving every exercise of 
pluralist or plebiscitary power contested by similar and opposing exercises of the same type of 
power from other institutional positions. As Chapters 3-5 show, movements have been 
squeezed by “political inflation” in their attempts to use these fully mature and diffused forms 
of political power.55  
I start with Skowronek because his work is central to the genesis of my work and he was 
front and center in my thoughts as I was teaching the Presidency while formulating this project. 
It was my starting point, but my framework is by no means simply an application of his 
presidential analysis to other political actors. First, while I use the categories of pluralist and 
plebiscitary power, I interpret them through a framework that draws more directly from social 
movement scholarship. Second, I include a third category of power, disruptive power, which is 
                                                           
54 Certainly earlier presidents made use of public appeals, and Skowronek acknowledges as much in 
discussing FDR’s fireside chats and JFK’s energetic use of television. But only with Nixon did media control 
become a major tool of governance, and this was a clear appropriation of the strategies pioneered and 
successfully executed by leftist movements in the decade prior.  
55 For example, Daniel Gillion has shown that movements inevitably give rise to countermovements that 
offer competing information and issue framings. Moreover, Gillion stresses that political elites make use 
of movement information and messaging for their own purposes, which may coopt not only the method 
of communication, but also coopt the message itself Invalid source specified.. 
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more centrally the province of social movements. And third, I consider other patterns that 
constrain the exercise of power beyond diffusion and inflation. While I must again admit that 
Skowronek’s weaving together of patterns of American political development influences both 
my language and perspective, my approach to these patterns parts way with his significantly. 
While the social movement literature is centrally concerned with power strategies, in 
recent decades considerations of power have increasingly focused on the ways in which the 
political system is open or closed to the exercise of movement power. This approach is referred 
to as political opportunity theory, and it has come to dominate the field, led by Sidney Tarrow’s 
work in Power in Movement. Tarrow argues that while movement power is important, that 
power can only be effectively used at times when the political system, and the political 
coalitions that run it, are vulnerable. During political moments in which the status quo is weak, 
movements of all stripes can leverage their resources to exploit existing political divisions. 
Conversely, during periods where the ruling political class is strong and unified, movement 
agitation is likely to be ignored or repressed. Consequently, he writes, “movements succeed or 
fail as a result of forces outside of their control” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 24). 
Tarrow’s views on opportunities and constraints have come to dominate much of the 
movement studies field, and as noted, this project takes its title and much of its focus from 
Tarrow’s book.56 However, a main criticism I take with Tarrow is that he characterizes the ebb 
and flow of movement opportunity as cyclical, with change concentrated in periodic moments 
                                                           
56 For example, major recent theoretical efforts like Edwin Amenta’s excellent When Movements Matter, 
still accept Tarrow’s framework almost whole cloth, introducing a “political mediation model” that 
attempts to argue different strategies are more or less effective given different levels of political 
opportunity in the system (Amenta, 2006). But for all its new label, Amenta’s is still a political opportunity 
variant, and one that I am not convinced generalizes well beyond his case study of the Townsend 
movement. But in many ways, my effort is similar to Amenta’s, as I seek to also reconsider the 
relationships of power and constraint, and the patterns that define them, but find myself fundamentally 
still part of the political opportunity theory camp.   
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of system vulnerability.57 In my view, Tarrow does not provide a satisfying explanation for the 
mechanisms that produce these periods of vulnerability, and neither does he offer us a way to 
know when, or if, such a period might arrive.58 Tarrow points to America in the 1960s as the 
most recent peak of opportunity and details the first “modern cycle” occurring in Europe 1848 
(Tarrow, 2011, p. 150). Beyond from these examples, and his abstract discussion, it’s unclear 
what other political moments constitute other American cycles. The Democratic surge that 
swept in Jackson? The abolitionist push before the civil war? The lengthy progressive era 
studded with movements for temperance, women’s suffrage, and more? The Depression era 
that swept in the Townsend movement and the New Deal?59  Tarrow’s limited examples hardly 
paint a convincing picture of opportunity cycles, let alone point us towards clear mechanisms 
that give us anything like predictive power. So even if we accept that the cyclical pattern has 
been operating throughout American history, can we be confident it is still operating? My 
answer is that a closer look at the institutional mechanisms and patterns of American political 
                                                           
57 I’m far from the only voice criticizing the logic of cycles in movement scholarship. Meyer and Minkoff 
make a strong case that as Tarrow’s model has spread across the movement literature it has lost 
coherence like a message in a game of telephone. Specifically, they change that scholarship is routinely 
sloppy in using cycles to describe both individual movement arcs and system-wide developments, which 
are two very different concepts (Meyer & Minkoff, Conceptualizing Political Opportunity, 2004). A lack of 
conceptual clarity has prevented the development of a robust theoretical and empirical account of 
opportunity cycles. 
58 Tarrow gives a pretty good account of the rise and fall of movement peaks in Chapter 9, but this doesn’t 
include the initial vulnerability of the system. Carmines and Stimson give us a much more precise 
explanation as to how civil rights activism exploited fissures in the Democratic party to both fracture the 
party and produce major advances civil rights legislation. But it is difficult to identify a major political issue 
today that could both fracture one or both political parties AND leave in place a political coalition capable 
of passing major reforms.  
59 By contrast, Piven does offer a somewhat clearer account US movement influence being defined by 
specific short peaks followed by long periods of retrenchment (Piven F. F., 2006). But Piven’s argument 
ties progress to brief moments of often violent contention, which break out periodically. Based on my 
understanding of power, as well as Tarrow’s model, it is at best a partial account of movement influence. 
And even Piven speculates on when and if American social movements can find the space and leverage for 
a new movement of political process. She is far from certain the disruptive mechanism remains fully 
available and adequately far reaching. She concludes somewhat pessimistically, “Injustice is not even 
injustice when it is perceived as inevitable” and turns her hope to the development of global and digital 
activist networks (139). 
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development that facilitate movement power suggests that the narrowing of political 
opportunities since the 1960s is likely not cyclical. Instead—to use Orren and Skowronek’s 
famous phrasing of American political development—we see “durable shifts in governmental 
authority” that leave outsiders increasingly shut out (Orren & Skowrone, 2004).  
In identifying patterns of constraint on movement power, I again draw heavily upon 
Skowronek’s theory of the presidency, but also part ways with him. Skowronek’s theory of 
American political development is built upon the duality of power and authority, which are 
subject to three independent patterns of development that interact in ways that defy 
predictions based solely on the development of institutional powers. These are the persistent 
pattern of presidents seeking to reshape politics in their image, the emergent pattern of 
developing new power resources, and the recurrent pattern of forging new sources of political 
authority that decline sharply following their initial use. It is an elegant theory, but the focus on 
the authority of America’s prime political mover takes it in a different direction than we need to 
go in considering America’s marginalized political voices. So I focus more exclusively on patterns 
of power development, specifically three patterns I see functioning throughout American 
history. 
The first pattern I identify is a enduring pattern of structural constraints placed on 
political challengers by policymakers. While the particulars of the laws, policies, and legal 
decisions shift over time, these shifts serve to help the same basic constraints endure despite 
changes in America’s social and political structures. The pattern is a constant in political systems 
for two reasons. First, those in power typically seek to entrench their political control and keep 
those with differing policy preferences out of power. This is the basic game in politics, and it 
would be naïve to think these efforts extend only to electoral competition and not the design of 
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the rules that govern institutional access. And second, part of the legitimate goal of governance 
is securing peace, stability, and order for the public. This goal puts those in power naturally at 
odds with movements, particularly those employing disruptive tactics. For example, in 1950 
President Truman issued an executive order instructing the military to seize and operate key 
railroads in anticipation of a railway strike. We should not conclude from this action that 
Truman was anti-labor, so much as that Truman viewed it as his duty to secure a functioning US 
infrastructure as the nation geared up to fight the Korean War. The nature of disruption is 
almost always at odds with interests and the responsibilities of the ruling class, and so we see 
laws, policies, and court rulings that limit disruption and insurgent political campaigns at all 
points of American history.  
The second pattern I identify in a cyclical pattern of political inflation, driven by the 
cycles of power innovation and diffusion discussed at length above. Movements expand their 
power resources by innovating new approaches to wielding power, but as these approaches 
prove successful mainstream political actors co-opt them for their own use. Since I conceive 
political power as a conflictual zero-sum game, increases in political resources across the 
political system serve to devalue those resources for early adapters. The most obvious example 
is campaign spending. As status quo forces spend more and more in each election cycle, each 
dollar spent is worth relatively less and shows diminishing marginal returns. And those at the 
fringes of the resource arms race generally find themselves least able to keep up with this 
inflation, let alone increase their relative position in the system. Eventually movements are 
squeezed out and forced to innovate new forms of power, starting the cycle over, and layering 
new resources on top of those currently at play in the system. 
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The third pattern I identify is a progressive pattern of institutional thickening, in which 
the expanding size of government renders the system less dynamic and malleable.60 As 
government grows, institutional resources and political commitments are increasingly locked 
into existing public policies, leaving less resources for new initiatives, and lessening the appetite 
of the public or policymakers for changes that may upset the applecart. Social Security and 
Medicare are legacies of past social movements, but they dominate the political landscape in 
ways that limit opportunities for advocates of free college tuition, single-payer health care, or 
green infrastructure investment. This is a phenomenon noted by Skowronek, but he posits it less 
as an independent developmental pattern, and more as a constraint upon his recurrent cycle of 
political authority.61 By contrast, I see this pattern not simply as a constrain on presidents, but 
more broadly as a constraint on those who wish to dramatically alter public policy. Thickening 
may limit the president’s ability to overhaul the political system, but it is even more limiting to 
movements who encounter a system where nondiscretionary spending and administrative 
legislation dominate governance. 
At face value, my three patterns of political development may seem overly pessimistic, 
as they are all constraints. And indeed, it is my contention that opportunities for movements to 
exercise power in the American political system continue to narrow. On the other hand, this is 
not to say that opportunities for movement power are absent or will permanently be in decline. 
First, well established movements for issues like civil rights, feminism, and environmentalism 
may escape some structural barriers because they have made inroads into the status quo. For 
                                                           
60 To be clear I mean “progressive” like a disease that spreads, not like leftist politics. This pattern hits 
political progressives much harder than conservatives, as Skowronek notes in his own discussion of the 
“waning of political time” in Part III. 
61 He writes, “the institutional universe of political action has gotten thicker all around—at each stage of 
development of the office there are more organizations and authorities to contend with, and they are all 
more firmly entrenched and independent.” (Skowronek, 55) 
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example, animal rights “terrorism” has been targeted for repression in ways that ideologically 
and tactically related environmental “terrorism” has not been.62 Moreover, such movements 
may already have significant access to the structural resources that are favored when insiders 
restrict outsider political access. For example, laws restricting outside political spending and 
favoring traditional political organizing may not impact movements who have developed 
significant PAC resources, such as feminism’s deep pocketed Emily’s List. These movements may 
even reap some relative benefits from the exclusion of new radical challengers from the political 
stage. 
Similarly, institutional thickening is less problematic for movements that have an 
institutional foothold in terms of legislation, committee structure, and bureaucratic 
representation. The presence of the EPA means that new environmental causes have a 
permanent venue for new issues, as well as fungible budgets, standing committees, judicial 
precedent, and legislation requiring reauthorization and amending. For example, the existence 
of the Clear Air Act regulatory regime provides a vehicle to address climate change through 
executive, bureaucratic, and judicial rulings on carbon dioxide emissions. So even movements 
pushing radical, unpopular, or strongly opposed policies may find institutional footholds in 
battles that were fought during more open periods.63  
Finally, while structural constraints and institutional thickening are constant progressive 
patterns, political inflation has functioned in a cyclical pattern of innovation and diffusion. 
Consequently, we are likely to see new developments in power innovation that will reinvigorate 
                                                           
62 Animal Liberation Front and Environmental Liberation Front activity in the 1990s shared many traits in 
common, but animal activists found themselves explicitly targeted by the Animal Enterprises Protection 
Act (later the Animal Enterprises Terrorism Act) while the far for destruction ELF was not targeted by 
specific federal legislation.  
63 Disability, bureaucratic rep. 
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movement power resources. The precursors to these developments may already be underway, 
though I remain hesitant to offer anything like a prediction as to the form and timing in which 
such innovations may come about. Still, in Chapter Eight I return to this possibility and hazard a 
few guesses as to where movements might find (or already be finding) new paths to political 
power, including leveraging global institutions and advocacy networks, forming electoral 
coalitions across largely unrelated movements, developing approaches that leverage local policy 
venues, or increasing the reliance on direct democracy through initiatives and referendums. 
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An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or 
that private property is robbery, ought to be 
unmolested when simply circulated through the press, 
but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally 
to an excited mob assembled before the house of a 
corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same 
mob in the form of a placard. 
-John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 
 
“Every idea is an incitement…The only difference 
between the expression of an opinion and an 
incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's 
enthusiasm for the result.” 
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Gitlow v. NY 
 
“The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well 
as the poor to sleep under bridges …” 
-Anotole France (quoted by Antonin Justice Scalia, Hill v. 
CO) 
 
 
Chapter 3: Disruptive Power and Movement Protest 
 
 On July 15, 1991, the anti-abortion group Operation Rescue began its “Summer of 
Mercy” campaign in Wichita, Kansas. For six weeks protester surrounded the area’s three 
abortion clinics, chanting, picketing, quoting scripture, and physically blocking clinic entrances. 
Organizers went as far as to have children lie down in front of moving vehicle to prevent women 
from entering clinic parking lots (Associated Press, 1991). During this period, the act of 
“blockading” abortion clinics emerged as one of the anti-abortion movement’s most 
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controversial and combative tactics. More than 2,000 “rescuers” were arrested during the 
Kansas summer, and the group claims some 75,000 arrests in Operation Rescue actions from 
1986 to 1994 (Steiner, 2006, p. p.8). Blockading was highly effective at reducing abortion access, 
financially undermining clinics, and raising the profile of the abortion issue. But in 1994 
Operation Rescue abandoned the blockade tactic, which largely disappeared from the broader 
movement’s  tactical repertoire. What happened in 1994? The federal government made two 
landmark decisions, one judicial and one legislative. 
 On Jan. 24, 1994 the Supreme Court ruled in National Organization for Women v. 
Scheidler that clinics had standing to sue anti-abortion groups under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.64 This 
unanimous ruling gave clinics the legal means to recover damages (including declines in revenue 
and increased security costs), court costs, and large punitive sums from groups engaging in 
blockade campaigns.  This judicial policy meant that if anti-abortion groups succeeded in 
financially harming clinics through criminal trespass, they would end up funding abortions with 
hundreds of thousands of dollars from their own treasuries. Moreover, group officers, 
volunteers, and even donors were potentially left liable for their roles in a “criminal conspiracy,” 
even if they had never directly broken the law  (Lewin, 1994).   
 While the RICO ruling raised long-term doubts about the viability of using civil 
disobedience against abortion clinics, it was the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) 
                                                           
64 510 U.S. 249 (1994) 
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Act that ultimately snuffed out the blockade tactic.65 FACE Section (a) provides automatic 
criminal and civil penalties for protesters who, 
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, 
intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with 
any person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such 
person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing 
reproductive health services; 
Violators of FACE were subject for first offenses to maximum penalties of 6 months in prison 
and/or $10,000 in fines for “nonviolent physical obstructions” and 18 months and $25,000 fines 
for subsequent offenses. Violations other than “nonviolent physical obstructions” carry double 
the prison time.66  Under these guidelines protesters could conceivably receive three years in 
prison for letting the air out of the tires of a vehicle seeking to access an abortion clinic. These 
penalties allowed Federal prosecutors to pursue penalties far greater than the misdemeanor 
state trespass charges commonly leveled at blockade protesters. The law also made cases rather 
open and shut, as it specifically addressed blockade behavior, leading to easier prosecutions and 
harsher plea deals. 
 From 1994 to 2013, the DoJ obtained 89 FACE convictions and brought 27 successful 
civil suits against prolife activists (National Abortion Federation, 2014). While many of these 
convictions related to threats, bombings, and other violent activities, they were most effective 
                                                           
65 18 U.S.C. § 248 
66 The Act also included optional statutory damages for civil suits, meaning plaintiffs did not have to prove 
damages. It also allow state Attorney Generals to bring civil cases on behalf of harmed parties. These 
measure significantly streamline the process of civil litigation. 
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in suppressing blockade behavior.67 Whereas violent attacks and property destruction were 
generally clandestine, the open nature of blockading made arrest and prosecution a rather 
straightforward matter.68 As Figure 3.1 shows, FACE took a heavy toll on the popularity of 
blockades, with the percent of clinics facing blockades dropping by 88% from 1993 to 1998. 
While there is an uptick in the number of clinics dealing with blockades after 1998, qualitative 
reports show these “blockades” typically consist of at most a handful of activists acting 
independently of any movement organizations. And by 2010, even these mini-blockades appear 
to have vanished from the anti-abortion moment’s tactical repertoire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
67 While blockades were certainly a main target of FACE, the law gained traction primarily in response to 
an uptick in clinic bombings and some high profile attacks/murders of doctors.  
68 Indeed, blockading protesters envision themselves as following the civil disobedience tradition of King 
and Ghandi, and being arrested was in many ways an essential aspect of their protest. It’s perhaps 
instructive to consider Henry David Thoreau’s foundational essay on this issue, Civil Disobedience. 
Thoreau’s own protests against slavery and American imperialism were highlighted by a short stay in jail 
for refusal to pay taxes. That jailing represented an existential choice for Thoreau and the most potent 
way he could disassociate himself from the evils he saw government perpetuate in his name. Similarly, 
abortion activists often seek arrest to show that their opposition to abortion extends beyond those 
directly involved to the State that sanctions and protects the practice. However Thoreau spent but one 
night in jail and had his taxes paid by a sympathetic relative. A year in prison and a $25,000 fine is a 
different matter. Up against FACE, the majority of blockaders found themselves backing down or off to 
prison. And by design, penalties multiplied for the movement core most willing to face arrest.  
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Figure 3.169  
 
 Blockading was considered a powerful tactic by both opponents and defenders of 
abortion, and it only disappeared because the US government extinguished it through 
legislation, prosecution, and judicial holdings. This example shows a fundamental dynamic of 
movement politics: at the heart of movement-government relations we find challenges to, and 
assertions of, law and order. Movement contention threatens core law and order functions of 
the state, and as such the state inherently seeks to tame and control social movement activity.70 
This chapter examines the extent to which social movements effectively use challenges to law 
and order to achieve public policy goals, whether the use of confrontational tactics is increasing 
or decreasing, and what systemic factors may constrain movement contention. I begin with a 
                                                           
69 Data taken from the Feminist Majority Foundation’s annual Clinic Violence Survey Reports 1993-
2000,2002,2005,2008, and 2010. The survey asks clinics about their experiences in the first 7 months of 
each year, and so likely underreports. Clinics that deal with blockades typically experience multiple 
blockades. The reports note that the number of protesters engaging in each blockade declines sharply 
after the initial years of the survey. 
70 It is a much more amorphous dynamic than government has with the other main challengers of law and 
order, criminals and revolutionaries. Criminals seek to evade law and order, while revolutionaries 
challenge the sovereignty that underlies law and order. Movements occupy a gray area that does not 
attempt to overthrow the state, but openly challenges the legitimacy of its law and order functions. 
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theoretical look at what I term disruptive power. I then suggest that contemporary movements 
have seen a significant decline in disruptive activity and power. I suggest three main sources of 
this decline are the three patterns discussed in the second chapter:  1) the building of structural 
barriers to outsider participation, 2) political inflation devaluing outsider resources, and 3) 
institutional thickening rendering major policy shifts more difficult. 
 In this chapter I try to focus on systemic shifts in the political order that impact all social 
movements. While I draw data and examples from particular causes, these are intended to be 
representative. I leave deeper consideration of particular movements for chapter 6. 
 
Movement Protest and Disruptive Power 
 The study of social movements in political science and political sociology is typically 
organized under the label of contentious politics.71 The defining political characteristic of 
movements is usually viewed as their willingness to violate the norms of political behavior and 
potentially the norms of law and order. David Meyer calls movement politics "the politics of 
protest," and surely the idea of "protest" is the contentious activity most commonly associated 
with social movements (Meyer D. , The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America, 2006). 
But where is the power in protest?72 How does protest reshape political opportunities and 
produce policy outcomes? How do we know when protest is an exercise in power and when it’s 
just spitting into the wind? The mechanisms by which protest changes public policy and political 
coalitions remain largely unspecified. 
                                                           
71 See for example the volume Contentious Politics (2006) edited by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, or 
the volume Dynamics of Contention (2001) edited by Doug McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly. 
72 Either in terms of “power over” competing interests, or the more constructivist/feminist conception of 
“power to” achieve goals or outcomes. See the theoretical discussion of power as a concept in chapter 2.  
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 Perhaps the most compelling theorization of power and contentious politics comes from 
Frances Fox Piven. In her 2006 book, Challenging Authority, Piven defines Disruptive Power as 
“the leverage that results from the breakdown of institutionally regulated cooperation” (Piven 
2006, p.21).73 This is the definition of disruptive power that I adopt in this chapter and in the 
larger work.  In a nutshell, Piven is pointing out that those losing a game always have the final 
option of quitting, or overturning the game board, and thus ruining the game for everyone. This 
final option gives the losers leverage to demand concession from the winners in turn for 
continuing the game. In essence, this perspective is an extension of classic western social 
contract political theory. But instead of imagining a people agree to the terms of society in a 
hypothetical state of nature, we are instead considering very real people withdrawing their 
consent from a social contract they believe to be unjust.74  
                                                           
73 Disruptive power is certainly not the only potential impact of protest on politics. Dan Gillion (2012) 
demonstrates that local protest is statistically correlated to Congressional roll call votes, suggesting that 
members of Congress likely interpretive protest as an “informative cue” about constituent preferences.   
74 Perhaps the least palatable part of Locke’s Second Treatise on Government is the lack of a practical 
remedy provided to minorities who feel their rights violated. Locke was willing to grant them a right of 
exit (as long as they took no property with them), but believed resistance or revolt against a majoritarian 
republic to be an affront to both society and God. Indeed, Locke instructed minorities who felt their 
natural rights violated to appeal to God for divine judgment in building their cause or vindicating them in 
heaven.  
 A more satisfying contract theory, in terms of its treatment of dissent, is Rawls’s A Theory of 
Justice. Rawls argues that just social institutions are those that a rational individual would chose in a 
hypothetical “original position,” in which the chooser is blind to her place in society. Rawls argues that in 
such a situation, the chooser would pick institutions that would most benefit her if she turned out to 
occupy the most disadvantaged social position. While Rawls himself discouraged direct parallels between 
his hypothetical situation and real world politics, one might reasonably interpret the withdrawal of social 
cooperation as a judgment by a movement that the relevant institution has not met Rawls’s minimum 
standard of justice. That is to say, when those in a subordinate social position chose to blow up an 
institution rather than continue to occupy their social position, it is probably a good indication that 
nobody would agree to that structure in the original position. Rawls writes, “When the basic structure of 
society is reasonably just, as estimated by what the current state of things allows, we are to recognize 
unjust laws as binding provided that they do not exceed certain limits of injustice” Invalid source 
specified.. Rawls is to be applauded for recognizing the situation as morally ambiguous (or conflicted) and 
I think he’s right to point to civil disobedience in chapter 53-59 of A Theory of Justice as one approach to 
resolving the conflict. However, not all disruptive acts count as civil disobedience and not all civil 
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What forms of “institutionally regulated cooperation” are at issue in this analogy? They 
come in two basic flavors, active and passive cooperation.75 Active cooperation involves 
institutions in which movement participants are actively participating. The most obvious 
example is labor and consumer participation in the economy. The Montgomery bus boycott of 
1955-56 is a classic withdrawal of consumer participation that rendered the city’s segregated 
transit system economically unviable. Passive cooperation involves non-interference with social 
arrangements that may not directly involve movement participants. The respecting of property 
rights, civil, and criminal law are key examples of such passive cooperation. Abortion clinic 
blockaders withdrew their cooperation from property and trespassing legal regimes, making it 
impossible for those clinics to conduct business and overburdening local police and courts.76  
It is important to distinguish disruptive acts from merely violent, unorthodox, or 
dramatic tactics. Protesting in funny costumes can be unorthodox and spectacular. Large 
“marches” on Washington, D.C. are usually dramatic, though decreasingly so. Assaulting police 
officers at a protest is certainly violent. But these acts do not necessarily pose a significant 
challenge to major forms of “institutionally regulated cooperation” such industry, commerce, 
governance, and basic law and order. By contrast, the refusal to work—strikes—directly disrupts 
industry. The refusal to purchase goods or patronize businesses—boycotts—can directly disrupt 
commerce. The mass refusal to abide by criminal law and police authority—most dramatically in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
disobedience is disruptive. As, such Rawls’s framework provides only a starting point for a normative 
theory of civil disobedience. 
75 The corollary is that the withdrawal of passive cooperation typically involves action, and the withdrawal 
of active cooperation tends towards inaction. Of course many form of protest combine active and passive 
elements. A successful boycott generally requires action elements such as outreach, education, and even 
coercion, not merely an inactive stoppage in purchasing.  
76 It is worth noting that “social norms” may be counted as institutions as well. For example, disrupting 
the norms of segregation through freedom rides, sitting at white-only lunch counters, etc. was disruptive 
to the core social rhythms of southern life. These “institutions” are more ephemeral, but non-the-less are 
important targets of disruptive power. 
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riots—can disrupt virtually all the major functions of society. If citizens refuse to work, buy, or 
obey, it threatens the wealth, comfort, and safety of those in power. In such cases, decision-
makers will need to wait the crises out, repress it, or appease it through policy concessions. 
Piven argues that disruptive power only really achieves policy change through dissensus 
politics, a process by which movements divide and shatters political coalitions. The classic 
examples of dissensus politics are the abolitionist movement splitting the Whig party over the 
issue of slavery, and later the civil rights movement splitting the mid-twentieth century 
Democratic Party over the issue of segregation. In each case movement protests forced divisive 
issues to the fore of the public and party agenda, where existing party coalitions could no longer 
suppress internal conflict. The process is traced with convincing precision in Carmine and 
Stimson’s Issue Evolution (1989), and I am convinced that movements can achieve dramatic 
victory by pushing party realignment.77 However, Piven’s focus on dissensus largely dismisses 
the issue of power between times of realignment and writes off these periods as times of 
inevitable retrenchment. Piven’s move is problematic for two reasons. 
First, I argue that disruptive power remains an active force even during times of 
“ordinary” politics, regardless of whether retrenchment occurs. As the wave of 1960s protests 
ebbed, new movements continued to emerge, and these movements relied heavily on 
disruption. The anti-nuclear movement emerged in the late 1970s and in addition to disruptive 
protests, activists repeatedly disrupted nuclear testing by trespassing in restricted testing areas. 
This movement has been largely successful in pushing for an end to nuclear weapons testing and 
a moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants in the United States. Furthermore, as 
                                                           
77 If there is a flaw in Carmines and Stimson’s account it is that their treatment of “activists” focuses too 
narrowly on party “activists” to the exclusion of movement activists (though in some cases these are the 
same individuals).  
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chapter 6 details, the anti-abortion, gay rights, disability rights, and animal rights all employed 
disruption in their emergence and beyond. Whether or not this disruption is ultimately effective 
in winning major policy concession, it is clearly an exercise in power that needs to be accounted 
for to understand movement politics. 
Second, it is quite possible that Piven’s recurrent pattern of consensus punctuated by 
dissensus is no longer active (if it ever truly was). We have not seen a period “open” to a 
dissensus break since the 1960s, and it is unclear a new one is on the horizon. Political 
opportunity theorists, such as Sidney Tarrow, often describe past “cycles of protest” but have 
little to say on when and how the wheel turns. Indeed, the concept has become muddled in the 
literature, being applied to individual movements and the larger polity with little consistency.78 
Moreover, one theme of this chapter, and the larger work, is that movement methods of 
organizing and the “thickening” of American political institutions have rendered the system less 
dynamic. Under such conditions it seems reasonable to focus on how disruptive power functions 
without creating dissensus. The “times in between” may be all that remain for movements, and 
these times may yet be productive. As such, I focus in this chapter on how structural barriers 
constrain movement uses of disruptive power. 
 
Declines in Disruptive Protest – an Empirical Look 
It is difficult to measure disruption in any empirically reliable sense, particularly over 
time. As noted above, 100,000 marchers on Washington may be highly disruptive in one era and 
                                                           
78 See (Meyer & Minkoff, Conceptualizing Political Opportunity, 2004) for an excellent critique of how 
movement scholars have begun to talk past each other by failing to define their terms and by misapplying 
the terms of each other. 
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just a matter of course a few decades later.79 As such measures of disruption tend to be highly 
qualitative and case specific.80 Moreover, most social movement research on disruption tends to 
focus on non-US cases exactly because tactical repertoires are more volatile in most other 
nations.81 There are some notable exceptions. William Gamson’s classic book The Strategy of 
Social Protest first made the case four decades ago that protest correlates with policy change. 
Gamson also found that the use of violence was associated with policy success, which is 
particularly intriguing for the disruptive hypothesis. But Gamson’s study lacks size and a 
convincing causal mechanism.82 More recently, Daniel Gillion has convincingly demonstrated 
that protest activity, aggregated by congressional district, correlates significantly with the policy 
positions of Members of Congress. He posits that protest may function by communicating 
intense constituent opinions to representatives, which would not be a disruptive form of power 
(Gillion, 2014). Instead, Gillion’s views on protest may fit better with the discussion of pluralist 
power in Chapter 4.83   
All that said, it bears looking at some basic data on arrests, violence, and property 
damage related to movement activity over time.  
To the extent we consider protest to be a core act of contentious politics, simply 
measuring the number of major protests over time can be used as a very rough measure of 
                                                           
79 Later I will discuss how changes in policing regimes have even rendered arrests a suspect measure of 
disruption. 
80 Piven (2006) is a good example of quality qualitative work built on a series of cases. 
81 Donatella della Porta’s work on political violence is perhaps the best example of non-US research in this 
area Invalid source specified.. 
82 Marco Guigni attempts to refine Gamson’s study by increasing the number of observations and using a 
time lag between movement mobilization and policy measurement, which focuses on movements as 
agenda setters Invalid source specified.. This mechanism fits more with chapter 5 on plebiscitary power. 
Guigni also focuses most of his empirical work on Europe. 
83 There is certainly room for debate over the interpretation of this data. Gillion’s project is not directly 
concerned with teasing out the mechanisms at work in protest influence, so much as establishing that 
such an effect is real and measurable.  
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continuous politics. In figure 2 we see that the number of protests covered by The New York 
Times has declined significantly since the 1960s from an average of more than 800 annual 
events to around 400 annual events.84 Chapter 4 will argue that movement organizational and 
financial resources have grown rapidly over recent decades, and this appears to contrast sharply 
to the decline in major protest activity in figure 3.2. I strongly suspect this trend has continued 
over the past two decades, as this chapter has argued the spike in confrontational anti-abortion, 
animal rights, and environmental activism in the late 1990s and early 1990s has been effectively 
suppressed. This admittedly a very rough measure, but it provides an interesting starting point. 
Figure 3.2: New York Times Covered Protest Events by Year 
 
                                                           
84 There are obvious problems with using newspaper event reporting as a measure of protest activity. The 
social movement literature is extensive on this methods topic, with several compelling lines of criticism, 
yet these reports remain the standard in social movement research. Moreover, the Dynamics of 
Contention database of New York Times reports is considered to be the gold standard of event reports, 
though it certainly has a regional bias and ignores local are regional movement events. From my 
perspective the most obvious issue is that chapter 5 of this work argues that political inflation should lead 
to a decline in attention to protest activity even when actual events remain constant or increase. It would 
seem that I cannot have my cake and eat it too, and would rather concede that this analysis is moderately 
suspect than back away from my theoretical position of plebiscitary power. 
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Figure 3.3 provides a richer look at trends in the types of protest activity that have 
occurred over time. Not only was protest activity more common in the late 1960s, but protests 
were significantly more likely to involve violence and property destruction. In 1967, 29% of 
protests involved violence and 21% involved property destruction. Recent levels of disruptive 
activity are far lower, and I suspect currently levels are lower still. Remember, laws like FACE 
and AETA have effectively targeted these behaviors for elimination since the mid-1990s, as 
shown earlier in Figure 3.1. Again, these measures are rough proxies for disruptive activity, but it 
is notable that we find both a decline in protest volume and a decline in the proportion of 
protests utilizing the most confrontational tactics. 
 
Figure 3.3: Disruptive Measures of Protest 1960-199585 
 
 
                                                           
85 Data taken from the Dynamics of Contention data set at Stanford University, which collects and codes 
all protest activity covered in the New York Times 1960-1995.  
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 The above data are only able to tell a limited story about disruptive power. A fuller 
picture requires examining the three patterns of American political development discussed in 
chapters 1 & 2, which combine to increasingly constrain movement power. First and foremost 
for disruptive power, structural barriers erected by elites criminalize and punish disruptive 
behavior using laws ranging from trespassing to racketeering, as well as more subtle barriers 
that channel disruptive behavior into forms that are principally symbolic and expressive, such a 
“free speech zones.” Second, political inflation dulls the impact of disruptive activities as social 
and political institutions adapt to frequent disruptions.86 I argued in Chapter 2 that disruptive 
power largely resists cooption by other actors in the political system, which somewhat limits the 
impact of the inflationary pattern and suggests a potential rebirth of disruptive opportunities in 
each generation. However, this potential may be undercut by the scorched earth political 
strategy that has taken root in the contemporary Republican Party, which suggests that political 
elites are finally incorporating disruption into to their repertoires. Third, institutional thickening 
entrenches public policy more deeply and renders significant change a ponderous process. By 
slowing political change, thickening renders it less likely that movements will be capable of 
sustaining disruption through the necessary steps of the policy process. 
 
Structural Barriers 
                                                           
86 It might be argued that this description fits poorly within my category of political inflation. Specifically, 
political inflation suggests that increase in disruptive activity will render each disruptive behavior less 
impactful, rather that institutional adaptation rendering those behaviors less disruptive. This may be a 
legitimate complaint and I will need to consider the issue further. At the very least, adaptations in 
expectations—citizens becoming less bothered by, and reactive to, routine disruptions—seems to fit my 
general definition of political inflation. 
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 James Madison argued in the Federalist # 10 that government exists to pursue the 
“public good” of providing order, liberty, and justice. While the Federalists gave little shape to 
the amorphous concept of justice in their papers and in the Constitution itself, the dual threats 
of anarchy and tyranny put order and liberty front and center in their designs. Madison and 
Hamilton devoted extended attention to arguing for a government strong enough to control the 
populace and prevent anarchy, while also checked and balanced to preserve individual liberties 
and prevent tyranny. Assuring a balance between the “energy” to insure order and the restraint 
to preserve liberty was the framers’ central dilemma, and it is one that persists today. When 
government exercises its core law and order functions, the space for disruptive powers is 
generally constrained, as perceptions of public danger, disorder, and nuisance are necessarily 
those of the elites and/or ruling majorities. Alternatively, the growth of judicial power has 
typically corresponded to a growth in the civil rights and liberties of dissenters, opening 
opportunities for disruptive protest.  
 American history is full of examples of government using heavyhanded police tactics to 
suppress and punish disruptive dissent. The British opened fire on a colonial mob in the Boston 
Massacre, and passed the "Intolerable Acts" to punish Bostonians for the Boston Tea Party. 
George Washington used military force against the so-called "Whisky Rebellion" and other 
challenges to the nascent republic's fiscal authority. Escaped slaves in the antebellum south—as 
well as black operators on the Underground Railroad—faced whipping, hanging, or even burning 
if caught in their attempts to undermine slavery. State and Federal forces, independently or in 
conjunction with private forces like the Pinkertons, repeatedly broke Progressive Era labor 
strikes with fist and club. Civil rights marchers and freedom riders faced attack dogs, fire houses, 
beatings, arson, and murder at the hands of police or police supervised white mobs.  
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 In each case these events stick in our collective consciousness because the government 
used or sanctioned extraordinary force again dissenters. But in each case we also remember 
these conflicts because government repression tended to add to the disruptive impact of the 
movement. Many of these instances are cited by Piven as successful examples of disruptive 
power at work (Piven F. F., Challenging Authority, 2006). While some would concluded that the 
decline in violent police confrontations with movement activists is evidence of a system open to 
disruptive power, I caution that it may denote the exact opposite. In this section I concentrate 
on the less extraordinary laws, court rulings, and policing policies that subtly constrain 
disruptive power without risking further conflagration. I begin with in the late 1960s and the 
first of several federal efforts dubbed the “war on crime.”87 
 
War(s) on Crime and the Professionalization of American Law Enforcement 
 The phrase “war on crime” has long been a staple of American political discourse. While 
crime is in many ways a perennial public issue, before the 1960s the federal government played 
a relatively small role in what was traditionally a core function of state and local government 
(DiIulio, 1992). One might reasonably ask if the struggle against organized crime that flared up in 
the 1920 and 1930s was the original “war on crime,” and the exploits of Eliot Ness in The 
Untouchables certainly make it seem likely.88 But Eliot Ness and his “G-men” were only a handful 
of prohibition agents empowered to enforce prohibition under the 18th Amendment. Their 
                                                           
87 Certainly the failings of law enforcement during the 1960s were a major reason police forces began to 
modernize their methods and procedures, which would lay the groundwork for the struggles of the 1960s. 
88 Following the passage of the 18th Amendment prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcohol, 
organized crime exploded in America’s urban centers. While “gangsters” were nothing new in America, 
prohibition handed the likes of Al Capone control over an industry with hundreds of millions of dollars in 
annual revenue. These revenues bought virtual immunity from local police and courts, as well as control 
over influential labor organizations. 
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resources and authority were limited and their influence was more on the silver screen than the 
urban jungle. In a pre-New Deal era the Supreme Court allowed the federal government 
relatively little leeway in encroaching on state police powers. J. Edger Hoover’s FBI famously had 
to pursue gangsters like Al Capone on tax fraud, mail fraud, contempt of court, and other 
ancillary charges where federal authority was on solid footing.  
In the late 1930s, the Supreme Court abandoned its restrictive Lochner era 
understanding of the Commerce Clause opening up new possibilities for federal policing in 
relation to commerce. The most significant law in this vein was the Hobbs Act, signed by Harry 
Truman in 1946.89 The Hobbs Act targeted racketeering by creating federal penalties of up to 20 
years in prison for robbery and extortion that affect, attempt to affect, or conspire to affect 
interstate commerce. While the Act was ostensibly aimed at mafia related activity, the Hobbs 
Act allowed federal law enforcement to reign-in the semi/extra-legal pressure tactics of labor 
unions. The old saying, “give a man a hammer and every problem starts to look like a nail,” is 
surely applicable here. As government policing resources and authority expand, they generally 
become institutionally entrenched and find application to other socially disruptive elements of 
society. The Hobbs Act is an early example of the persistent pattern of structural constraints 
placed on disruptive movements, and one that would intensify when crime eventually 
catapulted to the top of the public agenda in the mid-1960s, then again in the 1980s and 2000s 
(Simon, 2007).90 
The Nationalization of Policing 
                                                           
89 18 U.S.C. § 1951 
90Hoover’s FBI also turned their increasing post-mafia resources to monitoring and undermining civil 
rights leaders, including Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., whose extramarital affairs were famously recorded and 
disseminated by federal agents.  
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Barry Goldwater carried only six states in the 1964 presidential election, but the 
Goldwater campaign undoubtably impacted American politics and policy in profound ways. As 
mentioned earlier, Carmines and Stimson (1989) have persuasively shown how the Goldwater 
nomination represented a watershed realignment in party politics around the issue of race. 
Goldwater was not himself an overt racist in the cast of George Wallace (although many of 
Goldwater’s supporters were), but was instead a fervent supporter of states’ rights, economic 
liberties, and tough on crime policies. The practical consequence of Goldwater’s positions was 
an opposition to federal civil rights legislation and the advocacy of federal “tough on crime” 
policies in urban centers rocked by racial protests and riots. While Lyndon Johnson and the 
victorious Democratic Party continued forward with civil rights legislation, including the 1965 
Voting Rights Act, they largely followed Goldwater’s lead in making crime prevention a major 
federal goal.91  
 Johnson appointed a Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 
1965—generally known as the Crime Commission—and followed the its recommendation to 
dramatically increase direct and indirect federal involvement with crime prevention and control. 
The result was the 1965 Law Enforcement Assistance Act, establishing the Office of Law 
Enforcement Assistance (OLEA) within the Justice Department, which in addition to distributing 
funds, aided local law enforcement in the modernization of training, policies, and procedures. As 
the 1960s progressed, the increase in race riots and the rise of antiwar civil disobedience shifted 
the focus of crime prevention towards the prevention and control of mass “civil disturbance.”  
In 1968, following the “Long Hot Summer of 1967” and the 1968 riots that followed Dr. 
King’s assassination, Johnson appointed a new Commission on the Causes and Prevention of 
                                                           
91 Note: See Naomi Murakawa’s The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America. 
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Violence, which shifted the federal focus towards fighting urban crime. The 1968 Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act significantly increased federal aid to state and local police and 
courts, as well as direct federal spending through agencies such the FBI.92 The 1968 legislation 
replaced the OLEA with the more active and substantial Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA). LEAA helped local and state police implement crowd control and “use of 
force” protocols that were designed to minimize altercations between police and protesters, 
and helped equip police departments with non-lethal crowd control technologies that proved 
more effective and less visible than the infamous attack dogs and firehouses used on civil rights 
demonstrators.93 More than 10,000 law enforcement officers from across the country 
participated in training courses designed by the U.S. Army Police School and funded by LEAA 
(McCarthy & McPhail, 1998).94 Since 1991, the Department of Defense has also been supplying 
local and state law enforcement agencies with surplus military equipment at reduced or no cost 
through The Department of Defense Excess Property Program (1033 Program). Since 1997 that 
program has provided more than $5 billion in military hardware (Levine, 2014). In sum, it is clear 
that the federal government was a driving force behind the diffusion of modern police methods 
at the state and local levels.95 The institutionalized constraint of disruptive movement activity 
has been a deliberate and effective government strategy. 
                                                           
92 P.L. 90-351 
93 Much of the crowd control technology used today by law enforcement was developed by DoD’s Non-
Lethal Weapons Program (formally “Less-Lethal”), or by private military contractors. 
94 Sometimes information sharing involves spreading tactical developments from police forces in major 
metropolitan areas like Los Angeles and Chicago to agencies across the country. For example, the US 
Department of Justice has issued reports detailing DoD and civil law enforcement weapons that function 
like shopping catalogues for state and local police. See https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205293.pdf 
(accessed on 9/11/2014). 
95 McCarthy and McPhail stress that the near universal adoption of such practices is inconsistent with 
mere passive diffusion according to basic organizational theory. In other words, the evidence does not 
support the idea that local governments developed these policing strategies independently or simply 
copied those of other localities. 
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John McCarthy and Clark McPhail call these “institutionalized solutions to the recurring 
problem of protest,” Public Order Management Systems or POMS, and argue that they have 
systematically transformed the nature of protest activity in America into something minimally 
disruptive (McCarthy & McPhail, 1998). McCarthy and McPhail argue that POMS are 
characterized by three key principles: negotiation between parties, planning by authorities, and 
planning by activists. These three principles serve to make protest routines predictable and 
orderly, creating physical spaces and norms of behavior that separate activists, their targets, and 
the authorities. The effect has been to move from policing characterized by “escalated force”—
where police respond to increasing activist disruption with increasing force—to policing 
characterized by “negotiated management”—where police proactively avoid conflict with 
protesters.  
A central example of the POMS shift is the ubiquitous use of protest permits, which 
today are almost always granted, provided the space/time is not already committed to other 
events or protests.96 Permitting procedures have become the cornerstone of POMS because 
they force protesters to plan in advance and negotiating the rules of a protest long before the 
first placard is raised. A related development is the spread of “free speech zones,” which confine 
advocacy to specific (often out-of-the-way) locations, and have proliferated in National Parks 
and universities. McCarthy and McPhail document a number of other POMS practices that 
reduce conflict, including, pre-negotiating arrests, efficiently processing and releasing arrestees, 
                                                           
96 The National Parks Service (NPS) has restricted protest in some ways that are worth noting. As 
discussed later, the Supreme Court upheld an NPS refusal to allow Community for Creative Nonviolence, a 
homelessness advocate group, to conduct an overnight protest on the National Mall. The NPS has come 
under fire for not allowing demonstrations at certain sites, such as around Independence Hall in 
Philadelphia and the Statue of Liberty.  NPS also lost a 2010 case in Federal Appeals Court over the 
practice of requiring single individual advocates or small groups to obtain permits before speaking to 
park-goers, handing out literature, or gathering signatures. These restrictions were seen as overly 
burdensome given the lack of a real government interest in these cases. 
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designating protest leaders as “marshals” responsible for their fellows, cordoning off protest 
(and separate counter protest) areas, and more. Working from the same data source I use in 
Figure 3, McCarthy and McPhail present protest event data from 1991-1995 (non-linear), which 
shows a great deal of protest by notably “aggressive” groups (Queer Nation, Act-Up, Justice for 
Janitors, and Operation Rescue), with very little conflict or violence. While police were present 
at 212 out of the 213 protests by these SMOs, and arrests were made at 180 protests, only 42 
events saw the use of police force.  
Many of these events undoubtedly produced significant social and political disruptions. 
Janitors for justice created traffic jams with their signature highway blockades. Act-Up activists 
shut down legislative offices, churches, and even the New York Stock Exchange by chaining 
themselves to furniture and railings. And as previously discussed, Operation Rescue temporarily 
shut down abortion clinics with their persistent entrance blockades. But few activists were 
assaulted by police or counter protesters at these events, and protesters spent little if any time 
in jail.97 Police managed these disruptions and did everything in their power to avoid escalating 
conflict. As such, disruptions tended to be localized and brief, minimizing their impact. This is 
not to say that these disruption were without power, but merely that institutional 
developments in policing serve to facilitate protest while significantly constraining opportunities 
for disruptive power. Broader empirical analysis bears this out. 
Looking over the complete Dynamics of Contention data from 1960-1995, we see strong 
evidence of negotiated management. Figure 3.4 shows that police presence at protests has 
                                                           
97 It is also worth noting that mass civil disobedience is in part disruptive because it overwhelms local jails 
and courts. This was certainly the case in the Deep South during civil rights movement of the 50s and 60s. 
As today’s modern prison system has vastly expanded, the ability of cities and states to hold and process 
protesters has greatly expanded. Combined with POMs promoting plea deals and the dropping of charges, 
it is rare to hear of protesters “clogging the jails” these days.  
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plummeted from around 45% of protests to fewer than 10% of protests. Similarly, the amount 
of protests involving arrests has declined from heights of more 90% in the early 1970s to around 
10% in the 1990s.98 These trends suggest both that most protest lacks a significant likelihood of 
disruptions and that most protests are controlled through negotiated management rather than 
reactive police intervention. Furthermore, Figure 5 demonstrates that when police were present 
at protests, they are actively involved in managing protests. Some 90% of contemporary 
protests, slightly higher than the rate in the 1960s, were subject to police actions. Such actions 
cover the full spectrum from directing protesters to approved locations, to arresting protesters, 
to using force against protesters. But as Figure 3.5 makes clear, the percentage of protest 
subject to police use of force or violence declined over the same period.  
 
Figure 3.4: Percentage of Protests with Police Presence and Arrests  
 
                                                           
98 It needs to be stressed that these are protests that garnered coverage in America’s flagstone national 
newspaper, The New York Times. Consequently, the data over represent the figures involving police, 
arrests, and other dramatic activity. However, these volatile protests should be over represented in all 
years, meaning the trends remain a useful measure of protest dynamics. 
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of Protests with Police Actions  
 
Empirically, it seems rather clear that social movement disruption has declined over 
time. But numbers do not tell the full story. Turning back to structural constrains, we can see 
that the limits on disruptive power go far beyond the institutionalization of POMS. 
 
Pro-Life Racketeers and Environmental Sailor Mongering 
 The development of POMS is at its heart a story of government developing its law 
enforcement capacities to address very real problems with crime, and then applying those 
capacities to reduce both criminal and noncriminal activist disruptions. Modernized law 
enforcement presents a significant constraint on disruptive power. This same story can be seen 
more directly in the way federal laws targeted at criminal enterprises have been repurposed to 
constrain disruptive movements. Perhaps the most extreme example of this practice was the 
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second Bush administration’s use of an obscure 1872 “sailor mongering” law against the 
environmental SMO Greenpeace. 
 Sailor Mongering was the practice of illegally boarding a ship heading into port in hopes 
of enticing sailors into frequenting one’s tavern or brothel. Equal parts solicitation and piracy, 
sailor mongering had not been prosecuted under US law since the 19th century. But when 
Greenpeace activists boarded the ship APL Jade to protest the importation of prohibited 
rainforest mahogany, Attorney General John Ashcroft filed charged against Greenpeace. 
Importantly, the Bush administration targeted the organization itself, which threatened the 
group’s nonprofit status and could potentially designate Greenpeace as a “criminal 
organization” required to report to its activities to the Justice Department. A U.S. District Court 
Judge ultimately threw out the case on the grounds that the boarding took place some 6 miles 
out to sea, and thus did not count as “about to arrive” at port under the law. However, Judge 
Alderberto in no way suggested the origins of the law or the identity of the defendant were 
barriers to future prosecutions (Huus, 2003).  
 The bizarre facts of the Greenpeace case represent an extreme but useful example of 
how laws can be repurposed to target SMOs. A far more significant example is the Organized 
Crime and Control Act of 1970, which contained the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, or RICO, amending the 1946 Hobbs Act.99 Signed by President Nixon as part of the above-
discussed war on crime, RICO would eventually turn its attention from mobsters to movements. 
Anti-racketeering laws are designed to punish organizations that use criminal activities in a 
systematic way to extract money from their victims. The quintessential example is a mafia 
organization using assault, property destruction, murder—and the threat of these crimes—to 
                                                           
99 P.L. 91-452,  
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extort “protection money” from businesses. RICO allowed the federal government to prosecute 
the organization itself (and its leadership) with heightened penalties if its members were shown 
to engage in a “pattern of racketeering activity” (two or more crimes). So instead of simply 
sending low level muscle to prison, prosecutors could target decision makers and their front 
organizations, such as corrupt unions.  
 RICO was, and is, devastating to organized crime.100 But in the 1980s RICO was also 
turned against movement activists, SMOS, and organized labor.101 RICO and its amendments 
allow for targets of racketeering to file civil RICO complaints and seek damages and injunctions 
independent of criminal prosecution. In 1989, the National Organization for Women (NOW) 
added a RICO claim to an existing suit again anti-abortion activist Joseph Scheidler, the Pro-Life 
Action League, the Pro-life Direct Action League, and additional defendants Randall Terry and 
Operation Rescue.102 The plaintiffs argued that pro-life activists and SMOs conspired to use 
                                                           
100 The Sopranos had an ongoing RICO plotline that did a good job capturing the mechanics of the law and 
the lethal threat it posed to organized crime. See David Remnick’s interesting New Yorker piece on the 
show that notes the success of RICO is the major factor driving the Italian Mafia into extinction Invalid 
source specified.. 
101 There is a long history of RICO use against unions engaged in mafia-related extortion—i.e. give us an 
inflated contract or these thugs break your knee caps. But more recently, Civil RICO has been used by 
corporations claiming that union organizing—when it involves libel, slander, or other minor legal 
violations—constitutes conspiracy to commit extortion because employment concessions necessarily 
involve obtaining corporate property. While RICO claims were dismissed in the key case of Cintas Corp. v. 
Unite Here 601 F.Supp.2d 571 (2009), these lawsuits have arguably served as another tool for suppressing 
and burdening union organizing. Benjamin Levin argues that these suits have both an immediate 
deterrent effect on unionization and also a longer-term sociological effect of spreading negative social 
constructions of organized labor Invalid source specified.. These dual effects are equally problematic for 
SMOs whose influence and financial viability is built upon their public standing. 
102 The existing case is yet another example of the legal pattern discussed in this section. NOW originally 
brought the suit as an anti-trust violation of the 1890 Sherman Act, claiming that attempts to shut down 
abortion clinics were an unlawful attempt to reduce competition in the reproductive services market. This 
claim was eventually dismissed and the case came to focus on the RICO claim of extortion. And while 
NOW is itself is certainly an SMO, in this capacity it is clearly using the framework of government to 
constrain disruptive movement challenges. A central contention of this dissertation is that movements 
that have already claimed a strong position within the system are often benefited by constraints on new 
challengers. 
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blockades, arson, violence, and threats of violence to deprive abortion clinics of revenue. The 
key questions in the case were the extent to which advocacy of actions amounted to directing 
them, and whether the defendants needed to actually profit from these activities to fit the 
statutory definitions of “extortion” and thus “racketeering.”   
 In 1994, the Supreme Court decided NOW v. Schneidler 9-0, ruling that the plaintiffs 
application of RICO was not facially inappropriate. This ruling essentially gave a green light for 
RICO cases against SMOs associated with direct action or civil disobedience. In NOW v. 
Schneidler itself, a 1998 jury produced a guilty verdict on a number of racketeering charges, 
leading to a nationwide injunction against protests by the defendants and treble damages of 
$257,000 to the two clinics who were co-plaintiffs with NOW. The verdict led to another five 
years of appeals bringing the case back to the Supreme Court. In 2003 the Court reversed its 
1994 ruling and held that pro-life activism did not qualify as extortion because the defended 
obtained neither money nor property from the actions. In 2006, the Court heard the case a final 
time to consider whether the1998 verdict could be sustained on charges of violence unrelated 
to extortion. The Court rejected these charges as covered under RICO, putting the major 
questions of public law to bed.103  
 As discussed at the start of the chapter, the NOW v. Schneidler case was instrumental in 
the demise of Operation Rescue, and more broadly, in the end of blockade tactics by the pro-life 
movement. Even though abortion activists prevailed in the end—even recovering some court 
costs—the burden of two decades of litigating, temporary judgments, injunctions, and a cloud of 
threatening uncertainty were effectively silencing. And while the anti-abortion case is the most 
                                                           
103 Litigation over court costs dragged on until 2014. 
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famous, and most significant from a public law standpoint, it is not alone. A second example, 
this one involving the animal rights movement, goes even further in revealing the reach of RICO.  
 In 1998 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) launched a campaign against 
the contract animal testing firm Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS). The campaign was based on 
video, photos, and testimony by Michelle Rokke, a PETA undercover investigator employed at 
HLS’s New Jersey lab. Undercover investigations are a staple tactic of social movements that 
address social issues where the acts in question occur exclusively on private property out of the 
public eye. Animal rights SMOs are likely the most vigorous users of this method, infiltrating 
labs, fur farms, factory farms, slaughterhouses, circuses, and more. But the HLS campaign 
produced a stunning result. HLS filed a RICO suit against PETA, alleging that Ms. Rokke (and 
other PETA investigators in other investigations) repeatedly violated her employment contract, 
constituting a pattern of racketeering activity.  
 The implications of the HLS RICO suit are staggering. Under RICO, any damages that 
PETA’s public campaign caused to HLS were subject to treble damages. That is to say, if PETA’s 
protests and media appearances cause $1 million in clients to withdraw business from HLS, PETA 
could be on the hook for $3 million in damages. The nature of a RICO charge poisons the fruits 
of legal activism. The longer PETA’s HLS campaign continued, the more a potential RICO 
judgment grew. As such, the suit challenged the basic feasibility of activists engaging in public 
campaigns based on undercover investigations and other tactics where minor criminal penalties 
(say for trespassing or breach of contract) would otherwise be born solely by the investigator. In 
the end, PETA reached a settlement with HLS in which it surrendered all undercover pictures, 
videos, and testimony to HLS, agreed not to publicly discuss the HLS investigation, and 
guaranteed they would not infiltrate HLS for a full five year period (Kolata, 1998). While 
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monetary damages were not part of the deal, PETA was effectively forced to abandoned what 
was arguably the most important animal rights campaign against animal experimentation since 
the protests that produced the Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1985.  
 The HLS campaign spawned an animal rights offshoot name Stop Huntington Animal 
Cruelty (SHAC), which would lead one of the most aggressive direct action campaigns of any 
modern SMO. I will turn to the SHAC example in the next section of this chapter, but it is 
important to note here that the PETA-HLS settlement cut off any support to the fringe direct 
action group from PETA, the movement’s most radical mainstream group. With no other 
national animal rights SMO willing to test the RICO waters, SHAC was left isolated from the 
resources of the broader movement. In the end, RICO’s most constraining aspect is likely that it 
forces movements to quarantine their most disruptive elements off to prevent contaminating 
the movement’s major financial and organizational assets.104 If we turn to one last example we 
can clearly see the threat RICO poses to a movement’s core SMOs.  
                                                           
104 It is not unusual for movements to have interactions between fringe mainstream organizations and 
clandestine networks of extremist. In many cases, the relationship goes something like this. The 
clandestine network commits criminal activities and turn over pictures, videos, and property taken from 
their targets to the formal organization, which then publicizes the events and any exposes industry or 
government secrets. When these clandestine activists are arrested, the formal organization often covers 
legal fees for their defense. Movement insiders also provided important legitimacy for the networks, 
which made supporting their activities acceptable to much of the sympathetic public. SMOs are shielded 
in this relationship by claims that they did not know the identities of the activists or any of their plans in 
advance. Moreover, providing legal resources is generally justified under the sweeping American ideal 
that all defendants are innocent until proven guilty and entitled to competent legal representation. The 
most prominent examples of these relationships in the 1980s and 1990s were the Animal Liberation Front 
(ALF), which had an ongoing symbiotic relationship with People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA), and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), which maintained ties with Earth First (which eventually slid 
into the ELF half of the equation) and Greenpeace. These relationships were highly productive for both 
sides, enabling clandestine activists and raising the profile of fringe SMOs compared to their centrist 
counterparts. What RICO and related legal efforts have succeeded in doing is making these relationships 
too legally and financially costly for SMOs, allowing the clandestine networks to be marginalized, 
prosecuted, and broken up. See (Best, Nocella II, & editors, 2004). 
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Our third example of RICO’s effective use against SMOs also involves animal rights 
groups, this time in their fight to end the use of elephants in circuses. The importance of this 
example is that it shows how RICO—again, a law aimed at mobsters—even constrains SMOs 
engaged in public interest litigation. In 2000, a coalition of animal rights/welfare SMOs that 
eventually included the Animal Welfare Institute (AWI), The American Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), and the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) sued Feld 
Entertainment for violations of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The SMOs argued the Feld’s 
Ringling Bros. circus mistreated its elephants, constituting an illegal “taking” under the ESA. The 
litigation eventually began to fall apart as it became clear the cases star witness would be legally 
viewed as a paid witness.105 This prospect raised the specter that the animal groups might not 
simply lose the case, but be stuck with Feld’s court costs. So where does RICO come in? 
 In 2007, Feld filed a civil RICO claim against its opponents in the ESA case. Fled claimed 
that each and every payment of the litigation’s star witness constituted an act of fraud, 
producing 1,360 “predicated acts that constitute racketeering activity” by the SMOs. As NOW v. 
Shneidler shows, Feld would have to show the SMOs committed these alleged crimes to extort 
money or otherwise take Feld’s property, a difficult burden of proof.106 Still, the threat of RICO 
treble damages (multiplying actual damages up to three times) and injunctions was enough to 
lead the parties to settle the ESA and RICO suits together. In 2012, the ASPCA paid Feld $9.3 
million to settle, and shortly after, HSUS and the remaining litigants paid a $15.75 million 
                                                           
105 During the lengthy litigation various SMOs paid former Ringling elephant handler Tom Rider some 
$190,000 dollars for room and board, living expenses, air travel, media appearances, etc. The groups 
argued that they covered Rider’s expenses because participation in the suit rendered him unemployable 
in his field, but by all accounts the payments were sloppy and lacked transparency. They were at the very 
least poor legal practice. Having met Rider myself, my impression is that Rider was essentially extorting 
these groups by threatening to walk from litigation the groups had invested millions in.  
106 Though not entirely implausible depending on how the courts view attempts to have the elephants 
removed and/or attempts to fundraise based on the litigation. 
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settlement (Alexander, 2013). The other terms of the settlement are not public knowledge. 
Typically, SMOs forced to settle RICO suits or similar litigation agree to a gag order on regarding 
the facts of the case (such as pictures, video, and testimony of the alleged cruelty) and a set 
period in which the SMO cannot campaign against the other party. The result is that most of the 
major animal rights SMOs are effectively abandoning a major front of their social movement. It 
is a setback of years, or perhaps decades on an issue that had previously shown significant 
momentum.107  
 While RICO cases against SMOs are not an everyday occurrence, the threat of RICO is 
ever present, encouraging SMOs to avoid association with even the mildest crimes. This effect 
has only been heightened by the professional legal culture of institutionalized SMOs, as 
described in Chapter 4. It is not in any sense hyperbolic to wonder which of the black civil rights 
leaders and SMOs of the 1950s and 1960s would have faced RICO challenges had the law been 
in place at during that period.   
 
Terrorists Abound 
In 21st century America, charges of racketeering seem anachronistic and even quaint 
(although clearly such changes remain legally and financially devastating). Just as well throw 
around charges of syndicalism and communism these days. RICO remains a powerful legal tool, 
but one that lacks a certain resonance. If you really want to damn a group in contemporary 
America, you don’t call them racketeers, you call them terrorists. While the public generally 
                                                           
107 As discussed later, Ringling has in fact begun to phase out the use of elephants. I do not believe this 
development undermines the points made in this section.  
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associates this rhetorical shift with the events of 9-11-2001, anti-terrorism had already become 
a main focus of federal law enforcement in the 1990s.108 And as mentioned in the section of the 
“war on crime,” definitions of domestic terrorism are readily applicable to disruptive social 
movement tactics. In the mid-1990s—despite the Oklahoma City bombing—domestic terrorism 
prevention came to focus on what FBI Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division 
referred to as “special interest extremist movements.” Lewis declared that "The No. 1 domestic 
terrorism threat is the eco-terrorism, animal-rights movement," focusing FBI resources on these 
groups, as well as anti-abortion activists engaging in “direct action” campaigns (Schuster, 2005). 
These issue-based movements contrast with revolutionary movements that challenge the 
sovereignty of the state, such as America’s right-wing militia movement and Oklahoma City 
bomber, Timothy McVeigh. 
In 2004 and 2005, Lewis gave revealing Senate testimony on FBI efforts “working to 
detect, disrupt, and dismantle the animal rights and environmental extremist movements that 
are involved in criminal activity.” He notes doubling of counterterrorism agents from 1993 to 
2003, disseminating 64 intelligence reports and 19 strategic assessments to local state and 
federal agencies from 2003-2005, employing the FBI’s Terrorist Financing Operations Section to 
track movement resources, established 103 joint task forces with state, local, federal and 
international agencies, and as of 2005 were conducting 150 active investigations at 35 FBI 
                                                           
108 This is not to say that the 2001 PATRIOT Act did not enhance the powers of law enforcement, quite the 
contrary. In the twenty-first-century, activists have come to believe that they may be under surveillance 
at any time. During my time in the mid-2000s working at an SMO, we were told not send any electronic 
communications we would not want read by the FBI or IRS. It remains somewhat unclear the extent to 
which domestic law enforcement has made use of the PATRIOT Act in its operations against domestic 
extremists and this lack of transparency is a major complaint voiced by many activist communities. For 
movements that are involved in transnational advocacy—particularly in the middle-east, Africa, and 
South-East Asia—the PATRIOT Act more clearly allow federal agents in the NSA and FBI significantly 
expanded access to international communications and financial records. 
 88
offices. Lewis goes on to offer numerous examples recent arrests and prosecutions, highlighting 
the role of the Animal Enterprises Protection Act.109 
RICO was never designed to target social movements, let alone any particular 
movement. It is a leading example of a broad pattern in which the tools of law enforcement are 
repurposed to address movement disruptions. But not all of the key laws constraining 
movement disruption fit this pattern. Some are targeted responses to disruptive movements. 
The two central examples being the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE) 
and the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, Amended to the Animal Enterprises Terrorism 
Act of 2006 (AETA). In each case, these laws were designed to address types of disruptive 
activism that lawmakers felt were not sufficiently constrained by general criminal statutes. I 
looked at FACE to start the chapter, and will now look at AETA. 
AETA works on logic similar to that of RICO or hate crime laws. The idea is that the social 
threat presented by a group or network is worse than the sum of their individual crimes. As 
such, general criminal statutes are insufficient and special criminal and civil penalties must be 
added to crimes that are part of a larger collective undertaking. AETA covers acts that aim at 
“damaging or interfering with” a business that uses or supports the use of animals, including 
violence, property damage, threats, vandalism, trespass, harassment, intimidation, as well as 
conspiracy to commit any of these acts.110 Interestingly, the statute specifically includes 
                                                           
109 Pub.L. 102–346. Later amended to the Animal Enterprises Terrorism Act. 
110 Covered actions must be (1) for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an 
animal enterprise; and (2) in connection with such purpose— 
(A) intentionally damages or causes the loss of any real or personal property (including animals or 
records) used by an animal enterprise, or any real or personal property of a person or entity having a 
connection to, relationship with, or transactions with an animal enterprise; 
(B) intentionally places a person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to that person, 
a member of the immediate family (as defined in section 115) of that person, or a spouse or intimate 
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“records” as property, which would likely include much of the information targeted by 
undercover investigations. Also of note, the statute covers “intentionally [placing] a person in 
reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to that person” which is far more 
expansive than explicit threats, and can include actions like publishing the home address of a 
campaign target. AETA is full of such subjective and expansive clauses, which has led to 
significant anxiety (even paranoia) amongst more radical activists. When triggered, AETA 
penalties include fines and federal prison sentences that range from one year to life in prison, 
with five years possible for causing a mere $10,000 in property loses .111  
The most notable use of AETA was in the aforementioned prosecution of the fringe 
group Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), which had waged one of the most prominent 
and successful disruptive campaigns in recent memory. Huntingdon Life Sciences is a British 
contract testing company, and the world’s largest user of laboratory animals in pharmaceutical, 
cosmetic, and product testing. UK SHAC activity in the 1990s pushed the company to relocate a 
significant portion of their operations the US, resulting in the founding of a US SHAC branch. 
SHAC’s US organizers coordinated a loose network of activists who harassed and intimidated 
Huntingdon officers, and then broadened their campaign to target businesses working with 
SHAC (Kocieniewski, 2006).112 This last tactic drew particular government attention in part 
because of its unsavory guilt-by-association nature, but also for its remarkable effectiveness. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
partner of that person by a course of conduct involving threats, acts of vandalism, property damage, 
criminal trespass, harassment, or intimidation; or 
(C) conspires or attempts to do so; 
111 Note, this is property damage or lose, which includes lost profits and extra expenses. So adding a night 
watchman in response to trespassing (or threats) could easily pass the $10,000 – 5 year penalty level in a 
matter of weeks or months. The original AEPA had penalties roughly half as harsh, with sentences starting 
at 6 months.  
112 These tactics combined with more traditional, yet highly charged, protests that were attended by 
hundreds of supporters. Such protests were much more disruptive than most contemporary US protests, 
drawing heavy police presence, and leading to dozens of confrontations and arrests. 
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SHAC’s accomplishments included getting Huntingdon dropped by their bank and insurance 
company, as well as lowering the Company’s market capitalization to a level that prevented a 
planned listing on the New York Stock Exchange. The disruptions of this small group nearly 
crippled a corporation with hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue, potentially 
sending shockwaves through related sectors of the economy.  
In the end, the FBI was able to contain the disruptive threat of SHAC through AETA 
prosecution. Six officers and members of SHAC, along with the organization itself, were indicted 
as terrorists in 2004. Several defendants pleaded out, and three were convicted and sentenced 
to between four and six years apiece. The organization itself was ordered to pay $1 million in 
restitution to Huntingdon, but dissolved in anticipation of the verdict and the loss of most of its 
officers (Mansnerus, 2006). These convictions were based primarily on the group’s website 
activity, which served to indirectly coordinate and encourage criminal behavior. While that 
information was also used for legal protests, the courts judged that the defendants were aware 
the site would produce illegal activity and aimed for it to do so. As such, the defendants were 
found guilty of conspiracy to destroy property and place victims in fear of death or serious 
bodily injury. Importantly, the Federal Circuit Court ruled in US v. Fullmer that SHAC’s web 
postings of target personal information, documents about direct action tactics, and positive 
reports of illegal direct actions amounted to “true threats” unprotected by the First 
Amendment.113  
The significance of AETA and the SHAC case is far-reaching, as it directly impacts the 
ability for movements to make use of the Internet organizing for disruptive activity that Piven 
                                                           
113 584 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009). True threats is a category of speech similar to, but distinct from, 
incitement, which is also unprotected by the First Amendment. 
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anticipates. The decision reinforced an earlier 9th Circuit ruling that found the anti-abortion 
“Nuremberg Files” website a true threat for listing the names of abortion doctors and striking a 
line through those that were murdered (Liptak, 2002). Combined, the cases set a precedent that 
prominent movement speakers on the Internet are responsible for the foreseeable actions of 
their readers. Such a doctrine means that activists working in those gray areas of encouraging 
volatile disruptive protests, legal harassment and shaming, and even civil disobedience are left 
on precarious legal footing. The “true threat” doctrine is one piece of a larger shift in 
Constitutional law that may significantly constrain activist disruption. I turn to this shift next. 
 
Dangerous and Disruptive Speech under the First Amendment114 
 The American story of free speech and the First Amendment typically focuses on the 
freedom of speech’s humble 18th century beginnings and its meteoric rise over the course of the 
20th century. All in all it is told as a happy tale in which liberty and progress struggle against, and 
eventually triumph over, the forces of censorship and repression. The saga ends with 21st 
century Americans enjoying unparalleled First Amendment protections, which extend to even 
the most subversive and hateful forms of expression.115 It is an account that I generally accept, 
but also one that bears further interrogation. In particular, I am concerned that recent Supreme 
Court decisions (and non-decisions) may be quietly undermining the value of speech even as the 
right to speak is affirmed.  
                                                           
114 Make sure this is not too redundant when addressing the First Amendment in Chapter 2. 
115 It is perspective common to all the First Amendment surveys I’ve come across, with O’Brien (2010) a 
prime example. 
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In this section I look at the development of the Supreme Court’s contemporary free 
speech doctrine as it concerns disruptive speech and protest, and I argue that while speech 
rights have expanded they do not robustly protect speech by weak and dissenting groups. I 
argue that developments relating to hate speech and time, place and manner regulations are 
subtly allowing content based regulation to undermine the speech of marginalized groups.  
The traditional narrative by First Amendment scholars starts from the Sedition Act of 
1798, which reminds us that the framers had a somewhat truncated notion of free speech that 
was deemed consistent with the Adams administration criminalizing criticism of the president 
by his Jeffersonian opposition (O'Brien, 2010, p. 1) (Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of 
Free Speech, 1995, p. xiv). At the founding free speech and press merely codified English 
common law and the views of English jurists such as William Blackstone, which only prohibited 
government from issuing prior restraints. Throughout the 19th and early 20th century speech 
rights expand haltingly until Justice Holmes wrote his famous “clear and present danger” dissent 
in 1919’s Abrams v. US and Justice Sanford incorporated free speech rights to the states in 
1925’s Gitlow v. New York116. Driven by the opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, free 
speech quickly assumed a “preferred position” as a fundamental constitutional liberty in the 
first half of the 20th century, with the Court steadily raising the bar for what constituted 
dangerous and unprotected speech.  
At mid-century First Amendment traditionalists in the Stone and Vinson Courts rolled 
back the expansiveness of free speech doctrine, provoking impassioned dissents from absolutist 
Justices Black and Douglas. Writing for the Court in Dennis v. US (1951), Chief Justice Vinson 
favored redefining the clear and present danger test as a balancing approach more friendly to 
                                                           
116250 U.S. 616 (1919); 268 U.S. 652 (1925) 
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the regulation of speech, in this case upholding the Smith Act’s criminalization of communist 
advocacy.117 But this moment of retrenchment was short-lived, as the second half of the 20th 
century would be shaped by the Warren Court’s move away from the clear and present danger 
test and towards a new two-tier First Amendment doctrine of “definitional balancing” set down 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio.118 The definitional balancing approach offers near absolute protection 
to socially and politically relevant speech and applies balancing only to categories of 
unprotected speech including obscenity, defamation, incitement, fighting words and later on 
true threats. The judicial origin of such categories was Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), an 
earlier “fighting words” case where Justice Murphy wrote, “There are certain well defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”119 While Chaplinsky aimed at narrowing the scope 
of the First Amendment, Brandenburg relied on the “classes of speech” approach to render the 
vast majority of speech protections absolute. But as I will show, the Court’s embrace of 
absolutism has been consistent with judicial policymaking that continues to allow the 
suppression of “dangerous” advocacy.  
Brandenburg v. Ohio is rightly considered one of the 20th century’s landmark Supreme 
Court decisions because it fundamentally shifted how the Court would address the problem of 
dangerous, disruptive, and hateful speech. While the Court’s unanimous per curiam decision 
lacks the philosophical gravitas of key First Amendment writings by Justices Holmes, Brandeis or 
Douglas, its holding was profound. Clarence Brandenburg was a leader of an Ohio Ku Klux Klan 
chapter who was convicted under Ohio’s 1919 Criminal Syndicalism statute for a speech 
                                                           
117 341 U.S. 494 (1951) 
118 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
119 315 U.S. 568 (1942) 
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advocating violent and unlawful behavior against blacks and Jews. Ohio’s law criminalizing the 
advocacy of crime was representative of a wide array of laws passed during World War I, World 
War II and the Cold war. The Court had long held such laws to be consistent with the First 
Amendment and specifically addressed this question in Whitney v. California (1927).120 The 
Court in Brandenburg explicitly overruled Whitney, vacating Clarence Brandenburg’s conviction 
and declaring that no law criminalizing “mere advocacy” of criminal or revolutionary behavior 
was consistent with the First Amendment. 
In place of the rhetorically malleable “clear and present danger” test Brandenburg 
declared that dangerous speech is fully protected unless it is “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” This test has two 
important aspects. First, the “directed to inciting” clause follows Teminiello v. Chicago (1949) in 
shielding speakers from responsibility for the disorderly actions of hostile crowds. And second, 
the “likely to incite or produce” clause” protects speakers in all theoretical and speculative 
speech against the unexpected behavior of sympathetic listeners.121 This high standard for 
incitement is rarely met in practice.  As Justice Douglas sardonically notes in his concurrence, in 
the dangerous speech cases the courts have heard, “The threats were often loud, but always 
puny, and made serious only by judges so wedded to the status quo that critical analysis made 
them nervous.” Unsurprisingly it is the concurrence by Justice Douglas that best fleshes out the 
import of an opinion that seems otherwise content with minimizing its own implications.  
Justice Douglas’s Brandenburg concurrence offers nothing less than a 50 year history of 
the “clear and present danger” doctrine and a cutting analysis that lays bare its judicial and 
                                                           
120  274 U.S. 357 (1927) 
121 337 U.S. 1 (1949) 
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philosophical inconsistencies. He traces the Court’s troubles with the doctrine to a failure to 
heed Justice Holmes’s insistence in Gitlow that “Every idea is an incitement…The only difference 
between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's 
enthusiasm for the result.” Douglas argues that the Court’s efforts to differentiate advocacy of 
ideas from advocacy of political action in cases like Yates v. US (1957) and Scales v. US (1961) 
respectively were doomed to failure because they turned on conviction and required the 
government to “invade the sanctuary of belief and conscience.”122 Such inquests were 
untenable and violated the core of the First Amendment. Thus Douglas points us back to the old 
stalwart example of “someone who falsely shouts fire in a crowded theatre,” which is what he 
calls an example of when “speech is brigaded with action.” It is only when speech and action are 
inseparable that speech can be regulated. And for Douglas the standards for incitement laid out 
by the Court call for just such a brigaded situation. Incitement is a command to lawlessness. It is 
akin to a general ordering her troops into battle or a mafia boss ordering a hit on a rival. It is the 
ability for one’s words to directly cause crime that makes incitement an action that can be 
regulated by government. Douglas reminds us that while “Action is often a method of 
expression,” speech is very rarely an action.  
Douglas’s concurrence in Brandenburg focuses on the distinction between speech and 
action, and in it he rightly points our attention back to the previous term when the Court made 
its landmark symbolic speech decision, US v. O’Brien (1968). The case concerned David Paul 
O’Brien who in 1966 publicly burned his draft card in protest of the Vietnam War. The 
destruction of the card violated a 1965 amendment to the Military Training and Service Act, 
which specifically prohibited mutilating or destroying the government issued cards. O’Brien 
                                                           
122 354 U.S. 298 (1957); 367 U.S. 203 (1961) 
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appealed his conviction arguing that his act was a form political speech and the 1965 
Amendment was an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech because its purpose was 
suppressing dissent. 
Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court in O’Brien with only Justice Douglas dissenting. 
Warren held that the 1965 Amendment was not unconstitutional, rejecting the idea that “an 
apparently limitless variety of conduct” could seek shelter under the First Amendment simply 
because it seeks to “express an idea.” The view that symbolic actions could be protected as 
speech had been established since Stromberg v. California (1931) struck down an anti-
communist law banning the display of red flags.123 But the Court had also routinely upheld laws 
that impacted symbolic speech and Justice Warren took this opportunity to establish clearer 
guidelines on what constituted protected and unprotected symbolic speech. His four prong test 
came to be known as the O’Brien Test and remains controlling law for symbolic speech issues. 
The O’Brien Test asks four questions of a law impacting speech. First, is the law “within 
the constitutional power of government?” Second, does the law further an “important or 
substantial government interest?” Third, is that interest “unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression?” And fourth, is the law narrowly drawn so that its impact on expression is “no 
greater than necessary” to achieve the government interest? If the answer to these four 
questions is yes then the law does not violate the First Amendment. In this case, Warren upheld 
the ban on destroying draft cards as justified under Congress’s power to raise an army, 
furthered the important interest in aiding the “smooth and proper” administration of the draft, 
was not targeted at suppressing anti-draft dissent, and was narrowly written with no alternative 
that would allow more expressive conduct. At the heart of the O’Brien test is an attempt to 
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discern whether the government seeks to regulate action or speech. Laws that target the 
“noncommunicative” part of action are generally upheld from First Amendment challenges.  
 Justice Douglas’s dissent in O’Brien is uncharacteristically flat. He seizes on the first 
prong of Court’s new test by arguing that the constitutionality of the draft has not been 
established and thus bears reargument. His argument is largely procedural and addresses the 
only one of the four prongs of the test applicable to all judicial review. Douglas misses the 
opportunity for thoughtful criticism of prongs 2-4 of the O’Brien test. He fails to ask why the 
speculative administrative burden of identifying draft dodgers qualifies as a “substantial 
government interest” under prong two, which would seem a logical question given his judicial 
perspective. However, Douglas does take up the issue of the remaining two prongs in his 
Brandenburg concurrence, noting that government’s targeting the destruction of draft cards 
instead of their nonpossession in O’Brien suggests that expression was in fact being targeted. As 
such the 1965 draft Amendment would fail prong three and possibly prong four of the O’Brien 
test rendering the law not “consistent with the First Amendment.” It is unclear why Douglas 
returned to the issue of O’Brien a year later in Brandenburg, but I believe he may have 
recognized the joint implications of the two historic rulings.124 And to me, Douglas’s criticism 
cuts to the heart of the trouble with O’Brien and some of its subsequent applications decades 
later.  
Prong 3 of the O’Brien tests asks that lawmakers not target expression, but leaves open 
the possibility that muting the impact of that expression is a legitimate government interest. 
This leaves us with the disturbing possibility that the government may legitimately suppress 
                                                           
124 It is unclear to me from my reading of these cases and analysis of these cases. I have not at this point 
looked deeper into Douglass’s writings and writings on his judicial philosophy and record. 
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forms of speech that it finds threatening so long as that suppression targets the impact and not 
the ideas underlying the speech.125 In this way the O’Brien decision lays the groundwork for 
government to bypass the otherwise formidable protections erected a year later in 
Brandenburg. As we turn now to our contemporary cases we find some evidence that the 
reasoning in O’Brien is in fact being used allow the regulation of dangerous and disruptive 
speech. 
Most commentators point to the Court’s protection of flag burning in Texas v. Johnson 
(1989) as evidence that the O’Brien test provides solid protection to symbolic protest.126 
Similarly, the Court’s decision to strike down a Minnesota hate crime law in R.A.V. v. St. Paul 
(1992) is often taken as evidence that dangerous speech protections continue to grow, with the 
Court in that case narrowing the category of “fighting words” to near irrelevance.127 This 
argument carries a lot of weight, but we can also see this moment in the late 1980s and early 
1990s as a turning point in the Court’s approach to dangerous and disruptive speech. 
Conservatives were incensed by the flag burning issue and intent on carving out space for 
common sense law and order regulations. Liberals were frustrated by limits on their ability to 
suppress reactionary hate group activity. The time was ripe for retrenchment of speech rights, 
and each side found a majority on the Court willing to accommodate this desire with the 
increasingly important “time, place and manner” (TMP) doctrine. 
                                                           
125 It might be argued that you cannot target one without the other, but this is perhaps an overly 
rationalistic view of ideas, which believes their power is inherent in their rationality. At least some of an 
idea’s impact is clearly associated with its presentation, including the manner and setting of delivery. As 
the J.S. Mill quote at the beginning of this chapter stresses, to say that corn dealers starve the poor can 
have a very different impact when generally espoused compared to when it is delivered to a mob in front 
of a corn-dealer’s house.  
126 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
127 505 U.S. 377 (1992) 
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The Court has always acknowledged the government’s right to prohibit speech and 
protest at specific time, places, and using certain methods of communication. Before the Court 
moved away from its balancing approach to the free speech, such regulations blended in with all 
the other order and decency arguments the Court accepted as reasonable justifications for 
regulation restricting speech. But with the shift to definitional balancing, the TPM doctrine took 
on new significance. Justice Goldberg’s decision in Cox v. Louisiana (1965) lays out the 
foundations of the doctrine, explaining: 
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic 
society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may 
address a group at any public place and at any time. The constitutional 
guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining 
public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy. 
In the 1970s, the doctrine would begin to take on a more definite shape, with the contemporary 
standard for valid TPM laws solidifying in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984)’s 
ruling that such restrictions are valid if they are “justified without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”128 Moreover, the Clark ruling tied TPM doctrine more closely to the O’Brien test, 
                                                           
128 We come close to the Clark standard in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc. (1976) where Justice Blackmun writes, “We have often approved restrictions of that kind 
provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve 
a significant governmental interest, and that, in so doing, they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.” This definition makes no reference to “narrow tailoring,” which is 
increasingly the battle ground for divisive cases in this and other First Amendment areas. Rulings before 
Virginia sometime required only a “legitimate” government interest, and did not use the phrase “ample 
alternative channels.” The exact standards of Clark do appear a year earlier in Perry Education Assn. v. 
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with the Court laying out a firm position embracing the content neutrality of restrictions that 
impact a single group disproportionately. In Clark, CCNV requested a permit for an overnight 
“sleep-in” protest in Washington DC’s Lafayette Park and “the Mall” to raise awareness of the 
plight of homeless persons forced to sleep outdoors in the elements.129 Arguably, such a tactic is 
particularly effective because of the close association between the symbolic speech and the 
message. CCNV argued that the Park Service’s denial of their permit did not leave them 
opportunities to express the same qualitative message with anything like the same impact. The 
Court was unmoved by the CCNV position. 
 In 1988 the Court took TPM doctrine a significant step further with Frisby v. Schultz. The 
case centered on anti-abortion home demonstrations—referred to as “home demos” by 
activists—in front of the residence of a Wisconsin doctor who performed abortions. Because the 
demonstrators stuck to the sidewalks—a public forum—and violated no state or local 
ordinances concerning obstructions, noise, harassment, etc., the municipality passed a law 
specifically prohibiting protest in front of residences. What is notable is that lawmakers were 
explicit in their goal of prohibiting specific protest activity, and yet the Court did not feel this 
raised significant issues regarding content neutrality. This move appears to accept the statutory 
justification of a law irrespective of both legislative intent and the consequences of 
enforcement. The law may target protesters in its inception, and the effect may be to shut down 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Perry Local Educators' Assn.(1983)—and it is possible I have missed the wording in a yet earlier case—but 
it is with Clark that we see the language of the standard begin to be applied consistently and precisely. 
129 In is noteworthy that National Park Service’s permitting process for the “The Mall” and other central 
D.C parks has become both a national model for the institutionalization of protest and the key example 
advocates of TPM doctrine use in support of their position. 
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specific disruptive protests, but the law remains content neutral because it could apply to any 
home demonstration.130 
 In 1989, the Court further clarified the narrow tailoring requirement of TPM doctrine. In 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court considered a case in which the City of New York 
required that musical acts performing at a Central Park venue use city sound equipment under 
the control of city sound technician. The ordinance had been struck down in Federal Appeals 
Court in large part because the ordinance was not the “least restrictive” method of securing the 
government interest of preventing excessive noise. The Appeals Court posited several 
alternative regulations, including setting a maximum decibel level, requiring a maximum decibel 
regulator be attached to equipment, or even providing a concert supervisor that could “pull the 
plug” on noise violators. Justice Kennedy, writing for the conservative majority of the Court, 
rejected the lower court logic. He stressed that narrow tailoring only requires that a “regulation 
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.” In stressing that this “effectiveness” standard is all that is required under the 
O’Brien and Clark precedents, Kennedy presses that lower Courts should defer to legislative 
judgment on narrow tailoring “so long as the [it] could reasonably have determined” the 
regulation is the most effective approach.131 This deferential approach to TPM restrictions would 
hold sway for the next quarter century. 
                                                           
130 By contrast, O’Connor’s opinion that same year in Boos v. Berry (1988) struck down a DC law 
prohibiting “the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if that sign tends to bring that 
foreign government into ‘public odium’ or ‘public disrepute.’" The law—reminiscent of the Sedition Act of 
1798—was clearly not content neutral by plain wording of the law and thus faced strict scrutiny. By 
striking down the law O’Connor showed just how crucial the determination of content neutrality can be.  
131 Kennedy does not define effectiveness for us. Is it cost-effectiveness? Is it most fully fulfilling the 
government interest? Presumably the definition is flexible, giving more deference to legislative choice. 
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 As with much of contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, it is the issue of 
abortion that most clearly defines the parameters of modern TPM doctrine. Following the Frisby 
decision, the Court upheld an injunction setting a 36 foot buffer zone around a Florida clinic and 
the homes of its employees. The decision in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. (1994) was 
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and once again showed the flexibility of TPM restrictions 
ruled content neutral. The protesters argued that the injunction could not be content neutral 
because it only prohibited the speech of anti-abortion activists. Rehnquist dismissed this 
argument, writing, “To accept petitioners' claim would be to classify virtually every injunction as 
content or viewpoint based. An injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group 
(or individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of that group.”132  As such, 
Rehnquist sees the Ward standard, as applied in Frisby, to be controlling and declared the 
injunction passed Ward’s requirements for content neutrality.  
 Notably, Rehnquist argues that the injunction must “burden no more speech than 
necessary to serve a significant government interest” as a basic standard for valid injunctive 
relief, but he is very clear that this “least restrictive test” is an additional requirement because 
“standard TPM analysis is not sufficiently rigorous” to meet the separate injunctive standard. It 
was under this least restrictive means standard that the Court struck down the injunction’s 300 
foot “no approach” zone and its blanket ban on displaying images/signs during business hours. 
Rehnquist’s analysis suggests that such measures would not run afoul of TPM doctrine alone. 
                                                           
132 Importantly, Rehnquist is rather dismissive of the privileged position of speech in the way he groups 
“perhaps the speech” in with other group activities. While he goes on to note that injunctions on speech 
raise special concerns about censorship, he rejects the idea that these concerns required heightened 
scrutiny. By contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent argues that even if we judge an injunction content neutral, 
the targeted nature of injunctions should require strict scrutiny analysis. The Chief Justice pushes back 
hard against Scalia’s position on scrutiny, highlighting a shift in the Roberts Court, in which Scalia’s 
position is now a mere one vote from holding a majority. 
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And even applying the least restrictive means standard, Rehnquist lets stand the fixed buffer 
zone and a strict noise prohibition, writing, “some deference must be given to the state court's 
familiarity with the facts and the background of the dispute between the parties even under our 
heightened review.”133 Indeed, during the Rehnquist Court, the Chief Justice and Justice 
O’Connor regularly joined the more liberal half of the Court in endorsing such local deference 
regarding the regulation of speech. 
 In 2000, the Court again visited the issue of abortion clinic buffer zones in Hill v. 
Colorado. In Hill, the Court considered a 100 foot “no approach” zone law, which prohibited 
protesters from coming within 8 feet of clinic patrons.134 Justice Stevens writes for a majority 
composed of the four liberal justices, Justice O’Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, upholding 
the Colorado law. The Hill ruling sees the Court’s divide solidify, and sets a precedent that buffer 
zones will generally be allowed under the First Amendment, provided they avoid overt 
discrimination and are practical in application. Significantly, Stevens frames his opinion in terms 
of striking “an acceptable balance between the constitutionally protected rights of law-abiding 
                                                           
133 Here the state court is in the role normally occupied by the legislature when considering the 
constitutionality of laws. The deference to local knowledge concerning the necessity of provisions would 
seem to apply equally to laws and injunctions. 
134 In 1997 the Court had decided Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network, which had struck down a 15 foot 
“floating buffer zone” injunction against Project Rescue activists. Once again, the Court applied the least 
restrictive means standard as they did in Madsen. The floating buffer zone was found to restrict more 
speech than necessary because it created significant uncertainty for protesters wishing to comply. Most 
importantly, what must a protester do if a patron is walking toward them, perhaps intentionally using the 
floating zone to herd protesters away? Presumably protesters must retreat. But what of multiple patrons 
moving in different directions? The injunction lacked language that would allow protesters to simply stay 
still in these situations where it would be difficult to maintain the 15 foot zone. While striking down the 
floating zone, the Court upheld the fixed buffer zone, as it did in Madsen.  Importantly, Rehnquist is quite 
clear that in Schenk, as in Madsen, the Court is employing the least restrictive means test because of the 
nature of injunctive relief, not because it is required by TPM doctrine under Ward. This is particularly 
important because McCullen v. Coakley (2014) relies on Madsen and Schenk in applying the least 
restrictive means test to an MA statute as part of the narrowness clause of TPM doctrine. It is a subtle 
shift, but one that allows Chief Justice Roberts to move away from the more permissive interpretations of 
the Rehnquist Court.  
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speakers and the interests of unwilling listeners.” This claim is notable both because balancing 
approaches are generally permissive of government regulation and because the government 
argues an interest in protecting unwilling listeners from upsetting messages.135 Stevens draws 
on Brandeis’s famous “right to be let alone” dissent in Olmstead v. US (1928), which is a 
somewhat odd use of fourth amendment search and seizure doctrine.136 When it comes to 
applying Ward, Stevens is somewhat casual in determining the government’s interest, whether 
the law is narrowly tailored, and what alternative channels of communication are left open. He 
argues that while large fixed buffer zones may close off some opportunities for expression, “A 
bright-line prophylactic rule may be the best way to provide protection, and, at the same time, 
by offering clear guidance and avoiding subjectivity, to protect speech itself.” Here he stresses 
that narrow tailoring under Ward need not require the least restrictive means, as was applied in 
Madsen and Schenk. At its core, Stevens’s argument is that the Court “must accord a measure of 
deference to the judgment of the Colorado Legislature” in judgment whether a “prophylactic 
rule” is necessary and appropriate. Under Hill, buffer zones would remain largely intact for the 
next decade and a half. 
                                                           
135Recall that Chief Justice Vinson used a focus on balancing to weaken speech protections under the clear 
and present danger test. Arguably a similar approach is at work here. 
136 Justice Kennedy’s dissent skewers Stevens’s appropriation of Brandeis as a “right to avoid unpopular 
speech in a public forum” For Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, Stevens’s opinion implicitly endorses the 
targeting of disruptive or dissenting speech as a legitimate government interest.  Scalia bitingly writes, 
“The strictures of the First Amendment cannot be avoided by regulating the act of moving one’s lips; and 
they cannot be avoided by regulating the act of extending one’s arm to deliver a handbill, or peacefully 
approaching in order to speak.” My analytic position in this chapter is quite similar to Scalia’s critique, 
though I am not claiming the majority is legally or normatively incorrect in its interpretation of the First 
Amendment.  
 It should be noted that Brandeis also wrote passionately about the right to be free of 
government interference concerning First Amendment issues of speech and assembly in Whitney v. CA. 
While he does not use the Olmstead phrasing, he does essentially argue the First Amendment creates a 
right to have one’s ideas left alone. But Brandeis is making a civil liberty claim about government 
interference with speech, not about the government protecting citizens from the speech of their fellows. 
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 In 2014 the Court picked up the buffer zone issue once more with McCullen v. Coakley, 
this time considering a Massachusetts law creating a 35 foot buffer zone around clinic 
entrances. For all intents and purposes, the case was a re-argument of Hill.137 But in 2014, 
Rehnquist and O’Connor had been replaced by Roberts and Alito, which gave the Roberts Court 
a 5-4 majority highly skeptical of the validity of buffer zones. While the Court’s decision in 
McCullen was 9-0 in favor of striking down the MA buffer zone statute, it seems certain that this 
unanimous decision was leveraged by Chief Justice Roberts.138 Roberts likely brought in the four 
liberal justices onboard with the threat of writing a 5-4 decision more fully in line with Scalia’s 
sweeping views.139 Roberts bases his opinion primarily upon two shifts from Hill. First, he 
jettisons Steven’s “right to be let alone” as a compelling state interest, arguing that the state’s 
only real interests are in insuring access to healthcare and preventing harassment. Second, 
Roberts interprets the narrow tailoring prong of TPM doctrine to implicitly apply a least 
restrictive means test, although Ward, Frisby, and Hill all rejected the test as a requirement for 
narrow tailoring. Roberts writes, “the Commonwealth has not shown that it seriously undertook 
to address the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to it. Nor has it shown that it 
considered different methods that other jurisdictions have found effective.” By constraining the 
government’s legitimate interests and increasing the requirements of narrow tailoring, the Chief 
                                                           
137 Justice Scalia argues that McCullen should overturn Hill, but the Chief’s Majority chose to skirt the issue 
and avoid any stare decisis debates. 
138 I have yet to find any clear account of the Court’s internal negotiations, but one may be available now 
or in the future. However, this is the only way I can understand the Court’s split and lack of liberal 
concurrences. Ginsberg in particular has been on a tear in 2014, writing with passion and often anger. Her 
dissent in Buwell v. Hobby Lobby, handed down the same week as McCullen, forcefully accused the 
Court’s conservatives of devaluing the rights of women. I can only see her silence McCullen as a sign of 
pragmatic compromise. 
139 Roberts is well known for his efforts as Chief to produce unanimous decisions. As of July 2014, after 
McCullen and Hobby Lobby were handed down, about 2/3 of Court’s 2014 cases had been unanimous. 
That rate is unprecedented for a Court that has typically produced 20-50% unanimous rulings over the 
past half century Invalid source specified..  
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Justice abandons the deferential approach of the Rehnquist Court and places a difficult burden 
of proof on the state.  
 Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan presumably signed on to the Chief 
Justice’s opinion because the alternative was 5-4 split with Roberts writing for the conservative 
half of the Court.140 Scalia and Alito wrote concurrences, with Kennedy and Thomas joining 
Scalia, which argued that buffer zones are inherently content-based and viewpoint-
discriminatory. It is essentially the position laid out by the Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy in the 
Hill dissents, but their arguments have grown in force as Alito embraced their logic and Roberts 
embraced their result. If the Scalia faction were to gain one more vote on the Court, it seems 
entirely possible that all TPM restrictions aimed at limiting the effects of disruptive speech 
would be ruled to lack content neutrality. In such a case most TPM restrictions targeting 
protesters would likely fall under strict scrutiny. However, at this time Roberts remains the 
swing vote, and favors a more case by case approach under his more demanding interpretation 
of Ward. While the Court’s recent shift opens up more political opportunities for disruptive 
protest, it must be noted that decades of a more permissive TPM doctrine have left an indelible 
mark on the tactical repertoires of contemporary social movements and have reshaped public 
expectations about the legitimacy of disruptive protest.  
 Shifts in TMP doctrine raise the possibility that unpopular groups will be targeted by 
regulations with an intentionally disparate impact. A related development impacting unpopular 
                                                           
140 Of course the Court could have produces a 1-4-4 decision, such as when Justice Powell joined two 
separate majorities in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). Roberts had recently found 
himself in a similar position in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012), where 
Roberts found himself upholding the ACA’s individual mandate with the four liberal justices and striking 
down its Medicaid expansion requirements with the four conservative justices. Presumably no dressing of 
unanimity could be found in that case. 
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groups is a recent shift in hate crime law. Virginia v. Black (2003) the Court revisited the issue of 
cross burning prohibitions a decade after R.A.V. found cross burning to be protected speech 
outside the fighting words exemption.141 The Court in Virginia was highly divided with Justice 
O’Connor only able muster a plurality for her opinion. The case consolidated two violations of 
Virginia’s cross burning statute. In one, a Barry Elton Black led a Klan rally at which a 25-foot 
cross was burned on private property but in public view. In the other, Richard Elliot and 
Jonathan O’Mara burned a cross in their black neighbor’s yard after he complained about their 
backyard gun range. The consolidation of cases only furthers the complexity of the Court’s 
ruling. 
While Justice Souter’s dissent argued that R.A.V. was controlling and prohibited cross 
burning bans as the regulation of symbolic speech, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court held 
that cross burning statutes could be sustained under the unprotected speech category of “true 
threats” as established in Watts v. US (1969).142 While the Virginia statute was struck down as 
“overbroad” for declaring that all cross burning is “prima facie evidence of an intent to 
intimidate a person or group,” Elliot and O’Mara’s convictions were upheld because their use of 
cross burning as intimidation was proven on different grounds than the “prima facie” clause. 
O’Connor wrote for a seven justice majority vacating Black’s conviction and a very different six 
justice majority upholding the Elliot and O’Mara convictions. Overall the thrust of O’Connor’s 
opinion was that hate crime laws could pass constitutional muster as “Intimidation in the 
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs 
                                                           
141 Interestingly, the R.A.V. decision did consider the relevance of TPM doctrine, and found that its 
content neutrality requirement leant weight to striking down the cross burning ban as viewpoint biased. 
(Do I need a paragraph on the RAV holding/logic here?) 
142 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
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a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily 
harm or death.”   
O’Connor’s opinion is built upon two strains of argument that are in significant tension 
with one another. First, she details a long history of racial conflict to argue that “burning a cross 
is a particularly virulent form of intimidation” and thus a true threat. On the other hand 
O’Connor argues that cross burning statutes are content neutral because “It does not matter 
whether an individual burns a cross with intent to intimidate because of the victim’s race, 
gender, or religion, or because of the victim’s ‘political affiliation, union membership, or 
homosexuality.’”(Quoting R.A.V.). O’Connor continues that a state “may choose to regulate [a] 
subset of intimidating messages” without raising viewpoint discrimination concerns. The 
decision’s curious marriage of arguments derives in part from the odd consolidation of cases, 
with Black’s Klan activity anchoring the historical narrative of cross burning as a true threat and 
Elliot and O’Mara’s supposedly non-racial neighborly dispute establishing that such laws can be 
content neutral.  
Justice Souter’s dissent rightly calls the O’Connor ruling a “pragmatic doctrinal move” 
that is “content based” and suggests that “official suppression of ideas is afoot.” The dressing of 
content based regulation in content neutral clothing is potentially more troubling than the 
transparent content based balancing tests of the 1950s. This is the possibility that Justice 
Douglass first saw back in O’Brien. By ignoring that viewpoints are tightly associated with 
particular activities and symbols we open the door to viewpoint discrimination under the guise 
of untargeted laws. In addition to traditional hate crime laws, examples of such supposedly 
content neutral laws include the previously discussed 1994 Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances (FACE) Act and Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) of 1992 (amended 2006), 
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which apply enhanced sentencing to crimes associated with abortion clinics and animal related 
businesses respectively. Such acts are classified as content neutral because they follow Virginia 
v. Black in focusing on the target of speech instead of the viewpoint of the speaker. This pattern 
continues in a 2010 ruling that combines elements of hate speech regulation and TPM doctrine, 
one that is generally—and in my view somewhat mistakenly—viewed as a vindication of the 
rights of our most repugnant speakers. 
Snyder v. Phelps (2010) addresses the speech rights of Pastor Fred Phelps and his 
Westboro Baptist Church, which engages in high profile protests at military funerals to voice 
disapproval over the United States’s sinful tolerance of homosexuality.143 Their contention is 
that god kills American soldiers to punish the nation for its gay-friendly public policy. Phelps led 
his congregation at one such rally outside the Maryland funeral of Marine Lance Corporal 
Matthew Snyder, who was killed in action during the Iraq war. The Westboro protesters held 
signs with statements including “Fags Doom Nations” but remained on public property away 
from the service. Upon watching news coverage of the protestors Matthew Synder’s father filed 
a successful civil claim against Phelps, his daughter, and his group for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. Phelps claimed First 
Amendment protection. 
The Court laid down a firm 8-1 opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts vacating the 
jury’s multimillion dollar ruling against Phelps. Citing New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), Texas v. 
Johnson (1989) and series of other landmark speech cases Justice Roberts held the defendants 
immune from civil torts because their speech addressed “matters of public concern,” namely 
the nation’s moral, social and political treatment of LGBT citizens. The decision is rather straight 
                                                           
143 131 S. Ct. 1207 
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forward from a constitutional law perspective and most commentators find it notable primarily 
because the Westboro Church is widely held to have the most despised viewpoint in the 
contemporary American society. Moreover its views are widely seen as bizarre and nonsensical, 
which was part of Synder’s claim that the protest should be construed as a private attack on him 
and his family. By protecting Phelps under the First Amendment, the Roberts Court is seen as 
firmly declaring that virtually all speech will be protected absolutely. However I read the 
decision somewhat differently. 
Yes, Roberts protects hate speech from court action as one would expect following the 
Brandenburg precedent. But Roberts also goes far out of his way to note that “time, place, and 
manner restrictions” upheld in Clark w. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984) and 
elaborated in Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) can constitutionally resolve the issue by 
removing the offending speech from proximity to its target. Such restrictions do not inhibit the 
content of expression, but as previously discussed, they greatly impact the reach and force of 
said expression. At the time of the ruling, Maryland, 43 other states and the federal government 
had passed laws placing restrictions on funeral picketing.144 Roberts throws the Court’s backing 
behind such bans, citing earlier bans on home demonstrations upheld in Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 
and buffer zones around abortion clinics in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center (1994) and Hill v. 
Colorado (2000). This leads me to believe the Roberts Court will continue the trend of allowing 
                                                           
144 Admittedly, Westboro’s targeting of military funerals lacks the kind of historical or logical connection 
found between white supremacy and cross burning or between prolife ideologies an abortion clinic 
blockades, but these laws do primarily target Phelps and his followers. And as Virginia v. Black makes 
clear, neither Brandenburg nor O’Brien are interpreted as prohibiting target/symbol based regulations 
regardless of historical associations between specific groups and those targets/symbols.    
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issue-based and group-targeted legislation to pass as content neutral, despite the shift on 
abortion buffer zones.145 
Brandenberg v. Ohio expanded to breadth and depth of free speech protections in a 
historic way. Those protections largely carry through to today and the protection of Fred 
Phelps’s vile speech is a testament to the enduring legacy of the Warren Court. But Justice 
Douglas astutely recognized that the very strength of protections offered by Brandenberg would 
exert pressure on the speech-action divide laid out in O’Brien. Cases like Virginia v. Black, Hill v. 
Colorado, and Snyder v. Phelps show that this pressure is being relieved through disingenuously 
content-neutral hate crime and TPM laws. Such laws leave dissenting and marginalized voices 
vulnerable to government repression.  
 
Political Inflation  
 The cyclical pattern of inflation discussed in Chapter 2 argues that tactics developed by 
political outsiders will inevitably be adopted by political insiders if they prove effective. This 
adoption by insiders leads to a crowding out of marginal players and a loss of any relative 
advantage the tactics once gave to dissenters. However, disruptive tactics are especially 
resistant to this pattern because disruption is generally harmful to those in power. Riots are 
never good for business and are never good for elected officials. Disruption is in this sense the 
                                                           
145 Roberts’s move in Snyder seems somewhat inconsistent with his later McCullen decision, and supports 
the idea that the validity of TPM restrictions now hinges significantly on subjective application by the 
Supreme Court. Vagueness and subjectivity tend are generally presumed to have a chilling effect on 
speech. Indeed, I am hesitant to conclude the McCullen shift will spread beyond abortion policy in the 
near future. Moreover, the increasing permissiveness of the Court concerning hate crime regulation in 
Virginia v. Black suggests that the Roberts court might find a kind of synergy between hate crime and TPM 
restrictions, which allows significantly more regulatory flexibility under the first Amendment. 
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primordial power of the dispossessed and cannot be coopted. As such, there is less to say about 
political inflation in this chapter than will be said in chapters 4 and 5. But there are three trends 
in this area that may serve to blunt movement power: disruption fatigue, social acclamation, 
and insider disruption. 
 
Disruption Fatigue 
 Social movement activists will often discuss activism fatigue or activist burnout. The idea 
is that even a movement’s core adherents often eventually tire of making social conflict the 
center of their lives. Eventually, most activists refocus their energies on work, family, and leisure 
because activism is stressful for most of us.146 Periods of heightened disruptive protest are often 
associated with short term recruitment followed by significant attrition. Activism fatigue is 
certainly a limiting factor in disruptive politics, and it’s one of the major forces that has pushed 
movements to institutionalize using nonprofit organizations. As discussed in Chapter 4, these 
organizations let activists center work, friends, and even family around stable employment at 
activist organizations. However, this social and financial support can be jeopardized by 
participation in high risked activism because resource rich SMOs are particularly vulnerable to 
repression, as discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, there is a corollary to activism fatigue that 
organization forms do not address: disruption fatigue. Disruption fatigue refers to the public’s 
tolerance of disruption by activists.147  
                                                           
146 This observation builds on the idea of “biographic availability” as developed by Doug McAdam. See his 
“Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: the Case of Freedom Summer” or Political Process and the 
Development of Black Insurgency. See also my own significant decline in activism after I became a father! 
147 Closely related is “war fatigue,” in which public support for military ventures declines after extended 
US engagements. We say this with Vietnam, as well as more recently with Iraq and Afghanistan. War 
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 At first glance it may seem illogical to worry about public tolerance of disruption when 
the point of disruptive power is to render the status quo intolerable. While such a challenge 
accurately describes the mechanism of disruptive power, it ignores that fact that disruption is 
generally repressible in the absence of some public support. Here Sidney Tarrow’s pairing of 
political opportunity theory and cycles of protest has the most explanatory power.148 For 
Tarrow, vulnerable political regimes invite a wave of outside challengers because the regime 
lacks the clear authority to repress those challengers. But as the turmoil of peak protest years 
drags on, the public eventually tires of volatility and the regime becomes more resilient. The 
result is fewer concessions and more repression, which works to demobilize movements. The 
classic cycle example is social movements of the 1960s being followed by Nixon’s silent majority 
push for law and order.  
 If we pull back from the cycle model, we can conclude that disruption fatigue is a 
constant threat to disruptive power. In an age where protest norms focus on opportunities for 
expression, the public has little patience for ongoing disruption. In the case of Occupy Wall 
Street, initial public support protected protesters from being expelled from their encampments. 
However, as the weeks dragged on the public came to feel the protesters had “made their 
point” and major cities like Las Angeles, New York and Philadelphia were able to quietly clear 
protest cites overnight with little public outrage (Nagourney, 2011). In cities like Washington 
                                                                                                                                                                             
fatigue was arguably the major force behind the public opposition that kept President Obama from 
intervening in the Syrian Civil War in 2013.  
148 I have been critical of Tarrow’s protest cycle hypothesis primarily because it appears to employ shifting 
definitions and mechanisms, at least as employed by other scholars. Tarrow seems to generally press the 
idea that the unit of analysis for protest cycles is the polity, and that all movements should experience 
state vulnerablilty and resilience in roughly the same way. Yet many scholars, and at time Tarrow himself, 
quickly fall into using the cycle concept to describe the mobilization and abeyance of specific movements. 
These uses seem conceptually distinct and dependent upon very different mechanisms. My own opinion 
is that Tarrow’s state-wide concept is most clearly seen in the recurrent pattern of innovation, diffusion, 
and cooption of tactics.  
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D.C., where occupiers remained in McPherson Square well into the winter, residents and 
tourists generally came to resent the protesters as an eyesore and a traffic hindrance. When 
Occupy groups tried to shift strategies and issues following the end of their formal occupations, 
they found a public that was largely derisive and apathetic towards their efforts, national 
support for the movement having dropped from around 30% in November 2011 to around 15% 
in April 2012. Importantly, public opinion shifted even more harshly against Oakland protesters, 
where Occupy tactics were their most disruptive (Enten, 2012). 
 Does this pattern of disruption fatigue fit well with the concept of political inflation? 
Perhaps not on its own. But when added to social acclimation and insider disruption, the effect 
can be seen as quite inflationary. 
 
Social Acclamation 
 On Saturday, Oct. 31, 2010, comedians Jon Stewart and Steven Colbert hosted a satirical 
political rally on the Mall in Washington, DC Dubbed “The Rally to Restore Sanity.” The event is 
estimated to have drawn more than 200,000 attendees, roughly the same attendance as the 
1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Carr, 2010). Despite the similar numbers and 
a similar performative repertoire, there is no equating the disruptive impact of the two events. 
Stewart and Colbert cause delays on DC metro lines approaching downtown stations. The March 
on Washington shut down Washington DC and had the American people collectively holding 
their breaths. Would there be riots in the capital? Would police clash with marchers? Would 
 115
unrest spread to major American cities across the country (Barber, Marching on Washington: 
the Forging of an American Political Tradition, 2002, p. 101)?149  
 How did we get from the 1963 March on Washington to Stewart and Colbert? And why 
contrast this satirical rally with one of America’s defining historical protests? And for that 
matter, what was so funny about The Rally to Restore Sanity? The answers to these questions 
are linked. The Stewart/Colbert rally was a response to conservative commentator Glenn Beck’s 
August “Restoring Honor” rally, which drew almost 100,000 attendees to support a blend of 
conservative Christian and Tea Party politics. Stewart and Colbert were mocking Beck and media 
coverage that claimed Beck’s rally was a politically significant barometer of public opinion. The 
comedic punch line was that Beck’s rally was meaningless because any cause-of-the-day can and 
will draw tens or hundreds of thousands to a DC march or rally. Stewart and Colbert staged a 
rally about nothing—that frankly had little in the way of entertaining jokes or performances—
and they more than doubled Beck’s attendance. Marches and rallies at the Capital have become 
so standard, repetitive, and innocuous that they lack the power they had in earlier eras. This is 
especially true of disruptive power, which relies in large part upon the volatility of an event to 
unsettle the routines of daily life. When events become a routine part of daily life, they become 
no more disruptive than road work, a parade, or any other modern inconvenience. 
 Marching on Washington is a key example of social acclimation, the process of people 
and institutions adjusting their practices and expectations to accommodate disruptions that 
                                                           
149 Thirty Years prior in 1932, 15,000 “Bonus March” participants seeking veterans’ benefits for WWI 
service were even more disruptive. The group’s occupation of the capital and nearby Anacostia Flats led 
to General Douglas McCarthy burning down the group’s encampment and driving off marchers with tear 
gas and bayonets. The Bonus March was instrumental in the crumbling of the Republican regime under 
Hoover and in the rise of New Deal politics. While not the first “March on Washington,” the bonus march 
established the act as a powerful political tactic. Today 15,000 marchers would likely be local news at 
best. 
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become commonplace. This process can occur formally, as with the National Parks Services 
permitting process for events on the Mall and other popular sites for protest. Or it can happen 
informally, as with DC residents learning to better navigate the city during marches. In many 
cases formal and informal acclamation work together, such as Parks Service policies rendering 
protest procedures more uniform and routine, making it easier for residents to learn how to 
adjust their schedules. 
 This process is by no means exclusive to marches. A common tactic by many movements 
is to use graphic or shocking images and displays to make the public uncomfortable with specific 
practices or policies. Pro-life protesters use images of aborted fetuses. Peace activists use 
images of children killed in war zones. Animal rights protesters use images of abused or 
slaughtered animals, often relying on undercover video. These images are designed to disrupt 
our peace of mind until we sign a petition, donate money, or boycott the targeted practice. But 
we soon grow desensitized to these images and protesters must do something even more 
shocking to impact us.150 Activists quickly confront escalation problems where they either run 
out of new horrors to show, or they violate social norms in a way that brings repression and 
condemnation. The animal rights case is a classic example. The first undercover video one sees 
of a factory farm is often shocking and disturbing, but what about the second, third, or tenth? 
People become numb to the images and develop coping mechanism to rationalize or dismiss the 
                                                           
150 There has been a significant amount of psychological research in recent decades on the desensitizing 
effect of exposure to violence through television, movies, video games, and other types of media. While 
still a controversial area of study, findings suggest that exposure to violent images can render people 
numb to the pain and suffering of others. See Invalid source specified. for an account of two 
experimental studies showing that exposure to violent media reduced or slowed the reactions of test 
subjects to real world suffering.  
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disturbing information.151 The inflationary effect becomes particularly problematic when 
movements utilize similar imagery or tactics. For example, “die ins,” in which large numbers of 
activists present lay down in public spaces to symbolize corpses, are utilized by abortion, human 
rights, animal rights and other activists. These protests have quickly lost their shock value 
bystanders may pass by without even noting the cause at issue.152 
 
Insider Disruption 
 I began this section by noting that disruption is relatively resistant to political inflation 
because insiders cannot readily adopt these tactics. Those in positions of traditional power and 
privilege simply have too much to lose when social institutions break down, and therefore are 
extremely hesitant to disrupt the political order over policy disputes. When Wall Street traders 
objected to the Dodd-Frank Act, they didn’t hold a sit-in shutting down financial markets. When 
Republicans failed to capture the Presidency in 2012, Mitt Romney didn’t chain himself to the 
White House fence. These actors understand that the cost of undermining financial markets and 
elections are too high to consider disrupting them. Moreover, such actors always have the 
prospect of winning in the next election cycle or pushing back through lobbying and litigating. 
While this characterization is accurate for the most part, it is not always the case. In times of 
                                                           
151 An additional area of social psychological research relevant here centers on how people experience 
and reduce cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance occurs when one’s conception of the world and 
experiences of the world conflict. For instance, I may think of myself as a person who cares about the 
welfare of animals and also enjoys certain animal products, but am confronted by images that suggest 
they products are not ethically produced. When these two ideas conflict, they cause me anxiety and 
discomfort until I change one. Because conceptions of self tend to be very resilient, in most cases I will 
alter my understanding of the images I have seen. They are altered. They are not representative. They are 
not directly impacted by my choices. Animals do not really feel pain. And so on. Invalid source specified. 
is an excellent account of this phenomenon and the theories underlying it. 
152 For example, Pro-Palestinian protesters staged coordinated die-ins in major US cities during the Israel-
Hamas conflict in the summer of 2014 Invalid source specified.. 
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great political upheaval major political factions may be willing to turn to disruption. The clearest 
historical examples would be Southern Democrats’ willingness to break the Union over the issue 
of slavery and block desegregation of schools by police and/or mob force. Indeed, during 
periods in which the Klan was entrenched in mainstream southern political life, lynching and 
other forms of violence were used to disrupt efforts to develop black political power. These are 
generally exceptional times and circumstances. But more recently, disruption has become an 
increasingly central tactic of the modern Republican Party and its quasi-party adjunct 
movement, the Tea Party. 
 As Republican politics post-Reagan has embraced a philosophy of “government is the 
problem” it has become increasingly feasibly to get elected to office on a platform of disruption. 
If a candidate runs on a platform that government is never in the right, then causing 
government dysfunction only plays into her re-election narrative. Perennial Congress watchers 
Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein have gone so far as to identify this shift in Republican 
ideology as the defining characteristic of contemporary American politics and the central factor 
driving government dysfunction (Mann & Ornstein, 2012). They trace the problem to Newt 
Gingrich’s Speakership, which famously led to government shutdowns in 1995-6, pioneering the 
contemporary Republican practice of breaking government in order to save it. In the two 
decades that followed, the Republican Party has shifted further to the right, particularly in 
solidly red House districts. Mann and Ornstein point to the Debt Ceiling crisis of 2011—in which 
the Republican House threatened to default on America’s debt if the Obama administration did 
not grant policy concessions on entitlement reform—as the clearest example of the Republican 
Party’s willingness to hold America’s political and economic well-being hostage. But does this 
kind of disruption really compete with movement activities? I would argue yes. To the extent 
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that government is forced into a state of constant political, fiscal, and monetary crisis Americans 
are less apt to pay attention to more modest movement disruptions and their accompanying 
grievances. However, it is true that this kind of insider disruption is far from the kind of cooption 
we might expect with other forms of political inflation. A much more important type of insider 
disruption is that practiced by the Tea Party. 
 The Tea Party styles itself as a grassroots social movement with a radical 
antigovernment message. However, the 2009 emergence of the Tea Party is in many ways 
simply a rebranding of ideas that had already become pillars of the contemporary Republican 
Party. For example, in the 113th Congress 219 members of the House and 39 Senators have 
signed Grover Norquist’s Americans For Tax Reform pledge to oppose all tax increases or 
deduction reductions (Americans for Tax Reform, 2013). Those numbers show a majority of the 
House and two votes shy of unbreakable filibuster in the Senate publically pledging to carry out 
the central fiscal policy demand of the Tea (Taxed Enough Already)Party. So when people call 
the Tea Party a social movement, what they really mean is not that the Tea Party represents 
outsider ideas, but that the Tea Party adopts outsider tactics. In essence, the Tea Party has 
become a subsidiary of the contemporary Republican Party, set up to coopt disruptive social 
movement tactics without discrediting GOP officials and institutions.153 
 The Tea Party, in some form or another, has protested most of the Obama 
Administration’s policies. It also marched on Washington in 2009, drawing tens-of-thousands of 
participants. But without a doubt the clearest example of successful Tea Party disruption is the 
                                                           
153 Some critics would dub the Tea Party an “Astroturf” movement, suggesting is a fake grassroots 
movement. In truth it appears that the Tea Party phenomenon is a complex mixture of bottom up and 
top-down forces. See Invalid source specified. for a concise analysis of the movement makeup and Invalid 
source specified. for a more precise account. 
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relentless 2009 assault on congressional town hall meetings during the healthcare reform 
debates. Democrats and Republicans were at loggerheads over the Obama Administration’s 
proposal to overhaul the American healthcare system and members of Congress had broken for 
summer recess. Democrats and moderate Republicans involved in legislative negotiations held 
town hall style meetings to try explain their positions on the proposed legislation and gain 
constituent support.  
 Tea Party protesters packed the town hall events, waving signs and shouting down 
Representatives attempting to explain their positions. In a number of cases meetings 
degenerated into shouting matches, and in a few fights broke out. At one Maryland rally a 
Democratic congressman was even burned in effigy (Urbina, 2009). By all accounts, Tea Party 
members were highly successful in disrupting these events and undercutting any attempt to 
build momentum for reform. As intended, the chaos of these meetings reflected poorly for 
members of Congress in marginal districts and states. These members were, at least in part, 
blamed by the public for pushing forward an apparently divisive political issue. In the face of 
such optics, support for reform narrowed and some of the most ambitious elements of the 
reform were dropped, including a public insurance option and an Independent Payment 
Advisory Board utilizing comparative effectiveness research to determine what treatments the 
government would cover.154 The latter was gutted over Tea Party charges that Obama was 
assembling “death panels” to force euthanasia and “ration” healthcare. The public option and 
these expert panels were the primary cost saving mechanisms of the Patient Protection and 
                                                           
154 The PPACA did create an IPAB with some authority to restrict Medicare payments.  
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Affordable Care Act, meaning the Tea Party challenge undercut one of the central goals of the 
legislation.155   
 While some maintain that the Tea Party’s origins and activities were unrelated to 
Republican Party activities, this claim seems difficult to maintain. The theme of the Boston Tea 
Party has been used by conservative elites for decades to push an anti-tax, anti-regulatory 
agenda. The contemporary Tea Party can be traced to tobacco company efforts in the 1980s to 
raise opposition to cigarette taxes and regulations. In addition to smokers’ rights advocacy, 
these groups funded nonprofits like Citizens for a Sound Economy (CSE), which later split into 
the groups Americans for Prosperity (AFP) and Freedom Works, which where principle 
organizers and funders of early 2009 Tea Party protests (Fallin, Grana, & Glantz, 2013).156 
Freedom Works and AFP played key roles in organizing the town hall disruptions (Urbina, 
2009).In addition to the tobacco industry, billionaire energy tycoons, the Koch brothers, helped 
found CSE and have donated millions to it, AFP, and Freedom Works, while at the same time 
being major donors to Republican candidates and political committees (Mayer, 2010). These 
groups, their industry backers, and their political point men like CSE Chairman former House 
member Dick Armey represent the nexus of insider and outside conservative politics. In addition 
                                                           
155 The PPACA was premised primarily on reducing the cost of healthcare and insuring universal access to 
quality healthcare coverage. It is ironic that the Tea Party efforts effectively killed the cost saving 
measure, presumably the part of the legislation most line with Tea Party efforts. In reality, Tea Party 
insurgents were inches from the goal line in killing the bill entirely following the special election victory of 
MA Senator Scott Brown. Only masterful political maneuvering by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who 
avoided the need for conference committee by passing a less-than-popular Senate bill unaltered, kept the 
Tea Party from fully disrupting the legislative process. 
156 The Tea Party fits well into the Multiple Streams (or garbage can) theory of the policy process, as 
advanced by John Kingdon. Kingdon noted that policy ideas often develop before the problems they are 
eventually paired to, and these policy ideas are relentlessly pushed for years or decades before a political 
moment allows them to seize the agenda. In this case, Rick Santelli’s CNBC rant calling for a Chicago tea 
party to oppose the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the taxes that fund it, seems to wedded 
tobacco company proposals to the problem of government spending to combat the 2008 financial 
collapse and recession.  
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to these nonprofit organizations, prominent Republican media figures such as Glenn Beck, Sean 
Hannity, Rush Limbaugh, and Vice-Presidential candidate Sarah Palin helped rally Tea Party 
protesters. Hannity’s website declared “Become a part of the mob!” and “Attend an Obama 
Care Townhall near you!” (Urbina, 2009). Fox News and conservative talk radio offer yet another 
link connecting the Tea Party and Republican Party, pointing to a significant degree of 
coordination.  
 The Republican Party’s embrace of disruptive politics is one of the more significant 
recent developments impacting social movements. Most of the emphasis on institutionalization 
focuses on movements adopting the forms of insider interest groups, but here we see that the 
converse is also happening. As insiders adopt disruptive movement tactics, movements no 
longer have a monopoly over this type of power. This is of particular concern for movements 
seeking government spending and regulation, as these conservative disruptions seem aimed at 
preventing government from taking on new responsibilities. With disruptive forces pushing in 
multiple directions the safest course for politicians is to duck and cover, leading to gridlock and 
inaction. And in the end inaction serves the status quo.  
 Insider disruption may put especially large inflationary pressure on social movements, as 
studies have shown that protests surrounding issues that are already on the political agenda are 
more salient to the public.157 Similarly, disruptions to the ongoing legislative process are 
naturally more disruptive to most Americans. Because insiders are already enmeshed in decision 
making, their disruptions are likely to make bigger waves, diminishing the relative weight of 
outsider disruptions.  
                                                           
157 This point will be addressed in detail in the chapter 5 discussion of political inflation and media 
attention. 
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Institutional Thickening 
 As America’s economic and political institutions grow, it has two contrary effects upon 
disruption. First, as institutions become linked into intricate networks, whole networks become 
vulnerable when they hinge on key links that can targeted for disruption. The major economic 
example is the modern supply chain, where manufacturing depends upon “just in time” delivery 
of components fabricated across the globe. For instance, following the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster in northern Japan, a Louisiana GM auto plant was among the many US institutions to 
shut down because a few key parts were no longer being produced in the disaster zone (Lohr, 
2011). If activists are able to disrupt these key points in national or global networks, then they 
can potentially produce outsized disruptive pressure on political leaders.  
 The second effect of institutional growth is that activists increasingly face massive 
entrenched institutions that are difficult to disrupt and are so valued that disruption may 
produce a massive public backlash. As government and business become “too big to fail,” the 
state may no longer suffer the periods of vulnerability that characterize Tarrow’s cycles of 
protest. The Occupy Wall Street movement is a compelling example of this second effect. The 
Zuccotti Park encampment just down from the New York Stock Exchange was designed to 
disrupt the functions of national and international finance by heaping scorn on Wall Street 
traders and bankers. The idea was to be visible and audible to their targets as they entered and 
left their offices and trading floors day in and day out, robbing them of peace of mind by 
building up anxiety, tension, and hopefully shame. Yet the size and scope of the financial system 
meant that these traders and bankers were really only minor cogs in a machine that involved 
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exchanges and traders across the globe linked together by virtual networks with an enormous 
amount of flexibility and redundancy. So while it is true that the collapse of financial giant 
Lehman Brothers in 2008 shows the financial system to be a network with key points of 
vulnerability, these points seem largely removed from public access. Could protesters ever truly 
replicate such a disruption, or must those disruptions spring from the institutions of power 
themselves? Perhaps a more violent struggle by protesters might have actually shut down the 
NYSE, disrupting the stock market, but it seems such an action would almost instantly bring 
public condemnation and government repression.158 In almost any conceivable scenario, 
markets would resume functioning within days, if not hours. 
Fox Piven ends her treatise on disruptive power by struggling with the contrast of these 
two trends. She notes that traditional protest methods, particularly strikes, are rendered 
powerless by multinational corporations that can shift production offshore to escape disruption 
and punish disrupters.  But Piven ends on a hopeful note suggesting new tactics like 
transnational movements and “hacktivist” utilizing internet disruptions may yet reach the 
system’s vulnerable linkages (Piven F. F., Challenging Authority, 2006, pp. 144-146). Given the 
polemical nature of Piven’s work, it is unsurprising she reaches for an optimistic tone to inspire 
her readers. But my take sees the constraints of institutional thickening outweighing any 
potential vulnerabilities of a networked world.  
                                                           
158 Part of the institutional thickening argument is that institutional reach spreads to almost all Americans, 
making disruption universally painful. In this case most people are invested in the stock market either 
personally or through pensions and other institutional investors. Furthermore, the DOW has come to 
stand in as a barometer for economic health, meaning that drops in the stock markets result in real labor 
contractions that threaten broad swaths of the American public. The logic of disruptive power suggests 
that disruption needs to be buttressed by support from significant elements of the public and/or 
significant political coalitions. In the absence of that support government regimes are left highly resilient 
and capable of utilizing the full weight of law enforcement (or even the military) against protesters that 
lack any proportional force.  
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When it comes to government policy, institutional thickening presents special barriers 
to effective disruptive power for two reasons. First, as government grows programs become 
complex and interconnected. As discussed above, this means that assigning responsibility for 
grievances and singling out specific targets becomes problematic. Looking again to the Occupy 
movement, it is clear that one of the movement’s greatest challenge was defining what they 
wanted and whom they wanted it from. Who is behind income inequality and who can do 
something about it? Is it the banks and traders? Is it the SEC or the IRS or Congress or President 
Obama or city/state government? Is it the “1%” of wealthy Americans, and if so, are they 
expected to give their wealth away? Gallup polling revealed a majority of Americans were 
uncertain about the purpose of the movement, and news interviews with participants showed 
many were themselves uncertain (Gallup, 2011). Many commentators skewered the occupy 
protesters as fools unable to understand their own issue, but a more sympathetic take is that 
income inequality is reproduced by such a vast array of entrenched institutions that no simple 
answers were possible.159  Overlapping and divided governance responsibilities present a special 
problem for disruptive power, because public support and tolerance for disruption depends 
public perceptions of the legitimacy of the target. If no one is responsible, no one need take 
action. 
 Thick and complex government structures also mean that major policy changes impact 
many provisions from numerous separate programs. As such reform legislation requires more 
                                                           
159 This phenomenon is not isolated to broad class based movements like occupy, but applies to more 
specific movement interests as well. Take for instance the animal rights push to reduce/end 
experimentation on animals. Activists might try to blockade a specific laboratory conducting testing, or 
the FDA in Washington for mandating testing in drug development, or the USDA over application of the 
Animal Welfare Act, or HHS over the NIH’s enforcement of its Animal Care and Use Guidelines, or the 
Association for the Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Car (AAALAC) for their 
independent accreditation of these facilities, or Federal or State lawmakers.  Who should protesters 
target, and would that target have the authority to accommodate protester demands? 
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committee time, lengthier bills, and extended implementation. It takes time to change our 
institutionally thick government, and disruptive power is notoriously difficult to maintain over 
long periods. This is particularly true once policymakers take up an issue, as continued 
disruption is undercut by the appearance of government action. Surely the threat of resumed 
disruption might be held over policymakers, but for how long? Just consider the massive 
difficulty of restarting the occupy movement after the 2011-2012 winter decampment. 
Occupiers vacated their encampments as winter rolled in, confident that their message about 
the 1% would be a dominant theme in the upcoming 2012 elections. As spring turned to 
summer, and the Obama-Romney election kicked into full swing, it became apparent that 
income inequality would not be a major campaign issue.160 Faced with multi-year political and 
policy challenges Occupy groups were unable to remobilize their members, reclaim their 
physical encampments, or recapture the public agenda. 
A second barrier of institutional thickening deals with the scarcity of slack resources for 
social programs and new regulatory regimes. Most movement activists—along with the most 
Americans in general— support programs like Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. These 
programs, along with defense spending, account for the vast majority of government spending, 
leaving the government with sparse funds for discretionary projects or new entitlements. This 
puts most protesters in the position of robbing Peter and pay Paul, with the exception of some 
anti-government elements of the Tea Party. This problem particularly impacts disruptive power 
because disruption is a blunt tool that unsettles the status quo, which is unpalatable to 
                                                           
160 Granted, Romney’s 1% status became a liability following his 47% of Americans are dependent 
comment, but Occupy was unable to maintain any influence over Obama and his policies.  
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movement supporters. In issues with existing policy networks, disruption alone is likely to have 
little success in reshuffling the larger policy matrix.161  
 
Conclusions 
John Locke’s description of the social contract in his Second Treatise on Government 
argues that a people have the right and duty to overthrow their government if it persistently 
violates natural rights of life, liberty, and property. This idea was the guiding light for Jefferson’s 
American Declaration of Independence. But what if abuses and injustices stop short of the need 
for revolution? Both Locke and the American Founders had little to say here, with Locke 
suggesting that oppressed minorities should obey the government and direct their appeals to 
God. This has always struck me as a normatively and empirically poor vision of liberal 
democracy. Disruptive power fills in the gaps. Where a significant minority feels the system is 
unjust, they can gum up the system to everyone’s detriment. Instead of hitting the reset button 
on the polity, they can hit pause button and disrupt the game without ending it. From this 
perspective disruptive power is an ideal adjunct to the democratic process because it is risky and 
painful for the disrupters who use it, meaning it provides an appeal of last resort, but one 
unlikely to be abused.  
In this chapter I have argued that disruptive power is the original power of social 
movements, and one that remains relevant today. However, I have argued the disruptive power 
is increasingly constrained by structural barriers, political inflation, and institutional thickening. 
                                                           
161 These same themes will be developed more in the next two chapters. I’m having a slight problem with 
having developed some of these sections more fully in the following chapter, which I wrote first. 
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Compared to other types of movement power, disruptive power is constrained relatively heavily 
by structural barriers. By contrast, political inflation is a relatively light constraint on disruptive 
power because it is not readily co-opted by political insiders. Institutional thickening places 
some special burdens on disruptive challengers, but its effects are somewhat uniform in 
constraining all types of outsider challenges. Of particular interest in this chapter were policing 
methods and the First Amendment framework they navigate. I argued that authorities have 
taken much of the bite out of disruptive power by simultaneously adopting POMS to protect and 
encourage non-confrontational protests, while at the same time cracking down on disruptive 
protests through statutes and injunctions upheld by the courts as content neutral. These 
developments place social movements in somewhat of a bind, as declines in disruptive power 
must be offset by the development of more institutionalized approaches, yet this further 
institutionalization renders disruptive activity all the more difficult. In Chapter 6 I will revisit this 
dilemma and consider how four contemporary social movements have combined disruptive 
power with pluralist and plebiscitary power in their real world advocacy.  
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“[E]ffective advocacy of both public and private points 
of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably 
enhanced by group association.” 
 
-Justice John Marshall Harlan II  
NAACP v. Alabama (1958) 
 
“[M]ajor public policies…constitute important rules of 
the game, influencing the allocation of economic and 
political resources, modifying the costs and benefits 
associated with alternative political strategies, and 
consequently altering ensuing political development.”  
 
-Paul Pierson 
 
 
Chapter 4: Movement Organizations and Pluralist Power 
 
 
 
On Thursday, June 9, 1966 The Sierra Club took out full page ads in The New York Times, 
The Washington Post, The San Francisco Chronicle, and The Las Angeles Times. The ads criticized 
the Department of the Interior‘s plans to build hydroelectric dams on the Colorado River in and 
around Grand Canyon National Park, proclaiming,  
“If they can turn Grand Canyon into a "cash register" is any national park safe? 
You know the answer. Now only you can save Grand Canyon from being flooded 
... for profit.”  
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The environment group urged concerned citizens to contact their congressional representatives. 
While appeals to “contact your representatives” are a commonplace and rather innocuous 
fixture in American politics, these ads produced a rather remarkable result. Sierra Club lost the 
ability to offer its donors income tax deductions for their charitable contributions (Cohen 1988).  
Sierra Club’s largely successful attempt to shift public opinion on a legislative issue was 
considered “grass roots lobbying” by the IRS and lobbying is restricted under Internal Revenue 
Code 501(c)3. As a nonprofit public charity organized under IRC 501(c)3, Sierra Club was 
prohibited from engaging in “substantial” lobbying activities. Although the ads amounted to 
only a small fraction of Sierra Club’s annual budget, the IRS chose to suspend the group’s tax 
deductible status pending an investigation. The controversy came at a time when the modern 
environmental movement was just taking shape. Sierra Club was struggling to shift its identity 
from a “club” for outdoor enthusiasts to a mass membership public advocacy group. Club 
President David Brower recognized that advocacy required political engagement, but was it far 
from certain that his donor base of wilderness adventures would put up with a significantly 
increased tax burden.162 As such, the group faced a defining choice between political relevance 
and fiscal security. In the end, Sierra Club opted for political engagement by changing its 
incorporation from a 501(c)3 public charity to a 501(c)4 social welfare organization (Cohen, 
1988).163 The C4 classification allows for unlimited lobbying and limited involvement in electoral 
politics—electoral activity is strictly prohibited for C3 organizations—but this freedom comes at 
                                                           
162 Back in 1966 the top federal income tax rate was 70%, meaning that wealthy donors could effectively 
give $1 to a tax deductible charity or $0.30 to a non-deductible group and $0.70 to the government.  
163 C4 organizations are also sometimes referred to as “social advocacy organizations.” 
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the cost of tax deductible status for donors, which is often essential for attracting large 
contributions.164  
Two more recent examples serve to illustrate just how limiting the charitable ban on 
electioneering can be in practice. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP)—a C3 public charity—was subject to a two-year IRS investigation over charges 
of electioneering in the 2004 presidential election. The investigation followed anti-Bush remarks 
made in a speech by NAACP Chairman Julian Bond at the organization’s annual meeting. The IRS 
alleged that “Mr. Bond condemned the administration policies of George W. Bush on education, 
the economy and the war in Iraq” in a manner that could be interpreted as opposing Bush’s 
reelection. These statements violated the C3 prohibition on “directly or indirectly participating 
or intervening in any political campaign," which includes critical or supportive statements made 
to group members, the media, or the public (Fears, 2006).165 The NAACP survived what Mr. 
Bond called an “enormous threat” that “would have reduced our income remarkably,” but 
Operation Rescue—perhaps the most aggressive organized arm of the Anti-abortion 
movement—was stripped of its tax-exempt status for electioneering in the same year. The C3 
anti-abortion group was reproached for using anti-John Kerry appeals in their fundraising efforts 
and picketing Democratic events using a billboard truck with an image of an aborted fetus 
captioned “Kerry’s Choice” (Strom, 2006).  Operation Rescue now only exists as an 
                                                           
164 The Sierra Club is one of several prominent groups that eventually split its operations between C3, C4, 
and PAC organizations. While this approach does avoid some tax constraints, I argue that this strategy 
works only if the principle organization is a C4, as it is now with Sierra Club. If the mass membership is 
organized under the C3 organization then members cannot be mobilized in elections and in support of 
lobbying. Michael Cohen argues that Sierra Club did especially well absorbing the costs of their tax status 
change because they benefitted from the publicity that surrounded the tax controversy, rallying new 
supporters to replace lost revenue. 
165 A similar anti-war example from the 2004 election involved the All Saints Episcopal Church Invalid 
source specified.. 
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unincorporated (and greatly diminished) group.166  In these two cases, the IRS singled out 
relatively mild political activity, emphasizing just how little charities are permitted to engage in 
American electoral politics.167 
These opening examples illustrate a basic truth of politics: government policy 
fundamentally shapes the opportunities that challengers have to organize and participate in the 
political system.168 This chapter examines the extent to which social movement organizations 
(SMOs) effectively engage with the mainstream political system, whether opportunities for 
effective political participation are expanding or contracting, and what systemic factors may 
                                                           
166 In 2004 the group was still formally organized under the name Operation Rescue West and had 
previously been involved in a protracted dispute over the name “Operation Rescue” with the group 
Operation Rescue National (now Operation Save America). Regardless of which group could claim the 
clearest lineage to Randal Terry’s original 1986 organization, the West group is best known for 
maintaining and extending the original direct action tactics that are most clearly associated with 
Operation Rescue. 
167 Even more recently, the Obama administration has been under fire for the IRS targeting conservative 
“Tea Party” groups while processing nonprofit applications for tax-exempt status. The IRS had no clear 
guidance for personnel on how groups applying for C3 and C4 status should be screened for unacceptable 
political or partisan aims and activities. As such, local officials—specifically in the IRS Cincinnati office—
developed their own ad hoc system for identifying applications that needed further scrutiny. The core of 
their approach in 2010 was to create a “Be on the Lookout for (BOLO)” list of suspect terms, including “tea 
party” and “patriot,” and to subject these groups to further review. This alone was an unacceptably 
subjective approach, but because the local office was still unsure what standards to apply they requested 
guidance from DC. Unfortunately, this guidance never came, resulting in processing delays of 1 to 2 years. 
Moreover, when these flagged applications were finally processed, the IRS requested inappropriate 
information, including the names of donors, whether donations had been received from political 
candidates and how such donations were usedInvalid source specified.. While there does not appear to 
be any targeted repression of conservative activists by the Obama Administration, vague regulations and 
bureaucratic bubbling clearly placed disproportional hardships on conservative SMOs just as they were 
seeking to transition street protests into political organization. Since the IRS-Tea Party scandal other 
groups from progressive and nonpartisan movements have come forward claiming similar application 
problems, suggesting the Tea Party list out of Cincinnati may just be the most egregious example of a 
persistent problem (Jones, 2013).  
For more on the details see the IG report: Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-
Exempt Applications for Review. May 14, 2013. Reference Number: 2013-10-053. TREASURY INSPECTOR 
GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION. 
 
For more on progressive groups see Representative Elijah Cummings’s letter to Representative Darrell 
Issa, Chair of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, July 12, 2013.  
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/Letter.pdf  
168 This phenomenon is sometimes termed policy feedbackInvalid source specified..  
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constrain the power of SMOs. As the opening example suggests, I take the regulation of 
organizational forms to be a central factor impacting movement politics, but this regulation 
needs to be understood in terms of the broader shifting landscape of American pluralism. I start 
with a theoretical look at what I call pluralist power. I then argue that movement power has 
been somewhat constrained by the three trends in American political development laid out in 
the second chapter: 1) the building of structural barriers to outsider participation, 2) political 
inflation devaluing outsider resources, and 3) institutional thickening rendering major policy 
shifts more difficult.169 
This chapter considers movements as whole. That is, it treats social movements 
collectively as a segment of the American political system. In the chapter six I look more closely 
at variations between movements, but for now my focus is on system wide factors and 
aggregate trends.  
 
Pluralism and Movement Power 
 Pluralism argues that in free societies no single interest consistently divides the public 
into majority and minority segments.170 Instead, political power is dispersed amongst a 
                                                           
169 As detailed in Chapter 2 these three trends/patterns impact each type of power in unique but related 
ways.. 
170 Major statements of American pluralism include James Madison’s Federalist #10, David Truman’s The 
Governmental Process (1951), and Robert Dalh’s Who Governs? (1961). While the “group theory” 
approaches to political science that dominated the mid-twentieth century have fallen out of favor in the 
discipline, these works remain central to understanding the role of interest group politics in liberal 
democracies. Pluralism contrasts most notably to Marxist thought, which asserts a fundamental division 
of interests based on class. In the American tradition, pluralism is perhaps best contrasted with the 
political tradition advanced by John C. Calhoun during the second party system. Calhoun’s A Disquisition 
on Government argues that government policy inevitably divides society into two great segments, with 
the government redistributing wealth and power from minority to majority. In the American case, 
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multitude of overlapping groups competing directly with one another for influence over various 
public policy areas of relevance to their particular interests. In parliamentary political systems, 
such as Britain’s, strong parties typically lead interests to combine into stable electoral coalitions 
controlled by party organizations. But the American system of strong federalism and separation 
of powers leaves parties relatively weak and leads interests to organize more independently.171 
American pluralism is often referred to as interest group pluralism because formal organizations 
like labor unions, chambers of commerce, trade associations, and public interest groups play an 
especially prominent role in both elections and governance.172  
 Interest groups participate in politics in a wide variety of ways, but the most important 
fall under three categories: electioneering; lobbying; and litigating. These three activities are 
exercises in what I call pluralist power: the ability to influence public policy through direct 
interaction with the core political institutions that control elections, decision making, and policy 
implementation. They are the channels of influence built into the system to make government 
responsive to the people. They are the overt levers of power. When Exxon-Mobile wants to 
influence U.S. energy policy the company donates money to political candidates, hires an army 
of Washington lobbyists, and files legal challenges to onerous EPA and DoI regulations. When 
we say colloquially that a group or sector—such as the oil industry—is a particularly powerful 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Calhoun identified the great divide in sectional terms, with the Northern mercantilist (and free soil) policy 
redistributing wealth from the slave-holding South to the industrialist North. Writing in the mid-
nineteenth century, neither Marx nor Calhoun were able to anticipate vast growth in the role of 
government (and the expansion of citizenship across race and gender lines) that would create the 
complex intersecting interests at the heart modern pluralist democracies.  
171 This view is exemplified by the American Political Science Association’s (APSA) 1950 report, “Toward a 
More Responsible Two-Party System,” which generally lamented the contrast between weak 
ideologically-diverse US parties and strong ideologically-pure European parties. It is important to stress 
that the strength of parties is a function of political systems and not of ideology or some other factor. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the growth of the Federal government following WWII shifted 
the power balance further towards independent interests, resulting in an explosion of interest group 
organizing in the 1970s. 
172 The term intersest group pluralism was coined by by political scientist Ted Lowi. 
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interest group, what we typically mean that they have lots of resources directed at these three 
parts of the political system. In this way, pluralist power can be seen as the power of wealthy 
and well-connected insiders. It leverages money, connections, and specialized knowledge to 
play the game of politics in a direct and normatively acceptable way.173 Yet increasingly, social 
movement organizations (SMOs)—by definition social and political outsiders—are pushing to 
become pluralist players. 
 In recent years, a number of social movement scholars have noted the increasing 
institutionalization of American social movements.174 Sid Tarrow goes so far as to identify 
institutionalization as one of the two defining developments of late 20th and early 21st century 
social movement politics.175  Movements for causes such as gay rights, animal rights, and 
environmentalism have built themselves around large professional advocacy organizations that 
blur the lines between social movement and interest group politics. Many of these groups have 
annual revenue streams in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.  They have legal, 
communications, and campaign departments filled with highly educated full time staff. Press 
releases and letters to Cabinet Secretaries are more likely the order of the day than sit-ins and 
protests. When you walk into the corporate headquarters of The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) 
in downtown Washington D.C. you might understandably think you’ve wandered into an ad 
agency, a law office, or perhaps the offices of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Even the 
                                                           
173 This is not to say that campaign executives, lobbyists, and lawyers are popular in contemporary 
politics. Rather, they are normatively accepted in that they are legally sanctioned and otherwise 
institutionalized in the system. 
174See Dalton, Russell. 2013. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies, 6th ed. CQ Press; Meyer, David. 2007. The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America. 
Oxford; Skocpol, Theda. 2004. Diminished Democracy. University of Oklahoma Press; Tarrow, Sidney. 
1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge University Press; 
Meyer, David & Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. The Social Movement Society. Rowman and Littlefield. 
175 The other defining shift according to Tarrow is the globalization of movements and causes. 
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famously anti-establishment Occupy Wall Street movement—in many ways a throw-back to the 
counter culture movements of the 1960s—quickly found itself occupying a $5,400 a month Wall 
Street office after its Zuccotti Park eviction (Friedlander, 2011).176  
Movement scholarship has argued that the 1970s saw the rise of the so-called “new 
social movements,” whose participants draw increasingly from America’s upper middle class and 
focus on “post-material” issues.177 Consequently, most contemporary movements can marshal 
significant money, time, and political expertise in ways that movements of previous eras could 
not. As Figure 4.1 shows, movement organizational expenditures are now several billion dollars 
annually, and their growth has significantly outpaced overall US economic growth in recent 
decades.178 The movements of today appear resource rich compared to those of the past, but 
we need to be cautious in assuming that resources automatically translate to pluralist power.179 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
176 Occupy casts the institutionalization trend in an interesting light because taking to the streets both 
made the movement unusually captivating and unusually brief. If the streets do not fill up as the weather 
warms, we may take Occupy to be an example of the danger of shunning formal organization. 
177 See Larana, Johnston, and Gusgfield (editors). 1994. New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. There has been somewhat of a pushback against differentiating 
between “new” and “old” social movements, and in many respects the 21st Century literature has moved 
on from this debate. I personally do not find much traction in such distinctions, but do find it useful to 
note the increasing socio-economic status of many movement participants. 
178 For many movements, industries are their main political adversaries. Environmental and animal rights 
movements are clear examples, but even movements like disability rights look to impose regulatory and 
administrative costs on business. As such, GDP growth is a useful rough measure of the increasing 
resources available to other interest groups. The LGBT movement is one of the few that does not 
necessarily fit this model, as I will address in chapter 6. 
179 Recall the discussion in Chapter 2 about the active versus potential use of power. Dahl calls these 
power and power resources respectively. Morriss calls them influence and power.  
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Figure 4.1: Movement Growth v. GDP 1989-2008180 
 
 
These numbers suggest that today’s SMOs have revenue sources that are sizable, reliable, and 
expanding. But whether these resources can be harnessed for political purposes and whether 
they are adequate to compete with traditional moneyed interests are somewhat different 
questions.  
 
In chapters 1 & 2, I argued that pluralist power is a fully matured part of the American 
political order, and as such, access to it is dispersed across the political system. Consequently, it 
is not surprising that we find movements are mobilizing significant pluralist resources. But I 
suggest these resources offer only limited political opportunities for three general reasons. First, 
                                                          
180 Data about overall movement resources are for the subset of seven movements discussed throughout: 
animal rights, environmentalism, anti-abortion, disability right, LGBT rights, minority rights, and women’s 
rights. Because I am working with a subset of movements I try to focus primarily on change in resources 
over time. 
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there are structural barriers: insiders continue to exert institutional pressure on social 
movements to channel their resources into apolitical actions. This happens most clearly through 
IRS oversight of SMOs, FEC campaign finance law, and the First Amendment regime that sustains 
the selective regulation of political speech. Second, there is political inflation: while SMO 
resources have increased, so too have the resources of traditional interest groups. The amount 
of money in politics continues to increase at a rate that devalues, and often outpaces, the 
growth of outsider organizational resources. This point stresses that pluralist strength is largely 
about relative advantage. Furthermore, as more resources pour into the system from a more 
expansive group of political players it becomes increasingly difficult for any side of an issue to 
gain a decisive advantage. Each additional dollar simply has a declining marginal value. Lots of 
money on each side of an issue is generally a recipe for stalemate, which benefits status quo 
interests.181 Third, there is institutional thickening: When government grows the system tends 
to become less dynamic, which favors status quo interests. As governing institutions expand and 
mature they layer commitment upon commitment in terms of allocated resources, 
administrative capacity, and political capital. These commitments decrease the slack resources 
available for the new initiatives that social movements seek. Arguably, progressivism is 
stretched to its limits simply maintaining the current welfare state.182  Moreover, the growth in 
the size and scope of programs and regulations increases the disruptive nature of fundamental 
                                                           
181 Baumgartner et al. (2009) develop this argument in terms of lobbying and find significant empirical 
support for the proposition that money only influences policymakers on the rare case of a severe 
imbalance. The authors only find such imbalances on issues concerning the poor, providing more evidence 
in support of Piven and Cloward’s position.  
182 This is the tentative thesis Stephen Skowronek has advanced in his work on presidential power and 
leadership, which calls into doubt the possibility of revolutionary political reforms in the future. 
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reforms.183 Increased disruption tends to quickly undermine political and public appetite for 
reform. 
These three trends can, to a limited extent, work in favor of movements that have 
already achieved a significant measure of insider status. However, they present daunting 
barriers to movements aiming for radical policy change.184 I consider each trend in turn.  
 
 
Structural Barriers - Regulating Outsider Power 
 Those in power typically seek to limit challenges by those out of power. This is the kind 
of axiomatic political rule that brings out the realist in all of us. Sometimes these limits are overt. 
President John Adams famously tried to silence his Jeffersonian critics with the 1798 Sedition 
Act, which criminalized public criticism of the President. From 1836 to 1844 the House of 
Representatives held in place the notorious “Gag Rule” preventing the consideration of 
abolitionist petitions. The Espionage Act of 1917 (Amended 1918) recriminalized sedition to 
quash critics of US entry into WWI.  From 1910-1920, twenty US states criminalized 
                                                           
183 As discussed in Chapter 3, institutional thickening may raise the stakes of disruption, making disruptive 
power difficult and dangerous to employ, yet strengthening the potential impact if disruptive forces can 
be harnessed.  
184 As Baumgartner and Jones (2010) argue, long periods of political stability are punctuated by sudden 
dramatic political shifts. The shifts determine the major frames, players, and institutions that control a 
policy area during periods of stability. When activists gain an authoritative presence in the policy 
community they may continue to implement their values through the existing institutional structure. For 
example, the environmentalist movement of the 1960’s and 70’s was institutionalized in a number of 
ways, but most clearly in the Clean Air & Water Acts, the creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the granting of legal standing to environmentalist groups. During periods of political 
stagnation during and after the Reagan Administration, environmental goal continued to be implemented 
by existing bureaucratic and legal mechanisms. The inflexibility in some ways insulates these bureaucratic 
footholds from challenges by other interests or movements that may have competing policy goals.  
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“syndicalism” in an effort to suppress agitation by socialists and other political radicals. The 
1940 Smith Act and the subsequent era of McCarthyism made communist and socialist 
suppression a priority at the highest levels of government.185 These efforts to suppress dissent 
are rightly notorious, but often counterproductive; perhaps more important are the more subtle 
rules and regulations that entrench power in bi-partisan and non-issue specific ways.  
 
While there are a wide variety of policies that entrench status quo interests, two areas 
of policy are of particular importance to SMO influence: campaign finance regulation and 
nonprofit tax law. These two policy domains are the major areas of public law restricting and 
channeling “special interest” participation in American politics. I argue that policymakers have 
attempted to use both areas to limit interest group influence, but have been disproportionately 
successful at regulating through tax law, especially IRC section 501(c)3. This disparity is in large 
part due to some slapdash legislating by Congress and the Supreme Court’s very different First 
Amendment standards for tax regulations versus campaign finance law. While campaign finance 
regulations have received an “exacting” or “strict” level of heightened scrutiny, tax regulations 
have received only the lower level of “rational basis” scrutiny. Consequently, while campaign 
finance law has been limited by First Amendment protections for political speech and 
association, the Court has consistently upheld (or ignored) speech restrictions tied to voluntarily 
assumed tax status. In particular, the Court views 501(c)3 status as a government subsidy, which 
can be conditioned upon any speech restrictions that avoid content bias. As social movements 
are disproportionately invested in the C3 form, they are most constrained by the comparative 
                                                           
185 Piven (2006), especially chapter 6, provides an interesting account of repression and retrenchment by 
the status quo across American history.   
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strength of the tax law regime. The following sections briefly trace the diverging development of 
nonprofit tax regulation and campaign finance regulation. 
 
The Nonprofit Tax Code 
 The regulation of nonprofit organizations by the IRS dates back to Revenue Act of 1913 
and birth of the modern IRS. Prior the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment Congress had no 
power to level income taxes and the then Bureau of Revenue had little interaction with 
individuals or corporations.186 The progressive 1913 Revenue Act laid the first standing income 
tax on individuals and corporate groups, but included language drawn from earlier tariffs that 
exempted groups “free of private inurement.” In this way the modern nonprofit was born as 
something of an afterthought, and no legislative history exists regarding the treatment of 
nonprofits in the 1913 Act. The subsequent 1917 War Revenue Act allowed individuals to deduct 
from their gross income contributions made to “religious, educational, scientific, or charitable” 
organizations, which was extended to estate taxes in the 1918 Revenue Act.187 The following 
year the Department of the Treasury clarified with no further explanation that “associations 
formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not educational within the 
meaning of the statute.”188 While there are perhaps innocuous interpretations to the Treasury 
regulation—particularly for the exclusion of partisan political groups—the most obvious 
                                                           
186 The Supreme Court ruled federal income taxes unconstitutional in 1895’s Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & 
Trust Co. Up to this point the federal government had only used income taxes as an infrequent temporary 
measure to finance wars.  
187 Paul Arnsberger, Melissa Ludlum, Margaret Riley, and Mark Stanton. “A History of the tax-exempt 
Sector: An SOI Perspective,” IRS SOI Bulletin, Winter 2008. 
188 T.D. 2831,, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 285 (1919). 
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understanding of the exclusion of “controversial” advocacy is an attempt to suppress socialist 
and communist organizations.  
In his survey of nonprofit tax law and political activities, Oliver Houck has argued that in 
the following decade the clearest understanding the 1919 exemption  rule was that 
“propaganda” simply meant ideas that “were unpopular, and against the status quo.” 189 In 
keeping with this view, we find that temperance, labor, and women’s suffrage groups were 
amongst those denied exemption on these grounds in the 1920s. In the seminal case of Slee v. 
Commissioner the American Birth Control League challenged the “propaganda” exclusion to the 
US Second Circuit Court of Appeals.190 In Slee, Judge Learned Hand famously upheld the denial 
of the League’s tax exemption, writing, “Controversies of that sort must be conducted without 
public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from them.” Hand would go on to note that non-
controversial aims like the prevention of cruelty to children and animals may rightly seek 
legislative redress within the meaning charity, but that groups concerned with “prohibition, the 
League of Nations, or any other of the many causes in which ardent persons engage” should not 
expect tax-exempt status.  
Senator David Aiken Reed of Pennsylvania pushed to codify the judicial understanding of 
charitable exemption from Slee in the 1934 Revenue Act. Senator Reed was a main proponent of 
extending veterans benefits following the struggle between President Hoover and the “Bonus 
Army” of veterans that descended upon the Capital in the summer 1932. Amongst the major 
opponents of such benefits was the National Economy League, a conservative educational 
                                                           
189 Houck (2003). Houck further notes that there was a double edged sword at work for many groups 
because the less “controversial” an issue becomes, the more likely it is to be associated with a partisan 
position (or indeed an actual political party in the early twentieth century). 
190 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930) 
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organization. After years of public struggle with the League over veterans issues and tax policy, 
Reed explicitly sought to alter the tax code to ensure the League’s tax exempt status would be 
removed. The Senator pushed for strict lobbying and electioneering bans, but the Senate 
Finance Committee struggled to produce language that would strike organizations like the 
League while sparing traditional charities. In the end, the 1934 Revenue Act prohibited 
“substantial lobbying” and set aside the issue of electioneering. It was enough to revoke the 
National Economy League’s exempt status, but left significant uncertainty beyond the lobbying 
issue.191 
In 1954 the issue of tax exempt electioneering quietly returned to the Senate. This time 
the Senate’s new Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson, sponsored an Amendment to the 1954 
Revenue Act with no explanation, debate, hearings, or apparent opposition. The Amendment 
conditioned charitable tax exemption on an outright prohibition on electoral participation. By 
most accounts, Johnson was furious over McCarthyist accusations made against him by exempt 
groups including the Committee for Constitutional Government during his 1954 reelection 
campaign. Accounts differ on the extent to which Johnson actually felt electorally threatened by 
the Committee’s activities in the 1954 Democratic Primary, but it is clear his personal 
experiences were a primary motivation for the Tax Amendment.192 The circumstances of the 
legislation force us to ask, would a more modest prohibition have been produced had the 
measure been subject to the kind of scrutiny the 1934 Amendment received? Or conversely, had 
                                                           
191 See Houck 2003, pp.19-22 for an excellent account of the development of the 1934 Amendment and 
pp. 23-29 for an account of LBJs role in the 1954 Amendment (subsequent paragraph).  
192 See Woods (2007), p. 278 and Dallek (1991), p. 448-451. It appears that as the primary campaign 
progressed LBJ because less and less concerned about his reelection prospects, but also more and more 
infuriated by the rhetoric of the challenger, Dudley Dougherty, and his right wing supporters.  
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Congress been able to reach an accommodation back in 1934 would we have inherited a more 
moderate regulation comparable to the prohibition on “substantial” lobbying? 
The 1954 Revenue Act was the beginning of the modern 501(c) nonprofit classification 
system we continue to use today. In addition to clarifying the 501(c)3 category, it created the 
category of “social welfare” organization under section 501(c)4 as one alternative to seeking 
charitable exemption. However, the parameters of C4 status were not clearly laid out at the 
time and were only clarified through a number of later IRS rulings. In the mid to late 1950s the 
nonprofit sector began to use the C4 classification for groups wishing to engage in more 
lobbying than allowed under 501(c)3, and this use was given increasing support by IRS ruling 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.193 It wasn’t until 1981 that the IRS clearly specified that 
electioneering is compatible with C4 status provided it is not coordinated with candidates and is 
not the primary purpose of the organization.194  
 The story that emerges about tax regulation of nonprofit politics is an odd one. It begins 
with open hostility to dissent in the form of “propaganda” exclusions. In an attempt to codify 
those exclusions and strike a blow against the troublesome National Economy League, Congress 
inadvertently produced a modest restriction on charitable lobbying and punted on the question 
of electioneering. Later, LBJ quietly banned all electoral involvement by charities to spite an 
electoral thorn in his side. Finally, the IRS was left largely on its own to define C4 requirements 
                                                           
193 Rul. 60-193, 1960-1 C.B. 195; Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185; Rev. Rul. 76-81, 1976-1 C.B. 156 
194 Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 
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through piecemeal rulings. This is not the story of a thoughtful and comprehensive legislative 
process. It’s one of caprice, happenstance, and neglect.195 
 When Congress and the bureaucracy combine to produce capricious public policy that 
touches squarely upon core First Amendment issues of political speech, one expects clarification 
from the courts. But the very fact that we look at a 1920s Circuit Court ruling like Slee as 
“seminal” speaks to the general neglect the Supreme Court has paid this area of law. The Court 
has only casually addressed the First Amendment issues raised by the electioneering ban for C3 
groups, and we are left mostly to draw conclusions from a handful of cases addressing other tax 
issues and the regulation of charitable lobbying. 
 Where the Court has taken a firm position is on content-based tax denials. In 1958’s 
Speiser v. Randall, the Warren Court considered California’s denial of a veteran’s property tax 
exemption based on his refusal to sign a loyalty oath pledging not to advocate the overthrow of 
the government (effectively excluding communists).196 The State argued that the tax benefit was 
a privilege and its denial raised no speech issues. Justice Harlan disagreed, writing for the eight 
justice majority, “To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is, 
in effect, to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were 
to fine them for this speech.”197 Harlan acknowledges that California may reasonable identify 
                                                           
195 Perhaps the real exception in this narrative is the 1976 Revenue Act, which attempted to clarify what 
counts as “substantial lobbying” by allowing C3 groups to choose “h-election” with specific lobbying 
allowances. A concerted attempt was also made with H.R. 2942, Tax-Exempt Organizations' Lobbying and 
Political Activities Accountability Act of 1987, to further restrict political activities of charities following 
nonprofit involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal, but the bill died in committee. 
196 357 U.S. 513(1958) 
197 The Warren Court generally held that denying benefits was a punitive measure on par with criminal 
penalties. Most notably, Sherbert v. Verner (1962) ruled the denial of unemployment benefits to a woman 
refusing to work on her Sabbath to be free exercise violation.  
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classes of citizens who are eligible and ineligible for special benefits, but stresses that these 
classes cannot be based upon citizens’ social and political opinions. 
 The Speiser ruling raised the possibility that the Court might strike down some or all 
speech restrictions tied to 501(c) organizational forms. However, only eight months later Harlan 
wrote for a unanimous Court in Cammarano v. United States, refusing to apply Speiser 
protections to the denial of income tax deductions for lobbying on public initiatives.198 The 
Cammaranos, part-owners of a Washington state wholesale beer distributer, contributed to a 
trust organized to oppose a state initiative limiting retail alcohol sales to state run stores. The 
couple tried to deduct their contribution from their gross income as normal business expenses, 
but the deduction was denied. They claimed the denial violated the First Amendment under 
Speiser, but Harlan sharply distinguished the cases, writing, “Speiser has no relevance to the 
cases before us. Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage in 
constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activities 
entirely out of their own pockets.” While the facts of Cammarano ostensibly have little to with 
charitable lobbying and electioneering, the case firmly established the precedent that 
government could deny tax benefits over political activities, provided the denials were content 
neutral. 
 In 1972, the Burger Court finally considered to question of politicking by a 501(C)3 
organization. In Christian Echoes National Ministry v. United States, the Court considered 
whether the revocation of a church’s C3 status over lobbying and electioneering violated the 
First Amendment. 199 The case was ultimately dismissed by the Court, and some commentators 
                                                           
198 358 U.S. 498 (1959) 
199 404 U.S. 661 (1972) 
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have interpreted the decision as the Court denying 501(c)3 political prohibitions present a First 
Amendment issue.200 A closer reading of the Court’s brief per curium decision shows that Court 
more or less punted on the First Amendment issue. Essentially, it holds that the District Court 
only ruled on the application of 501(c)3 in this case, not on the constitutionality of Section 
501(c)3. While the lower court decision contained criticism of the IRS understanding of 501(c)3 
as applied, the Burger Court denied the lower court opinion raised constitutional concerns 
about the statute itself.  The Court wrote, “This holding restricts freewheeling enforcement and 
may make it more difficult to revoke certain tax exemptions. But it does not call into question 
the validity of the underlying statute.” Upon dismissal the case was returned to the Tenth 
Circuit, which then reversed the District Court ruling, writing, “In light of the fact that tax 
exemption is a privilege, a matter of grace rather than right, we hold that the limitations 
contained in Section 501(c)(3) withholding exemption from nonprofit corporations do not 
deprive Christian Echoes of its constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech.” The Supreme 
Court’s subsequent denial of certiorari to the case could be read as approval of the lower court 
position, but need not necessarily be read that way. An equally plausible interpretation is that 
the accommodationist Burger Court had no stomach for considering the implications of Christian 
Echoes for the First Amendment’s religion clauses.201  
                                                           
200 For example, Houck (2003, p. 43) blends quotes from the Circuit Court decision that followed the 
Supreme Court’s dismissal, treating the lower court statements as views of the Supreme Court. This 
seems less than sound legal analysis, and does not provide a sound basis for claiming the Court has 
established a broad precedent rejecting First Amendment implications of nonprofit tax policy.  
201 Specifically, the Berger Court held in 1970’s Walz v. Tax Commission that providing 501(c)3 tax 
exemptions to religious organizations did not violate the Establishment Clause, and 1971’s Lemon v. 
Kurtzman stressed that “government entanglement” would be the central piece of the Court’s new 
establishment test. Consequently, the Court could not readily sanction executive and judicial branch 
investigations to monitor statements from the pulpit for political content. Indeed, the Court’s logic in 
Walz depended on the idea that a blanket approval of religious tax exemptions was less constitutionally 
problematic than forcing the IRS to consider when a group’s purpose crossed the line in becoming too 
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 If we leave Christian Echoes aside, the Supreme Court’s sole statement on political 
activities by C3 groups is the 1983 case Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington. In 
the case, the nonprofit group Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR) was denied in 
their application for C3 status because a substantial portion of their activities were deemed to 
be lobbying. TWR challenged the “substantial lobbying” prohibition as a violation of their First 
Amendment rights under the Speiser precedent. Justice Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous court 
rejecting TWRs position and citing Cammarano as controlling. Rehnquist argues the government 
has no obligation to “subsidize lobbying,” and “Legislatures have especially broad latitude in 
creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.” As such, Rehnquist sees no fundamental 
rights at stake and applies only rational basis scrutiny to the regulation. Moreover, he accepts 
Senator Reed’s 1934 rationale for the bill that “exempt organizations might use tax-deductible 
contributions to lobby to promote the private interests of their members.”202  
With Regan we have our first and best answer as to the constitutionality of conditioning 
nonprofit tax status upon political prohibitions. Of course we are yet to hear directly from the 
Court on C3 electioneering prohibitions. While it may seem to be a straightforward application 
of Regan’s logic, I would argue that the electioneering ban raises different, and more pressing, 
First Amendment issues. While one might reasonably extend Regan’s holding to independent 
expenditure such as television advertisements, it’s unclear in what way the president of a C3 
                                                                                                                                                                             
religious. Christian Echoes raises the possibility that the IRS would have to consider when a group was not 
religious enough (in other words when it became too political). 
202 In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun is joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan in conditioning 
support for the Court’s opinion on the IRS providing no barriers to the formation and use of a C4 affiliate 
by charities interested in lobbying. Blackmun stresses, “It hardly answers one person’s objection to a 
restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control, may speak for him.” Specifically, 
Blackmun is concerned that C4 affiliates may be prevented from lobbying explicitly on behalf of their C3 
counterpoints. It appears that the IRS may have somewhat loosened their standards for C3/C4 
interconnectedness in part to satisfy this concurrence. 
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organization saying, “I support the reelection of Barack Obama,” involves a government subsidy 
to that speech. It is pure speech and its power is almost entirely found in public (and member) 
regard for the opinions of the speaker. As such, I believe the political restriction in 501(c)3 to be 
overbroad.203 My views aside, the Court has made no indication it plans to reconsider the issue. 
So for our purposes the tax regime facing SMOs solidified in the early to mid-1980s and 
presented substantial barriers for movements utilizing the C3 nonprofit form.  
 
Campaign Finance 
In contrast with nonprofit tax law, campaign finance law has received a great deal of 
considered attention from Congress and the Supreme Court. Campaign finance law emerged in 
its modern form with the 1907 passage of the Tillman Act, which prohibited direct contributions 
to candidates from corporations and banks. The Tillman Act sought to limit the rising influence 
of interest groups at a time when party control of the political system was in decline. Anti-
corruption reforms, chief among them the 1883 Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, were 
choking off the patronage system that dominated 19th century politics. As party funds declined, 
and the use of direct primaries spread, the parties sought to prevent corporations from 
developing direct financial ties to political candidates. The Tillman ban became the centerpiece 
of the 1910 Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which remained the backbone of US campaign 
finance law until the 1970s. In that time, the two major additions to the FCPA regime were the 
1943 Smith-Connally Act and the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, passed over the vetoes of FDR and 
                                                           
203 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) for foundation of the overbreadth doctrine. See also 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), as discussed in Chapter 3, and United States v. Stevens, 559 
U.S. 460 (2010), as discussed in chapter 5.  
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Truman respectively. The former act extended the Tillman ban on corporate contributions to 
unions. The latter act banned independent campaign expenditures by both corporations and 
unions.  
The generally nonpartisan (or perhaps bipartisan) nature of campaign finance reform is 
striking. While the Tillman Act was a classic progressive measure and Smith-Connally was clearly 
anti-labor, both bills drew strong bipartisan support toward the goal of insulating elections from 
outside contributions. The Taft-Hartley expenditure ban was a further effort to prevent 
participation in elections by forces across the political spectrum One might reasonably ask why 
rational politicians would want to limit their access to business or labor money. Why did a 
Republican Congress pass Democratic Senator Benjamin Tillman’s anti-business regulations? 
Why did a supermajority of a Democratic Congress pass labor restrictions over FDR’s veto? The 
simplest answer is that incumbent politicians control core political resources and so naturally 
benefit from restrictions on outside funding and activity. This is particularly true in primary races 
where challengers typically must secure funds without party support. Encouraging broad direct 
participation by outside groups is simply an unnecessary risk for most incumbents.204  
The second major regime in US campaign finance law began in 1971 with the passage of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The original 1971 FECA sought to formalize and clarify 
the FCPA regime, to increase disclosure requirements for candidates and parties, and to extend 
                                                           
204 David Mayhew’s Congress: The Electoral Connection goes so far as to argue that every decision made 
by Members of Congress is best understood as an attempt to secure reelection, and this simple argument 
has remained the cornerstone of congressional studies for half a century. It’s not difficult to find 
examples. Redistricting by legislatures creates safe seats for both parties. Pork barrel politics and 
logrolling let representatives deliver pet projects to their districts. Staff and franking privileges fuel a 
perpetual incumbent campaign on the government’s dime. And a high public profiles allows for early 
fundraising, which often scares off potentially viable challengers. These incumbent advantages lead to 
congressional reelection rates regularly topping 90%. 
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those requirements to political action committees (PACs). While FECA’s initial goals were 
modest, the law was significantly enhanced in the wake of serious violations in President Nixon’s 
1972 reelection. Nixon had organized his campaign behind his own Committee to Reelect the 
President (CRP), which rested control away from the party apparatus and opening the door to 
more direct connections between the candidate and outside groups. In addition to the 
notorious Watergate shenanigans, 18 American corporations were found to have violated FECA 
contribution rules. Perhaps most notably, American Milk Producers, Inc. split $2 million in 
contributions into hundreds of committees hoping to gain favorable price supports from the 
Nixon Administration.205 In 1974 Congress amended FECA to place firm limits on contributions 
and expenditures, limit personal contributions by wealthy candidates, and create the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) to enforce the new campaign finance regime. Once again the 
legislative effort was bipartisan and once again it overrode a presidential veto, this time Ford’s. 
However, significant aspects of the FECA regime have been constrained or undone by the 
Supreme Court’s entry into the fray.   
Buckley v. Valeo is a critical juncture in this story.206 The Court had previously ruled on 
the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions, most notably 1921’s Newberry v. US in 
which federal regulation of state primaries was struck down. However, previous cases like 
Newberry primarily addressed Ninth and Tenth Amendment concerns about the limits of 
Congress’s Article 1 powers. In Buckley the Burger Court took a different approach by focusing 
on the First Amendment. Its 7-1 per curium decision applied a speech plus conduct analysis 
                                                           
205 Hearings before Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93rd Congress, 1st 
Session (1973). 
206 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
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following US v. O’Brien, which found campaign spending deeply “intertwined” with speech.207 
Moreover the speech analysis was buttressed by a freedom of association argument following 
NAACP v. Alabama.208 As such, regulation of both contributions and expenditures were 
considered under “exacting scrutiny,” which requires campaign finance laws to be “substantially 
related” to “sufficiently important” non-speech government interests.209 FECA’s contribution 
limits met these criteria because contributions create a direct relationship with candidates, 
raising a clearer possibility of quid pro quo corruption. Moreover, the amount of speech being 
limited was seen as minimal since, “[t]he quantity of communication by the contributor does 
not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution.” For the Court, giving $5,000 or 
$10,000 to a candidate expresses comparable symbolic support for their politics. By contrast, 
the Court felt expenditures created a less dangerous indirect link between candidates and 
supporters, while “expenditure ceilings impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity 
of political speech.”  Consequently, “quantity restrictions” on expenditures by candidates, 
parties, and PACs were found to be unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  
In my view, the Court in Buckley correctly characterized Congress’s aims in the FECA 
Amendments as “restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have money to 
spend,” and to “exclude all citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the 
institutional press from any significant use of the most effective modes of communication.” This 
assessment casts a shadow of illegitimacy across the entire enterprise of campaign finance 
regulation. Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence suggested the Court would indeed 
                                                           
207 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) 
208 357 U.S. 449 (1958) 
209 The Court did stress that expenditure regulation raised greater concerns than contribution regulations. 
While the Court is somewhat vague in its language, it could be interpreted as suggesting a higher level of 
scrutiny for expenditure regulations. By contrast I interpret the Court as meaning that contribution 
regulations more easily pass the exacting standard. 
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need to go further than it did in Buckley. He argued that it was untenable to regulate only some 
organizational forms because “the First Amendment does not ‘belong’ to any definable category 
of persons or entities: It belongs to all who exercise its freedoms.”210 Burger’s view of Buckley 
would eventually gain a majority of the Court, but not for another thirty years.  
In 1978, Justice Powell wrote for the Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
which ruled 5-4 that corporations had a constitutional right to make expenditures regarding 
voter initiatives and referendums.211 The case did not touch on electoral expenditures, but 
Powell’s rationale affirmed that corporate political speech warranted every protection afforded 
to the speech of individuals. Justice Powell drew upon Burger’s logic in Buckley, writing, “The 
inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend 
                                                           
210 For Burger, the use of corporate forms by the press (and visa versa) made it untenable to differentiate 
between types of speakers based on their organizational form. Drawing parallels to the pamphleteers of 
the American Revolutionary era, Burger recognized that in the modern communications era political 
speech and speakers would come from every facet of society (though surely he did not foresee the 
development of the internet and social media). As such, he saw the free speech and press clauses of the 
First Amendment working together to create a broader “liberty to disseminate expression” that goes 
further than Buckley. While not in Burger’s time, this vision of Buckley would one day win out in the 
Roberts Court. 
 The Buckley case put the Court and Congress at odds over campaign finance in a struggle that 
persists to this day. Over the next decade the Burger Court assembled majorities to chip away federal and 
state campaign finance laws, with Justice White the lone voice consistently opposing the basic logic of 
Buckley. 
 Justice Blackmun also expressed a fundamental discomfort with Buckley’s logic of treating 
contributions and expenditures differently. Liberal justices Brennan and Marshall were at times more 
amenable to the regulation of wealthy and corporate donors (Bellotti). Justice Rehnquist opposed the 
incorporation of the First Amendment to the states as concerned campaign spending (Bellotti), and 
Rehnquist and O’Connor generally took a case-by-case approach to each regulation. But these elements 
rarely produced a pro-regulation majority in the Burger Court.  
211 While the right of corporations to lobby elected officials was long recognized as protected by the First 
Amendment right to petition the government for redress, the petition clause does not easily extend to the 
public as lawmaker in referendums. It’s an awkward category combining lobbying and electioneering. 
Thirty-two years later the Roberts Court would essentially merge the Buckley and Bellotti logics into the 
Citizens United ruling striking down bans on election expenditures by corporations. First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”212 As 
with Burger’s Buckley Concurrence, the full impact of Bellotti would not be felt for a full three 
decades.  
In 1985, FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee fully extended Buckley’s 
expenditure protections to PACs.213 Writing for the Court, Rehnquist argued the First 
Amendment guaranteed “PACs unlimited independent expenditure – to do less would 
disadvantage collective speech to individual speech.”214 
The following year saw Chief Justice Burger retire, and among the first cases heard by 
the new Rehnquist Court was FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life.215 The case further 
extended expenditure protections to 501(c)4 social welfare groups that meet the following 
three specific criteria: 1) it is a political nonprofit organization; 2) It has no shareholders; and 3) 
It is neither founded by a for-profit corporation nor funded by contributions from for-profit 
corporations. This standard sought to draw a “bright-line rule” between political and non-
                                                           
212 Importantly, the Court rejected arguments that this right of corporations to speak be limited to issues 
“materially affecting” the corporation’s business. Powell, argued, “If a legislature may direct business 
corporations to ‘stick to business,’ it also may limit other corporations—religious, charitable, or civic—to 
their respective "business" when addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the 
expression of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment.” True to these words, the Court would 
soon take up the question of speech by these other corporate forms. 
213 The specific issue was Congress’s attempt to hold PACs accountable to candidate agreements under 
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, which promised candidates matching funds contingent upon 
a voluntary expenditure ceiling. The Act sought to cap PAC expenditures at $1,000 when supporting a 
publically financed candidate. The Court found repugnant the idea that Congress would finance one 
speaker (the candidate) at the cost of silencing a separate speaker (an ideologically aligned PAC), while at 
the same allowing wealthy individuals unlimited expenditures under Buckley. 
214 For our purposes it is important to note that in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee (1982), a 
unanimous Court led by Justice Rehnquist ruled that C4 organizations like NRWC could only solicit funds 
for a PAC from “members” with ongoing active ties to the group. This sharply limited the capacity of C4 
groups to fundraise for their segregated political funds. The 1986 MCFL ruling (discussed in the next 
paragraph) was in part an acknowledgment that PACs are not in themselves a fully adequate outlet for 
nonprofit political speech. We see this problem compounded by the fact that C3 charities cannot directly 
establish PACs and must first establish a sister C4 that can then establish a PAC. These many layers of 
bureaucracy make nonprofit political speech cumbersome and less effective. 
215 470 U.S. 480 (1986). 
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political organizations, with political organization speech wholly unrestrained. PACs, C4s, and 
political parties fall on the political side, while businesses and charities fall on the nonpolitical 
side. Writing for a bare majority, Justice Brennan argued “Voluntary political associations do not 
suddenly present the specter of corruption merely by assuming the corporate form,” and found 
no evidence of corruption involving MCFL type groups.216  
Throughout the twenty years of the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005), the MCFL dichotomy 
between political and nonpolitical groups held. It was affirmed in 1990’s Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, in which the Court refused to extend expenditure rights to for-profit 
corporations and their non-profit representatives such chambers of commerce.217 In 1996’s 
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, the Court reaffirmed that 
independent expenditures by parties were protected speech, and in a subsequent 2001 case 
between the same parties confirmed that coordinated party expenditures could be regulated.218 
Between the CRFCC cases, Nixon v. Shrink upheld Missouri’s campaign contribution limits, which 
                                                           
216 Importantly, the Court also seemed to broaden its understand of how campaign finance regulation 
burdens speech, writing, “MCFL is subject to more extensive requirements and more stringent restrictions 
than it would be if it were not incorporated. These additional regulations may create a disincentive for 
such organizations to engage in political speech.”  This practical disincentive is deemed sufficient to 
qualify as a burden or core political speech. The importance of MCFL is that it expanded the reach of the 
First Amendment under Buckley, while at the same time reaffirming the government’s interests in 
preventing business corruption. 
217 This is not to understate the importance of Austin, which shored up a Buckley regime that was 
struggling to adapt the 1970s doctrine to more recent campaign finance realities. Conservative members 
of the Court immediately took issue with Austin’s addition of an “antidistortion interest” as akin to and 
implied by Buckley’s corruption, appearance of corruption, and shareholder rights compelling state 
interests. Eventually, the Court would reverse itself on the matter and overrule Austin in Citizen’s United 
v. FEC. It is, of course, a matter of intense debate whether Austin legitimately or illegitimately halted the 
extension of First Amendment doctrine that had preceded it and subsequently resumed in the Roberts 
Court. For our purposes the important point is that the Court in Austin maintained the status quo in terms 
of what regulations were constitutionally permissible. 
218 518 U.S. 604 (1996), 533 U.S. 431 (2001) 
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were more strict than FECA allowances.219 These rulings maintained the FECA regime in a more 
or less stable condition for the two decades of the Rehnquist Court. 
While the Court was in a holding pattern, by the mid-1990s individuals, parties, unions 
and corporations had figured out that the speech protections granted by the Burger Court could 
be exploited to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars beyond what hard contribution limits 
would allow. Congress responded with the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA), which sought to close the loopholes the Court had opened in its FECA decisions. BCRA, 
commonly known as McCain-Feingold, contained two main pieces.220 First, it banned “soft” 
money contributions and expenditures by parties and candidates.221 In conjunction with this 
ban, BCRA significantly raised “hard” money contribution limits, reminding us that campaign 
finance reform legislation typically is intended to channel and redistribute campaign funding, 
rather than simply to limit it.222 BCRA’s second major reform banned the use of “issue ads” by 
unions and corporations, which criticize (or congratulate) a candidate on her issue positions, but 
avoid being classified as independent expenditures because they do not take an overt position 
                                                           
219 161 F.3d 519 (2000). 
220 BCRA also contained two lesser restrictions that bear mentioning. First it banned contributions by 
minors. And second, it contained the so-called “millionaires provision” in which a presidential candidate 
receiving public funding would receive additional public funding if facing a challenger spending over $1 
million in personal funds. Both were subsequently been ruled unconstitutional. 
221 These are activities not explicitly related to a specific candidate’s campaign and thus not regulated by 
the FEC. This includes activities like “get-out-the-vote” drives, state party office expenditures, and 
advertisements promoting a party and/or its issues. The problem with these activities is that a campaign 
can use “vote Democratic” advocacy as the functional equivalent of “vote Democratic Senator X” 
advocacy.  As Gerber and Green (2008) have rather convincingly shown that increasing turnout is much 
more efficient than persuading non-supporters, soft money can be used just as effectively as hard funds. 
222 One consequence of this channeling was to shift significant amounts money from party control to 
candidate controlled PACs. One might well argue that declines in party power further insulate members of 
Congress from outside influences, especially in light of the “millionaires provision,” which hamstrings 
wealthy wildcard challengers. 
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on the election.223 Both aspects of BCRA aimed to, in John McCain’s words, “limit the influence 
of special interests in federal campaigns.”224 While who qualifies as a “special interest” is always 
a matter ripe for debate, BCRA does seem to maintain the FECA focus on controlling business 
and union influence. 
BCRA was predictably met with a slew legal challenges that were consolidated into 
2003’s McConnell v. FEC.225 The McConnell decision sees the Court splitting more clearly on 
ideological lines than we see in the decisions of the 1980s and 1990s.226 With Justice O’Connor 
increasingly shifting her votes from the Court’s pro-speech faction to its pro-regulation faction, a 
solid five Justice liberal majority had emerged by 2001’s FEC v. CRFCC, and carried the same bare 
majority into McConnell.227 Justice O’Connor was simply convinced by campaign funding 
developments that the compelling government interests identified in Buckley now applied to 
new practices. As O’Connor and Steven note in their joint opinion, soft money had increased 
from 5% of party spending in 1984 to 40% of party spending in 2000. Moreover 60% of that 
money had come from a mere 800 wealthy and corporate donors in 2000, raising exactly the 
appearance of corrupt influence discussed in Buckley. As for issue advocacy, the Court argues 
that Buckley made no determination on the permissibility of issue ads, and limited itself to 
                                                           
223 The class of advocacy groups known as MCFL nonprofits was not initially spared. BRCA’s “Wellstone 
Amendment” included all non-profits in the expenditure ban. The Court in Beaumont v. FEC 278 F.3d 261  
(2003) narrowed the interpretation of the ban to exclude MCFL groups, a move the McConnell ruling 
affirms. This move was anticipated by Congress, which included the “Snowe-Jeffords exemption” for 
MCFL groups in the event that Wellstone was not deemed constitutional. 
224 Senate Floor statement, 1-4-2004. 
225 540 U.S. 93. 
226 Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O’Connor took case by case positions on campaign 
finance that found each supporting small expansions and contractions of First Amendment protections. 
The Justices that joined the Court in the late 1980s and early 1990s tended towards more fixed ideological 
positions. Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas voted consistently to strike down campaign finance regulations, 
while Ginsberg, Breyer (usually), and Souter(usually), joined justice Stevens to uphold most regulations.   
227 O’Connor regularly voted to strike down regulations in contentious campaign finance cases prior to 
2001. She cast the deciding vote in MCFL and joined Kennedy’s dissent in Austin. Her positions seem to 
have somewhat straight forwardly responded to the increase in unregulated campaign funding.  
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considering express advocacy merely to prevent a reading of the 1974 FECA Amendments that 
was either vague or overbroad. Thus the Court in Buckley is said to treat express and issue 
advocacy separately simply as a “statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional 
command.” As BCRA now explicitly addresses issue advocacy, O’Connor and Stevens judge the 
government has a compelling interest in regulating business and union issue ads because they 
are the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy. 
From MLCF to McConnell, the Rehnquist Court pushed to preserve a version of Buckley 
that extended both the concern for First Amendment burdens and the acknowledgement of 
money’s potential to corrupt the electoral process. But with the retirement of Justices Rehnquist 
and O’Connor, two moderate voices on campaign finance issues, the Roberts Court produced a 
five Justice majority that viewed campaign finance regulation with a presumption of 
unconstitutionality. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—along with longtime campaign 
finance opponents Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia—have voted as an unwavering block in favor of 
striking down every major piece of campaign finance legislation they have considered.  
The key shift in the Court’s approach came in 2007’s FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, in 
which Chief Justice Roberts argues, “Because BCRA §203 burdens political speech, it is subject to 
strict scrutiny,” and “Under strict scrutiny, the Government must prove that applying BCRA to 
WRTL’s ads furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” 
Applying this heightened standard, WRTL stuck down BRCA’s issue advocacy ban. Roberts 
argued that “a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only 
if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or 
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against a specific candidate.228 More broadly, Roberts warned that “a prophylaxis-upon-
prophylaxis approach to regulating expression is not consistent with strict scrutiny.” In other 
words, the Government would likely need to present specific evidence of corruption for its 
interests to be considered narrowly tailored and compelling.  Thus in applying strict scrutiny the 
Roberts Court cast into doubt every campaign finance regulation previously upheld under 
Buckley’s “exacting scrutiny” standard.229  
The conservative bare majority that solidified in WRTL carried over three years later into 
the most significant campaign finance case since Buckley.230 In 2010’s Citizens United v. FEC, the 
Court struck down BCRA’s independent expenditure ban for business corporations, unions, and 
nonprofits with business connections. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy rejected the 
political/apolitical organization dichotomy that grew out of MCFL and justified Austin’s refusal to 
extend expenditure rights to nonprofits with corporate ties. Kennedy argued that the Court’s 
case law contains both “a pre- Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on 
the speaker’s corporate identity and a post- Austin line that permits them.” The latter he views 
as inconsistent with the Court’s ruling in Bellotti and unable to survive heightened scrutiny. 
Taking up Chief Justice Burger’s position in his Buckley concurrence, Kennedy stresses that the 
                                                           
228 McConnell had previously rejected arguments that the ban was facially unconstitutional, accepting the 
government’s claim that issue ads were the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy, which could be 
regulated under Austin. Furthermore, Roberts argues that McConnell only rejected claims that the ban 
was not “facially unconstitutional,” not as applied in specific controversies. In addition, Roberts rejected 
any “intent-based analysis” relying on the context of the speech to clarify its meaning as “amorphous 
considerations of intent and effect.” By this standard only “magic words” that explicitly state an electoral 
intent qualify as an electioneering communication. Without the equivalency to express advocacy, the 
Court was left with no convincing evidence that WRTL style speech produced any corruption. 
229 Many of the Court’s decisions in this area make no reference to level of scrutiny, or employ somewhat 
vague descriptions of heightened scrutiny. But it is significant that the Court’s speech protections 
strengthen with the first addition of “strict scrutiny” language. 
230 In 2008, the same 5-4 majority ruled BCRA’s millionaire’s provision unconstitutional in Davis v. FEC. The 
language of Justice Alito’s opinion is somewhat less ambitious than WRTL or the upcoming Citizens 
United. This is understandable given the fact that Buckley struck down a similar provision and McConnell 
likely would have done the same had the complaint not been dismissed for lack of standing.  
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use of corporate forms by the press (and vice versa) is proof enough that corporate identity is an 
untenable ground for restricting political speech. Channeling Burger, Kennedy writes, “Rapid 
changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—
counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain 
speakers.” If regulating expenditures by organizational form is unacceptable, any expenditure 
ban is going to be almost by definition too broad to meet the requirement for narrow tailoring 
under strict scrutiny. 
 Kennedy’s opinion appears to require clear and specific evidence of corruption to justify 
restrictions on political speech. In examining the legislative and judicial histories surrounding 
BRCA Kennedy finds no such evidence of expenditures buying influence, and “only scant 
evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate.”231 In 2014, a plurality of the Court, led 
by Chief Justice Roberts, took the significant step of extending the expenditure logic to the 
constitutionality of campaign contribution restrictions. In Robets’s McCutcheon v. FEC opinion, 
the Court struck down FECA cumulative campaign contribution limits as unconstitutional 
because of a lack of quid pro quo corruption.232 It appears likely that that cumulative 
                                                           
231 Kennedy’s opinion is most forceful in rejecting Austin’s “anti-distortion” rationale for limiting corporate 
speech, which argues that unrestrained business expenditures can purchase quantities of speech that are 
disproportionate to their public support. But in rejecting anti-distortion, Kennedy also brushes off 
Buckley’s “appearance of corruption” rationale as overly dependent upon unconstitutional presumptions 
about the “right” sources and amounts of speech. Indeed, Kennedy implies that quid pro quo corruption is 
the only reasonable basis for regulating campaign expenditures, and cites the lower court finding that, 
“The McConnell record was ‘over 100,000 pages’ long, McConnell I , 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 209, yet it ‘does 
not have any direct examples of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures,’ id. , at 560 (opinion of 
Kollar-Kotelly, J.). This confirms Buckley ’s reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or 
create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption. In fact, there is only scant evidence that independent 
expenditures even ingratiate.” 
232 While Buckley found clear evidence of corruption involving contributions back in the 1972 election, the 
Court dismissed those examples as an outmoded vestige on Nixon-era government corruption. There is a 
cause and effect problem with legislation that prevents undesirable activities. If the legislation works it 
becomes nearly impossible to determine if the legislation is continuing to suppress the activities or if the 
activities are gone for good. In the latter case the legislation may no longer be justified by a compelling 
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contribution limit will not be the last contribution ban struck down.but regardless, the end of 
expenditure bans essentially means that all potential political actors can now spend freely 
throughout the election process. This new reality was driven home later in 2010 when the DC 
Circuit Court handed down a unanimous decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC.233 The DC Court 
applied Citizens United to the question of PACs that only engaged in protected expenditures, 
ruling that so-called “Super PACs” were entitled to make unlimited expenditures and receive 
unlimited contributions unencumbered by FECA’s PAC donation limit. As such, FECA no longer 
provides a substantial barrier to interest group electioneering, a shift so significant we can 
consider ourselves in a new post-Buckley campaign finance regime. 
 
When we compare the trajectory of campaign finance law and nonprofit tax law we see 
that Congress has rather consistently sought to place constraints on outside political spending. 
When seeking to control business and union interests this legislation has been deliberate, 
precise, and thorough. The 1974 FECA Amendments and the 2002 BCRA legislation were major 
efforts to produce a desirable balance of political voices. By contrast, nonprofit law has been 
reactionary, vague, and haphazard. It banned “propaganda” by charities in 1917, “substantial” 
charitable lobbying in 1934, enacted a blanket prohibition on charitable political speech in 1954, 
and allowed sections 501(c)4 and 527 restrictions evolve through a series of non-comprehensive 
IRS rulings. The result is that while business and union organizations were prohibited from 
                                                                                                                                                                             
interest if it is impinging on civil liberties.  In 2013’s Shelby County v. Holder, the same five justice majority 
as in Citizens United struck down key provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act because there was 
insufficient evidence that those provisions were continuing to suppress racial discrimination. It’s entirely 
possible that the VRA was unable to meet heighten scrutiny because it was working too well in 
suppressing the behaviors that would justify its continued application. Arguably the same logic could be 
turned against FECA contribution limits. 
233 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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purchasing campaign ads from their general treasury funds, charities were prohibited from even 
uttering a word of pure speech around elections. But if Congress has held a firmer line against 
charities than businesses and unions, they have generally sought tocontain and suppress all 
forms of interest group speech.  
Like Congress, the Supreme Court applied very different standards of review for IRC 
restrictions and campaign finance law. The Court’s very brief Cammarano, Christian Echoes, and 
Regan rulings apply regular scrutiny and essentially conclude that nonprofit tax law cannot 
violate the First Amendment unless it is content-based. By contrast, Buckley, McConnell, and 
Citizens United are amongst the lengthiest analytical treatments of public policy and civil 
liberties the Court has undertaken. The result is charitable speech restrictions are upheld whole 
cloth while campaign finance restrictions have been picked apart in phases. From 1976 to 1985, 
the Burger Court unleashed direct speech by candidates, parties, PACs, and individuals, while at 
the same time upholding restrictions on businesses, unions, and nonprofits. This period served 
to limit the potential influence of movements. From 1986 to 2005, the Rehnquist Court largely 
maintained the Burger Court regime, but the MCFL loophole created a notable opportunity for 
social movements that chose to organize in the C4 form. From 2006 to the present, the Roberts 
Court extended direct speech rights to all organizational forms, opening the flood gates to a tide 
of business, union, and wealthy individual expenditures.  
Viewed in isolation the twenty-year span of the Rehnquist Court could be view as an 
open period from a political opportunity theory standpoint. MCFL C4 organizations could 
participate directly in elections while, trade groups, chambers of commerce, businesses, and 
unions were forced to navigate the unwieldy PAC landscape. But in combination with the IRC 
ban on charitable lobbying that Regan cemented in 1983, the Rehnquist era is better seen as a 
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conditionally open period. To take advantage of their political opportunities, movements 
needed to make basic choices about resource allocation. As figure 2 makes clear, SMOs did not 
invest in C4 or PAC forms during this period. 234 And now that the Roberts Court has unleashed 
the polity’s major moneyed interests, movements are at an even greater relative disadvantage.  
 
Figure 4.2: Movement Growth by Organizational Type  
 
*The earliest comprehensive PAC values available are from 1998. Non-PAC 527 money was not a major 
factor before the 2004 election cycle and factors only into the 2008 PACs + 527s figure.  
 
How do we explain social movements shunning C4 and PAC organization during the 
relatively open period from 1986-2007? It is tempting to interpret this trend as indicating little 
                                                          
234 Movement use of 527 political orgs is largely a post-Rehnquist-Court phenomenon. It is a significant 
development, but does not change the fact that movements did not make heavy use of political 
organizations during the long period of relative advantage. 
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social movement interest in political forms. But a more fruitful approach to this question takes 
into account that organizational decisions are individually made and must make organizational 
survival a priority. As James Q. Wilson reminds us, organizations that focus on mission over 
organizational maintenance will eventually cease to exist, and will cede the field to more self-
interested rivals.235 Just as Mayhew pointed out that Congressmen can only achieve their 
political aims by securing reelection, institutionalized SMOs can only achieve social change by 
keeping the lights on and the doors open.  
If we consider a group’s choice of organizational form purely in terms of financial 
maintenance, the incentive of choosing the C3 form is obvious. But if we consider those 
incentives in terms of a non-zero sum mixed-motive game in which two groups are competing 
for resources, we see that the incentive to choose C3 form is even greater. Figure 3 models such 
a situation, with each organization having a preference order of C3/C4 > C3/C3 > C4/C4 > C4/C3. 
Not only is C3/C3 pareto efficient and the only Nash equilibrium, but C4/C3 is a sucker’s bet in 
which the C3 group siphons resources from the C4. To put it another way, in choosing C4 form 
an organization not only must worry about donors decreasing support due to a tax penalty, but 
they also must worry about donors being poached by C3 groups working in the same 
movement.236 These incentives strongly discourage C4 organization.  
 
 
 
                                                           
235 Wilson’s 1973 work Political Organizations brings a rational choice approach to bear on the behavior of 
interest groups and bureaucratic agencies. He further argues that organizations will tend to view 
increasing resources as a central goal in itself. 
236 In fact, groups must worry about support being poached by groups working for other causes as well. 
Realistically, donors often support a number of causes from a common checkbook. 
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Figure 4.3: Financial Incentives of Organizational Choice 
Org B 
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Preference Order: C3/C4 >C3/C3 > C4/C4 > C4/C3 
Nash Equilibrium: C3/C3 
Pareto Efficient: C3/C3 
Dominant Strategy: C3 
 Figure 4.3 is of course an abstraction that focuses only on one organizational goal: 
maintenance. A clearer picture of organizational choice requires us to also consider the issue of 
movement power. Figure 4.4 considers organizational choice in terms of its impact on 
movement power, arguing that a balance of C3 and C4 organizations is likely more effective than 
investing solely in C3 or C4 forms. The preference order in such a game would be C4/C3 = C3/C4 
> C4/C4 >C3/C3.237 This is a classic coordination game. While communication and iteration easily 
produce an ideal solution, it is worth pointing out that groups typically only make an 
incorporation decision once, hindering coordination. As such, there are two Nash equilibria, 
meaning that there is no dominant choice strategy for each group. So if we consider that 
organizational maintenance councils a clear strategy of charitable organization, and 
organizational power/efficacy councils an ambiguous strategy, it is unsurprising that most 
                                                           
237 The idea is that C3 movements attract more resources than C4 organizations that can be directed 
towards litigating and other activities that are not restricted by the IRS. As such, a mix of prominent C3 
and C4 organizations would be more efficient than using C4 organizations exclusively. While I picture 
C4/C4 as having more utility than C3/C3, the logic of the game plays the same if we were to assume C4/C4 
= C3/C3. 
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groups see the C3 form as a clear choice. The choice situation is expressed in Figure 5, where 
each group prefers a C3/C4 outcome, and consequently they produce a C3/C3 outcome that is 
not pareto optimal.238 Even though C4 organizing carries the same utility to the group as C3 
organizing (C4/C3 = C3/C3), if organizational choice is uncoordinated then it remains rational to 
opt for C3 form. There is no risk and a potential advantage. The C3/C3 position is admittedly a 
weak and unstable Nash equilibrium in this model, but it is enough to explain a sub-optimal 
amount of C3 organizing, in spite of the recognized collective advantage of a diverse C3/C4 
movement.  
 
Figure 4.4: Power Incentives of Organizational Choice 
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238 I have written the payoffs so that each group prefers all outcomes other than C3/C4 equally. While this 
assumption is debatable, it seems more accurate than some classic alternatives like the prisoner’s 
dilemma or chicken.  
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Figure 4.5: Combined Financial and Power Incentives of Organizational Choice 
Org B 
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A sub-optimal amount of C4 organizing is indeed what we find. If we parse movement 
data by organizational type it from 1989-2008 it becomes clear that SMO revenue growth has 
been heavily concentrated in C3 organizations. As Figure 4.2 shows, C3 charities grew 186% over 
the period studied while C4 advocacy groups grew only 88%. This means that SMOs with the 
ability to participate in electoral politics grew only slightly faster than the overall economy. 
Another way of looking at the situation is that in 1989, 17.3% of movement resources were 
devoted to C4 organizations, but by 2008 this percentage had dropped to just 12.0%. This trend 
hardly suggests that social movements are working to increase their political presence. 
 The most important structural barriers movements face are neither hidden nor 
particularly malicious. Since the turn of the 20th Century Congress has made clear that it aimed 
to subsidize charity but not “propaganda” and dissent. Over time charitable status was extended 
to more and more dissenting ideologies, and the propaganda exclusion became tied to political 
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activities instead of political ideas. The tax structure’s siren song promises SMOs cold hard cash 
to forsake key speech rights, which in itself is such a soft form of political suppression that it 
barely deserves the name. But when we consider that SMOs compete for their lifeblood with 
other nonprofits within their movements and across the charitable landscape, we see that the 
incentives to organize charitably are far more pressing. When combined with campaign finance 
regime that has protected the speech rights of movement competitors, we see developments 
that have put movements at an organizational disadvantage. And with the Roberts Court 
removing outside speech almost entirely from FEC control, we are entering a period where 
charitable speech restrictions have become a profound disadvantage for movements that have 
invested heavily in the C3 organizational form.  
 
Political Inflation 
 In the previous section I focused abstractly on speech rights, with expenditures serving 
as a vehicle for, and a metric of, political speech. I now aim to contextualize that election 
spending within the political system. Political spending is in many respects an issue of relative 
power, where the absolute amount of money spent by one side is far less important than the 
amount spent relative to the competition. If an environmental group spends $10,000 opposing 
the election of a pro-drilling candidate, that means very different things if pro-drilling trade 
groups spend $10,000 vs. $100,000 in support of the candidate. It also means very different 
things if the candidates themselves spend $2 million vs. $10 million in a given race. Just as 
regular inflation means your dollar buys less, political inflation means your electoral dollar buys 
less votes and less influence.  
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The relevant baseline for social movement pluralist power should be the general 
expansion of political spending. Movements need to maintain their share of political spending 
just to stand still. If we look at Figure 4.6, we see that after adjusting for economic inflation, 
total election spending increased 227% from 1988 to 2008. Moreover, “outside spending,”—the 
independent expenditures that interest groups, unions, business councils, PAC (super and 
regular), party committees, and C4s engage in—has increased an astounding 1838% over the 
same period. These figures mean that social movements need to increase their political 
resources at a substantial rate just to break even with competing interests.  
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Figure 4.6: The Growth of Money in Politics (in millions) 
 
Figure 4.6 also includes the numbers for lobbying and PAC expenditures, which I 
considered only passingly in the previous section. Despite a very modest increase in overall PAC 
expenditures of 42% from 1998-2008, this increase is more than quadruple that of SMO PACs 
over the same period. This is a good example of how slow growth can translate into relative 
decline in a competitive electoral environment. The figures for lobbying are more difficult to 
analyze, but look far better for movements. Our sample movements increased their lobbying by 
                                                           
239 This includes independent expenditures and coordinated activities by 527s, C4s, and PACs 
240 This value is quite conservative because I am using the 1992 election as a baseline, as it is the first 
Presidential election year for which we have reliable outside expenditure numbers. As the 2010 midterm 
election saw $489 million in outside spending, I think it is safe to say 2008 would have seen approximately 
400 million in spending were it a non-presidential year. As such, we might conservatively estimate a 
3,000% increase from the 1989-90 baseline of $12 million. 
241 I do not include PAC activity in the “Total” category to avoid double counting money dispersed to 
candidates or covered as independent expenditures. 
242 I use 1998 for the base amount, as that’s where our movement data begins. 
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C3 organizations 153% from 1989-2008.243 While this growth outpaces the 74% increase in 
congressional lobbying from 1998-2008, political inflation eats away at half of C3 SMO gains.244  
Another important comparison is between SMOs and the larger nonprofit sector. While 
movements often find their clearest opposition in industry groups, other charities and social 
welfare groups are their most direct competition for agenda space. The overall C3 sector grew 
126% from 1989-2008, somewhat less than SMO C3s. But lobbying by all charities increased a 
whopping 378%, well over double the rate of SMO lobbying growth. During the same period the 
overall C4 sector grew 185%, also more than double SMO C4 growth. In each case we see the 
SMO share of political resources losing ground to their direct competitors. The data suggests 
that movements are actually being crowded out of their own lobbying niche by the American 
Cancer Society, the United Way, and various other traditional charities, as well as by partisan 
organizers in the C4 sphere.245  
Perhaps the most important way to look at all the political inflation we see is to note 
that the political system is simply awash in money these days. As Baumgartner et al. (2009) has 
shown, most policy issues tend to draw coalitions of moneyed interests to both sides of the 
                                                           
243 C3 organizations are required to report lobbying expenses to the IRS, though the standards for 
determining the amount spent on lobbying are somewhat ambiguous. If the group president flies to 
Washington to speak to Congressmen, her airfare might be counted, but none of her annual salary would 
be. Dossiers distributed to members would be, but the in-house computers used to design the materials 
would not. By contrast, all these expenses are included in when groups hire outside lobbyists. As such 
comparisons are inexact and the development of in-house resources can mask lobbying activity. 
 
Lobbying disclosure was not precisely tracked prior to 1998 so direct comparisons should be with SMO 
lobbying from 1998-2008. 
244 Political inflation also outpaces C4 expenditure growth, and C4 organizations often view lobbying as 
their central mission. 
245 I have argued elsewhere that without any electoral leverage C3 SMOs are essentially pleading for 
support when lobbying. As such, other charities become their most direct competitors for time, funding, 
etc.  
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debate, which typically results in static issue frames. Money only buys effective agenda space 
when it faces resource poor opposition.   
  
Institutional Thickening  
Institutional thickening has two elements, which I refer to as “crowding out” and 
“locking in.” Crowding out refers to existing government commitments limiting the resources 
available for new initiatives.  Locking in refers to the resistance new initiatives receive because 
they disrupt popular existing programs or influential agencies. The two elements work together 
to create an inverse relationship between government size and government dynamism. I will 
deal with each element in turn. 
 
 In the last section we considered campaign spending in terms of relative power, 
suggesting that pluralist power requires outdoing the competition. We also considered that 
competition does not necessarily mean political opposition because SMOs must compete with 
each other and non-movement causes for government attention and services. We can expand 
on this idea by considering that yesterday’s agenda items continue to occupy government long 
after the initial decision making process ends.246 Since the American public and its political 
institutions have limited financial and personnel resources, increased interest group 
competition since the 1970s must necessarily lead to each issue receiving a smaller slice of the 
pie or new issues finding only an empty pie tin on the table. The latter is more often the case 
                                                           
246 In Chapter 6 I deal with the closely related phenomenon of limited agenda attention caused by 
policymakers addressing and readdressing items that have gained a permanent spot on the public agenda.  
 173
with established interests crowding out newcomers. Crowding out is the dominant pattern 
because many issues like defense, infrastructure, and public lands occupy a consistently large 
and irreducible percentage of government activity. If we imagine government capacity as hotel 
capacity, we might say that several floors are occupied by permanent residents, making it tough 
to get a room. If we envision government as a dinner party, the late arrivals are scrambling for 
the last open seats at the table. Either way, crowding out ensures that as ongoing government 
commitments increase there are simply less slack resources for new contenders. 
The logic of crowding out is built on two assumptions. First, government has limited 
capacity. And second, new policy issues arise more quickly than old ones disappear (if they ever 
do). The first assumption is somewhat easily shown. The three branches of the federal 
government are headed by a set number of officials. We’ve had 435 House members since the 
Apportionment Act of 1911and had 50 Senators since 1959 when Alaska and Hawaii gained 
statehood. We’ve got a single President and a single Supreme Court, which has numbered nine 
Justices since 1869. At the highest levels these institutions have a relatively fixed capacity. It 
might be reasonably countered that lower-level personnel have increased with the size of 
government. While this is true if we look across the whole span of American history, it is not if 
we consider only the past two or three decades. Non-military executive branch personnel 
peaked in 1990 with just over 3 million employees, and has steadily declined to a current level of 
around 2.7 million. Legislative and judicial personnel peaked in 1992 with around 66 thousand 
employees, and have more or less held that level since then.247 But perhaps government is 
                                                           
247 Data taken from the US Office of Personnel Management website on 10/03/2013. 
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-
reports/historical-tables/total-government-employment-since-1962/ 
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simply more efficient today. After all, the “reinventing government” craze of the early 1990s 
was all about doing more with less. 
A look at government policy outputs suggests that the federal government is actually 
becoming steadily less productive over time. As figure 4.7 shows, the number of public laws 
produced by Congress, Executive Orders by the President, and rulings by the Supreme Court are 
all at or near record lows. The number of Congressional hearings held and bills produced have 
also fallen steadily since peaks in 1979 and 1969 respectively.248 While some may look to explain 
this decline in productivity in partisan terms—perhaps as a result of polarization or increased 
conservatism introduced by the Nixon and Reagan administrations—I follow Baumgartner and 
Jones in looking for more systemic explanations.249  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
248 Data taken from the University of Texas Policy Agendas Project website on 10/03/2013. 
http://www.policyagendas.org/page/trend-analysis 
249 In Chapter 5, I more directly address Baumgartner and Jones’s argument that institutional capacity 
limited by the “bounded rationality” of policymakers, which forces them to attend to issues serially. Here I 
am making a related argument that focuses on resource allocation. Admittedly, when I suggested to Frank 
Baumgartner my “crowding out” interpretation of this data implied there would be no new cycle of 
federal productivity, he responded, “huh, I suppose anything is possible.” He and Jones contend that new 
policy comes in spurts, and that we are merely in a recurring static period before the next flurry of new 
government. I believe my suggestion that policy productivity  may not be cyclical is a contribution of my 
work, similar to my argument against Tarrow’s political opportunity cycles. 
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Figure 4.7: Policy Output: Publics Laws, Executive Orders, and Supreme Court Cases 1946-2012 
 
Turning to our second assumption, we must consider the possibility that a constant (or 
even declining) output of policy does not limit new initiatives provided the government can shed 
old business. Limited capacity at a hotel or dinner party is no trouble if there is a constant 
turnover in guests. But that is not what the evidence indicates is happening with federal policy. 
Instead we find clear evidence of crowding out.250 Perhaps the clearest evidence comes from 
measuring the percentage of laws devoted to “government operations,” which support ongoing 
government functions. As Figure 4.8 shows, government operations laws represented 10-20% of 
US public laws up until the early 1990s. But starting in the mid-1990s this ratio shifts to 25-50% 
of all laws passed by Congress. As the total number of laws passed has declined, government 
operations laws have stayed steady or increased in number. Other major policy areas, such as 
public land & water management, defense, and transportation show similar patterns. For the 
most part, once an issue becomes public policy it remains an active concern for policymakers 
indefinitely.  
                                                          
250 Or conversely this could be construed as the result of Locking in, which will be discussed next. I feel this 
evidence I cite is best interpreted as persistent responsibilities, many administrative, taxing the system. 
Regardless, both interpretations support institutional thickening as a force constraining new business. 
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Figure 4.8: Government Operations Laws v. Total Laws 
 
 
The evidence of crowding out can also be seen in federal budget expenditure trends. As 
Figure 4.9 makes clear, given current trends, mandatory expenditures on Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid will increasingly crowd out virtually all other budget items. And as 
interest rates retreat from the historic lows caused by the 2008 recession, interest payments 
will also become a significant crowding factor. Moreover, roughly half of discretionary spending 
goes to defense, which although more flexible than mandatory expenditures is nonetheless  
resistant to cuts. Taken altogether we have a budgetary picture in which deficits are growing, 
entitlement spending is growing, defense spending is robust, and slack resources are 
increasingly scarce. It is important to clarify that Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are 
themselves products of past social movement success. The point is that this past movement 
success is institutionalized in ways that crowd out future initiatives.  
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Figure 4.9: Historic and Projected Federal Budget Expenditures251 
    
 
While crowding out is part of the story of institutional thickening, it is not the whole 
story. The growth of government also reduces its dynamism because major policy shifts disrupt 
an increasingly extensive and complex network of existing programs. These programs are likely 
popular with the public and form essential commitments of the government coalitions that have 
enacted and maintained them.252 Public opinion polls consistently show high public approval 
rates for all major federal agencies, with about 2/3 of Americans approving of agencies like the 
CDC (70%), NASA (68%), and DoD (65%) and nearly half of Americans approving of the much 
maligned IRS (45%) (Pew Research Center, 2015). As Skowronek puts it, “More has to be 
changed to secure a break with the past, and those adversely affected by the changes will be 
able to put up more formidable resistance.” (Skowronek 1993, p. 56).253 Movements are 
especially impacted by this thickening because their policy initiatives typically do not fit neatly 
                                                           
251 Taken from the Whitehouse’s Office of Management and Budget website (accessed 10/3/2013). 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/budget/fy2009/outlook.html. I intend 
to eventually make my own charts that say the same basic thing, but these get the point across. 
252 Certainly the size and complexity of the modern economy and other large non-government institutions 
also contributes to this phenomenon. 
253  
 178
into previous legislative and bureaucratic categories. Take, for example, the Organic Foods 
Production Act of 1990. 
The organic food movement emerged in response to the “green revolution” in mid-
twentieth century agriculture that introduced the widespread use of chemical fertilizer, 
herbicides, and pesticides.254 The movement achieved its major legislative goal with the 1990 
Organic Foods Production Act, which on its face appears to create a simple USDA certification 
for chemical-free agriculture. However, it took twelve years for regulations to be put into effect, 
in large part because the USDA held so many existing policy commitments. At its core, the USDA 
is charged with the dual missions of promoting the sale of US agricultural products and 
promoting the nutritional health of US consumers. Under the former mission there are 
programs ranging from disaster assistance and crop insurance, to direct payment and federal 
purchasing. Under the latter mission the USDA tracks foodborne illness, sets standards for 
school lunches, and funds programs like WIC and Food Stamps. In addition, other sub-missions 
such as enforcing the Animal Welfare Act and encouraging the conservation of land and water 
have been layered onto the USDA’s primary goals. Each of the USDA’s seventeen agencies was 
in some way impacted by the addition of the National Organic Program (NOP), even if merely 
through indirect budgetary concerns. Moreover, each program impacts multiple interest groups, 
as well as other federal and states agencies.255  
                                                           
254 Discussion of the “organic food movement” raises the persistent question, “what counts as a 
movement?” The push for organic food standards can largely be considered a sub-movement of modern 
environmentalism. Some might consider it a coalition movement drawing support from environmentalist, 
small farm, and slow/local food movements.  
255 The following are some of the questions the USDA faced. Will organic certification hurt sales of 
conventional agricultural products? Will the cost of certification price out small farmers? Will organic 
crops be more or less resistant to infestations and weather events covered by government insurance? Will 
the push for land and water intensive organics undermine environmental efforts to reduce water use and 
promote reclamation of wildlife habitats? Are organics more or less susceptible to bacterial 
 179
In the case of the NOP, the regulatory process was repeatedly derailed by opposition 
from major agricultural trade groups, anti-GMO environmentalists, and other factions across the 
political spectrum. After twelve years of conflict, the USDA produced a series of watered-down 
regulations designed to service corporate organic agriculture while intentionally minimizing the 
impact of regulations on the broader US agricultural sector.256  
Locking in is a story we also see in the legislative process, where the average bill passed 
by Congress went from two-and-a-half pages in the mid-twentieth century to over fifteen pages 
long in the early twenty-first century.257 The length of legislation has become a central point of 
contention in contemporary debates, with the backlash against the 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act being the prime example.258 The push for the PPACA, President Obama’s 
most significant legislative achievement, was stalled in large part due to a highly effective 
opposition strategy that focused on the length of the bill. Conservative opponents of 
“Obamacare” focused relentlessly on the more than 2,000 page length of the House version to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
contamination? Should schools be encouraged to use organic products? Should WIC cover organics? 
Should animal welfare standards be part of organic certification? How will import standards be upheld? 
Will organics produce WTO non-trade barrier violations? How much of federal R&D and advertising 
should be diverted to organics? Should the USDA defer to the EPA in deciding what chemicals are 
unacceptable. Should it defer to the FDA on antibiotics use in livestock and on the safety of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs)? 
256 See Ingram and Ingram’s fascinating account of the organic movement’s implementation battle in 
“Creating Credible Edibles” (in Meyer et al. 2005). 
257 Christopher Beam. “Paper Weight,” Slate Magazine. August 20, 2009. 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/08/paper_weight.html  
258 Perhaps it is odd to choose an example of legislation that passed. However, the PPACA only passed due 
to an extraordinary effort by House Speaker Nancy Polosi, who managed to whip House Democrats into 
passing the Senate version of the law without conference. This despite Democratic control of the White 
House, House, and a supermajority in the Senate. Furthermore, the final version of the law did not 
contain many of the most transformational aspects of reform floated in the House. Moreover, it should be 
noted that in pursuing health care reform, the Obama administration was forced to abandon many other 
major reforms, including climate change legislation.    
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argue that comprehensive health care reform is, as The Weekly Standard put it, “a project too 
large, too complicated, too expensive, and too disruptive to succeed.”259260  
While the Senate version of the PPACA that eventually became law was less than half 
the length of the longest House version, it was still 25 times the length of the Original 1935 
Social Security Act.261 Many Republican claimed the length of the PPACA to be an indicator of 
botched legislating, but a more reasonable assessment is simply that any major legislative effort 
is likely to impact dozens of existing programs and thousands of pages of existing regulations. It 
is a structural issue. While institutional thickening may inherently hamstring progressives more 
than conservatives, it is not a function of contemporary politicians or political parties. It is simply 
the result of the growth of government. Major governance change is getting increasingly more 
difficult, and this limits the opportunities for social movements to reshape the system to reflect 
their goals. 
 
Conclusions  
In this chapter I have argued that social movements face an increasingly closed political 
system, which limits their opportunities to effectively employ pluralist power. These declining 
pluralist opportunities result from three trends. First, movement organizing is structurally 
repressed through tax and campaign finance public law. Second, movement resources are 
                                                           
259 Yuval Levin. “Real Health Reform,” The Weekly Standard.” Vol. 14, No. 45, August 17, 2009. 
260 In addition, the need to bring the insurance industry, small businesses, hospitals, doctors, nurses, labor 
and other interests on board limited how radical the PPACA could be. Core proposals supported by liberal 
reform movements—particularly single payer systems and a competitive “public option” competing in 
private insurance markets—were early casualties of the crowded interest group space. This is explained 
by Underdal’s Law of the least ambitious program. Marie Gottchalk (2000) offers a fascinating account of 
how the interests of labor and business undermined the Clinton’s health care reform efforts in the 1990s. 
261 As judged by word count: 389, 369 v. 15,264. (NOTE: find word count of 65 SS amendment) 
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drowned out by political inflation in a system where pluralist power is a fully mature part of the 
political system. And third, institutional thickening favors established interests by rendering the 
system less dynamic.262  
Despite the closed nature of the system, I will argue in chapters 6 & 7 that some 
movements have done significantly better at mobilizing political resources. But first, I turn to the 
issue of plebiscitary power. 
  
                                                           
262 The three trends will correspond to similar ones in chapters 3 (disruptive power) & 5 (plebiscitary 
power) and be explained in terms three larger pattern in chapter 2 (theory).  
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“On the contrary, the right to speak can flourish 
only if it is allowed to operate in an effective 
forum - whether it be a public park, a 
schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or 
a radio and television frequency. For in the 
absence of an effective means of 
communication, the right to speak would ring 
hollow indeed.” 
-Justice William Brennan, CBS v. DNC (1973) 
 
“Once politics was about only a few things; 
today, it is about nearly everything” 
-James Q. Wilson, “American Politics, Then & 
Now” (1979) 
 
 
Plebiscitary Power: Leveraging the People 
 
 In February 2013, Amy Meyer was driving past a Utah slaughterhouse and saw a horrific 
sight. A downer cow—one unable to walk from the transport truck to the slaughter floor—was 
being pushed across the grounds by a front-loading tractor. Meyer, an animal rights activist, 
filmed the scene on her cellphone until confronted by the facility manager and police (Meyer A. 
, 2013). Ultimately, Meyer was charged with violating Utah’s 2012 Agricultural Operation 
Interference Act for “without consent from the owner of the agricultural operation, or the 
owner's agent, knowingly or intentionally [recording] an image of, or sound from, the 
agricultural operation” (Oppel Jr., 2013).263 Meyer was the first activist prosecuted under the so-
called “Ag-Gag” laws that have been proposed in 24 states and passed in 7 of them (Pitt, 2014). 
                                                           
263 Utah Criminal Code 76-6-112 
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These laws criminalize taking audio, video, and photographs of “animal facilities” or obtaining 
employment at such facilities for such a purpose. The goal of these laws is to prevent animal 
rights activists from using undercover investigations and other forms of surveillance against 
agribusiness and other animal-using industries. 
 The case against Meyer was eventually dropped, largely because it produced a First 
Amendment firestorm that involved other movements and free speech advocates like the ACLU. 
However, the recent spread of Ag-Gag laws remains a significant recent phenomenon.264 These 
laws seek to constrain the animal rights movement’s most effective tactic for rallying public 
support, publicizing videos of animal cruelty. They show how the state can directly and 
profoundly limit the ability of social movements to appeal to the masses. This chapter examines 
what I term plebiscitary power: the ability to influence public policy by leveraging public support 
through mass communications. I start with a theoretical look at the concept. I then look at how 
the following three patterns, laid out in Chapter 2, constrain movement opportunities to wield 
plebiscitary power: 1) the building of structural barriers to outsider participation, 2) political 
inflation devaluing outsider resources, and 3) institutional thickening rendering the public 
agenda static and major policy shifts more difficult. 
 In this chapter I try to focus on systemic shifts in the political order that impact all social 
movements. While I draw data and examples from particular causes, these are intended to be 
representative. I leave deeper consideration of particular movements for Chapter 6. 
 
                                                           
264 Kansas and Montana passed Ag-Gag bills in 1990 and 1991 respectively, but the vast majority of bills 
have been introduced from 2012-2014. 
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Movement Protest and Plebiscitary Power 
 When Michael Lipsky published “Protest as a Political Resource” in 1968, it turned 
political science conceptions of protest and social movements upside down. Political scientists 
had long held to a crude understanding of protest that resembled a caricature of Frances Fox 
Piven’s views on disruptive power.265 That is, protest was largely viewed as mob behavior and 
considered separate and largely unrelated to traditional politics. What Lipsky showed is that 
protest can be understood as an appeal by the politically weak for the support of the politically 
strong.266 Protests are a way of seeking political alliances and political representation, which 
puts them squarely within the realm of traditional democratic politics.267 The 1968 study 
considers civil rights protests, and notes that black protesters had neither the resources nor 
votes to win traditional political battles, but through televised coverage the protesters reached 
a sympathetic northern white liberal audience that did wield money, votes, and political 
connections. For Lipsky, movement power primarily functions by activating sympathetic third 
parties through the mass media. My understanding of the plebiscitary power of movements 
takes Lipsky as a key starting point (Lipsky, 1968).  
 There is a temptation when focusing on plebiscitary power of equating attention with 
power and not delving deeper into the mechanisms involved. Simply by making a scene, by 
drawing the public’s gaze, do movements necessarily increase the likelihood of achieving their 
                                                           
265 Early works in social movement theory struggled against the idea that protest was not really a form of 
politics. William Gamson’s The Strategy of Social Protest (1975 is perhaps the best example, along with 
the piece by Lipsky that I draw on in the next section of this chapter. 
266 Lipsky’s full model considers four audiences for protest; 1) organizational members, 2) the broad 
public, 3) potential third party supporters, and 4) decision makers. All four are significant, but I focus hear 
on the third audience as Lipsky’s real insight into plebiscitary power. 
267 Lipsky’s work builds on E.E. Schattschneider’s insights about expanding conflict to third parties. For 
Schattschneider losers win not through persuading adversaries, but by altering the scope of conflict. 
When the weak fight the strong, Schattschneider points out that the weak party’s only chance is to 
involve the fight’s audience and hope they side with the weak Invalid source specified.. 
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policy goals? Is any type of media coverage better than no media coverage? It seems to me that 
Lipsky got things largely correct in stressing that protesters wield power through activating 
spectators who are already likely to side with the cause. In many ways Lipsky’s views on 
“activation” are being born out in the contemporary presidential literature on plebiscitary 
politics. In particular, Canes-Wrone has shown that the President cannot simply bend the public 
to his purposes, but can successfully leverage plebiscitary power when his views are already 
popular with the masses, but Congress is unwilling to take action (Canes-Wrone, 2001).268 In 
other words, the President can activate a sympathetic public, just as Lipsky argued with 
movements. This makes plebiscitary politics more an agenda setting force than a persuasive one  
 As discussed in Chapters 2 & 4, I largely follow Baumgartner and Jones’s punctuated 
equilibrium model of the policy process. That model posits that public attention and issue 
reframing are the key factors driving major policy shifts. According to B&J, policymaking is 
generally confined to bureaucratic issue networks of political insiders and resists change based 
on outsider interests and ideologies. However, when the broader public focuses its attention on 
an issue decision-making shifts to the major democratic institutions, particularly Congress and 
the Presidency (though the Supreme Court also provides a venue shift that is more sensitive to 
public sentiment and invites direct participation by challengers as litigants and amicus curiae). 
When issues shift venues new interests have an opportunity to reframe the values by which we 
judge the policy. For example, civil rights protesters were able to capture national attention and 
                                                           
268 As discussed in Chapter 2, as well as the political inflation section of this chapter, Stephen Skowronek’s 
work on the presidency was highly influential on my thoughts about the innovation and cooption of types 
of political power. His analysis of plebiscitary power, along with the more fleshed out work of Samuel 
Kernell, convinced me that the presidency entered the plebiscitary period around the time of Nixon’s 
presidency, which I argue is in many ways a cooption of the plebiscitary tactics pioneered in the early 
1960s by civil rights activists and other movement actors. Going public and appealing directly to the 
people are insider strategies that developed in response to a period with insiders lost control of the public 
agenda when confronted by nationally televised protests. 
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reframe civil rights legislation a matter of justice, social stability, and as an anti-communist 
measure needed to strengthen the US position with non-white nations in Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere.269 Previously, frames of local culture and self-governance (states’ rights) had kept 
many northern white liberals out of the conflict despite their support for civil rights. 
 To the extent that the policy process is driven by attention and reframing, plebiscitary 
power has become the central tool of contemporary social movements.270 But when can we 
expect movement protest and other visible actions to both shift public attention and reframe an 
issue? A good rule of thumb is that issues grab public attention when they are dramatic or when 
they impact people directly.271 Violence, confrontation, and danger are dramatic. Protesters 
clashing with police is nearly always deemed a news worthy event. And when protest events 
encroach upon the places people live, work, commute through, the impact becomes personal.272 
Celebrity, spectacle, and novelty can also be dramatic. When a protest involves Alec Baldwin or 
nude bike riders people are interested. But do violence, nudity, and Alec Baldwin provide the 
proper framing for movement issues?  
                                                           
269 I follow Klinkner and Smith’s account of the civil rights movement in The Unsteady March. The K&S 
account notably shows the way plebiscitary and disruptive politics are often intertwined.  
270 More precisely, plebiscitary politics has become a central tool of all actors on the political scene. My 
work in this chapter draws heavily on Samuel Kernell’s book Going Public, and to a lesser extent 
Skowronek’s The Politics Presidents make. Both work argue that plebiscitary politics emerged in the 1970s 
(with Nixon) as the primary form of power wielded by presidents. As argued in Chapter 2, I see the 
presidency as the primary institutional adapter of power strategies pioneered by outsiders, in this case 
principally the civil rights movement. I deal with the consequences of this cooption in this chapter’s 
section on political inflation. 
271 Ruud Koopmans argues that media uses three “selection mechanisms” when choosing to cover 
movement protests: visibility, resonance, and legitimacy Invalid source specified.. Visibility roughly 
corresponds to my category of “drama” and resonance to “personal impact.” I believe legitimacy bears 
primarily on the nature of the coverage and the frame employed.  
272 I would also argue that one reason protest around issues already on the policy agenda is news worthy 
is because people are better able to see the protest as impacting real laws in the immediate future. For 
example, the 2009-2010 health care reform debate promised to directly impact millions of Americans, 
making Tea Party protests more clearly relevant to people’s lives. 
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 Positive framing primarily concerns focusing on the aspect of the issue on which your 
side wins. Remember, plebiscitary power is more about activation of existing views than about 
persuasion. As John Zaller has convincingly shown, every issue has multiple aspects, and rational 
people will naturally take different positions based on which aspect is most salient to them 
(Zaller, 1992). When the Westboro Baptist Church holds anti-gay protests, one may naturally 
oppose their views but support their free speech rights. News coverage with a legal framing will 
lead to defense of the protesters, while coverage with a moral framing will produce 
condemnation of the protesters. Baumgartner et al. has shown that the anti-death penalty 
movement has made its greatest strides by shifting the framing of the debate to the costs of 
maintaining capital punishment and the appeals system required to administer it. As 
conservatives began to focus on the tax burden of execution (an aspect they had clear negative 
feelings about) instead of the need for retribution (an aspect they had generally positive feelings 
about), support for the death penalty cratered in many states (Baumgartner, DeBoef, & 
Boydstun, The Decline of the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence, 2008). 
 A central dilemma faced by movements is how to create drama and impact the public 
without simultaneously producing an unfavorable framing. Todd Gitlin’s classic work, The World 
is Watching, documents how the desire to hold and expand media attention led the leadership 
of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to pursue increasingly radical tactics. This 
radicalization eventually led to public backlash, group fragmentation, and the breakup of SDS. 
Jackie Smith, John McCarthy and colleagues have empirically shown that protest behavior 
deemed more “news worthy” is least likely to frame movements in a positive light (Smith, 
McCarthy, McPhail, & Augustyn, 2001). The essential problem appears to be that as tactics 
become more aggressive and compelling, the nature of the tactics becomes the dominant media 
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frame. Furthermore, as protest has been increasingly institutionalized as a commonplace and 
orderly form of expression, the public has increasingly viewed aggressive protests as 
illegitimate.273 Consequently, while American politics is undoubtable awash in plebiscitary 
power, and that power remains essential to the prospects of social movements, movement 
opportunities to exercise that power appear increasingly constrained.  
 
 I turn now to the three patterns of political development that I argue constrain 
movement political power: the persistent pattern of structural constraints, the recurring pattern 
of political inflation, and the emerging pattern of institutional thickening. 
 
 
Structural Constraints 
 In contrast to disruptive and pluralist power, plebiscitary power faces far fewer 
structural constraints. The obstacles movements face when attempting to go public are largely 
subtle and indirect. The proliferation of “Ag-Gag” laws discussed at the start of this chapter are 
not the norm, but remain a significant exception.274 More pervasive are laws and policies that 
decrease the visibility of protest and reduce movement access to media, as well as the First 
Amendment speech and press regime that sustains these laws and policies. While Ag-Gag laws 
                                                           
273 This idea is explored in Chapter 3, where I argue that the state’s protection of passive forms of 
expressive protest undercuts moral legitimacy of disruptive protest in the public’s eyes. 
274 Another comparable issue is the right to film police, which impacts a wide range of movements, but is 
most centrally related to police brutality and civil rights. While some states are passing laws mandating 
body and vehicle cameras for police, Illinois is considering Senate Bill 1342, which specifically bans 
recording police and prosecutors under eavesdropping law.  
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draw significant attention, there is little public concern over more general state-by-state 
recording laws. These laws often target paparazzi, “shock jocks,” or pornographers, but they 
have significant indirect impacts on movements. In 12 states it is illegal to record audio or video 
unless all persons involved have consented to the recording (Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press, 2012). Such laws make undercover recording virtually impossible. All 50 state have 
laws regulating hidden cameras to various degrees (private property, unattended, with or 
without audio, etc.), with most states criminalizing recordings in which the recorder is not a 
party. The FCC bans recordings of phone conversations without full consent. And various states 
and the FCC provide criminal and civil penalties both for making illegal recordings and for 
broadcasting/distributing illegal recordings. Such penalties are particularly significant because 
even when individuals are willing to break recording laws, distribution penalties can sever their 
access to SMO and media outlets.  
 Beyond the regulation of recordings, state policies dramatically shape the nature 
protests, and thus how those protests appeal to media. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
emergence of Public Order Management Systems (POMS) has removed most violent and volatile 
conflict between protesters and police. This lack of visible police repression denies movements a 
major source of drama that produces sympathetic issue frames. Images of civil rights protesters 
being assaulted by southern mobs and police armed with clubs, fire hoses, and attack dogs 
produced national and international outrage and generated a powerful moral framing for civil 
rights demands. While a legal/constitutional frame had produced some support for southern 
claims states’ rights against civil rights claims of equal protection, a frame focused on morality 
activated broad support for civil rights demands. This effect was spread and magnified by 
coverage on national television news and national newspapers, which reached sympathetic 
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northern white voters. POMS have greatly reduced the amount of televised police violence that 
today’s protesters can generate, even in their most aggressive and provocative actions. 
 In the same vein, the Occupy movement made its most significant gains, in terms of 
sympathetic media attention, after a University of California at Davis police officer was videoed 
pepper-spraying a docile group of seated protesters (Seelye, 2011). The Occupy sit-in on a liberal 
college campus would have garnered little local attention, let alone a national and international 
spotlight, had police not used excessive force. And because the coverage was framed in terms of 
police misconduct, movement claims of elite oppression were front and center. While this 
incident proves POMS can never fully remove the unpredictable human element from police-
protest interactions, rest assured UC Davis strengthened their officer training and SOPs to 
prevent any such future fiascos. Indeed, one can assume that every police force in the country 
was hard at work in November 2011 reviewing and revising their own crowd control policies. By 
rendering protest routine and boring, police have forced protesters to stir the pot themselves, 
reliably generating media frames that focus on protester misbehavior.275 
 
 While the state has generally not been heavy-handed in suppressing movement access 
to media that does not mean that state policies are neutral. Government creates the framework 
                                                           
275 While the 2014 “black lives matter” protests following the deaths of Mike Brown in Ferguson, Missouri 
and Eric Garner in Staten Island, NY (and lack of officer indictments that followed) may seem to be 
examples of police violence, they are not violence directed at protesters. While initial displays of 
militarized police in battle armor and assault vehicles in Ferguson did create useful plebiscitary frame that 
captured national sympathy, police quickly demilitarized their response to produce better optics. Despite 
vigorous and sustained protests across the country, leading to hundreds of arrests, there was notably 
little evidence of police violence against protesters. This allowed a significant amount of media coverage 
to be framed around the “Ferguson riots” and the unsympathetic behavior of some protesters. My 
argument is not that conflict between police and protester can be eliminated, but only that police have 
come to understand that POMS prevent the stoking of public outrage and encourage the media to move 
on to pressing matters like the “Black Friday” shopping coverage that quickly supplanted Ferguson news. 
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within which media operates and exercises significant control of mass communication through 
the FCC. Four trends have combined to create a media climate unfavorable to political 
challengers. First, the federal government has moved away from communications regulation 
that requires media companies to provide public access. This trend has been exacerbated by 
technological shifts away from broadcast media that have broadened access, making these 
equal time regulations appear obsolete. Second, the U.S has largely abandoned its commitment 
to providing media access through public broadcasting. Third, the government has allowed 
intense media consolidation that has not been undercut by recent developments in Internet and 
social media communication, which instead have produced a troubling coexistent trend toward 
media fragmentation. And fourth, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to 
advance the first three trends and to provide no rights to media access under the free press 
clause. I will look at each of these trends in turn. 
  
Public Broadcasting and Public Interest Requirements 
 In 1912 the Titanic sank in the North Atlantic Ocean killing more than 1,500 passengers. 
The tragic event played a central role in framing broadcast regulation as a matter of public 
interest. While Congress had recently passed the 1910 Wireless Ship Act, mandating large 
vessels be equipped with radios, there remained little regulation of how those radios, and the 
spectrum they broadcast on, would be used. Arguably, radio interference and unmanned radio 
equipment prevented ships from aiding the Titanic in a timely manner, costing hundreds of lives. 
In response, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1912 and got into the business of managing 
America’s broadcast spectrum (McGregor, 2012).  
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 As commercial and recreation radio exploded in the 1920s, it became clear that the 
federal government needed to take a heavier hand in managing access to spectrum, as signal 
interference was becoming bad enough as to raise doubts about the viability of radio as a 
medium of mass communication. In 1927, Congress passed a new Radio Act, which established 
explicitly that the public airways belonged to the public, but also established that broadcasters 
would not be regulated as common carriers. This meant that while the state would dole out 
access to spectrum, licensees would remain free to deny broadcasting access to whomever they 
chose. So while phone companies could not withhold services from homes with communist 
occupants, radio stations could refuse to sell advertising time to communists or any other group 
they disagreed with or found offensive. The Communications Act of 1934 would establish the 
FCC, which continues to oversee the relationship between government and media licensees to 
this day. Over the years, new technologies would be included under the FCC’s jurisdiction, most 
importantly, television.  
 While broadcasters were not made subject to strict common carrier restrictions, the 
Radio Act directed that the public spectrum be regulated to serve the “public interest, 
convenience, or necessity.” In practice this meant revoking licenses for those who abused the 
public airways, such as snake-oil salesmen giving dangerous medical advice over the radio.276 In 
1946, the FCC attempted to formalize public interest requirements in a “Blue Book” issued to 
licensees. While significant for its precedent, the Blue Book never resulted in any license 
revocations and was abandoned in 1960 for a stricter “formal programing statement” that 
included 14 programing categories that must be provided by licensees, which notably included 
the category of “service to minority groups” (McGregor, 2012). 
                                                           
276 KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47F.2d 670,671 (D.C. Cir. 1931) 
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 While 1960s and 1970s saw the FCC attempting to insure that radio and television 
provided broad access to many groups and had significant “public affairs” content, the 1980s 
saw a dramatic policy reversal under President Reagan. In the hands of Reagan’s FCC Chairman 
from 1981-1987, Mark Fowler, the FCC adopted the philosophy that the telecommunications 
landscape had grown diversified enough that market competition would effectively provide for 
the public interest. While the Reagan administration made sure that the FCC would continue to 
prevent the use of the work “fuck” on radio and television, positive content requirements were 
largely dropped, and the “Fairness Doctrine” requiring equal time for political candidates was 
scrapped.277 As public interest regulation narrowed to focus on public decency, it provided 
increasingly little benefit to political outsiders. Indeed, the restriction of shocking content serves 
only to restrain movements in their quest to capture public attention through drama and 
conflict. 
 FCC Chairman Mark Fowler argued that the emergence of cable television had 
completely reshaped the broadcast landscape and rendered the existing public interest 
regulatory regime obsolete. While conservative politics clearly drove this deregulatory swing, 
the technological shift away from over-the-air communications is certainly a key contributor to 
the trend. With the emergence of cable and satellite technologies, the share of mass 
communication carried by broadcast television and radio continues to decline. According to the 
National Association of Broadcasters, only 15% of households now rely solely on over-the-air 
broadcast for their television needs.278  At such low levels, applying public interest requirements 
                                                           
277 By positive requirements I mean content stations must provide, in contrast to content they must avoid. 
As in Isaiah Berlin’s use of the terms positive and negative liberty. 
278 A somewhat higher percentage supplement cable or satellite with broadcast. This mixed use seems to 
have somewhat stabilized broadcast viewership, not is small part due to the adoption of HD broadcasting 
and the persistence of live broadcast sports. 
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merely to spectrum-based communications is no longer an effective means of promoting public 
interest media goals. Faced with this change, the federal government could have attempted to 
extend its broadcast regulatory approach to non-broadcast technologies, but  instead has largely 
chosen to abandon the regime. Certainly such a move would raise thorny First Amendment 
issues, which I will turn to shortly, but the political climate of the 1980s prevented the FCC from 
pursuing this potential path. 
 
Abandoning Public Broadcasting 
 An alternative to forcing commercial media companies to provide access to political 
outsiders would be for government to simply provide that access itself. This is not to say that 
government should be the main source of news and information—ala the Ministry of Truth in 
1984—but that establishing and financing public broadcasting can create open media channels 
that focus exclusively on serving the public interest. Public broadcasting is a major part of the 
media landscape in most developed countries, but is only a marginal player in the United States. 
Comparing developed nations, Hallin and Mancini note that public broadcasting accounts for 
just a 2% share of America’s television viewership, by far the lowest of any country studied. By 
contrast, in most European countries public broadcasting captured 30-50% of viewership, with 
only Greece below the 20% mark. The U.K. and its flagship BBC came in at 39% and Denmark 
topped the list at an astounding 69% (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). So why is public broadcasting 
such a minor part of the American media landscape? 
 The United States has a long broadcast history, stretching back past FDR’s famous 
fireside radio chats. But it was LBJ’s Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 that first established the 
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Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) as a government created and supported entity 
independent of the federal government. CPB’s primary function is to distribute funding to the 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and its local stations, National Public Radio (NPR), Public Radio 
International (PRI), and various smaller public broadcasting entities. In 1967, Congress 
appropriated a mere $5 million for the CPB, but that amount quickly grew to $103 million by 
1977. In the nearly 40 years that followed, CPB funding has grown to $445 million, which is an 
inflation adjusted increase of just over $40 million (Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 2014 ). 
So essentially, as the media landscape has gone from the basic programing of the big three 
(ABC, NBC, & CBS) to a vast array of billion-dollar major, minor, and specialty networks, the 
federal government has left public media’s funding unchanged.279 A central point of this project 
is that in the struggle for power, if your competitors are moving faster than you are, you are 
really moving backwards. So why has support for public broadcasting been so stagnant? 
 As with the FCC’s public interest regulatory regime, funding for public broadcasting was 
in large part a casualty of the Reagan revolution. 1983 is the first year in the history of the CPB 
that funding declined, in this case from $172 million in 1982 to $137 million the following year. 
In 1984-1986, the Reagan administration included further cuts in public broadcast funding in 
their annual budget proposal. A second decline in CPB funding occurred from 1995-1999 during 
the Speakership of Newt Gingrich (Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 2014 ). More recently, 
ending funding for public broadcasting has become a salient issue for the Republican base, with 
Mitt Romney famously saying during his first presidential debate with Barack Obama, “I like PBS. 
I love Big Bird” but that he would “stop the subsidy to PBS” if elected (Stelter & Jensen, 2012). 
As conservative efforts succeed in halting or rolling back government support of public media, 
                                                           
279 The Sports Network ESPN alone is worth approximately $50 billion dollars Invalid source specified.. 
More values of media? Maybe just the big three 
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these potential outlets for political challengers fall further off the radar of more and more 
Americans.  
  
Media Consolidation& Fragmentation 
 The Reagan Administration argued that government involvement in the media industry 
was unnecessary and unfruitful because the market would provide communication channels for 
all voices and listeners. However, the promise of diversified media has been somewhat undercut 
by the concentration of media under a few corporate entities, as well as the attrition of 
investigative and local reporting. In 1983 the largest 50 media corporation controlled a majority 
of media outlets (as measured by audience), but by 2003 this number had fallen to just five 
corporations: Time Warner (now owned by Comcast), Disney, Viacom, News Corp (now News 
Corp and 20th Century Fox) and Bertelsmann (Bagdikian, 2004). These names shift periodically 
due to mergers and acquisitions, but the consolidation trend has held steady. Big corporations 
are not inherently evil boogeymen, but this concentration of media power under major 
corporate control presents some problems for political outsiders. 
 The first problem is that massive corporate conglomerates create conflicts of interest. 
The NBC comedy 30 Rock had a running joke that NBC’s (now former) owner GE required the 
network to promote their products and bury stories (or jokes) that played up GE corporate 
scandals. While fictional, the show raises a valid point about conflicts of interest and the 
micromanagement of parent companies. This critique is most often made against News Corp, 
where CEO Rupert Murdoch has been accused of managing his properties to advance a personal 
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conservative agenda and minimize personal scandals.280 There is certainly some truth to these 
allegations, but perhaps more important are the biases that all major corporations share. These 
can include biases against taxation and regulation, which can cut into bottom lines, as well as a 
bias toward “infotainment” to attract consumers and sell advertising space.281 Contrary to 
popular opinion, the primary bias in media is bottom-line bias, not partisanship.  
 As FCC Chairman Mark Fowler’s “market forces” have gone to work on a deregulated 
media landscape, one of the main result has been an increase in soft news stories about sports, 
entertainment and human interest matters, along with shrinking sound bite coverage of social 
and political issues.282 As James Hamilton argues, an economic theory of profit maximization in 
news production predicts that programmers will lean toward soft news offerings because 
advertisers value this content more and because it costs programmers less to produce. Hamilton 
argues that hard news is generally a public good that is underprovided by the market and 
regulatory policy and public media can successfully increase public exposure to important social 
and political issues (Hamilton, 2003).  
 Hard news gathering is expensive and increasingly lacks economic viability for many 
outlets. This means fewer investigative reports and less coverage of legislative and bureaucratic 
                                                           
280 The documentary Outfoxed (Brave New Films, 2004) is perhaps the best known case for Murdoch 
micromanaging his news assets, particularly Fox News. On personal scandals, see Hack Attack: The Inside 
Story of How the Truth Caught Up with Rupert Murdoch Invalid source specified.. 
281 The case that media bias is less about ideology and more about finances is perhaps best laid out in Eric 
Alterman’s book What Liberal Media? Invalid source specified.. Alterman argues that while some news 
persons may have liberal biases, corporate ownership/management bias is far more influential. He further 
argues that this bias tends to be business and status quo friendly because of both the interests of 
ownership and the interests of advertisers.  
282 It has been well documented that news coverage of electoral campaigns dropped from an average 
candidate clip of 43 seconds in 1968 to just 9 seconds per clip by 1988 Invalid source specified.. It has 
further been show that coverage has since remained attenuated and shifted to rely far more heavily on 
“image bites” than verbal communication Invalid source specified.. Such trends is news coverage are not 
limited to elections alone, and generally favor familiar issue frames, as well as frames focusing on the 
tactics of protestors.  
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issues, particularly at the state level. A recent report from Pew Research’s Journalism Project 
found that the number of full-time newsroom staff at newspapers fell 30% from 2003-2012 and 
the number of full time Statehouse reporters declined 35% from 2003 to 2014 (Enda, Matsa, & 
Boyles, 2014). And when the fat (and muscle) are trimmed at news organizations, it is often 
investigative reporters that are first to go. These trends make it hard for movements to take 
advantage of frequent and deep news attention to their issues, leaving them with sporadic 
coverage using ready-made issue frames. 
 During the same period the media landscape has consolidated, it has also diversified 
and fragmented. On the surface these trends appear contradictory, but they merely describe 
two coexisting sectors of media. While the majority of media interests are controlled by a 
shrinking handful of big companies, the minority share has fractured into a dizzying array of new 
and niche media that blurs the lines between news reporter and news consumer.  
 Most Americans and movement activists view the rise of Internet and social media 
communications as a democratizing force that benefits political outsiders. There is certainly 
much truth to this narrative, but there are also reasons to remain skeptical. While the Internet 
creates substantially lower entry costs for media production and dissemination, it also 
dramatically fragments audiences, which limits the ability to capture mass audiences, promotes 
self-selection bias, and in the end allows traditional media interests to dominate Internet news 
as well.  
 If you run an SMO in the 21st century then you have a website, a twitter account, and a 
facebook page (at least one of each). You probably also post videos on Youtube and take 
advantage of a wide variety of other internet and social media platforms. The advantages of 
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these new media forms are obvious. Movement organizers can communicate instantly with 
existing supporters, recruit new supporters through “links” and “sharing” by supporters or 
media outlets, and movement content can “go viral” saturating the tech savvy public. The gay 
rights movement saw a perfect storm of online activism surrounding the issue of gay marriage in 
2014. The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) was able to reach mass audiences with its campaign 
asking supporters to change their Facebook profile pictures to a red version of the HRC “=” 
logo.283 Millions of Facebook users participated, bombarding their friends with a steady stream 
of HRC logos. The campaign successfully focused mass attention on the issue of gay marriage 
and reframed the two 2013 gay marriage Supreme Court cases under the frame of national 
public opinion (Penney, 2014). That is to say, HRC helped focus debate on the fact that in the 
past few years a majority of Americans had come to firmly support gay marriage, as opposed to 
legal issues of states’ rights and equal protection. It has been argued that the logo campaign did 
successfully grow the gay rights community and put the issue front and center for its supporters 
(Jones, 2013). I would go so far as to argue that the social media work of HRC in general, and the 
logo campaign in particular, impacted judicial politics on the Supreme Court.284 
 While the benefits of social media and online communication are real, so are the 
limitations. Perhaps the central overarching limitation is media fragmentation. As more and 
                                                           
283 The HRC logo is a yellow equal sign on a blue background, but they produced a logo with pink equal 
sign on a red background to symbolize the specific issue of marriage equality. 
  
284 I strongly believe that public opinion influenced the Court’s recent gay marriage decisions, as 
demonstrated by the fact that Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor v. United States (2013) lacked a clear and 
coherent constitutional logic and seemed to understand that 14th Amendment equal protection 
precedent did not support striking down DOMA. Kennedy opted for a “the time has come” “ it’s no longer 
acceptable” kind of living constitution approach that implicitly (and at times explicitly) takes shifting 
public opinion as a major justification for shifting constitutional law doctrines. 
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more sources of media emerge, each outlet gets a smaller and smaller piece of the pie.285 For 
every HRC success story, there are a hundred movement groups reaching fewer eyeballs per 
story. Consider the trend in nightly news broadcasts. From the 1950s to the 1980s, ABC, NBC, 
and CBS dominated the television landscape, particularly in terms of nightly news. With the 
emergence of other networks and cable programing in the 1980s, the “Big Three” saw their 
share of the nightly news audience decline, but as of the early 1990s, the Big Three still 
accounted for a majority of the evening news audience. Fast forward two decades and that 
number drops below one-third, as seen in Figure 5.1. Consequently, a movement getting 
covered on ABC’s evening news in 2013 reaches roughly half the Americans in 2013 that it 
would have reached in 1993. So to the extent that media outlet coverage is out of sync, it 
becomes more difficult to influence large swaths of the American public.286 Figure 5.2 shows the 
same trend with newspaper readership, which has lost readers to broadcast and cable news, 
and more recently to online news sources. Similar trends can be found for most regional/city 
newspapers and most national news magazines. For example, circulation of Time magazine and 
The Economist have both dropped by 50% just from 2008 to 2013 (Pew Research Center 
Journalism Project, 2014). 
 
 
                                                           
285 This idea is similar to political inflation, as discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
286 John Zaller has argued that media coverage does periodically converge on a single issue in a “feeding 
frenzy” that serves as a kind of “burglar alarm” focusing public opinion on pressing public problems 
Invalid source specified.. Zaller’s “monitorial citizen” model assumes people have better things to do than 
pay constant attention to public policy, and so a media that simply covers all the important issues at all 
times is worse than useless. Instead, a fragmented soft news media can entertain the public without 
sapping their civic reserves, then unleash them on the rare issue that strikes the public’s nerve. For a 
counter argument claiming these feeding frenzies neither identify truly pressing issues, nor frame public 
issues usefully, see W. Lance Bennett’s critique of Zaller Invalid source specified.. 
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Figure 5.1: “Big Three” Percentage of Evening News Audience over Time287 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Total U.S.  Daily Newspaper Circulation (in Millions)288 
 
                                                           
287 Data taken from the Pew Research Journalism Project (http://www.journalism.org/media-
indicators/evening-network-news-share-over-time/). Accessed 10/8/2014. 
288 Data taken from the Newspaper Association of America: http://www.naa.org/Trends-and-
Numbers/Circulation-Volume/Newspaper-Circulation-Volume.aspx (accessed 11-04-2014). 
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 The problems of fragmentation are exacerbated by widespread selection bias in the way 
people consume media. Cass Sunstein has been one of the loudest voices arguing that with the 
rise of the Internet “people are increasingly able to avoid general interest newspapers and 
magazines and to make choices that reflect their own predispositions” (Sunstein, Going to 
Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide, 2009, pp. 79-83). Sunstein’s major concern is that 
media fragmentation and selection bias will further political polarization and extremism because 
in-group communications between like-minded individuals promote group shifts away from 
moderation. At first glance this may seem beneficial to movements, who may be able to recruit 
more ideologically committed core members, and this is likely the most significant benefit 
movements derive from the Internet. However, this recruiting advantage is at odds with the way 
plebiscitary power functions. As I have defined it, plebiscitary power works by grabbing the 
attention of the sympathetic masses and framing the issue in a way that secures their support. 
But if more and more people are gravitating toward news stories and sources that they are 
already actively interested in, the opportunities for activation shrink. In addition, Sunstein also 
worries that the “echo chamber” effect can create a “crippled epistemology” as movements 
build their beliefs, strategies, and arguments in relative isolation. Such movements may not 
adequately understand their own issues, be blind to new information, and unable to 
communicate their positions to opponents or third parties. 
 While fragmentation and selection bias mean that much of the Internet is composed of 
small niches, there remain some large media sites that account for a significant chunk of 
Internet news, either directly or through reposting of content. The top Internet news sites year 
after year continue to be those of newspapers (New York Times, Washington Post, LA Times, 
USA Today, Wall Street Journal), cable news networks (CNN, MSNBC, FOX News), and Search 
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Engines (Yahoo News, Google News, Bing News), with a scattering of digital-only giants like the 
Huffington Post. These sites are fed by traditional media, The Associated Press and routers and 
in turn are selectively cherry-picked by the various niches of the Internet (Olmstead, Sasseen, 
Mitchell, & Rosenstiel, 2012). As much as we might like to think of the Internet as a bottom-up 
font of democracy, in many ways it replicates the top-down distribution of traditional corporate-
owned media channels.  
 In sum, while Internet communications and social media are a dynamic and ever 
changing part of the media landscape, they continue to be shaped by two contrary forces: 
fragmentation and consolidation. While news production and distribution capacities have 
become more broadly distributed, this has in many ways only strengthened the role of major 
media players who still control central positions in the media food chain. It is difficult to describe 
these two trends without sounding a bit schizophrenic, but they nonetheless define the state of 
American news media, new and old alike. And together they present challenges for movements 
hoping to “go public” on their issues. 
 
The First Amendment: A Right to Speak, Not a Right to Be Heard 
 Like the right to free speech, the First Amendment right to free press began its life in a 
rather attenuated form. Following the tradition of English common law, the right to freedom of 
the press was originally a mere right against prior restraint. Congress could not prevent citizens 
from publishing their views, and could not seize and censor these publications before their 
distribution, but publishing opinions on specific issues could still be criminalized. So at the 
founding of the American Republic, citizens had the right to print a pamphlet criticizing the 
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government and then be arrested and imprisoned upon distribution of that pamphlet. Indeed, 
the Sedition Act of 1798 made it a crime, 
“To write, print, utter or publish, or cause it to be done, or assist in it, any false, 
scandalous, and malicious writing against the government of the United States, 
or either House of Congress, or the President, with intent to defame, or bring 
either into contempt or disrepute…” 
At the time, most prominent political figures considered there to be no conflict between the law 
and the Constitution, though Madison and Jefferson famously and strenuously objected.   
 Clearly, the First Amendment has come a long way from its relatively humble origins. In 
1931, the Supreme Court incorporated the press clause to the states in Near v. Minnesota and in 
1964, New York Times Company v. Sullivan the Court held that the press was shielded from libel 
claims unless it can be proven that reporting errors were the result of “actual malice” resulting 
from speech that is "knowingly false or with reckless disregard for the truth." Soon after, in 
1969, Brandenburg v. Ohio shifted the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence to the doctrine of 
definitional balancing. Under definitional balancing, all speech and press received near absolute 
protection, with the exception of a narrow set of specific speech categories that are 
unprotected. And in in 1971, the “Pentagon Papers” case New York Times Company v. United 
States held that “national security” was not grounds for prior restraint on a publication unless 
the government could prove the danger specific and serious. Taken together, these cases have 
produced one of the freest media systems in the world. 
 In general, America’s free press helps open up the political opportunity structure for 
movements to exercise plebiscitary power. The two New York Times cases serve to shield the 
media from damages that could otherwise result from publishing movement claims against 
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government and non-government targets. Sullivan concerned The Times running a civil rights 
advertisement that made accusations of brutality against Alabama police.289 Times v. U.S. 
concerned the paper’s right to print leaked information concerning the Vietnam War. In these 
cases we see the civil rights and anti-war movements’ plebiscitary power being enhanced and 
protected by the Supreme Court. However, there are two limiting trends of note that push in 
the opposite direction. First, the Supreme Court has allowed Congress and the FCC to place 
public morality restrictions on broadcasters. And second, the Court has not interpreted the First 
Amendment as requiring the government ensure or promote public access to media.  
 In 1978, the Supreme Court put the brakes on an expanding free press clause by 
upholding FCC public decency standards in FCC v. Pacifica. While in many ways an anomaly in 
the broader sweep of First Amendment Jurisprudence, Pacifica nonetheless came to define the 
relationship between the FCC and television networks in a way that was entirely unhelpful for 
social movements. As discussed above, the FCC has long enforced public interest requirements 
on radio and television broadcasters as a condition of using public spectrum. But following 
Brandenburg v. Ohio’s shift to “definitional balancing” it was unclear if the FCC could prohibit 
                                                           
289 The civil rights group Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the 
South placed a full page ad entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices” in the March 29, 1960 edition of The New 
York Times. This ad called for donations and described the movement’s violent suppression in a number 
of southern cities. One such city was Montgomery, Alabama where the ad claimed local police had 
suppressed mass student protests at Alabama State College using “truckloads of police armed with 
shotguns and tear-gas” and by “[attempting] to starve [students] into submission.” Montgomery 
Commissioner L. B. Sullivan disputed the factual accuracy of both the size of student protests and the 
nature of the police response. As the city official responsible for supervising the police department he 
claimed the ad falsely defamed his character and sued four civil rights leaders and The New York Times for 
libel. Justice Brennan writes, “We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award 
damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Since this is 
such an action, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable.” Brennan finds that in this case “the 
proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard 
demands, and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under the 
proper rule of law.” The proof is found lacking because the ad did not reference the respondent by name, 
no evidence was presented that the Times believed the information published to be false and no evidence 
is presented that the Times showed “reckless disregard” by violating its own editorial standards of review. 
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broadcasters from airing content that did not fit into one of the suspect categories of speech. In 
the Pacifica case, the Court deals with indecent content that falls short of the standard for 
obscenity laid out in Millar v. California. While the Court allows the regulation of obscene 
material, the Pacifica case concerned a radio broadcast of comedian George Carlin’s “filthy 
words” monologue, which involved profanity that both lacked appeal to “prurient interests” and 
had clear social and political value as commentary on censorship.290 While clearly not obscene, 
the FCC nonetheless felt empowered to prevent children from being exposed to “patently 
offensive” materials under its charge to serve the public interest. 
 Justice Stevens’s Pacifica opinion takes an odd approach in pointing out that speech of 
certain types may be limited. He specifically cites fighting words (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire), 
libel (Gertz v. Roberts Welch, Inc.), and Obscenity (Miller v. CA), which are chief among the 
suspect categories singled out in definitional balancing doctrine, and not general justification for 
regulating harmful speech.  Stevens does not attempt to argue that indecency represents a new 
category of speech lacking First Amendment protection, but does suggest that Carlin’s indecent 
comedy is deserving of only limited First Amendment Protection, which must be balanced 
against the public interest in regulation. Justice Stevens then notes that a long history of (pre-
Brandenburg) precedents for public interest regulations on broadcasters, and argues, “Patently 
offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in 
public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly 
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.” This talk of “privacy of the home” and 
                                                           
290 The Court actually denies  that Carlin’s comedy involves any social or political commentary, writing, “If 
there were any reason to believe that the Commission's characterization of the Carlin monologue as 
offensive could be traced to its political content—or even to the fact that it satirized contemporary 
attitudes about four-letter words—First Amendment protection might be required. But that is simply not 
this case.” I just don’t think Justice Steven gets Carlin’s humor.  
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television as “an intruder” employs a rhetoric that invites government to protect the people 
from unwanted media messages. Essentially, the Court in Pacifica reaches back to defunct “bad 
tendency” theories of speech regulation that had not been controlling since the Vinson Court. 291 
 Pacifica did not lead to an immediate wave of FCC fines, but did encourage and justify 
more aggressive self-censorship by television and radio networks. Networks were encouraged to 
move all questionable material to after 10PM, which the FCC considered a “safe harbor” time 
unlikely to include young viewers. But broadcaster decisions on content remained highly 
subjective and influenced by considerations of who might complain to the FCC. If showing or 
implying sex on television is offensive, is showing or implying interracial or gay sex more 
offensive if more people complain?292 If so, we see immediate barriers to civil rights and gay 
rights movements gaining an important outlet for advancing their social and political goals. At 
the very least, avoiding “sexual” or “excretory” depictions serves as cover for avoiding particular 
sexual or bodily content that may be subject to the biases of network executives, sponsors, or 
vocal elements of the public.293 Movements that rely on graphic and disturbing depictions are 
also impacted by decency standards, including the animal rights and anti-abortion movements. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, disturbing images play a central role in the strategies of these 
movements. Animal Rights groups have been largely unsuccessful in getting videos of factory 
                                                           
291 The Dissent smartly notes, “if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a 
reason for according it constitutional protection.”  
292 The FCC complaint process has been dominated by the conservative groups the Parents Television 
Council and the American Family Association. While some would call these groups right wing social 
movements, I would argue these groups are essentially defenders of the status quo. Their advocacy in this 
area is small “c” conservative in that it fights to preserve established decency standards, not inject new 
ideologically based standards. Of course this question is an open and interesting one, and highlights the 
persistent challenge of deciding what constitutes a social movement for social movement studies.  
293 Were the Supreme Court to take a firm stand that the FCC is prohibited from banning certain content, 
that would not in itself force networks to carry that content, but it would further the norm that refusal to 
air programs or advertisements should be viewed as corporate censorship.  
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farming and slaughterhouses on air, as have anti-abortion groups looking to air images of 
aborted fetuses. Broadcasters are able to avoid any controversy in these decisions by pointing to 
FCC policy under the Pacifica ruling.294 
 While the FCC did not immediately focus on indecency standards following Pacifica, this 
changed during the Reagan administration, when the FCC decided its indecency rules were 
“unduly narrow” and it would adopt a more “generic definition of broadcast indecency” that 
was based upon “contemporary community standards” for “patently offensive” materials (Levi, 
2008). In addition, Reagan signed into law a bill sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms, which 
eliminated the safe harbor approach to indecency and directed the FCC to ban indecency 
content 24-hours a day. And finally, the Reagan administration abandoned the “fairness 
doctrine,” which required broadcasters to provide equal time to dissenting points of view on 
political issues covered on air. Essentially, Reagan’s FCC shifted its mission from promoting 
political discourse to policing deviancy. And while not all of Reagan’s policies have survived 
judicial and political scrutiny, it is telling that the FCC’s most prominent function over the past 
few decades has been laying out fines for cursing and “wardrobe malfunctions” during live 
broadcast television and radio. 
 To understand the Supreme Court’s role in shaping the FCC, and media regulation in 
general, we need to step back and look at the development of the public interest doctrine, 
starting with National Broadcasting Co. v. US (1943). In National Broadcasting Justice 
                                                           
294 An important loophole has been uncovered by antiabortion advocates, who have successfully argued 
that stations must broadcast some graphic images if they are presented as campaign advertisements. A 
number of such activists have run noncompetitive congressional election campaigns solely with the intent 
to bypass indecency concerns. In the 1990s a GA candidate for house used images of aborted fetuses in 
his ads. As of now the courts have favored election rules requiring broadcasters to sell time to each 
candidate (section 315 of the Communications Act) when the material in question is not specifically ruled 
indecent (only offensive). Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1996)..  
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Frankfurter wrote for a 5-2 majority adopting the “spectrum scarcity” rational as the legal 
justification for placing public interest requirements on broadcasters under Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers. As mentioned above, the regulation of radio and television 
broadcasting came about largely because unregulated use of the airways had produced a 
tragedy of the commons in which overuse by the public had created unacceptable signal 
interference, rendered the airwaves nearly unusable for mass communications. This situation 
arose because the universe has provided a magnetic spectrum with a limited range, placing 
natural limits on the number of broadcast frequencies available. As such, the usable spectrum 
can be seen as a public good only obtainable through government regulation. The Court seized 
upon the fact that any allocation of spectrum rights would inevitably leave some citizens with 
access and some without, and the inclusion by Congress of a requirement that the allocation 
serve the "public interest, convenience, or necessity" would not increase the number of citizens 
who lacked access to the airwaves. Frankfurter writes, 
“Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities 
of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to 
all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of 
expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used 
by all, some who wish to use it must be denied. But Congress did not authorize 
the Commission to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, 
economic or social views, or upon any other capricious basis.” 
Frankfurter pushes this logic to conclude, “The right of free speech does not include, however, 
the right to use the facilities of radio without a license.” In the end, public interest doctrine rest 
squarely upon the principle that the public has no right to access the public airwaves. 
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 In 1969, the Court addressed the most contentious element of the FCC’s public interest 
requirements, the fairness doctrine. The fairness doctrine required that broadcasters to devote 
time to controversial issues and give adequate time to opposing views. One specific requirement 
of the doctrine was to provide an opportunity for public figures to respond to personal attacks, a 
requirement that was at issue in the seminal fairness doctrine case, Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC 
(1969).295 
 An oft overlooked fact of Supreme Court history, the Court’s Red Lion decision was 
handed down on June 9, 1969, the same day as Brandenburg v. Ohio. In one sense, Red Lion was 
the first decision of our contemporary First Amendment regime. But in a larger sense, Red Lion 
was an essential part of establishing the boundaries of the new Brandenburg regime because it 
demonstrated that definitional balancing would provide less-than absolute protection, even for 
speech falling squarely under the First Amendment’s purview. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. was 
licensed to operate a radio station in a Pennsylvania. The station aired a 15-minute segment 
entitled “Christian Crusaders” in which Reverend Billy Hargis harshly criticized the book 
“Goldwater—Extremist on the Right” and its author journalist Fred Cook. Cook requested that 
Red Lion allow him to respond on air to Hargis’s personal attacks but the station refused. The 
FCC ruled that under the fairness doctrine Red Lion was required to provide Cook with time to 
respond, and Red Lion appealed the ruling all the way to the Supreme Court 
 Justice White argues that the nothing in the First Amendment prevents the government 
from requiring that licensed broadcasters share their frequency with others who do not have 
access to the airwaves. He writes, 
                                                           
295 395 U.S. 367, 89 S. Ct. 1794; 23 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1969) 
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“It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege of 
using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obligated to 
give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern. To condition 
the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present representative 
community views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends and 
purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgment of 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Congress need not stand idly by 
and permit those with licenses to ignore the problems which beset the people or 
to exclude from the airways anything but their own views of fundamental 
questions.” 
 
The unanimous ruling confirmed that even the cumbersome public interest requirements of the 
fairness doctrine were consistent with the new Brandenburg standard. However, White also 
emphasizes that spectrum scarcity remains the core justification for this approach, which 
tethers the public interest standard to technological circumstances with a limited shelf life. Still, 
Red Lion is a ringing endorsement of the government’s constitutional authority to promote 
access to media communications and diverse debate on controversial issues. In these respects, a 
more circumscribed First Amendment allows government to open up political opportunities for 
movements to exercise plebiscitary power. But Red Lion does not force Congress or the FCC to 
promote media access.  
 The possibility of a First Amendment right of access to communications platforms was 
addressed by the Court in CBS v. Democratic National Committee (1973), where the Court 
considered if a broadcaster could reject paid radio advertisements by the groups Business 
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC).  
While the DC Circuit held "a flat ban on paid public issue announcements is in violation of the 
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First Amendment, at least when other sorts of paid announcements are accepted," the ruling 
was reversed by a heavily divided Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger cobbled together a 
shifting majority on the four parts of his opinion, with four justices penning consents, including 
Justice Douglas concurring in judgment only. Finally, Justice Brennan dissents, joined by Justice 
Marshall, arguing that CBS’s refusal to air editorial advertisements violated “the people's right to 
engage in and to hear vigorous public debate on the broadcast media.” Brennan’s dissent was a 
stillborn case for a First Amendment right of media access, which fell on the deaf ears of the 
increasingly conservative Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 
 Perhaps the most important phrase employed by Brennan is “effective self-expression.” 
As laid out in Chapter 2, and touched upon in Chapters 3 and 4, the Court’s First Amendment 
doctrine has often expanded rights of self-expression, while allowing or promoting government 
policies that constrain effective expression. Brennan’s CBS dissent suggests that an efficacy 
requirement is implied in the First Amendment. He argues, “the First Amendment embodies, not 
only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but also the right of an individual to utilize an 
appropriate and effective medium for the expression of his views.” The dissent rightly notes that 
denying all editorial advertisements does not create a level playing field, as it privileges 
commercial advertising, which often promotes values and behaviors antithetical to the 
prohibited editorials.296 For Brennan, by facilitating private broadcasters in denying dissenters 
access to “the most effective means of reaching the public” the Court and the FCC “necessarily 
                                                           
296 Imagine a situation where an animal rights advertisement condemning factory farming is not aired, but 
an advertisement for bacon is aired. Dissenters would point out that the latter needs no editorial position 
only because it speaks from a position of privilege where its values are assumed to be universal. Or 
rewind to the antebellum South when abolitionist petitions were banned, while slave auctions were freely 
advertised. 
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renders even the concept of ‘full and free discussion’ practically meaningless.” Consequently, 
Brennan views CBS as a sharp shift away from the spirit of Red Lion.297 
 While CBS was a messy decision—with three justices seeing no First Amendment issue, 
three seeing FCC policy as constitutional under the First Amendment, Justice Douglas seeing no 
regulation of speech as constitutional, and two justices seeing the policy a violation of the First 
Amendment—the case laid to rest any First Amendment theories that include a right to media 
access and effective speech. In this area the Court has allowed Congress and the FCC to create 
policies that limit movement plebiscitary power. However, CBS does not in itself prevent 
government from providing media access, it simply does not require it.298 It is conceivable that 
in an alternate political environment access requirements could have been written into 
broadcast regulations, as Justice Burger himself stresses in CBS. But the political winds were not 
blowing in that direction. When an Administration finally took office with an interest in vigorous 
FCC oversight, it was Ronald Reagan’s, which took the FCC in a very different direction. 
 As discussed above, Reagan’s FCC generally moved towards deregulation, including 
ending the fairness doctrine. 299  It did, however, reassert the public interest doctrine in one 
                                                           
297 Brennan captures the spirit of plebiscitary power well, writing, “For our citizens may now find greater 
than ever the need to express their own views directly to the public, rather than through a 
governmentally appointed surrogate, if they are to feel that they can achieve at least some measure of 
control over their own destinies.” 
298 The lack of regulatory direction in the FCC in the mid-to-late 1970s had more to do with the decline of 
the liberal political regime and the growth a new conservative one. During the Carter year, FCC Chairman 
Ferris quietly began a deregulatory shift that is typically associated with the Reagan revolution. Indeed, 
many of the deregulatory policies of the 1980s have their roots in the 1970s. Arguably Carter and the 
Democrats were responding to anti-government public sentiment, but I also believe the growth of 
aggressive conservative social voices gave liberals pause about leaving robust bureaucracies in the hands 
of their political successors. In this light, FCC deregulation could be viewed as a kind of scorched earth 
tactic of leaving no resources behind for the enemy as one retreats. 
299 Following CBS, the Federal Courts held that rescinding the fairness doctrine was fully compatible with 
the First Amendment. Syracuse Peace Council v. FEC, 867 F.2nd 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Arkansas AFL-CIO v. 
FCC, 11 F.3d 1430 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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area; the censorship of offensive material. On the issue of indecency, Reagan enlarged the scope 
of public interest doctrine until it again collided solidly with the First Amendment. In 1987, the 
FCC moved to a strict policy of confining even single utterances of indecent content, under a 
broad “generic definition,” during the “safe harbor” hours of midnight-6am. The channeling 
policy was upheld in Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (1988) by Justice Ginsburg, then on 
the D.C. Circuit, though the expansion of safe harbor from a 10PM start to midnight start was 
remanded for improper rulemaking procedures.300 In ACT and two follow up cases (ACT II & ACT 
III), the Courts affirm the ability of government to channel speech to times when significantly 
fewer viewers/listeners are attending to it. 
Under the second Bush Administration, the indecency controversy flared again, this 
time forcing the Supreme Court to reconsider the limits of the indecency classification set out in 
Pacifica. The Bush FCC made the unprecedented move of applying indecency fines to single 
expletives and unscripted moments of live television, as well as dramatically raising fines against 
violators. This shift began with the FCC ruling against NBC for airing a broadcast of the Golden 
Globes in which U2 singer Bono uses the nonliteral expletive, “Fucking brilliant”. Previously, 
indecency had only been applied to content that referenced literal sexual or excretory acts or 
body parts, per the definition of indecency applied in Pacifica. But in the wake of the Bono 
ruling, the FCC laid down an increasing number of rulings for the use of “fleeting expletives,” in 
                                                           
300 On the heels of Ginsburg’s ruling, Reagan signed an appropriations bill that included an amendment by 
Senator Jesse Helms that instructed the FCC to enforce indecency standards 24 hours a day.  This total 
ban would be struck down in ACT II (1991) as failing to meet the narrow tailoring requirements of strict 
scrutiny, with the DC Circuit Court holding that the far more significant speech costs were unjustified by 
the purported claim of protecting a handful of child viewers from late-night indecency.  Not daunted, 
Senator Helms added a provision to the 1992 Telecommunications Act moving the safe harbor start time 
from 10PM to midnight. In ACT III, the DC Circuit ruled that this shift would have been constitutional had 
the regulation not exempted broadcasters that go off the air before midnight.  The Court found this 
disparate treatment of speakers was not justified by the government’s stated compelling interest of 
protecting children from indecency. 
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some cases reaching back prior to the Bono incident. Two cases would play out over the 
following decade, which would largely uphold this expanded FCC policy: FCC v. Fox (2009) and 
FCC v. CBS (2012). 
Fox concerned the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards, in which singer Cher told the 
audience “fuck ‘em” in regard to her critics, and socialites Paris Hilton and Nicole Richie 
commented,  “Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking 
simple.” The broadcaster argued that these expletives did not meet the definition of indecency 
under Pacifica, however, Justice Scalia argued for a 5-4 majority that an expletive like fucking 
“inherently has a sexual connotation” regardless of the context of use. Moreover, Scalia argues 
that it is reasonable to crack down on fleeting uses of expletives because the first exposure to 
indecency may be the most damaging, widespread social use of expletives increases the 
importance of broadcast media as an important refuge from indecency, and a soft policy on 
fleeting use would encourage rampant violations. Scalia’s opinion draws support from the four 
other most conservative justices, and opposition from the four liberals, which is a common 
theme seen in speech cases discussed in Chapters 3 & 4.  
In a case deeply intertwined with Fox, CBS v. FCC eventually dismissed the $550,000 fine 
resulting from Janet Jackson’s Super Bowl halftime show “wardrobe malfunction.” But while the 
fine was dismissed as an arbitrary and unexpected departure from previous FCC policy, Justice 
Roberts warned “It is now clear that the brevity of an indecent broadcast — be it word or image 
— cannot immunize it from F.C.C. censure.” Despite Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion in CBS that 
the Court may wish to consider abandoning the Pacifica indecency doctrine, for now the Court 
continues to hold a significant degree of moral censorship allowable under the First 
Amendment. 
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 So what do these First Amendment developments mean for social movement power? 
First, as I have noted, a First Amendment regime that allows the FCC to suppress shocking or 
offensive content takes away one tool that movements use to grab public attention. In fact, by 
forcing broadcasters to develop technologies like broadcast delays, government facilitates 
broadcasters’ ability to censor spontaneous movement disruptions at live events. If an activist 
runs on stage at an award show with a sign, the broadcaster will likely have the ability and the 
motivation to edit the disruption out of the broadcast. 301 
 Second, movement issues often center around bodily issues that may be censored as 
indecent. Abortion concerns reproduction, bodily autonomy, and the excretion of aborted 
fetuses. Gay rights concerns issues of sex, including the taboo of sodomy. Disability rights 
concerns the body, including norms of sex and excretion. Animal rights concerns the 
dismemberment of (nonhuman) bodies. In each case, movement activists seek to bring 
attention—and either horror or social acceptance—to practices that the FCC deems 
inappropriate for most broadcast times. Telling for our purposes, one of the initial three actions 
under the new 1987 FCC rules was against an LA radio play, “Jerker, or the Helping Hand,” which 
featured explicit descriptions of gay sex, and touched on themes of AIDS advocacy and disability 
advocacy. Or consider Janet Jackson and “nipplegate,” where the FCC asserted that displaying a 
part of a female body is categorically indecent, throwing up roadblocks to some feminist efforts 
                                                           
301 A perfect example is the 2010 Westminster dog show, which was interrupted by animal activists with 
signs that read, "Mutts Rule" and "Breeders Kill Shelter Dogs' Chances." Westminster is the biggest dog 
show of the year, but more importantly it is virtually the only nationally televised dog show watched by 
millions of casual dog lovers. The activist disruption was seen by 15,000 show attendees, but these pure-
breed partisans do not include any of those sympathetic third parties that Lipsky discusses. The broadcast 
edited out the disruption, which occurred during the crucial final judging, preventing activists from 
reaching millions of at-home watchers who might have been sympathetic to reframing the issue as one of 
breeding (and euthanasia of shelter mutts) vs. adoption. The activists plebiscitary reach was neutered—so 
to speak—by broadcast technology and policy. 
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to de-stigmatize the female body. In most cases government censorship based on status quo 
majority morality works against social movements. 
 Third, and perhaps most important, the FCC’s focus on indecency censorship has come 
to define the agency’s mission, set public expectations for government’s role in the media 
landscape, and has monopolized the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the First Amendment 
and media. The Court left open the possibility that Congress and the FCC could push for broader 
public access to broadcast (and perhaps cable and satellite) media under the public interest 
doctrine, but the Courts are essentially a reactive enterprise, and in the absence of legislative 
and bureaucratic action pressing a compelling government interest in promoting media access 
the Courts simply cannot develop precedent on the matter.302 And the longer the Court has 
remained silent concerning media access following its 1973’s CBS ruling, the more the 
presumption builds that media access claims must be based on the decaying rational of 
spectrum scarcity, and thus have only grown weaker since being rejected in CBS.  
  
Political Inflation – Has the Public Seen It All? 
                                                           
302 Even in the area of indecency, which the government has pushed its prerogatives, there has not been a 
credible compelling interest advanced. In U.S. v. Playboy (2000) the government tried to argue that cable 
subscribers did receive an unwanted intrusion of indecent material into their homes—like from broadcast 
signals in Pacifica—from the problem of “signal bleed.” But without proposing an alternative theory to 
“spectrum scarcity” the government’s case falls on deaf ears, with Justice Kennedy’s decision flatly 
pointing out that broadcast precedent does not apply in the same way to cable television transmitted on 
privately owned wires directly to consumers. To carve a space out for public interest regulation the 
government would need to argue that there is a compelling interest in providing media to the public, 
which is not served by the market. It would have to be something akin to an antitrust argument, which is 
not farfetched given that most areas are served by a single cable provider.  Note, I had the good fortune 
of attending the oral arguments for this case during a high school field trip! The case was very well argued 
on Playboy’s side, and the government struggled mightily.  
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 Of the various types of movement power I have discussed, plebiscitary power is likely 
the most susceptible to political inflation. The nature of going public requires grabbing mass 
attention, and the attention game is largely zero-sum. As discussed in Chapter 2, I follow 
Baumgartner and Jones in believing that bounded rationality makes attention shifts the primary 
driver of policy change, not broad shifts in public belief. The main idea is that the people can 
only effectively focus their attention on one (or a few) issues at a time, and only on one (or a 
few) aspects of that issue. This capacity is essentially fixed, and it means that policies on most 
issues will be static most of the time. And significantly, as more issues seek public recognition, 
either more will be ignored or the public will be forced to shift its attention between issues 
more quickly. Either way, movements are being shut out of opportunities to control the public’s 
attention in ways that can push their issues through the policy process.  
 As competition for “eye balls” increases, it is unsurprising that social movements find 
themselves in something of an arms race, constantly escalating their attention grabbing tactics. 
To seize the public’s gaze, activists cannot simply be interesting and shocking, they must be 
more interesting and shocking than the next group. Furthermore, this arms race tendency is at 
times more active within movements than between. As discussed in Chapter 4, SMOs within a 
movement compete for members and supporters, a goal dependent in large part upon their 
level of public recognition. All this competition can be viewed as healthy in the sense that it 
encourages diligence and tactical innovation, but I am arguing that these benefits are 
outweighed by the effects of political inflation. 
 While competition within and between movements is one driver of plebiscitary 
inflation, another is competition from mainstream interest groups. As plebiscitary politics has 
become a dominant part of the political landscape, lobbyists and trade groups have moved 
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beyond the closed doors of smoke-filled back rooms. Today, issue advertising is a massive part 
of the media landscape, with groups like oil and coal producers advertising the merits of their 
preferred policies directly to the American public. In Chapter 4 I discussed the massive influx of 
campaign spending from interest groups in the form of issue advertising. These advertisements 
are often seen as thinly vailed campaign advertisements, but they are also clearly a form of 
“going public” on specific policy issues.  
 The third, and most significant, driver of political inflation in plebiscitary politics is the 
adoption of media relations as a tool of officials at all levels of government. The driving force 
behind the political inflation concept is essentially a diffusion of successful tactics throughout 
the political sphere. In an where every politician takes to twitter at the drop of the hat, the 
diffusion of media-based politics seems rather complete.  
 
Attention is Finite 
 In a multitasking world, it may seem like our attention can be split between infinite 
directions. But as discussed in Herbert Simon’s “Human Nature in Politics,” psychological 
research supports a bounded rationality view of humans as serial processors.  That is, humans 
can only effectively attend to one decision (focusing on one aspect of that decision) at a time. 
Consequently, the number of issues people can judge is limited by the amount of time they can 
(and will) spend attending to policy issues. And despite the spread of news sources and the 
availability of internet news, Americans are not spending more time consuming news. As PEW’s 
Center for the People and the Press has reported (Figure 5.3), American media consumption has 
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remained largely flat since the mid-nineties.  So despite the emergence of on-demand, on-the-
go, 24-7 news availability it seems that public attention to the news is a finite resource. 
 
Figure 5.3: Daily Time Spent on News 
Consumption 
 
 
 As Chapter 4 argued, the number 
of active social movements and social 
movement organizations has steadily 
increased in the past few decades.303 A 
big reason for this trend is that once 
established, movements rarely disappear.304 While the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 
1960s has atrophied due to success, civil rights issues and advocacy continue to command a 
significant amount of media attention, including on issues of affirmative action, voting rights, 
police brutality, and a wide variety of issues.305 One reason established movements are able to 
                                                           
303 Frankly, this growth in issues is as old as the polity. While demands for the expansion of social, 
political, and economic rights wax and wane, the general trajectory is towards expansion. As the role and 
size of American government has increased so to have the demands placed upon government. However, 
Chapter 4 deals primarily with data reaching back only until 1989. 
304 An exception would be a movement like Temperance, which was wildly successful in its ultimate 
legislative goal of national prohibition. Had their success not been so absolute, and subsequent failure, 
been less absolute the Temperance movement could easily exist today in a more viable form, either 
continuing the fight over alcohol or battling other perceived vices.  
305 As noted earlier, the late 2014 police killings of unarmed black men in Ferguson, MI and Staten Island, 
NY thrust civil rights issues back into the media spotlight, much as the Trevon Martin killing had done in 
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remain in the media spotlight is that media coverage of movement advocacy has been shown to 
track issues already on the policy agenda (Oliver & Maney, 2000).306 Past agenda success primes 
the system for future success because both media frames and public institutions are already 
equipped for to address these issues. For example, the Supreme Court’s consideration of 
affirmative action in Fisher (2012) and Schuette (2014) and voting rights in Shelby County (2013) 
have primed the public to attend to civil rights movement claims. Furthermore, as highlighted in 
Chapter 4, the institutionalization of social movement organizations has allowed movements to 
survive long beyond peaks in mass action. These SMOs allow and encourage movements to turn 
their attention to new issues as old ones are solved or shelved. The environmental movement is 
an excellent example. 
 The modern environmental movement took shape in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
and initially focused on conservation of wilderness and the hazards of pollution. Early policy 
victories like the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Endangered Species Act made the implementation, 
reauthorization, and altering of these policies continual sites of activism and contestation. Those 
issues haven’t gone away, but new issues have been layered on top of them, with which the old 
issues must split time. These “new” issues include nuclear and toxic waste, 
renewable/sustainable energy, acid rain, global deforestation, organic food, genetically modified 
organisms, and of course, global warming. The consequence? We get exposed to a little of each 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2012 and 2013. This issue shows no sign of disappearing and will sadly continue to reemerge on the 
agenda for the foreseeable future. During the media frenzy around Ferguson, a women’s rights campaign 
around street harassment and catcalling burst into the media conversation, but simply could not sustain 
attention in light of more visible race politics. The point being that the social issues that dominated the 
1960s continue to fight for recognition and attention today, and these issues still jockey for attention 
between themselves and with newer contenders. 
306  
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of these issues, one at a time, and arguably not enough to sustain a push for public action on 
expansive issues like global warming. In sum, we have more movements and issues per 
movement competing limited public attention. 
  
Arms Race Sensationalism 
 As mentioned above, media attention often focuses on activism related to issues 
already on the agenda of major political institutions. Looking over all The New York Times 
articles from 2010 referencing animal rights, about half of them concern the enforcement of 
animal cruelty laws, wild horse management, and other existing public policies.307 The second 
most common type of article concerns international practices that are shocking and exotic to 
American readers, including eating dogs and cats in China, seal hunting in Canada, bullfighting in 
Spain, and Islamic animal rights activism in Egypt. One article mentions the scholarly work on 
animal rights of Cass Sunstein, whose appointment as Obama’s “regulatory czar” was being 
opposed by Republicans. Another article concerns Philadelphia Eagles quarterback Michael 
Vick’s conviction for dog fighting.308 Mixed in was a pair of articles on reforming the use of 
battery cages in egg production, an article on the use of chimpanzee is biomedical research, and 
an article on puppy mills. These last four articles directly addressed issues activists were seeking 
to put on the public agenda, but were spread across three unrelated issues.  
                                                           
307 This is a cursory search that does not include articles on animal rights issues that do not contain 
“animal rights” in the title or body. I include this information only illustrate a view of media coverage that 
I base on the work of others and my own impressions. I hope to provide more systemic evidence in the 
future.  
308 Media coverage of movement issues often concerns celebrity endorsements or confrontations. This 
case is perhaps an exception to the rule in that Vick’s notoriety provided a steady stream of articles 
discussing dog fighting over several years. The coverage is typically somewhat more superficial. But still, it 
is notable that the only dog-fighting story has a celebrity frame (specifically a celebrity redemption 
frame).  
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 Faced with an uncertain media landscape many SMOs have seized on the media’s love 
of scandal, conflict, and celebrity to gain attention. Actor endorsements, nude protests, strange 
costumes, and disrupting high-profile but unrelated events have all become common place. I 
once jokingly suggested that SMOs could maximize Internet clicks simply by splicing their 
message into free pornography. Lo w and behold, in 2007 a prominent SMO began producing an 
annual “State of the Union Undress,” in which a women parodying the president’s State of the 
Union speech stripped fully nude while talking about the group’s positions. But after a few 
years, the media and public were no longer shocked and the Undress was discontinued due to 
poor media exposure (so to speak). 
 Political sociologist Sarah Sobieraj’s excellent book, Soundbitten: the Perils of Media-
Centered Political Activism, provides an ethnography of 50 diverse activist groups pressing issues 
during the 2000 and 2004 election cycles. Her conclusions are must the same as mine, as she 
finds for those organizations, 
“[Rampant] media-centrism proves ineffective and in some ways even destructive. 
Activists’ often-outrageous attempts to lure journalists politicize public spaces in 
memorable ways, but for most groups the pursuit of media attention is largely futile, 
brings with it important organizational costs…and comes at the expense of other 
political activities.” 
Essentially, Sobieraj expands on Gitlin’s initial observation that movements change their 
strategies in self-destructive ways to play for the camera, but Sobieraj further finds that the 
amount and quality of news coverage gained is paltry. She notes the biggest event of her study 
saw 400 activists arrested, but The New York Times coverage focused only on tactics and never 
mentioned the specific claims the activists were pressing. She notes a large immigration reform 
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rally where news cameras focused almost exclusively on a single youth garbed in “black-box” 
anarchist attire. And importantly, Sobieraj noted that while immersed in these organizations she 
felt like she was watching “historic events” unfold and was surprised to discover just how few 
people were watching with her (Sobieraj, 2011, pp. 2, 129-131). As I noted earlier, media 
fragmentation often leads activists to feel like they are on the main stage when they are in 
reality at best a side show. 
    
Everyone Goes Public 
 At the risk of belaboring the point, political inflation works through the diffusion of 
successful political tactics across the different actors in the political system. Stephen Skowronek 
has argued that the Presidency is the primary source of innovation in political power, but I argue 
in Chapter 2 that the president adopts tactics originally developed by political outsiders. In this 
case, LBJ and JFK’s engagement with civil rights and antiwar protesters made the power of the 
media clear to the office, and led to the first plebiscitary president in Nixon. Samuel Kernell 
details Nixon’s use of the media to advance his election and policy goals independent of the 
party apparatus, but notes that just as Clinton’s presidency perfected media management, other 
office holders were stealing some of the plebiscitary spotlight.309 Specifically, Gingrich’s 
speakership saw a congressman consistently challenging the president’s control of the media 
agenda.310  
                                                           
309 See Invalid source specified. for an inside account of the Clinton White House’s management of the 
media. 
310 See Invalid source specified. on the Gingrich and the public role of the Speaker of the House. 
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 Since Gingrich, Speakers and Senate Majority Leader, House and Senate Minority 
Leaders, Party Chairs, potential presidential candidates, governors, and more have become 
fixtures on the national political stage. Competition between these actors has created its own 
media arms race where politicians struggle to expand e-mail lists, Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube followers, and maximize their news exposure through appearances, interviews, and 
press conferences. As Kernell notes, plebiscitary politics has become a double edged sword that 
always threatens to be turned on its user. And if the president is unable to hold media attention 
to a specific framing of a specific issue, what chance do SMOs have? There is at best a stalemate 
in the plebiscitary world, where no actor can gain and sustain a decisive advantage. As I have 
pressed again and again, such stalemates inherently favor the status quo.311 
  
Institutional Thickening 
 In the Fall of 2013, Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones separately presented their latest 
work from the Policy Agendas Project at the University of Pennsylvania. This was of course very 
exciting and useful to me, as their work is clearly foundational to my own. When Jones 
presented the charts included here as Figures 3, I was floored. They showed that the number of 
issues Congress deals with annually peaked in the late 1980s and has since declined dramatically 
by key metrics. In my mind, Jones was providing me with the empirical data I was looking for to 
show the effects of institutional thickening on his own model of the policy process. Jones 
himself argued that the trends of increase and decline in legislative capacity are cyclical, and 
                                                           
311 Jure Leskovec et al. have developed a method of data mining language use across news, blogs, and 
social media to track the rise and fall of ideas in the news cycle. They report that the dramatic rise of 
twitter in the 6 months prior to the 2008 election dramatically sped up the news cycle Invalid source 
specified.. 
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powerfully pressed the position that institutional factors, not political factors, dominated trends 
in legislative productivity. In other words, the focus on gridlock between Democrats and 
Republicans mostly misses the forest for the trees. While I agree that partisan gridlock is not the 
main cause of this trend, I believe the mechanism at work is progressive rather than cyclical, 
suggesting we will not see a return to earlier levels of issue diversity. 
 In this section I will flesh out the argument that Baumgartner and Jones’s data supports 
the proposition that institutional thickening is limiting movement opportunities to place new 
policy issues on the political agenda. The basic argument goes something like this: Legislators, 
like other humans, have natural limits to the amount of issues they can attend to during a given 
period of time. The number of federal legislators has not increased since Alaskan and Hawaiian 
statehood brought the Senate to 100 seats and the Apportionment Act of 1911 set the House at 
435 seats. Moreover, the time members of Congress commit to legislating has shrunk, as the 
demands of campaigning and district work have continually grown.312 In addition, the rapid 
growth of the state means that the established responsibilities of government will occupy a 
larger percentage of legislative attention, placing greater claims on member time. The combined 
effect is less legislative time for more standing issues, limiting the opportunities for new issues 
the shoulder their way onto the agenda.  
 Consider the US Budget, an annual bill that grows every year, as every program passed 
in earlier congresses must receive annual appropriations. In Chapter 4 I argued that the growth 
of existing US budget commitments was a limiting factor for new programs seeking funding, but 
these commitments are just as much a limiting factor for new issues seeking legislative 
                                                           
312 While attention to their districts is surely at the heart of representation Invalid source specified., the 
truth is fundraising and campaigning are increasingly the activities shrinking the congressional work week. 
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attention.313 Yes, congressional staff has ballooned, and is bolstered by the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) and Congressional Budget Office (CBO), but all of that research must still 
be channeled through 535 Congressmen and Senators. And those representatives still need to 
push bills through committee, floor, and conference, all the while hearing testimony, debating, 
negotiating, and voting (not to mention attending to the media and constituents). If these 
activities on recurring issues have maxed out legislative capacity, then movements face 
significant challenges in translating media coverage into government action. 
 The Baumgartner and Jones data are plausibly explained by the institutional thickening 
hypothesis. Figure 5.4 shows that the number of issues addressed in congress rose sharply from 
the late 1940s to the late 1970s, before leveling off and then dropping sharply from the late 
1980s until today. The second chart in Figure 5.4 shows that roll call votes and non-legislative 
hearings also leveled off during the 1980s, but have not significantly declined. My argument is 
that legislators simply maxed out their capacity and as some issues fell from the agenda they 
were replaced by more hearings and votes on existing issues, not new ones.314 None of this is to 
                                                           
313 Legislation need not recur annually to take up consistent space on the congressional agenda. Consider 
the Farm Bill, passed once every four years. The Farm Bill typically occupies agenda space for multiple 
years, as price supports, environmental controls, and food assistance are tweaked and debated. Most 
environmental legislation requires reauthorization and involves debates on what should be covered. 
Issues like education, entitlement, and tax reform never get solved to anyone’s satisfaction and take up 
constant agenda space. The list goes on and on. 
314 An alternative explanation of this data is simply that the period of issue expansion coincides with the 
period of New Deal dominance, and that decline is simply the success of the Reagan “revolution” of the 
1980s. Even granting the premise that Reagan reigned in the reach of government, there is a bit of a 
chicken and egg issue at play here. Did the rise of modern conservatism constrain views on the role of the 
state, or did the over-extension of state capacities fuel the rise of modern conservativism? For me, the 
causality here is somewhat mute, as either way it appears that the opportunity to expand the agenda is 
somewhat constrained by management of—and contestation over—the expansive modern government 
agenda. Another potential critique is that government is dealing with fewer subjects because there are 
simply fewer subjects that demand government attention. This mirrors the claim that social movements 
are less influential these days because there all the important issues have been addressed. I simply do not 
buy the proposition that there are a limited number of topics appropriate for government to address of a 
limited number of social ills facing society. Life is simply too dynamic for such logic to hold. 
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say that new issues cannot seize the public agenda, particularly when focusing events bring near 
universal attention to an issue and present an obvious movement friendly framing.315 But an 
overextended agenda exerts pressure on members of Congress that makes taking on new issues 
less attractive. 
 
Figure 5.4: Number of Subtopics Addressed by Congress over Time316 
 
                                                          
315 Again, think of the Fukushima nuclear accident and how it created weeks of nightly news coverage 
under the frame of nuclear safety. Nothing anti-nuclear activists did put nuclear safety on the public 
radar, but they were certainly able to take advantage of the agenda access to kill plans to expand the 
number of US nuclear facilities. 
316 Charts Taken from Invalid source specified. 
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Conclusion  
 Most activists and SMOs have embraced plebiscitary power as the primary source (and 
metric) of movement power. Sure, seeing specific legislative victories is the ultimate goal, but 
such victories are few and far between. Day to day and year to year, media coverage, Twitter 
followers, and website hits provide quantitative evidence of a movement impact. Where 
pluralist power is slow and disruptive power is risky, plebiscitary power appears to offer 
immediate results to activists creative and determined enough to get noticed. This chapter takes 
a step back and questions the effectiveness of media-based movement power, and argues that 
developments over the past fifty-years limit plebiscitary opportunities. 
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 I have argued that Lipsky first got to the heart of plebiscitary power, when he noted that 
civil rights protesters were primarily activating powerful sympathetic allies who had previously 
avoided battles over race. It was a real and effective form of power that, while always in 
existence, jumped to the forefront of movement politics with the advent of modern mass 
communications. Movements rightly acknowledge that shift, but too often ignore more subtle 
recent changes in the media landscape. In many ways movement politics and movement 
scholarship remains in the shadow of the civil rights movement. We consider what the activists 
of the 1950s and 1960s did, note their overwhelming political success, and try to apply those 
lessons today. This observation is especially true of plebiscitary politics, where today’s 
movements conclude that if civil rights activists were able to leverage the emergence of national 
television, then harnessing cable news, Internet news, and social media must offer even greater 
opportunities.  
 This chapter has shown that movements should be skeptical about the opportunities 
offered by media exposure. The diversification of media, which so excites movements, carries 
with it a fragmentation of viewership that makes capturing a broad audience difficult. And with 
government focusing on media censorship, instead of promoting media access, movements 
hoping to hold a national gaze face a daunting task. In practice, media coverage of movements is 
more likely to be an adjunct to coverage of issues already being debated by politicians. And with 
politicians and interest groups of all stripes attempting to play the plebiscitary game, it seems 
unlikely movements will see in improved media access in the future. Finally, with a massive 
permanent agenda occupying our political institutions the prospects for plebiscitary agenda 
setting are ultimately limited.  
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 All this is not to say movements should ignore the power of media. Limited power is not 
the absence of power. Chapters 3, 4, & 5 have stressed that all of the dominant approaches to 
exerting political influence are of limited use, and that those limitations are likely to increase in 
the immediate future. In light of this somewhat closed political opportunity structure, it seems 
to me that successful social movements are most likely the ones taking advantage of all their 
power opportunities. In Chapter 6 I flesh out the way four contemporary movements have 
utilized disruptive, pluralist and plebiscitary power and make some preliminary observations 
about which strategies seem most likely to lead to political success.317 
 A constant challenge in the social sciences, and particularly in social movement studies, 
is to learn from the past while remaining open to the possibility that today’s patterns and trends 
might be entirely different. It remains possible—even probable—that new forms of movement 
power are emerging now, or will emerge in the near future. I return to this prospect in Chapter 
7.  
 
  
                                                           
317 I am very much trying not to give them impression that my work makes firm causal claims about what 
movement strategies lead to political success. At the same time it seems reasonable to generate 
hypotheses and speculate on their respective merits. 
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“I have been to this point unwilling to sign on to 
same-sex marriage primarily because of my 
understandings of the traditional definitions of 
marriage. But I also think you’re right that 
attitudes evolve, including mine.” 
-President Barack Obama, 2010 
 
“We don’t make frontal attacks. Never attack 
where the enemy is strongest. We don’t want 
to re-create Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg. 
We pick our battles. What we do is very much 
under the radar screen and not very sexy.” 
 
-Charmaine Yoest, CEO of Americans United for 
Life 
 
Chapter 6: The LGBTQ and Antiabortion Cases 
 
 Up to this point I have considered movement power primarily in the aggregate, drawing 
on scattered supporting examples from a number of American social movements. Hopefully, this 
approach has helped demonstrate that the conceptual model of power types is not merely a 
description of one particular movement (or even a handful). However, unless the model 
provides a useful description of actual movements—one that fits well with qualitative 
accounts—such a model would lack facial validity. In the next two chapters I take a more 
extended—yet still relatively brief—look at four important contemporary social movements and 
describe their interactions with the political system in terms of our three types of power. In 
doing so I also draw a number of additional conclusions about how movement power works and 
can be strategically maximized. 
 I have chosen to examine the LGBTQ Rights and Antiabortion movements in this 
chapter, followed by the Disability Rights and Animal Rights movements in Chapter 7. The four 
movements I look at are of great personal and professional interest to me. Though not all of 
them align with my own politics, I consider them all to capture essential elements of modern 
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movement dissent. These cases are not intended primarily to be empirical data, in that the 
choices and presentation do not meet social science standards for hypothesis testing. Rather, 
they are intended to show the explanatory value of my model.  In each we see the use of 
disruptive, pluralist, and plebiscitary power constrained by patterns of structural barriers, 
political inflation, and institutional thickening. However, we also see that these constraints do 
leave opportunities for movements to exercise power. In particular, a look at these four 
movements suggests that effective exercises of power usually involve drawing on multiple types 
of power to overcome the limitations of any one type. In addition, examining the trajectory of 
these movements reminds us that luck, not power, is sometimes the decisive factor in securing 
policy wins. 
 For each movement I offer a brief chronological narrative highlighting major policy 
goals, events, organizations, and tactics. These narratives are periodized in an attempt to 
highlight dominant movement power strategies at different points in their development. While 
some of the themes explored are consistent across movements, at other times I highlight 
particular developments within each movement that offer unique lessons.318 
  
LGBTQ Rights319 
 The movement for LGBTQ rights has experienced so much political success in the past 5 
to 10 years that it is tempting to believe these good fortunes inevitable. Gay marriage, open 
military service, hate crime and anti-discrimination protections top a list of state and federal 
accomplishments that have some movement observers declaring victory. Moreover, public 
opinion polling now shows a stable national majority favors marriage equality, with analysts 
chocking the shift up to generational replacement (prejudices dying with the elderly voters and 
                                                           
318 There is an admitted lack of uniformity in the four treatments, and I stress again that these are not 
cases in the traditional hypothesis testing vein.  
319 I use the terms LGBTQ Rights and Gay Rights interchangeably because the terms have been fluid 
throughout the periods studied. I consider both phrasings inclusive of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
and queer identities. 
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tolerant young folks coming of age).320 While replacement is certainly an important 
phenomenon in general, and for LGBT acceptance in particular, it is a bit of a deus ex machina 
narrative that fails to explain why youth views developed as they did and ignores very real shifts 
in broader opinion. Moreover, such explanations ignore the fact that neither public opinion nor 
political progress follows a simple upward linear trend. While “It gets better” has become the 
hopeful slogan for bullied gay youth, simply assuming that things get better for progressive 
causes in a liberal democratic state seems to me to be an analytically poor approach.321 Instead, 
I hope to explain the gay rights movement’s successes (and failures) in terms of its use of power. 
 In looking at the history of the gay rights movement in terms of power, I find six periods 
that help us understand the shifts in the movement’s power resources. Before 1969 we had the 
“Pre-Stonewall Era” in which no recognizable mass movement existed. From 1969-1979 we had 
the “Stonewall Era,” which was characterized primarily by its use of disruptive power. From 
1980-1986 we have the “AIDS Era,” in which conservative political forces rolled back movement 
gains and the emerging AIDS epidemic further revealed the movement’s pluralist weakness. 
From 1987-1995 we see the “Resurgence Era” that again mobilized disruptive power, but also 
sought to develop more significant pluralist resources. From 1996-2008 the movement built up 
significant pluralist resources, particularly in the legal world, and buttressed these efforts with a 
plebiscitary focus on hate crimes and civil rights frames. I call this the “Legal Era” because 
movement gains came primarily through the courts, while conservative forces battered the 
movement legislatively. Since 2009 we have seen the movement enter a “Majoritarian Era” in 
which a majority of the nation has come to support all the movement’s key policy goals, and gay 
rights finds itself a political asset in contested areas of the electorate. 
 Before I explore each of these eras in more depth, it seems worth noting a few basic 
observations, which I will return to at the end of this section. 
                                                           
320 Linda Hirschman titled her recent history of the movement, Victory, and defends the choice in a stirring 
epilogue that stresses how truly profound the success of the movement has been, and how dark things 
had and could be.  
321 Note, the antiabortion movement has had considerable success rolling back progressive laws on 
reproductive rights. Moreover, in a number of Middle East countries we see examples of theocratic shifts 
away from liberal rights, particularly woman’s rights and speech rights. We should be dubious about 
repeating the mistakes of historical materialism and assuming history has a clear trajectory.  
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1. Power of each type is increasingly constrained, but opportunities to influence politics 
and policy persist.  
2. When a single type of power is exercised in isolation, gains are limited, movements are 
vulnerable, and those in power are able to undermine activist opponents. 
3. While movements need to employ different types of power in support of one another, 
the danger exists that different types will undermine one another.  
4. Most major victories have been dependent upon activists infiltrating existing institutions 
and grafted their demands onto existing policy structures.  
5. Opposition matters. Movements have significantly greater opportunities when they are 
not opposed by well-funded organizations that take that opposition as central to their 
organizational mission. 
 
The Pre-Stonewall Era 
 Before 1969, gay rights was not a mass social movement. This is not to say gays weren’t 
widely oppressed. To the contrary, gays faced “Blue Discharges” from army psychiatrists, a ban 
on Federal employment, and targeted arrests for “cruising” and “disorderly behavior” at bars.322 
But there was no organized or sustained challenge to these practices, and the three types of 
power were not exercised in significant ways. Gay was generally not a social identity that was 
embraced by potential movement participants and gays individually and collectively pursued a 
strategy of duck and cover. Avoid drawing attention. Hope to be left alone. Pass. Certainly there 
were gay individuals standing up for their own social and political rights during this period, and 
even a handful of small organizations, but American gays were overwhelmingly closeted.  
In terms of pluralist power, the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis 
represented a couple of hundred gay members. Their actions were minor and generally 
conservative, with the original Mattachine Society largely dissolving over a divide between 
members wishing to support or oppose McCarthyist anti-communist measures. The Society’s 
                                                           
322 There were also some pro-gay policies that passed during this period, including Illinois becoming the 
first state to decriminalize sodomy in 1962. However, these early victories were hardly displays of 
movement power. Illinois was simply the first state to reform its criminal statutes along the guidelines of 
the American Law Institute’s 1962 Model Penal Code. The ALI was progressive for the time in suggesting 
that statutes criminalizing consensual sexual behavior be dropped.   
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One Magazine did achieve a notable victory in One v. Olson, which established that materials 
promoting or celebrating homosexuality were not automatically obscene under the Court’s new 
standard in Roth v. US. This allowed One to be distributed through the US mail and opened up 
basic opportunities for organizing a geographically dispersed gay population. However, the small 
victories of Pre-Stonewall organizations were confined to basic applications of the rights of 
other citizens, as with the application of Roth, in which gay activists road the coattails of 
pornographers. In other words, there was minimal power being exercised. 
In addition to these early organizations, some gays with resources and/or connections 
were able to use their rights as American citizens to challenge unjust arrests, firings, and other 
forms of overt discrimination.323 Frank Kameny, who would revive the largely defunct 
Mattachine Society in the 60s, was an astronomer fired from the Army Map Service in 1961 for 
his sexuality. Kamney challenged his dismissal in court, “modeling his claim on NAACP challenges 
to racially-based firings,” but the Supreme Court refused to hear his appeal in 1968 (Hirshman, 
2012, p. 3). While some lower courts did reverse civil service dismissals, the policy of dismissing 
gays from federal service remained firmly in place. And while public officials were pushed to 
publicly state that “cruising stings” and “gay in public” bar raids were not state policy, police 
harassment remained the status quo. With no plebiscitary or disruptive threats to contend with, 
the rule of law was a paper thin protection even for gays with the resources to press their legal 
rights. 
What plebiscitary power did exist at the time was weak and reactionary. For example, 
the papers went wild when a New York City undercover cop arrested a priest for “cruising” in an 
overzealous act of entrapment. Such incidents forced public officials to renounce entrapment 
strategies, but the coverage was not sustained and gays lacked the organizational resources to 
ensure accountability. Simply put, nothing changed. Kamney and his Mattachines held small 
protest rallies, for example 10 white males in business suits quietly holding a sign in front of the 
White House reading, “Fifteen Million U.S. Homosexuals Protest Federal Treatment.” Kamney’s 
largest march before Stonewall had just 55 participants (Hirshman, 2012, p. 83). There was 
                                                           
323 An unsurprising pattern in civil rights movements is that those individuals with higher socio-economic 
status are able to use the system to secure the rights and privileges of other citizens well in advance of 
most group members. This functions through access to legal resources to enforce due process, personal 
connections, and other insider resources. 
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nothing attention grabbing about these tactics, and they stayed as far away from disruption as 
possible.324 
 
The Stonewall Era 
 Stonewall changed everything. I am normally skeptical of narratives that reduce critical 
junctures in politics to a single event in one time and place, but the Stonewall Inn riots changed 
everything for the gay rights movement in America. The event is so crucial that many of the 
details have passed into myth and apocrypha, but the basics we know. The Stonewall Inn was a 
Mafia owned New York City gay bar, which was periodically raided by police, as were all such 
“disorderly” establishments in the city. In the early morning hours of June 28, 1969, police 
conducted a raid that surprised patrons for its timing and its violation of certain norms in the 
relationship between the police, mafia, and clientele. When the arrests for cross-dressing began, 
the crowd grew large and angry, and some youths started throwing pennies at the police. 
Pennies allegedly gave way to rocks and bricks, and a full scale riot quickly broke out. The police 
barricaded themselves in bar, police cars were flipped, and rioters battled riot police for control 
of the streets. Protests and riots flared on and off over the course of three days, with the 
number of participants swelling and eventually drawing in straight elements of the left 
(Hirshman, 2012, pp. 98-99). It was the first significant exercise of gay power in America. 
 The Stonewall riots were a pure and simple display of disruptive power. In the absence 
of just treatment, gay American’s withdrew their participation from the norms of law and order. 
As argued in Chapter 3, disruptive power is the primordial power of movements because it 
always lurks on the edges of possibility and cannot by coopted by status quo forces. With no 
planning or calculation, gays told the city of New York (and the broader country) that price of 
police harassment would be violence and chaos, where formerly there was no cost at all. The 
raw, unfocused, and unorganized power of Stonewall revealed to potential movement members 
that power was there for the taking, and thus sparked the mobilization of a mass movement. 
                                                           
324 Before a movement is fully mobilized, disruption carries a heightened risk of severe, or even deadly, 
repression. Lynching of vocal blacks in the post-bellum, pre-civil rights South is perhaps the clearest and 
darkest example. 
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Gay Americans had embraced the “duck and cover” strategy of the Pre-Stonewall Era because 
there seemed no alternative. Those days were over. 
 The Stonewall Era (1969-1979) of the gay rights movement was defined primarily by its 
use of disruptive power. While rioting is generally an unsustainable tactic that invites repression, 
gay rights activists quickly replaced it with a signature disruptive tactic, the zap. Zaps were 
theatrical disruptions of high profile officials and groups that combined the civil disobedience of 
sit-ins with the playful subversive elements of drag culture. The phrase often used to start the 
confrontations was “Zap! You’re Alive,” which established the playful non-violent character of 
the disruptions. But disruptions they were. New York Mayor John Lindsay was repeatedly 
zapped at fundraisers and galas, including high profile media-packed events at the Metropolitan 
Opera and Radio City Music Hall. Activists would infiltrate these events, chain themselves to 
railings, and confront the Mayor over police harassment, employment discriminations, and 
other rule of law issues (Hirshman, 2012, p. 121). These tactics were remarkably effective, in 
part because Lindsay’s public stance was that his administration did not support harassment or 
discrimination against gays. Stonewall Era activists were able to repeatedly leverage disruption 
to create costs for officials who could grant concessions without making public moves that 
might be criticized as “pro-gay.” 
 Another target of disruption was the American Psychiatric Association, whose inclusion 
of homosexuality as a psychological disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) 
provided scientific cover for discriminatory public policy. By more or less shutting down the 
ASA’s 1971 annual meeting and other conferences, activists managed to get homosexuality 
removed from the 1973 revision of the DSM. This key victory would set the stage for key policy 
change, such as the 1975 removal of the US civil service hiring ban. Without the justification that 
mental illness was a de facto reason for exclusion, such bans lacked any basic justification 
(Hirshman, 2012, p. 131).325 
                                                           
325 Of course the military carried on with its own unique appeals to morale and institutional culture until 
the Obama administration eventually ordered an end to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in 2010. Even then, 
congressional hearings were required so that key military personnel could report their findings that open 
service would not impact troop solidarity and cohesiveness. 
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 Importantly, zaps and other disruptive actions were always conceived of as 
opportunities to also exercise plebiscitary power. The presence of media raised the costs to 
targets because activist messages were carefully scripted to frame the confrontations in friendly 
terms, such as fairness and the rule of law. With the APA disruptions, articulate professional 
gays were able to refute the mental illness classification through their presence and 
presentation. Moreover, gays framed their request to the APA in terms of participation in the 
process of DSM revision, which reinforced their position that the psychological community 
lacked any significant experience with gays who were not already undergoing treatment for 
other psychological problems.  
 This modest plebiscitary force functioned more as an adjunct to disruptive efforts than 
as an independent avenue of influence. By controlling the framing of their disruptions, and 
conducting them in the presence of media, activists constrained how their targets could react. 
Heavy-handed reactions by targets play poorly in media, particularly with a minority seeking 
basic rule of law protections and a stake in defining their own mental health. But whereas 
Chapter 5 discusses plebiscitary power in terms of winning policy support from third parties, 
here we see public attention functioning more purely as a type of punishment. Gays did not yet 
have public respect and professional organization to wield decisive plebiscitary force. Yet the 
targets did not need to feel overwhelming support for the policies activists wanted, but simply 
needed to fear the embarrassment and ridicule of being shamed by their lowly adversaries and 
pushed to behave badly. In this way, plebiscitary power served to defend and enhance the 
exercise of disruptive pain. 
 Activists also blended plebiscitary power with pluralist power, particularly on the issue 
of criminal sodomy. The “Felons 6” in California is the prime example. These gay Californians 
admitted to committing sodomy and offered themselves up for arrest, all in front of the media. 
While the formal intent of the activists was to challenging the issue in the courts, the real goal 
was to embarrass and shame the public officials who would have to publicly prosecute the 
cases. While the activists’ cause may not have been particularly popular, no official wanted to be 
known as the sodomy prosecutor. The Felon 6 couldn’t get themselves arrested, and to 
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eventually the California legislature repealed the sodomy ban in 1975.326 During the Stonewall 
Era 19 states other than CA decriminalized sodomy, but in those cases gay activists played only 
minor roles in legislation designed to modernize criminal codes on sex following the sexual 
revolution of the 1960s (Eskridge Jr., 2008).327   
 Perhaps the most dramatic plebiscitary effort came in 1979, when some 75,000 activists 
marched on Washington in the movement’s first grand national display. But consistent with 
Chapter 5, the impact of medium-large marches on Washington was already waning in the late 
70s (Barber, Marching on Washington: the Forging of an American Tradition, 2004). The march 
produced only scant media coverage, include a brief Page 17 New York Times article that gave 
significant response space to Christian conservative opponents (Thomas, 1979). Absent any 
disruptions (like the bloody Southern marches of the Civil Rights movement that framed the 
1963 March on Washington) or any significant lobbying or electioneering pressure, the march 
was simply not a significant source of power.  
 The disruptive nature of the movement during the Stonewall Era mobilized participants 
and accomplished some of the basic early gay policy goals. However, that disruptive nature also 
made organization building problematic and prevented the development of pluralist and 
plebiscitary resources. The newly mobilized activists thirsty for dramatic disruptions and 
skeptical of authority had little patience for developing organizational rules and norms. Groups 
like the Gay Liberation Front and Radicalesbians displaced the establishment Mattachine Society 
following the Stonewall riots, but GLF folded after just 9 months due to organizational struggles. 
GLF would discuss positions for hours in open rules meetings before taking a member vote, only 
to have the vote’s loser reintroduce the issue at the next meeting. Unable to plan or act, GLF 
divided or disbanded (Hirshman, 2012, p. 107). Organizations with little in the way of hierarchy 
or decision-making process where the loci of public attention, activist energy, and the 
movement’s scant resources, but such groups did little to build a more permanent agenda or 
strategy.  
                                                           
326 Similar efforts were conducted in Minnesota, New York and the District of Columbia, but none were 
successful. 
327 This is another example of how the gay rights movement was able to achieve goals by piggybacking on 
more established movements. Here the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s pushed hard to 
decriminalize sexual and reproductive behavior. 
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 The Stonewall Era did see the emergence of some of the movement’s core pluralist 
advocates, including the Lambda Legal Defense Fund and the Gay Rights National Lobby (GRNL 
was the precursor to the Human Rights Campaign Fund). In San Francisco, gay activists turned 
out to elected gay ally Diane Feinstein as City Council President in 1972, and eventually openly 
gay activist Harvey Milk to City Council. Gays made tentative strides in broader California politics 
with the Alice B Toklas Democratic Club, becoming a minor player in statewide Democratic 
primaries. And perhaps most importantly, gay activists worked their way into more established 
liberal organizations like the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), which had firmly resisted incorporating gay issues at the beginning of 
the Stonewall Era (Hirshman, 2012, pp. 159-164). These organizational achievements set the 
stage for a strong pluralist movement, but the movement’s organizational standing in the 1970s 
is well captured by the GRNL, which had its phones cut off for non-payment in 1978.  
 The period did see a scattering of local legislative victories, with Miami (1977), Aspen 
(1977), Berkley (1978), and San Francisco (1978) passing antidiscrimination ordinances. The 
casual observer will note that these victories came unsurprisingly in localities with exceedingly 
liberal populations and an overrepresentation of gay citizens. These narrow victories galvanized 
statewide and national opposition that revealed gay rights groups to be relatively weak and 
unprepared. Religious conservative groups like the Focus on the Family and Save our Children 
emerged in 1977 to push back against gay rights in Colorado and Florida respectively. These 
groups, supported by an ascendant Republican Party, would soon prove the gay rights 
movement extremely vulnerable to democratic politics by repealing gay rights ordinances in 
initiatives/referendums in Miami (1977), St. Paul (1978), Wichita (1978), and Eugene (1978) 
(Hirshman, 2012, p. 245).  
 When Harvey Milk, the movement’s first real political player, was assassinated in 1978 
his killer, Dan White, received only a slap on the wrist conviction, manslaughter. While pundits 
have distorted the history of the trial to claim White got off on the famous “Twinkie defense,” in 
actual fact it appears a conservative jury simply felt that killing a gay man was something less 
than murder. Upon seeing their lack of fair access to the courts or the media, San Francisco’s gay 
community rioted. Police eventually put down the riot, and retaliated by raiding a prominent 
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gay bar in the district, bringing the Stonewall Era to a close in an episode eerily similar to its 
beginnings. 
 
The AIDS Era328 
 From 1980-1986 the gay rights movement struggled against two challenges that 
overwhelmed the movement’s meager resources. First, the Reagan revolution united a small 
government ethos with religious social conservativism, and put gay rights protections squarely 
on the Republican hit list. Second, the emerging AIDS crisis dramatically expanded the rights and 
services the gay community needed from government, an expansion that especially taxed a 
movement built around requests to be left alone by government. The result was that the AIDS 
Era was a period of retrenchment, where the movement’s power was overwhelmed by its 
adversaries. 
 The disruptive power that characterized the movement in the 1970s did not carry-over 
into the 1980s, which is hardly surprising given the realities of activist fatigue discussed in 
Chapter 3. The problem of fatigue was exasperated by the transient nature of Stonewall Era 
organizations and the lack of more permanent activist networks for mobilizing activists. Save 
Our Children was shifting the venue of contention to state level voter initiatives, which are not 
ready targets for disruption. It is difficult to inflict pain on voters and then turn around and get 
them to vote for your cause, which again highlights the tensions that can exist between 
different forms of power. In addition, the rise of AIDS as a public health crisis in the gay 
community raised confusing questions about what the movement wanted and who could 
deliver. I have argued that if disruption is not based on clear targets and deliverable goals, then 
the public will have little tolerance for the disrupters. All these factors tempered disruptive 
power in the early 1980s. 
 The AIDS Era saw both progress and retrenchment in state and federal politics. The 
movement began to build pluralist resources and made tentative pushes in electoral, legislative, 
and judicial venues. On the electoral front, gay groups continued to build their presence in 
                                                           
328 While the AIDS epidemic extended well past 1986, this period of gay rights activism was defined by the 
movement’s difficulty responding to the crisis. The following period saw a more effective response. 
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California. Gay signatures were a major reason Gary Hart was able to secure the top ballot 
position in the 1984 Democratic Presidential Primary, and gay votes helped Hart narrowly carry 
California over the eventual party candidate, Walter Mondale (Hirshman, 2012, p. 218). While 
Hart failed to secure the nomination, the Democratic Party began to recognize gay money and 
votes as a cohesive segment of the party that candidates would need to court. However, this 
budding electoral influence did not produce policy, or even significant promises, for some time. 
 On the legislative front, in 1982 Wisconsin passed the first statewide antidiscrimination 
law covering sexual orientation, almost a decade ahead of any other state. The Wisconsin effort 
was largely an inside job pushed through by State Representative David Clarenbach, with most 
gay rights groups viewing state legislation as a losing cause. Clarenbach, the son of NOW 
founder Kathryn Clarenbach, was not openly gay during his time in office, but later claimed most 
players in Madison were aware of his sexual orientation. He pushed relentlessly for several 
years to pass the legislation, along with measures decriminalizing various forms of consensual 
sex. The success in Wisconsin is a notable exception, as was the passage of 1984 hate crime 
legislation in California. Other victories tended to come in insolated liberal localities, such a 
Boulder, Colorado, which in 1981 followed joined Aspen in banning discrimination against gays 
(Hirshman, 2012, p. 247).   
 While small legislative victories were achieved in the early 1980s, the broader political 
environment became markedly more conservative. Following the example of Save Our Children 
in the late 1970s, conservative activist groups like the Moral Majority passed referendums 
repealing gay rights legislation in Santa Clara (1980), San Jose (1980), Duluth (1984), and 
Houston (1985). In the case of Houston, the anti-gay measure received a whopping 82% of the 
vote. Anti-gay activists were even able to secure a bipartisan vote of 281-119 by the House of 
Representatives, with the approval of President Reagan, to overturn a District of Columbia 
municipal law removing sodomy from the sex crime code.329 The brief national campaign saw 
gay rights advocates completely outgunned in terms of financial and political resources, and in 
1981 sodomy was re-criminalized in the nation’s capital. Beyond the laws they passed, the surge 
in anti-gay activism effectively tied up movement resources in defensive measures and halted 
                                                           
329 The Supreme Court has since ruled that single house vetoes of DC legislation are unconstitutional, 
however, the Congressional campaign still points to how overmatched gay rights advocates were on the 
national stage. 
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movement progress on issues like decriminalizing sodomy (Eskridge Jr., 2008, pp. 209-219). As I 
have stressed throughout, stagnation and inaction are always victories for those holding power 
and privilege.  
 At the same time the activists were hitting a wall on sodomy and antidiscrimination 
laws, the AIDS epidemic shifted the priorities of the movement and taxed its weak 
organizational resources. It turned disruptive power in on the movement as discussions of 
sexual restraint produced a mass withdrawal of support from activists concerned with 
preserving hard fought sexual freedoms. This infighting undermined the authority of movement 
leaders on the AIDS issue, such as the group Gay Men’s Health Crisis, who increasingly looked to 
the government for a cure. Where previously activists where seeking an end to harassment, 
criminalization, and discrimination, now they were actively seeking government money and 
support. This switch in goals did not gel well with movement frames of non-intervention or with 
disruptive tactics. Channeling disruptive power to produce action from policymakers on 
legislation and bureaucratic rulemaking takes carful targeting by savvy groups employing clever 
plebiscitary frames. It takes groups that know what they want and how they want it to happen. 
The gay rights movement simply lacked the organization and power resources to push such an 
agenda at the start of the 1980s.  
  As discussed in Chapter 5, plebiscitary power can be a double edged sword, and 
activists always risk losing control of media frames. This was certainly the case with AIDS. By 
1981, an emerging group of rare and aggressive cancers, infections, and respiratory conditions 
was being identified in New York and California’s gay communities. The unfortunate name 
settled on by researchers, the CDC, and the NIH: Gay-Related Immunodeficiency or GRID. Gay 
rights advocates asked for government action, and the government responded by addressing 
the health crisis as a gay disease. Anti-gay opponents were quickly able to parley GRID into three 
devastating frames: public health, public morality, and divine judgment. The public health frame 
claimed that anal sex leads the development and spread of disease, which even many liberals 
found a compelling reason to leave sodomy laws in place. The morality frame argued that gay 
culture promoted promiscuity, as evidenced by GRID, and thus public policy should not 
legitimate gay life choices through legal protections. Finally, Jerry Falwell and the Christian right 
pushed a frame of divine judgment that argued the emergence of a disease afflicting only the 
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gay community was evidence that the Christian God had singled out homosexual sin for 
retribution. This final frame worked not only to stymie overall movement progress, but also 
justified public health policy that simply let GRID do its deadly work. After all, you don’t try to 
stay the hand of God. 
 For the first few years of the AIDS crisis, the Reagan administration did virtually nothing. 
No public statements. No research funding. No public health programs. The gay rights 
movement found itself largely powerless to force Reagan’s hand. They had neither effective 
media frames nor organizational muscle, and without these resource the movement could not 
harness its disruptive potential. Adding insult to injury, a number of constitutional challenges to 
sodomy bans were percolating up through the lower courts, leading to the devastating 1986 
Supreme Court Ruling, Bowers v. Hardwick. The Bowers ruling upheld sodomy laws as consistent 
with the Constitution’s right to privacy, and further asserted that the regulation of moral 
tradition was a valid role for government. Bowers also appeared to foreclose Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection challenges to anti-gay laws.  Although a close 5-4 ruling, Bowers 
made clear that the Courts would not provide an alternative venue for a movement struggling to 
influence democratic politics. 
 
The Resurgence Era (1986-1996) 
 In the wake of Bowers v. Hardwick the gay rights movement came to terms with its lack 
of political power. For many, it felt like a return to the days before Stonewall. Unsurprisingly, 
this meant a renewed focus on disruption, but this time it would be more deliberately pared 
with organizational structure and precise messaging. These efforts would not turn the tide in the 
movement’s favor overnight. There would still be a number of brutal defeats in this era. 
However, the movement that emerged from this period was set upon a path to greater power 
and influence. 
 This era could also be called the “Act-Up” era. The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power 
delivered on its name: it unleashed power. Where Larry Kramer’s previous group, The Gay 
Men’s Health Crisis, had proved largely impotent, Act-up succeeded in pushing gay rights onto 
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the national stage and held it there until government responded. The group is most well known 
for its use of direct action protests that disrupted major institutions in attempts to increase the 
availability of AIDS drugs. Starting in 1987, the year of its founding, Act Up shut down the streets 
surrounding the New York Stock Exchange three times in as many years. Well over a hundred 
activists were arrested in these protests, and in 1989 members even managed to chain 
themselves to VIP balconies inside the Exchange. In 1988, over a thousand activists surround the 
FDA’s headquarters and shut down operations for a full day. Two years later hundreds of 
activists held a die-in in front of the NIH. These early actions typify Act Up’s central tactic of 
“shutting down” targets and highlight the centrality of disruption in late 1990s gay rights 
activism.  
 While Act Up built its reputation through disruption, a fuller picture of the NYSE, FDA, 
and NIH protests demonstrates that the movement’s resurgence was tied tightly to better use of 
organization building and media appeals. Act Up made significant use of strict meeting rules, 
developed a formal committee structure, including an Action Committee and a Treatment and 
Data Committee, and actively sought to incorporate skilled professionals, either within its own 
committees or through support from groups like Lambda Legal.  From the very start Act Up 
sought to avoid the disorder that had quickly sunk the Gay Liberation Front, and further sought 
to build the resources and expertise to leverage their disruptions in negotiations with 
policymakers. For example, Lambda filed Freedom of Information Act requests so that Act Up 
was fully informed about potential AIDS drugs and their progress through the FDA process. The 
Treatment and Data Committee was led by pharmaceutical chemist Iris Long, who taught the 
group the details of the drug approval process they hoped to influence, and made Act Up a 
legitimate authority on the state of AIDS research. They turned the FDA protest into a form of 
grassroots lobbying that gave specific reasons for the expedited approval of specific drugs. And 
during the NIH protest, “AIDS Czar” Anthony Fauci, head of the Nation Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Disease, invited the Treatment and Data leadership to begin a collaborative process 
that revolutionized how experimental drugs for terminal illnesses are ushered through clinical 
trials. Act Up was an institutionalized pluralist organization in a way that previous radical gay 
rights groups were not. 
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 Equally important, from the very start Act Up seized upon effective plebiscitary frames 
and strategies. As discussed in Chapter 3, disruptive actions are most easily ignored or 
suppressed when the public does not clearly understand why the target has been selected and 
what the target is supposed to do about the grievance. During the Retrenchment Era there was 
little agreement amongst movement activists about targets or demands, and the available 
action frames were coopted by the opposition to focus on regulating sodomy and gay culture. 
But in 1987 AZT was approved by the FDA for the treatment of AIDS and all at once the 
movement’s message crystalized: make AZT available to everyone who needs it and hurry new 
drugs to market. The maker of AZT, Burroughs Wellcome, could sell the only available AIDS 
treatment at a less obscene profit margin, and Congress could subsidize costs. The FDA could 
stop dragging its feet in approving new AIDS drugs. The NIH could make clinical trials more 
flexible to give more patients access to experimental treatments. And for each of their demands 
they hit on the key frame: life and death. Act up employed phrases like “we die, they do 
nothing,” “you’re killing us,” the Act up moto “Silence=Death,” and adopted the Pink Triangle 
symbol co-opting of the sign the Nazis used to mark gays in the Holocaust.    
Act Up founder Larry Kramer was able to place an op-ed in The New York Times the day 
before the group’s first Wall Street protest. Act up borrowed the services of HRC media 
personnel to distribute media kits nationwide before the FDA protests. The centerpiece of the 
NIH protest was a massive “die-in” that perfectly framed the group’s message. In each case we 
see a movement that has become increasingly savvy and understands that temporary 
disruptions can be leveraged as agenda setting moments if the media adopts the desired issue 
framing.  
 As important as Act-Up was in reenergizing gay rights activism, it was hardly the whole 
story of the Resurgence Era. The disruptive ethos of the period extended both to establishment 
and fringe elements. In 1987, HRC shut down Pennsylvania Avenue across from the White House 
in a call for increased AIDS drug access. Marty Robinson, pioneer of the movement’s direct 
action “zaps,” resurrected the tactic with his new group, The Swift and Terrible Retribution 
Committee, as well as its informal counterpart known as “The Lavender Hill Mob.” The mob 
targeted Catholic Church officials, Senators, CDC officials and anyone they viewed as responsible 
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for the silence on the AIDS issue. The success of their “Silence=Death” motto would lead to its 
adoption by Act-Up.  
 Beyond disruption, we see a more complicated picture emerge, in which the gay rights 
movement increasingly intertwined pluralist and plebiscitary power.330 A key example is the 
movement’s success in piggybacking on Jewish hate crime tracking legislation. The National Gay 
Task Force, after much cajoling, was able to secure a partnership with the Anti-Defamation 
League in 1987. Their joint lobbying produced the 1990 Hate Crime Statistics Act, which tasked 
the FBI with tracking hate crimes against groups, including gays. This lobbying effort succeeded 
in large part because activists embraced an informational issue frame, which undercut 
opposition claims that gays did not need special protections. If gays were not being widely 
targeted for violence, the FBI would confirm it. But activists knew the data would show 
significant victimization of gay Americans, and it did just that. The Statistics Act would go on to 
show that hate crimes against gays are prevalent, involve particularly high rates of assault, and 
include a number of murders.331  
 Another area where plebiscitary power was able to thrive in conjunction with pluralist 
power is in the movement’s resurgent use of the courts. After Denver passed an anti-
discrimination ordinance in 1992, Colorado conservatives rallied to pass Amendment 2, a 
statewide law prohibiting Colorado municipalities from protecting gays as a class. The case 
would be challenged in Romer v. Evans as a violation of the 14th Amendment right to Equal 
Protection, and wind its way through the appeals process until the Supreme Court decided the 
case in 1996. While the ruling striking down Amendment 2 was itself historic, also notable were 
the televised lower court proceedings, which presented the country with a striking contrast of 
upstanding model gay plaintiffs v. thinly veiled and factually challenged prejudice of the law’s 
                                                           
330 The movement continued to build its more conventional political giving, even being courted by Bill 
Clinton for his ’92 and ’96 election campaigns. But while these efforts built a foundation for future 
political influence, movement money was just a drop in the bucket at this point, and a drop with no other 
bucket to fill.  
331 For example, 1996, while there were roughly the same number recorded gay (1281) and Jewish (1209) 
victims of hate crimes, 78% of crimes against gays were against their persons, while only 34% of crimes 
against Jews were against their persons. If we look at assault numbers, 41% of hate crimes against gays 
were assaults, while only 4% of crimes against Jews involved assault. So whereas Jews suffered from a 
high incidence of vandalism and property destruction, gays suffered from high rates of bias motivated 
violent crime. In this respect the plight of gays looked similar to that of black victims of hate crimes. See 
the FBI’s 1996 Unified Crimes Report. 
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proponents. As stressed in Chapter 5, access to the political agenda is the clearest way for 
activists to secure meaningful media attention for their issues. 
 Romer v. Evans was a surprising and historic ruling that breathed significant pluralist and 
plebiscitary power into the movement. The ruling was surprising in that Bowers v. Hardwick had 
so recently appeared to squash any hope gay activists had of using the 14th Amendment’s Equal 
Protection clause, specifically by denying that gays could constitute a “suspect class” that could 
only be singled out in legislation with a compelling state interest. Bowers give governments 
permission to treat gays differently, provided legislators offered a minimal rational justification 
for that treatment. Under this standard, and given the Court’s endorsement of encouraging 
“traditional” values in Bowers, how could Colorado lose in Romer? The answer is the Court 
decided that the only justification for the Colorado law was to discriminate and demean gay 
Coloradans, and as Justice Kennedy wrote, “animus towards the class that it affects” does not 
qualify as a legitimate interest of the state. By rejecting moral and cultural rationales for 
differential treatment, the SCOTUS presented anti-gay forces with a kind of Sophie’s choice: 
they could abandon moral/religious rhetoric in their legislative campaigns and risk losing 
popular support, or press forward with anti-gay moralizing and risk defeat in the Courts. This 
frame shift mirrored the one that followed SCOTUS decisions on racial housing discrimination 
and school segregation. More than any other moment, the Romer decision allowed the gay 
rights movement to escape a cumbersome morality frame on sexuality issues and assume the 
potent plebiscitary mantel of the generation’s defining civil rights cause. 
 The Hate Crime Statistics Act and Romer v. Evans victories both involved two 
intertwined forms of power. When movement activists tried to press their claims with a single 
power approach, the result was often failure. For example, Bill Clinton’s unwillingness to fight 
on the issue of gays in the military stunned many gay supporters. Clinton had won key financial 
and electoral support over his primary opponent, longtime gay ally Paul Tsongas, after Clinton 
appeared to promise sweeping military reforms (amongst other policies) in a 1992 speech to 
Access Now for Gay and Lesbian Equality (ANGLE).332 Movement activists were emboldened by 
an apparent friend in the White House and the establishment of new electoral and lobbying 
                                                           
332In the California primary, gays raised $4 million for Clinton, turned out thousands of canvassers, and by 
some reports produced 1/7 of the Clinton vote through their ballots and those of friends and families 
(Hirshman, 2012, p. 224). 
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organizations like the 501(c)4 Human Rights Campaign Fund in 1989 and the Victory Fund in 
1990. But when the issue of gays in the military hit the agenda in 1993, military brass was hugely 
successful in framing the issue in terms of military culture and moral. Caught off guard, 
movement organizations were unable to shift the debate away from issues of military 
preparedness, and the Commander in Chief was unwilling to expend his political capital on the 
issue. The result was the unfortunate institution of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which further 
entrenched the idea that homosexuality was incompatible with patriotism and public service. 
With no plebiscitary game plan, pluralist efforts at military reform were a flop.333 
                                                           
333  Two other examples of movement efforts stumbling without plebiscitary support are the push to 
shift the Catholic Church’s position on safe-sex AIDS prevention and the push to pass gay marriage laws at 
the state level. In the former case, the conflict came to a head in 1989 when 4,500 Act-Up protesters 
disrupted a mass by Cardinal John O’Connor New York’s St. Patrick’s Cathedral. With the streets blocked 
by a die-in, inside, activist Michael Petrelis screamed “O’Connor, you’re killing us! You’re killing us, just 
stop it! Stop it!” while other activists laid down in the aisles or chained themselves to pews. Police 
removed the “dead” protestors and took 111 activists into custodyThe “Stop the Church” action produced 
one of the biggest media moments in the movement’s history, but almost all press coverage was harshly 
critical of Act-Up (Hirshman, 2012, pp. 205-206).  Coverage framed the issue as religion v. homosexuality, 
with activists framed as anti-religious. Mayor Ed Koche’s statement, ''If you don't like the church, go out 
and find one you like - or start your own,'' succeeded in undermining activist attempts to draw attention 
to the complex connection between the Church and public health policy (DeParle, 1989). While some 
movement activists to this day take the “any media is good media” view that Stop the Church was a 
success, it seems clear that Act-Up did not have a practical plan to support their disruption with a well-
framed media message. While a “sell us the drug” protest of a pharmaceutical company and a “approve 
more drugs” protest at the FDA make intuitive sense, Stop the Church lacked the clear target and policy 
connections that Chapter 3 discussed as essential to disruptive power. 
 Our second example concerns gay marriage. In 1993, Hawaii’s Supreme Court declared that same 
sex marriage was required under the state’s equal protection clauses of the Hawaii Constitution. This 
stunning pluralist victory came sooner than most movement groups anticipated possible, and there was 
no significant framing of the marriage issue present in mass media. In the rush to capture public opinion 
on the ruling, activists ran into religious opposition that was far better positioned. The Christian Right 
pressed forward with dual frames that had proven successful in the past. First, they claimed that the state 
was siding with gays in a dispute between religion (the traditional keeper of marriage) and the anti-
religious gays of Stop the Church. Second, the trope of Save Our Children reemerged arguing that gay 
marriage would place children in harm’s way because “kids do best with a mom and dad.” While the legal 
issue in Hawaii remained muddled for years, until voters amended the Constitution in 1998 to ban gay 
marriage, the national issue of gay marriage surged forward under the religious and family framing. After 
Newt Gingrich and the right took Congress in the 1994 election, there would be a rush amongst 
Democrats and Republicans to show who was the most “family values” friendly on the marriage issue. The 
tellingly named federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) would eventually sail through Congress with only 
67 nays in the House and 14 in the Senate. And once again, erstwhile ally Bill Clinton signed anti-gay 
legislation. While this vignette certainly shows that movement pluralist power was not adequately 
organized for the marriage battle, it is unlikely any movement could muster the money and votes to 
overcome such a poisonous plebiscitary framing. 
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 A final point worth noting on the Resurgence Era is the light it shines on institutional 
thickening, particularly as discussed in Chapter 4. I noted there that institutional thickening was 
likely to shut out challengers from institutional channels, but that the phenomenon may actually 
work to the advantage of established movements who already have a seat in these institutions. 
What we see in the Resurgence Era is that this later point can be extended to robust 
institutional channels that have largely outlived their original function. As James Q. Wilson 
points out, the drive of organizations to survive and grow often leaves the organizational 
mission malleable and fungible. In the case of hate crime legislation, gay activists were able to 
graft their policy goals onto the far more established and moneyed Jewish and Black interests. A 
far more telling example centers around the Romer case, which drew legal support from top of 
America’s legal minds, most notably in Professor Laurence Tribe’s influential Amicus Brief. One 
interpretation behind the surge of law school interest in gay rights, one I find compelling, is that 
a new generation of lawyers working in the shadow of the great civil rights cases was champing 
at the bit to lay down their own markers on history. That is to say, the law school system, and its 
connections to judging and clerking, had built its position in the American polity based on its 
defense of minority civil rights. As opportunities to break new legal ground on black and 
women’s civil rights have been exhausted, gay rights presented the best opportunity for the 
kind of profound legal work that defines a career. Why gay rights? I would argue that the 
Resurgence Era pressed forward claims to marriage, military service, and antidiscrimination in 
housing and employment. These issues mirror many of the great civil rights cases of the past. 
Finally, the AIDS epidemic lent a life or death urgency to gay rights that attracted the “white 
knights” of the legal community.  
 
The Legal Era (1997-2008) 
 The two major policy events of 1996 would set up movement dynamics that remained in 
place for more than a decade. First, movement opponents discovered effective ways to harness 
public opinion into legislative victories. DOMA (as well as DADT) was a prominent and public 
national affirmation of restricting gay rights, and it opened the floodgates for repressive state 
laws, including state DOMAs. Second, the movement hit upon a successful venue to press its 
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claims in the courts. The Romer decision laid out a legal rationale and for state and federal 
courts to strike down laws based on animus towards gays, but just importantly it gave the high 
court’s seal of approval to lower courts looking to push the boundaries of permissible judicial 
activism.  
 During this era, disruptive tactics receded in prominence and pluralist and plebiscitary 
power worked in tandem. The movement turned the Romer precedent and issue frame on state 
sodomy laws, specifically targeting the handful of laws that only criminalized homosexual 
sodomy. Lambda Legal and the ACLU initiated legal challenges to sodomy laws in six states, 
including the Texas suit that would make its way up to the Supreme Court. In 2003, SCOTUS 
handed down its decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which stated that sodomy laws violate the “Right 
to Privacy,” but drew much of its logic from Romer’s discussion of animus against minority 
groups.334 Animus, discrimination, persecution. The movement had established its narrative at 
the judicial level, and this judicial framing would provide a one-two punch of eliminating some 
anti-gay legislation and painting a frame of prejudice on opposition efforts. The prejudice/civil 
rights frame would be essential in slowly eroding the opposition’s public opinion advantage. 
Most people don’t want to be on the wrong side of civil rights history.  
 As SCOTUS was considering Lawrence, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was 
considering Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, a suit advance by Gay and Lesbian Advocates & 
Defenders (GLAD), which argued the equal protection clause of the MA State Constitution 
required the legalization of same sex marriage. Justice C.J Marshall held off ruling on Goodridge 
until Lawrence was handed down, and then preceded to quote Lawrence in the second 
paragraph of her opinion. So we can clearly trace the judicial civil rights frame from Romer to 
Lawrence to Goodridge, with gay rights advocates litigating as pluralist insiders and leveraging 
their victories into a plebiscitary advantage that would eventually shift the overall political 
landscape in their favor.335 
                                                           
334 Only Justice Ginsberg’s Concurrence favored a direct adoption of the Equal Protection Clause as in 
Romer.  
335 The role of the courts in this social transformation and others is regularly disputed. Judges are often 
considered fundamentally conservative because they are appointed by elected officials at one political 
moment and serve to institutionalize those views in offices that in many cases carry life appointments. 
When their rulings appear to be at the leading edge of change, critics suggest that the courts are simply 
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 I stress the plebiscitary aspect of the movement’s judicial strategy because there was 
nothing inevitable about the movement’s gains in public support. In the wake of Lawrence and 
Goodridge, opposition forces organized one of the most dramatic state legislative campaigns in 
American history. Earlier democratic frames of “majority rule” were successfully pressed, as 
they often are when court rulings run counter to public opinion. Defense of Marriage Acts 
amending state constitutions to prohibit gay marriage were placed on the 13 state ballots 
through initiatives and referendums. All of them passed. In 2005, Kansas and Texas passed gay 
marriage bans, and in the 2006 midterm elections, 7 more states followed suit. And in 2008, 
California, Florida, and Arizona passed marriage bans. In most of these public votes, the 
outcome was not even close. In Alabama, a striking 81% of voters favored prohibiting gay 
marriage. Perhaps more surprising, 57% of voters in liberal Oregon also favored banning gay 
marriage (McKinley & Goodstein, 2008). In all, 25 states took dramatic and popular legislative 
steps to halt the advance of gay rights. Zero states voted pro-gay on DOMA measures. This 
period was a legislative drubbing.  
 If we look public opinion polling on the gay marriage issue we see a significant uptick in 
support for gay marriage following legalization in Massachusetts. I argue that the civil rights 
frame of the courts was impactful, particularly for a receptive element of liberal America. 
Moreover, the policy presence of gay marriage in Massachusetts was a visible rebuttal to 
opposition “the sky is falling claims” that played on people’s worst fears of social decline. In the 
opposite direction, the opposition’s legislative efforts starting in 2004 breathed new life into the 
democracy frame that legitimates majority values. Movement gains in public opinion ground to 
a stop for the rest of the Litigation Era following the 2004 election season. The legislative and 
judicial battles of the Era are a good demonstration of the way in which pluralist efforts both 
depend upon and reinforce key issue frames. 
 While the gay rights movement was losing legislative contest after legislative contest, it 
continued to build its pluralist electoral and lobbying capacity. As discussed in Chapter 4, gay 
                                                                                                                                                                             
trying to maintain their institutional legitimacy by avoiding rulings that will shortly become reviled and 
overturned. Better to seek the crest of the wave than be swamped by it, regardless of your personal 
feelings about the wave! Romer, Lawrence, and Goodridge make the gay rights movement a compelling 
example of the courts producing significant social policy and working substantially alter the trajectory of 
public opinion. Later SCOTUS cases certainly seem to be riding a shift in public opinion, but a strong can 
be made that these early case were instrumental in producing that shift. 
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rights organizations concentrated significantly larger percentages of movement resources in 
political active C4 organizations and PACs. In particular, The Human Rights Campaign amassed 
the money, activist network, and professional expertise to engage on federal issues and set up 
field operations in states with ballot initiatives. The Equality Federation took on the role of 
coordinating actions between states. Gill Action spent millions as a political hit squad targeting 
vocally anti-gay politicians. The Service Members Legal Defense Network defended and 
documented DADT discharges and built an expertise in military culture that could challenge DoD 
characterizations.  As the years past, HRC and these other players developed an election ground 
game that significantly outpaced opposition organizations. During the Legal Era, the gay rights 
movement moved almost entirely away from disruptive power and institutionalized to a 
remarkable degree.  While the black civil rights movement achieved its greatest legislative 
victories with a constant threat of disruption hanging over the country, the gay rights movement 
appears have followed a somewhat different trajectory. This should give us pause in concluding 
that any specific constellation of power strategies is “the right one” across time and 
circumstance. 
 
 The Majoritarian Era 
 In 2009, the gay rights movement turned a corner as its pluralist reach began to extend 
to legislative victories. The 2009 Hate Crime Prevention Act was the fruit of two decades of hate 
crime statistics tracking. More importantly, 2009 saw the Vermont legislature, the Maine 
legislature, and the Washington DC city council all legalize gay marriage.336 In each of these 
cases, the civil rights frame had taken firm hold in liberal circles and movement organizations 
brought significant resources to bear. As public opinion inched forward on gay issues, state 
battles shifted from defense battles in conservative states to offensive pushes in liberal states.  
On March 1st, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley signed The Civil Marriage Protection 
Act of 2012 into law, making the Old Line State the 8th in the Union to legalize same-sex 
marriage. The Act squeaked through both Houses of the MD legislature, with the critical votes in 
the House of Delegates only secured in the final hours of the campaign. In such a close political 
                                                           
336 Though the Maine law would be overturned by referendum.  
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battle, any number of factors might be seen as decisively shifting the outcome, but in this case I 
see organization as key. After an unsuccessful 2011 effort, the state group Equality Maryland 
ceded control of the campaign to The Human Rights Campaign (HRC), which spent some 
$500,000 dollars and countless staff hours lobbying key members of the MD House of Delegates 
prior to the vote (Linskey, 2012). In a similar show of lobbying strength, the organization had 
previously devoted 30 full time organizers to lobby New York’s state representatives over a 2011 
marriage equality bill, which also passed by the slimmest of margins. I stress these marginal 
victories because they offer clear evidence of the movement using skilled lobbying and 
electioneering to swing critical votes and pass legislation. One could hardly ask for a more 
obvious display of pluralist power. 
It is also worth noting the increasing electoral presence of the gay rights movement 
starting in 2008. HRC flexed its muscles in the 2008 election by endorsing Barack Obama for 
president and spending some $7 million to turnout Democratic voters.337 But perhaps more 
importantly, HRC did not endorse a candidate in the highly competitive 2008 Democratic 
primary, and the gay rights community was able to position itself as a key demographic courted 
by both Obama & Hillary Clinton at high profile HRC events. Promises were made, and the 
movement was organized to see those promise were kept. HRC’s political mobilization 
undoubtedly contributed to the White House’s decision to expend some of its waning political 
capital in 2010 pushing for the repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. The call for 
repeal, following the grueling battle over health care reform, was widely seen as a move to 
shore up the wavering support of the gay rights movement ahead of the 2010 and 2012 
elections.338   
As figure 6.1 shows, gay marriage, the movement’s most important and divisive policy 
issue became a majoritarian issue 2011, pushing President Obama to explain that his views on 
the issue were “evolving” and essentially switch his position from support of the civil union 
middle-ground to full support for marriage equality. The combination of legislative victories and 
favorable public opinion served to undercut the key frame of the movement’s opposition. The 
                                                           
337http://www.hrc.org/the-hrc-story/our-victories. Accessed on March 2, 2012 
338 Simmons, Christine (October 10, 2009). "Gays Question Obama 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Pledge". USA 
Today. Associated Press. Retrieved December 10, 2009. 
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plebiscitary importance of the national frame is key, as even states with strong majorities 
opposing gay marriage were unable to successfully deploy democratic frames. Their best 
alternative was “states’ rights,” which is suspect frame on many issues, let alone an issue 
advancing a civil rights frame. As argued in Chapter 5, the impact of this plebiscitary surge 
arguably reached all the way up to the Supreme Court, where the Justices affirmed a significant 
expansion of the Romer equal protection animus logic in Windsor and Perry. Windsor and the 
shift in public opinion drive a new wave of state and federal court decisions overturning most of 
the gay marriage provisions passed from 2004-2008. Finally, in 2015 the Supreme Court ruled in 
Obergefell v. Hodges that marriage is a fundamental right of all Americans, regardless of sexual 
orientation, requiring all 50 states to grant and recognize same sex marriages. It is a stunning 
reversal, but one that makes sense in terms of shift power dynamics. 
 
Figure 6.1 
 
In the second decade of the 21st Century, a positive position on gay rights became good 
politics for Democrats and no-win situation for Republicans. Gay organizations had developed 
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money and public support, and had shed most stigmas in the eyes of independents and even 
moderate Republicans. Add to this electoral and legislative strength a growing body of pro-gay 
law, and we see a movement entering its majoritarian phase, where implementation and budget 
battles will soon be the chief concerns.339 What lessons can we draw from the most successful 
movement considered in this chapter? 
First, power of each type is increasingly constrained, but opportunities to influence politics 
and policy persist. I began with the gay rights movement because most of the constraints 
discussed in Chapters 3-6 are clearly at work, and yet the gay rights movement is arguably the 
biggest social movement success story of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The key point to 
note is that limitations on power do not entail the absence of power. This observation should 
lead us to avoid placing too much faith in cyclical theories of political opportunity structures. 
Political outsiders are still impacting the system, and it is worth paying attention to which 
groups seem to be weathering the constrained political system best.   
Second, when a single type of power is exercised in isolation, gains are limited, movements 
are vulnerable, and those in power are able to undermine activist opponents. In particular, we 
saw that episodes where the movement did not have adequate plebiscitary messaging and the 
opposition was able to frame movement efforts as anti-religious, anti-family, or anti-
country/national security. In these cases, movement demands went nowhere and activists were 
often faced with an active surge in opposing activity, such as state amendments banning gay 
marriage. We might consider this pattern evidence that the types of power deployed by 
movements serve different and complementary roles, as employing different types of power 
can constrain the response options of targets more than simply overpower them.  
Third, while movements need to employ different types of power in support of one another, 
the danger exists that different types will undermine one another. When types of power came 
into conflict, the movement floundered. For example, the “Stop the Church” campaign undercut 
public support the more it disrupted the highly esteemed (literally sacred) workings of the 
Catholic Church. Disruptive actions seem to have the greatest potential to undermine 
                                                           
339 As well as the implementation of policy goals with broad public support like anti-bullying and anti-
discrimination legislation. These goals are not always simple and easy to achieve, but they are widely 
accepted as public problems requiring policy solutions. 
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plebiscitary frames and pluralist negotiations, which is consistent with the discussion of the 
challenges of institutionalization in Chapter 3. Of course, the dynamic also runs in the other 
direction, which we saw when Act Up activists were included in NIH decision-making, disruptive 
elements essentially caused the organization to implode. Pluralist and plebiscitary elements 
seem to mostly work in tandem, however, not always. Activist victories in the courts fueled 
opposition “democracy” frames in state initiatives/referendums and in Congress that battered 
the movement for a decade. This last example is important because it forces us to recognize 
that power tradeoffs may be an unavoidable and necessary part of movement strategy, not 
simply the result of poor planning and execution. 
Fourth, major victories have been dependent upon activists infiltrating existing institutions 
and grafted their demands onto existing policy structures. On one hand, the idea that insider 
connections are import seems to move us beyond the realm of outsider power and back into the 
realm of politics as usual. But on the other hand, Chapter 4 makes clear that institutional 
thickening should advantage those with access to established political channels. What the gay 
rights movement shows us is that access to these channels need not come from a decades long 
push to become a valued piece of one or both party coalitions. Instead, access may be gained 
through structural similarities to existing legislation or legal theory. Hate crime law allowed for 
a—to put it bluntly—“us too” approach. Another perspective is that gay rights seems to provide 
an excellent example of John Kingdon’s multiple streams policy-making model, in which civil 
rights law was a policy solution in search of a problem, and was coupled to gay rights by legal 
policy entrepreneurs like Laurence Tribe. While this example may seem to lead us again away 
from outsider agency, it must be stressed that gay rights advocates positioned themselves as 
the prime candidate for this legal attention. One more path to insider access is through personal 
connections to power players. With gay rights this came in the form of closeted politicians like 
Representative Barney Frank who became entrenched in the halls of power long before their 
sexuality became an electoral issue, as well as politicians with gay family and friends. Perhaps 
the best example is Vice President Dick Chaney, whose gay daughter pushed him to break with 
Republican opposition to gay rights and blunt his party’s vitriol on the issue. This last kind of 
insider access appears to be immensely important, and not evenly available across movements.  
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And fifth, the opportunities movements have are shaped in large part by the nature of the 
opposition that they face. Movements often face reluctance from the general population and 
political officials, as well as sharp opposition for organized interests. This organized opposition 
can be divided into those groups who make opposition one of several policy goals, and those 
groups organized entirely in opposition to a movement. The gay rights movement faced 
widespread dislike and disregard from the American public and its representatives, often 
captured in a vague “ick factor” emotion many people felt towards homosexual sex. It was a 
moral opposition, but these vague aversions proved somewhat malleable and were particularly 
vulnerable to the “replacement” effect of new generations entering the body politic. 
Consequently, political party opposition to gay rights has always been opportunistic and subject 
to change based on the winds of public opinion. Opposition by organized interests has been 
fiercer, but centers on religious right organizations with a number of policy priorities. So while 
these organizations wielded significant public influence and money, there was never any 
guarantee that these resources would be channeled towards gay rights issues. As issues become 
losers for the organization, a shift in policy focus to other areas is likely, and we have seen just 
that since 2009.  
Finally, the LGBTQ movement has only been opposed by a handful of organizations focusing 
specifically on gay rights issues. Anita Bryant’s initially successful, but short-lived Save Our 
Children and the more recent National Organization for Marriage (NOM) are the two major 
examples, as well as other temporary groups formed to push specific referendum votes, such as 
ProtectMarriage.com, which supported CA Proposition 8.340 NOM, also formed to support 
California’s 2008 gay marriage ban initiative, is an excellent example of the narrow and limited 
nature of the movement’s core opposition. While NOM has spent millions supporting various 
pieces of legislation, it is not a mass membership organization and draws the majority of its 
funding from just a few anonymous donors. This narrow foundation limits NOM’s ability to 
match the gay rights movement’s plebiscitary and disruptive actions, which typically require a 
broad and/or ideologically committed activist base. NOM’s narrow financial base also leaves the 
group unstable and unable to build reliable professional resources. If the whims of a single 
individual control 40% of your budget, organizational survival is a constant issue. And even with 
                                                           
340 ProtectMarriage.com was heavily funded by the Mormon Church and partner with the Catholic Church 
and other religious organizations in support of Prop 8. 
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NOM generating $5-10 million in annual revenue, its financial resources are dwarfed by 
movement players like HRC. In facing a purely moral opposition, gay rights advocates do not find 
themselves facing the significant pluralist resources of any particular industry, or business in 
general.341 In sum, the gay rights movement faced an opposition with significant vulnerabilities 
and an inability to counter all forms of movement power. 
 
 
The Anti-Abortion Movement 
 
 The United States Constitution protects a woman’s right to abortion under the right to 
privacy, generally seen today as a 14th Amendment liberty right. This is a high hurdle for a 
movement to face, and indeed, the anti-abortion movement is the only one of the four 
movements in Chapters 6 & 7 that finds itself directly stymied by the seemingly insurmountable 
barrier of having its ultimate aims explicitly ruled unconstitutional. In this sense, the 
antiabortion movement faces a far more powerful opposition than the popular majority that 
confronted gay rights activists. Despite this challenge, the anti-abortion movement has 
managed to wield significant power of all three types and accomplish substantive policy wins. In 
this sections we support for the same five observations made about the LGBYQ movement, but I 
also draw five additional lessons at the end of the chapter. 
 
The Pre-Roe Era (1967- 1972) 
 
 In a very real sense, there was no anti-abortion movement before the Supreme Court’s 
1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. When national and state public policy and public opinion have 
                                                           
341 In fact, as strides have been made in employment protection, business has gravitated to the position 
that uniform employment laws protecting gay rights encourage commerce and reduce labor conflicts. See 
2015 religious freedom controversies, including Walmart opposition.  
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been on your side for all of American history, you are not the political outsider. But the nascent 
anti-abortion movement began forming in 1967 when Colorado liberalized its abortion laws, 
which began mobilizing forces in a more active defense of the status quo. This period is notable 
because it was dominated by the Catholic Church, which commanded a prominent place in 
moderate-liberal politics and the Democratic Party and had access to significant financial, 
professional, and member resources. The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) was founded 
in 1967 as the first national organized effort on the abortion issue, and was notably established 
and funded by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. The effort was one of insiders with 
significant political access and a long established institutional role. So while we may associate 
anti-abortion politics today with aggressive tactics, shocking images, and right wing politics, the 
movement was birthed out of a middle-left institutional heritage on nuns and housewives 
opposing war and supporting Great Society anti-poverty programs.  
 Needless to say, social movements rarely grow out of establishment interests with 
strong institutional support. For one that did, it should be unsurprising that its formative years 
involved mostly traditional lobbying and some plebiscitary appeals concerning the sanctity of 
life. Essentially, the pre-movement movement functioned as a kind of interest group defending 
status quo morality against a genuine budding pro-choice movement that passed 19 state laws 
liberalizing abortion from 1967-1972. While these state level battles did galvanize local 
antiabortion activists in tandem with Church efforts, it was the 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade 
that birthed a vigorous national mass movement. 
 
The Roe Era (1973-1985) 
 The case of Roe v. Wade is likely the most famous Supreme Court case since Brown v. 
Board of Ed. While Roe’s impact on the larger political alignments of American politics remains 
vigorously debated, it is undeniable that the ruling completely redefined the politics of abortion. 
Roe argued that the “Right to Privacy” established in Griswold v. Connecticut also covered the 
decision of a woman and her doctor to continue or terminate a pregnancy. While the legal 
foundation of Right to Privacy remained and remains disputed, the Court’s three trimester 
division of pregnancy rights was rather unambiguous banning abortion regulation absolutely in 
 262
the first three months of pregnancy and in all cases other than maternal health for the next 
three months. With the weight of the U.S. Constitution falling clearly on the side of pro-choice 
politics, there was a dramatic reversal in which advocates were insiders and which were 
outsiders. Roe, even more clearly than Stonewall for gay rights, allows us to delineate the start 
of the modern antiabortion movement.  
 Despite the upheaval caused by the Roe decision, the early antiabortion movement was 
built largely upon the preexisting moderate insider heavy-Catholic foundation of the Pre-Roe 
period. The NRLC officially gained independence from the Catholic Church in a move of both 
symbolic and practical significance, but its personnel and tactics carried over significantly from 
its pre-Roe days (Williams, 2015). This meant that power was primarily exercised in pluralist 
ways; specifically legislative attempts to overturn Roe, or at least contain its impact.342 In 1973 it 
remained unclear just what kinds of abortion regulation would run afoul of Roe, and whether 
refusal to fund abortions by government institutions was prohibited. Moreover, most US states 
still had strong antiabortion majorities, and antiabortion views remained nationally majoritarian 
for some time. Consequently, the movement met with some significant legislative success 
without resorting to more aggressive plebiscitary and disruptive tactics.  
 Perhaps the biggest early victory of the movement was securing the Hyde Amendment 
to the 1977 Appropriations Act, which barred federal Medicaid funding from paying for 
abortions.343 At the state level, similar laws were passed restricting public funding and services 
from facilitation abortions. SCOTUS generally upheld these funding restrictions as consistent 
with Roe, most importantly upholding the Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae (1980) 
(Shimabukuro, 2015). These measures were a central goal of antiabortion moderates who were 
most concerned about encouraging or paying for abortion with their tax dollars. Indeed, these 
laws and their companion court rulings opened up a path for Democrats and independents to 
                                                           
342 There were certainly acts of aggressive and sometimes violent activism, particularly from 1977-1979, 
which included arson, vandalism, and assault (Sheppard Jr., 1982). However, these actions were largely 
the work of isolated individuals and never garnered significant support from movement activists or 
organizations. 
343 Over the years, Hyde and Hyde-like abortion restrictions have been expanded from HHS to spending by 
the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense, and other federal agencies. The overall 
impact has been to remove federal participation from almost all abortion related programs, domestic or 
abroad. These restrictions are sometimes collectively referred to as the Hyde Amendments. 
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support abortion choice as a private liberty while claiming personal moral opposition to the 
practice. In this way, the more radical elements of the antiabortion movement were primed to 
assert control over the next set of movement issues and tactics. 
 A second legislative push involved restrictions on abortion that fell short of outright 
prohibitions. At the state level, numerous laws were passed requiring waiting periods, informed 
consent requirements, spousal consent, parental consent for minors, fetal viability testing, 
abortion provider medical requirements, and other administrative hurdles. Some of these 
measures were upheld as consistent with Roe, but most were struck down as impermissible. The 
application of the right to privacy to abortion rights remained a murky business, as it continues 
to be today. However, by the mid-1980s it was becoming clear to activists that wherever the line 
between permissible and impermissible abortion regulation lay, Roe would protect “abortion on 
demand” in the vast majority of cases.344 Repeated attempts to pass “Life Amendments” striking 
abortion rights from the Constitution foundered on super-majoritarian rocks, and abortion 
activists began losing faith in pluralist power (George Jr., 1985).   
 
The Direct Action Era (1983-1994) 
 As the 1980s progressed, abortion views became roughly sorted along partisan lines, 
with Democrats increasingly embracing the Roe status quo (Williams, 2015).345 Supreme Court 
nominee Robert Bork was famously denied Senate confirmation in no small part because of his 
commitment to overturn Roe. 1983 saw the last significant push at a Human Life Amendment, 
which garnered only 49 votes in the Senate, well short of the 2/3 supermajority needed. As the 
majority of the American public, and its representatives, settled into moderate views on 
abortion, a core of antiabortion activists began to lose faith in insider power. While legislative 
efforts continued, and changing the composition of the Supreme Court remained a major goal, 
the energy of the movement shifted to more aggressive tactics. 
                                                           
344 Of course then as now, the vast majority of abortions occur squarely back in the first trimester.  
345 See also James Stimson’s Tides of Consent (2015) for a broader account of how partisanship slowly 
teaches people what their views on an issue should be based on party identification. The sorting out of 
views on abortion between Democrats and Republicans is one of Stimson’s most compelling examples.  
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 A year earlier, in 1982, three individuals calling themselves the “Army of God” had 
kidnapped abortion provider Dr. Hector Zevallos and his wife, finally releasing them after eight 
days (Sheppard Jr., 1982). The incident captivated the nation and reminded activists of the 
potency of disruptive power. While few would emulate the Army of God’s extreme tactics, a 
growing segment of the movement mainstream privately applauded the group’s militancy. After 
several years of pluralist efforts with little disruptive activity, widespread movement 
dissatisfaction with the pace of change was shifting views on which tactics were appropriate.346 
A year later, In 1983, activist Joseph Grace set an abortion clinic in Norfolk, VA ablaze. The 
following year an Alabama clinic had its employees assaulted and its equipment smashed with a 
sledge hammer and a Florida clinic was bombed on Christmas morning (Cohen & Connon, 2015). 
This escalating disruption sent shockwaves through a movement bitter over the failure of the 
major 1983 push for a Human Life Amendment and struggling to come to terms with a dramatic 
increase in Democratic support for abortion ahead of the 1984 elections.  
The founding of Operation Rescue by Randall Terry in 1986 marks a major shift in 
antiabortion activism, with disruption becoming an organized tactic supported by increasingly 
large numbers of activists. The group’s slogan, “If you believe abortion is murder, act like it’s 
murder,” would become the movement’s dominant ethos, and seemed not only to justify direct 
action, but to demand it as moral necessity. Slowly but surely, Operation Rescue and other 
radical groups started pulling housewives, priests, grandmas, and other social respectable 
activists into their direct action approach.  Importantly, these activists drew on frames of civil 
disobedience and personal sacrifice that channel black civil rights and peace activists. The 
plebiscitary support of these frames legitimated significant disruptions that might otherwise 
have been repressed. As discussed in Chapter 3, Operation Rescue was able to ramp up their 
disruptive actions, culminating in more than 1200 arrests at the 1988 Democratic National 
Convention and many thousands more during the 1991 “Summer of Mercy.” These arrests 
produced relatively few prosecutions in large part because of the protective mantel of a “civil 
disobedience” framing. 
                                                           
346 Sequence? The reception of certain tactics depends heavily on the tactics that have previously been 
employed. The, “we tried to play nice” effect. 
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A key point about the Direct Action Era is the relationship between the moderate 
mainstream and the extreme fringe. The Operation Rescue faction stood between the moderate 
NLCR faction and the extreme Army of God Faction. Moderates provided pluralist and 
plebiscitary cover for the civilly disobedient faction, but this faction was effectively able to share 
their credibility with more violent extremists. It is exceedingly difficult to legislatively target 
some law-breaking protesters and leave others unaffected. I argue that this intra-movement 
coalition effectively sustained a lengthy extreme application of disruptive power against 
vulnerable women and healthcare professionals. Of course, this raises the important question of 
why antiabortion disruption was eventually suppressed by the Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances (FACE) Act, along with RICO suits and other measures. Chapter 3 and the previous 
section of this chapter suggest that disruptive power will be suppressed when a movement fails 
to buttress it with plebiscitary or pluralist power. Is this prediction born out in the antiabortion 
case? 
For the most part it is. The central shift in abortion politics seems to be the election of 
pro-choice President Bill Clinton, who campaign on the slogan that abortion should be “safe, 
legal, and rare.” Clinton’s centrist approach to abortion astutely rode growing public resentment 
with the “abortion as murder” Operation Rescue issue frame and the terroristic tactics of more 
extreme antiabortion factions. A look at Figure 6.2 shows support for the movement position of 
no legal abortions was around 20% during the Roe Era, but Declined into the low teens as the 
Direct Action Era progressed. Public opinion data also captures the continued development of a 
sizable minority supporting  legal abortion in all cases during the Direct Action Era. What Clinton 
did was not so much to drive these shifts in popular and elite opinion, so much as to channel 
them into a moderate prochoice Democratic establishment and stake out an issue frame that 
appealed to both the 30+% of Americans who supported abortion on demand and the half of all 
Americans who preferred significant but limited abortion access. The hodgepodge of (often 
popular and successful) abortion regulation pushed by antiabortion moderates simply did not 
provide a useful overarching frame to counter “safe, legal and rare.” Clearly the antiabortion 
movement was unable to sustain its previously strong plebiscitary and electoral advantage, but 
the question remains, is this development causally related to the emergence of disruptive 
antiabortion activism? I think so. 
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Figure 6.2 
 
Causality here is extremely difficult to unravel because I am arguing both that the 
emerging center on abortion radicalized the antiabortion movement and that movement 
radicalization ceded pluralist and plebiscitary advantage to abortion moderates. What is 
undoubtedly true is that the emergence of the FACE Act on the early 1990s legislative agenda 
and its relatively easy passage (69-30 in the Senate, 241-174 in the House) shows the movement 
was not able to suppress “violence,” “extremist,” and “terrorist” frames or secure the votes of 
moderate Republicans and Democrats. In addition, the use of civil RICO charges discussed in 
Chapter 3 was successful in part because antiabortion disruptions were carried out by groups 
and individuals lacking significant organizational resources. Even Operation Rescue, the most 
prominent direct action group, never grew beyond about a million dollars in revenue and a 
couple of dozen employees, with much of these resources committed to paying fines levied 
against the organization. Such relatively minor resources do not prepare a movement for 
protracted legal battles, particularly when multi-issue civil liberty groups like the ACLU are not 
supportive (as they were for gay rights). Moreover, these legal battles insured that the direct 
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action wing of the movement had little, if any, slack resources to devote to complementary 
lobbying and electioneering. In the end, what we see is that while the movement’s direct action 
elements initially sustained its radical fringe, these elements were ultimately unable to maintain 
both their militant orientation and their public legitimacy. Arson, assault, and murder are 
powerfully disruptive, but are clearly undermine plebiscitary and pluralist avenues. 
While disruption defined the antiabortion movement in for the decade preceding 1994, 
pluralist efforts pushed forward in states with large religiously conservative populations. State 
laws placing restrictions on the process of getting abortions inevitably led to lawsuits by women 
seeking abortions, Planned Parenthood and other parties asserting a violation of the Right to 
Privacy under Roe. In one key flashpoint, Pennsylvania’s 1982 Abortion Control Act was 
amended in 1988 and 1989 to include more stringent restrictions on abortion access, including a 
spousal notification requirement. These regulations were challenged in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey (1993), which upheld the core Right to Privacy holding of Roe, but laid out new standards 
for judging if abortion restrictions violate a woman’s right to an abortion. Seeking to set clear 
new standards, Justice O’Connor wrote for the Court, “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence 
of doubt” and set “viability” of the fetus as the clear dividing line separating when the State 
could and could not regulate abortion. Before viability, states could only pass measures that did 
not create an “undue burden” on a woman seeking an abortion. In Casey itself, informed 
consent, parental consent for minors, a 24 waiting period, and a variety of clinic reporting 
requirements were all deemed acceptable. Only Pennsylvania’s requirement that married 
women seek spousal consent was struck down as an undue burden that could potentially 
expose women to domestic violence and prevent women from obtaining abortions they strongly 
and surely desired.  
Casey’s impact on the antiabortion movement was immediate and profound. On one 
hand it squashed movement hopes that pluralist and plebiscitary pressure might push the Court 
to overturn Roe and eliminate constitutional protections for abortion. On the other hand, the 
Court signaled that many regulations on abortion would not run afoul of the undue burden 
standard. The Court stressed that spousal-notification measures raised issues of physical 
violence against women, which invites interpretations of a high bar for constitutional offense. 
With the disruptive elements of the movement reeling, and the parameters for legislative 
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battles set by SCOTUS, the antiabortion movement embraced pluralist power with renewed 
vigor. 
 
The Burden Era 
 
 The Burden Era was principally an attempt to legislatively regulate abortion to the full 
extent allowed under Casey. Certainly disruptive actions continued, but as detailed in Chapter 3, 
government repression largely ended the effective use of disruptive power.347 It was a pluralist 
era in that the major battles were fought through lobbying, litigating, and electioneering, but it 
was also a plebiscitary era in which the intent of legislation became central in determining its 
permissibility. A burden is not “undue” if can be justified as ensuring informed consent or 
improving the safety of abortion as a medical procedure. The battle over the interpretation of 
Casey is essentially a matter of framing.348 Applying those frames to ever-more intrusive and 
unorthodox restrictions, and maintaining the information and safety frames when everyone 
involved knew that reducing abortions was also a central goal, were plebiscitary tasks requiring 
significant skill and organization.  
 During the Burden Era, activists expanded the concept of informed consent to include 
mandatory counselling on potential health risks of abortion based on thin and unconfirmed 
research, to listening to fetal heart beats and looking at sonograms, to multiday waiting periods, 
and other requirements that made the abortion process long and emotionally taxing. Activists 
astutely played legislators and the press, asking how more information and more time could be 
a burden to a woman truly set on securing an abortion. This framing generally beat out 
                                                           
347 This is not say disruption stopped as a strategy. It continued in the form of “sidewalk counseling,” 
direct or veiled threats, vandalism, and occasional violence.  But much of this disruption abandoned public 
policy (or even social change) as a goal and focused on stopping individual abortions. Such behavior does 
not well fit the definition of disruptive power laid out in Chapter 3. 
348 This shows again that activist cannot simply create effective frames from the ether, they usually must 
adopt or adapt frames that already carry significant political or cultural resonance. SCOTUS makes such 
frames for a living and is more than happy to latch onto their own words when they are fed back to them 
in future cases. 
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competing frames that argued the dubious and irrelevant information was necessarily “undue” 
because it served only to scare and confuse women seeking medical help (Trumpy, 2014). 
 Similarly, activists asked how “more safety” could be a burden, framing their attacks on 
late term abortion procedures, emergency contraception, and other types of abortion as 
protections for women’s health. In addition, more stringent licensing and operating standards 
for clinics were pressed as a means of ensuring abortions were as safe as possible. Again, 
opponents claimed that these measures were “undue” because they eliminated access to 
procedures that were medically very safe, buy these pro-choice frames did not resonate as well 
with the public.  
 By contrast, legislative measures that were framed clearly as bans seeking to prevent 
abortions of “babies,” ”infants,” or “unborn children” because they are “immoral,” “murder,” or 
because “life begins at conception” often became flashpoints of controversy and generally fell in 
federal court. Among the most important of these was a Nebraska ban on so-called “partial-
birth” abortions, which was laws struck down by the Supreme Court. In Stenberg v. Cahart 
(2000) Justice Breyer wrote for a bare majority arguing the law was “vague” in describing which 
procedures would be banned and why they would be banned, and also appeared to thumb its 
nose at Casey’s requirement that post-viability bans contain exceptions for women whose lives 
are endangered by carrying their pregnancies to term.349 Stenberg served as the most prominent 
marker for the continued application of the Roe tradition and the Casey undue burden standard, 
but not one that would stand unchallenged. 
 While antiabortion advocates lost on Stenberg, “partial-birth abortion” proved an 
exceedingly popular issue frame, and the 2000 and 2002 election cycles saw near universal 
opposition to D&X procedures from Congressional conservatives and moderates, as well as 
President George W. Bush. In 2003, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 64-33 in 
the Senate and 282-139 in the House, and President Bush very publicly signed the measure into 
law. It was the first federal abortion restriction since Casey, and signaled the movement’s state 
pluralist organizing had built a national powerbase behind regulating (at least some) abortions. 
The Federal Ban, while substantively very similar to the Nebraska law in Stenberg, more fully 
                                                           
349 By the time of the decision, 30 states had passed partial birth abortion bans of various sorts.  
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embraced what Alexa Trumpy calls the “Pro-Woman, Pro-Life” framing of abortion regulation as 
protecting women’s health (Trumpy, 2014).350 Justice Kennedy notably bought into the 
movement’s position on women’s health by acknowledging the goal of protecting the mental 
(moral? spiritual?) health of women who may later “come to regret their choice.” Additionally, 
the Act’s proponents take advantage of the appeal to scientific and “medical uncertainty” which 
Kennedy finds an appealing defense against claims that the Act prohibits procedures that would 
be in the best health interests of some women.351 Indeed, as the movement seized upon the 
medical uncertainty frame, activists realized that exploiting the “precautionary principle” would 
allow them to dramatically limit access to abortion services in sympathetic states. The mental 
health and medical uncertainty frames combined to open up dramatic new opportunities 
regulate procedures that were far safer than carrying to term and delivering a baby. 
 
The Limiting Access Era (2007-present) 
 A quarter-century after Casey, some commentators judged that the movement had 
played itself out, with public opinion, constitutional law, and public policy finding equilibrium 
around the compromises of Casey. Most notably, Neal Devins proclaimed that the movement’s 
sweeping success in passing Casey-approved state laws “(pretty much) settled the abortion 
wars” (Devins, 2009). But just as Devins penned his own Francis Fukuyama “end of history” 
proclamation, the antiabortion movement was shifting into a new phase where it attempted to 
eliminate abortion by restricting access, rather than through criminalization. After 2007’s 
Carhart II, the movement began a renewed push for legislation that both burdened individual 
women seeking abortion and made running clinics difficult. This legislation led to higher clinic 
costs, difficulties securing physicians and support staff, and lower revenue from patients and 
government programs. As Planned Parenthood’s attorneys in Casey, Wharton and Kolbert, have 
                                                           
350 Trumpy documents a contentious intra-movement struggle over the dominant antiabortion frame, 
with pro-woman challenging traditional fetal rights frames. I argue that the Burden Era was in many ways 
about the movement learning to accommodate and channel the pro—woman frame strategically to 
neutralize pro-choice frames and meet the “due” burden standards of Casey.  
351 Scientific and medical uncertainty is an increasingly common frame employed in support of (or defense 
against) more robust issue frames. While it is often associated with conservative activism (for example, 
climate change denial) it is readily deployed by anti-GMO environmentalists, anti-vaccine health 
advocates, and other movements that draw heavily on left leaning supporters.  
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stressed, these regulations “operated cumulatively” to close clinics and make those that remain 
open less accessible to women (Wharton & Kolbert, 2013). 
The Access Era is interesting because it layers the three types of power in subtle ways. 
Pluralist power remains at the forefront, with activist groups lobbying and electioneering 
intensely at both the state and federal level. Gridlock in 2009 over federal health care reform 
and the subsequent the conservative swing in the 2010 midterm elections proved an 
opportunity for antiabortion activists to flex their pluralist muscles. The movement stalled, and 
threatened to kill, the President’s signature initiative in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act over concerns that healthcare exchanges would promote and subsidize insurance plans 
covering abortions. In the healthcare debate and in the 2010 election cycle activists successfully 
pushed abortion as a litmus issue, despite the fiscally conservative nature of the Taxed Enough 
Already (TEA) Party rhetoric driving conservative momentum.352 Moreover, the movement 
astutely introduced sweeping antiabortion ballot measures in an election that promised heavy 
Republican turnout and a disproportionate presence from the extreme right wing of the party. 
At a moment when the “small government” wing of the Republican Party was ascendant, the 
movement still managed to position itself as one of the biggest winners.353 
State legislation was a hallmark of the Burden Era and the Access Era. So what change is 
really behind the shift in abortion politics in this era? What changed were the plebiscitary 
frames that supported pluralist activities and the continued decrease in highly visible disruptive 
activity. As discussed in the last section, Carhart II endorses the application of “informed 
consent” and “women’s health” frames to a new expansive category of regulations. For 
example, laws requiring that doctors preforming abortions have admitting privileges at a local 
hospital were successfully presented as ensuring women received the highest quality medical 
care, when their central purpose and effect was to disqualify a significant number of the already 
small pool of providers.354 Such burdens on clinics work in synergy with laws that reduce patient 
                                                           
352 Whatever the movement’s origins, there is ample evidence that social conservativism was a central 
motivation for most supporters of the TEA Party Invalid source specified..  
353 The question arises, is this simply a matter of riding the political tides? A moment of political 
opportunity with Republicans ascendant? While the opportunity structure was open, I think it is clear that 
movement mobilization produced unexpectedly large dividends during this period. 
354 Admitting privileges are generally not deemed necessary by most medical professionals because the 
vast majority of abortions are simple outpatient procedures and attending doctors at local hospitals can 
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demand through informed consent laws like waiting periods, fetal ultrasound and heartbeat 
viewing/listening requirements, and more invasive gynecological exam requirements. Higher 
costs and fewer patients leads to an unviable economic model that closes many clinics in the 
absence of criminalization (Soffen, 2015).355 What the movement has discovered is that pursuing 
these regulations piecemeal under narrow frames minimizing the practical impact of legislation 
serves to reduce conflict and undercut opposition. As stressed in Chapter 5, plebiscitary politics 
is about the control of attention, and what the antiabortion movement teaches us is that 
suppressing broad attention can be a successful strategy for pursuing policy change, not merely 
for defending the status quo.356  
The role of disruption in the current era is complicated, but is perhaps best captured by 
the rise of “sidewalk counselling” as the public face of antiabortion direct action. Activist 
continue to use harassment of patients and clinic staff as a means to reduce the number of 
abortions performed and make operating clinics less feasible in terms of practical operations. In 
these ways, disruptive power is being successfully paired with pluralist power to reduce 
abortion access. And like pluralist efforts, disruptive actions have framed themselves as 
“informing women” about the choices they face and “informing the community” about the 
practices conducted at clinics. Information and pro-women frames downplay the intimidation 
and harassment inherent in many of these interactions, particularly those that play on the veiled 
threat of sporadic violence and the past experiences of the abortion provider community. In this 
way, antiabortion direct action takes on a kind of double-meaning, with those involved 
experiencing the frontlines as a kind of war, and the general public viewing these exchanges as a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
easily admit women in the case of a medical emergency. The real effect is to add a significant cost to 
practicing in these locals and to disqualify doctors who work part time covering understaffed clinics 
spread across the state.  
355 In a notable recent development, the Court recently struck down Texas’s abortion provider restrictions 
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, which directly addresses the antiabortion strategy outlined in 
this Limited Access Era section. The case is the first major reassertion of the undue burden standard since 
Casey and it is entirely possible that this ruling will shift the state of the abortion battle in a new direction. 
Time will tell.  
356 By contrast, “personhood amendments” continue to be soundly defeated, even in highly conservative 
states like Mississippi Invalid source specified.. These laws resurrect the old frames of fetus v. women, 
which continue to attract only a minority of voters in all US regions, and mobilizes broader public debate 
and participation in elections. However, these laws arguably demonstrate the return of more extreme 
elements of the movement to the pluralist arena, energized by significant victories achieved under more 
palatable frames. 
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dialogue, as a speech issue. This transition has allowed the antiabortion movement to remain 
one of the most aggressive users of disruptive power in American politics, while avoiding the 
plebiscitary damage that can derail pluralist efforts. 
More recently, the movement has used its newfound messaging acumen to push 
complete bans on abortion earlier into pregnancy, in many cases well before the earliest 
standards for viability. So-called “fatal pain” and “heartbeat” bans attempt to reframe the issue 
of viability in terms that are salient with the public, but attached to earlier stages of fetal 
development. An audible heartbeat or the ability to feel pain conjure up images of viability, but 
the related legislation has mainly targeting cutoffs from 18-20 weeks, a full month before the 
earliest current realistic estimates of viability. Most notably, the House passed the Pain-Capable 
Unborn Child Protection Act in 2015 (Hetteman, 2015). As medical advances continue to blur 
the line of viability and push it earlier—now flirting with 22 weeks—the emotionally salient 
frame of “pain” or the easily understand and implemented frame of “audible heartbeat” are 
being pressed as stand-ins. And with Justice Kennedy’s nod to “medical uncertainty,” these 
frames may soon allow the movement to significantly reinterpret Casey’s viability standard in its 
favor. 
 
So what does the antiabortion example teach us about movement power? Let’s look at 
the five observations taken from the gay rights movement. First, do opportunities continue to 
exist in our constrained contemporary political environment? It would appear so. While total 
policy victory does not seem to be on the horizon, as with the gay rights movement, the 
antiabortion movement seems another clear example of effective movement power. It confirms 
the observation that movements continue to exercise power in contemporary American 
politics.357 
                                                           
357 Indeed, the success of the antiabortion movement in the face of a constitutional prohibition on its goal 
raises the question of whether movement power is as constrained as I have suggested. It perhaps remains 
too soon to tell, but it should be noted that the anti-abortion movement is uncommon in that it emerged 
in a majoritarian position. So while their gains are impressive, the movement has been unable to achieve 
its main policy goal despite an advantaged starting point. 
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Second, are isolated types of power vulnerable? To some degree, it appears so. In 
particular, the early movement focused almost exclusively on pluralist pushback against Roe, 
allowing the pro-choice position to win the public over with the “safe, legal, and rare” frame. 
The movement missed its opportunity to force action from its political supporters during the 
Reagan years, lacking the disruptive or plebiscitary means to punish inaction from conservatives 
and moderates. Overall, the antiabortion movement has always displayed a strong balance of 
the tree types of power, a balance which it has recently perfected. As such, its success can be 
partly attributed to not relying too heavily on a single power strategy.     
Third, do different types of power sometimes undermine each other? Here we see an 
emphatic yes. During the Roe years, the movement’s strong pluralist position clearly prevented 
organized disruptions, and more importantly, that pluralist strength tied the movement to past 
religious frames expounding on the sacredness of human life. Such frames made it difficult for 
politicians to act without appearing to be legislating their faith. And even more than with gay 
rights, antiabortion disruption undercut pluralist and plebiscitary attempts in the early 1990s. At 
a time where the Republican House and Reagan/Bush Court were ascendant, Congress was 
passing FACE and SCOTUS upholding Roe. The violence and extremism frames compared poorly 
to the moderate pro-women rhetoric of Clinton’s Democratic Party. The current success of the 
movement can in large part be attributed to the three types of power being employed in synch, 
adopting intense but low-profile disruptive tactics that do not poison plebiscitary rhetoric. 
Fourth, is insider access essential? Clearly the antiabortion movement has leaned on 
heavy connections to state and national politicians and on the Republican Party as a whole. As I 
have stressed, wholesale opposition to abortion was the status quo majoritarian position 
amongst the public and its representatives through the 1970s. With legislative majorities and bill 
sponsors at the state and federal level, it is easy to attribute the movement’s success to insider 
support. Moreover, a movement-sympathetic SCOTUS and lower court system has provided 
protection for “sidewalk counselling,” and helped insulate the movement from repression. Of 
course this is support that the movement has itself cultivated with its exceptionally vigorous and 
persistent pluralist push to secure a sympathetic judiciary. 
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Fifth, does opposition matter? Here, I think we gain significant insight and confirm the 
finding that the type of opposition faced matters a great deal. In the case of gay rights, 
movement opposition came from religious and political organizations that addressed many 
issues, along with a small and under-resourced set of groups specifically opposing gay rights. 
When public opinion began to shift, the opposition shifted away from the issue and the core 
opponents were eventually steam rolled.358 In the antiabortion case, opposition came initially 
from a budding abortion-rights movement and from a well-established feminist infrastructure. 
These groups have prevented significant progress in state legislatures in liberal states, made the 
centrist Clinton approach to abortion appealing, spread the initial “pro-choice” frame that 
successfully countered pro-fetus framings, bankrolled vocal pro-choice candidates, and 
spearheaded legal and legislative crackdowns on antiabortion violence. NOW’s role in 
dismantling direct action networks through RICO is a particularly notable example of the 
opposition flexing its pluralist muscle. More recently, women’s groups successfully pushed the 
“war on women” frame to discourage national Republican politicians from supporting some of 
the more extreme antiabortion legislation.  
While Democratic pro-choice allies have often become complacent, taking the defense 
of Roe as their main goal and letting abortion slide off the party agenda, Pro-choice advocates 
maintained a resource rich organizational core that has mobilized attention and votes in key 
confrontations.359 Facing “combat ready” opposition that tracks antiabortion actions and seeks 
to counter them has had two significant consequences for the antiabortion movement. First, it 
pushes the movement to evolve and adapt more quickly than it might otherwise have to, as the 
opposition learns to counter frames and disruptions, or deploys pluralist resources to contested 
venues. The second consequence is that abortion politics has more readily sorted itself into 
partisan politics, with each side entrenching itself at the opposite ends of the political spectrum. 
The result has been a highly resilient regime that has pushed the movement towards a state 
policy strategy centered in highly red states.  
Beyond the five observations made in the section on LGBT rights, the antiabortion case 
highlights five additional points. First, history is not progressive, or not deterministically so. The 
                                                           
358 It has become acceptable for mainstream politicians to refer to groups opposing gay rights as hate 
groups, which demonstrates the lack of political capital these groups now possess.  
359 EMILY’s List, NOW, NARAL are key examples of the politically resource rich pro-choice camp. 
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antiabortion movement is by most accounts a regressive movement, seeking to reverse post-
1960s social liberalization. Such movements, including most notably white supremacists, are 
often dismissed as going against the tide of history or being on the wrong side of history. But the 
antiabortion movement has reversed that tide in what may be more than a temporary shift 
towards limited abortion access. Beyond simply reversing the trend in abortion politics, it should 
be noted that movement progress has not been steady and has been subject to significant 
reversals.360 The success of choice advocates in pushing the “war on women” frame, which killed 
the candidacies of a number of vocal antiabortion candidates in 2014, is good example of how 
momentum can quickly turn on a movement. These shift further highlight the importance of 
movement power and agency, and warn us against assuming any movement’s victory or defeat 
is inevitable.  
Second, the origins of movements matter. As already discussed, the antiabortion 
movement emerged out of a majoritarian position under the wing of the Catholic Church. As 
such, the antiabortion movement did not rely on dramatic disruptions like the Stonewall riot to 
mobilize participants and disruptive tactics were not significantly integrated into the core 
movement in its first decade. The movement did turn to disruption when its pluralist push 
stalled in the 1980s, which leads us to the intuitive conclusion that disruptive power is only 
mobilized by groups that feel otherwise powerless, though disruption may continue alongside 
other types of power once mobilized. This observation about movement origins should lead us 
to expect more traditional types of political power from movements that arise because of 
changes in technology (anti-GMO), laws (anti-free trade), or other social or physical 
circumstances (climate change). These issues are likely to mobilize existing interest groups and 
their resources. By contrast movements that emerge for longtime ignored or powerless 
interests (including poor peoples’ movements) are more likely to employ disruption as a means 
for jumpstarting mobilization. 
Third, the types of power employed by movements can be dramatically shaped and 
reshaped by government policy, including policies enacted by supporters and/or detractors. The 
early 1990s experience of the antiabortion movement is remarkable in that we see government 
strongly suppressing disruptive behavior through FACE and RICO, while at the same time Casey 
                                                           
360 See Invalid source specified. and (Piven F. F., 2006) 
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lays out a clear legislative blueprint for incremental pluralist measures, complete with Court 
approved issue frames. The federal government was essentially telling the movement which 
avenues to change would be open and which would be closed, and the movement responded by 
shifting its efforts toward open political opportunities. While these developments helped the 
movement achieve some victories, they also channeled movement activism is to safe spaces 
that conformed with majority public opinion, and may have detracted from efforts to achieve 
the movement’s more radical central aims. In recent years, the movement has expanded its 
legislative program in ways that appear more in line with its core abolitionist goals, but this shift 
has been at least partially shepherded in by a Court that has endorsed an expansion of 
regulations under an altered Casey regime. The question arises, what if the Court had chosen to 
strengthen the Casey regime instead? Would the movement have had the will or the power 
resources to challenge such a shift? Or is the movement too dependent upon the opportunities 
fed to it by political insiders? I would suggest that partisan sorting is a double-edged sword for 
movements, but one which antiabortion activists have thus far not been cut by. 
Fourth, regardless of our answers to the preceding questions, it is clear that an 
institutionalized incremental policy can be adapted to pursue abolitionist goals. The “reform v. 
abolition” debate is one of the primary internal divides between activists within a number of 
contemporary movements.361 These debate loosely parallel Piven’s concerns that 
institutionalization and attempts to wield pluralist power will undermine a movement’s capacity 
to respond disruptively when denied more than symbolic gains. The antiabortion movement 
appears to have married reformist methods with abolitionist goals, all the while maintaining a 
supportive undercurrent of disruptive power. I have argued that the movement’s success in 
bridging reform and abolition is due largely to its layering the three types of power in a 
synergistic way, but the question warrants further inquiry.  
Fifth, while I have followed Schattschneider in arguing that movements can change their 
fortunes by expanding the scope of conflict and drawing more attention to an issue, the 
antiabortion movement shows that they can also succeed by shrinking the scope of an issue. 
                                                           
361 As noted in my introduction, a schism in the animal rights movement between advocates of 
incremental welfare reforms and their abolitionist critics was the debate that first brought me to this 
dissertation topic. In my own view, the evidence seems to side with incrementalism as a viable, though 
perhaps not necessary, path to dramatic social and political change. 
 278
Until the 1980s the movement had concentrated its push on a Constitutional Amendment either 
overturning Roe or granting 14th Amendment rights of citizenship to fetuses at conception. Both 
their issue and their venue were pursued at the broadest level, but by 1983 it became clear that 
public opinion in support of their push was insufficient and trending in the wrong direction. 
Subsequently, the movement shifted back to state venues with public audiences that 
overwhelming supported their policy proposals. Furthermore, the movement’s recent success 
has largely resulted from its ability to frame legislation in small piecemeal ways, avoiding 
discussion of the practical consequences of layer upon layer of regulatory red tape. As more 
abortion restrictions have passed, news coverage and public debate has not kept pace, and this 
has worked to the advantage of a movement with a strong core of politically active supporters. 
Moreover, this is not merely venue shifting, as discussed by Baumgartner and Jones, because 
the movement has also minimized attention within chosen venues to maximize its advantage. 
These observations confirm the importance of controlling attention, but show that increasing 
participation is not the only effective manipulation of the public gaze. 
 
LGBTQ rights and antiabortion are very dissimilar movements in obvious ways 
(participants, subjects, affiliated political ideologies, etc), and the fact that we see similar power 
dynamics at work in both movements is a good sign for the framework presented in this project. 
Both movements have organized effectively and made significant policy gains in spite of the 
constraints I argue apply to all social movements today. They have not escaped those 
constraints, but rather, they show that effective power strategies allow movements to cope 
with a constricting political opportunity structure. I turn from here to the animal right and 
disability rights movements, which have been less vigorous in cultivating power resources, and 
offer some addition insights. 
  
 279
I also want to say a special word to our friends 
in the business community. You have in your 
hands the key to the success of this act, for you 
can unlock a splendid resource of untapped 
human potential that, when freed, will enrich us 
all. 
-President George H.W. Bush, Speech at the 
Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
 
 
Chapter 7: Animal Rights & Disability Rights 
 
In Chapter 6, I looked at the power strategies of the LGBTQ and Antiabortion 
movements, and made 10 observations about how power dynamics relate to movement 
outcomes. In this chapter I look at 2 additional movements, the Animal Rights and Disability 
Rights movements, and further develop last chapter’s observations. I also draw some additional 
conclusions from these two movements, which have not eschewed developing some important 
power resources. 
 
The Animal Rights Movement 
 Along with the antiabortion movement, the animal rights movement has been amongst 
the most consistently disruptive since the 1970s. However, the animal rights movement has not 
achieved the same influence as antiabortionists, and by many measures can be considered 
highly unsuccessful at wielding power. Are the differences in effective power do to internal 
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characteristics of the movements, or to the political opportunity structures they each face? This 
account offers a mixed answer.  
 
 The US animal rights movement can be traced back to the late 19th century when 
concerns over the treatment of urban draft horses and the use of animals in medical 
experimentation led to the founding of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (ASPCA) and the American Anti-Vivisection Society (AAVS) (Beers, 2006).362 From its 
somewhat radical origins, this movement settled comfortably into what is more typically called 
the “animal welfare” movement, a moderate movement concerned with curbing unnecessary 
suffering.363 This moderate social cause dominated animal concerns until the 1970s when more 
radical “liberationist” concerns surfaced, in large part imported from British activists. Most 
observers date the modern movement to the 1975 publication of Animal Liberation by 
philosopher Peter Singer. This first stage could be termed the Vivisection Era, lasting 1975-1985. 
The next phase lasted from 1986-2001, and can be called the Institutional Era. Finally, from 
2002-present we have the current Pluralist Era. 
 
The Vivisection Era 
 Britain has a long history of producing the progressive edge animal movements, in no 
small part because fox hunting was a perennial issue that raised passions on both cruelty and 
                                                           
362 I find it striking that the issues that gave rise to the movement are very much still alive today. Animal 
research and the use of carriage (but not cargo) horses in NYC and other cities remain hotly contested a 
century and a half later (Beers, 2006).  
363 The animal welfare movement has gone through its own evolutions, with the modern version 
emerging after WWII and continuing to exist alongside the contemporary animal rights movement. 
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class grounds. In the early 1970s hunt-saboteurs expanded their activities to laboratories using 
animals, and the modern animal liberation movement emerged. On the other side of the pond, 
utilitarian Philosopher Peter Singer (actually an Australian exposed to animal liberationists while 
doing post graduate work at Oxford) was publishing Animal Liberation, a book of practical ethics 
grounded in academic philosophy but written for a popular audience. Readers of Animal 
Liberation, often previously active in animal welfare/sheltering, slowly gravitated to animal 
rights activism. But Singer’s impact on the emerging animal rights movement was even more 
direct. Singer’s earlier article “Animal Liberation” in The New York Review of Books had caught 
the attention of high school teacher Henry Spira, who subsequently signed up for a continuing 
education class taught at NYU by Singer in 1974. The relationship between the intellectual and 
the working class New Yorker spawned the first organized campaign of the new animal rights 
movement, an effort to end a series of sex experiment on cats at New York’s American Museum 
of Natural History (Singer, 1999).    
  This initial campaign, and the early movement more generally, deftly balanced all three 
types of power. Spira organized a grassroots campaign (purposefully avoiding incorporating his 
group) that relied on highly visible demonstrations in front of the prominent museum. From the 
very start disruptive power was key, but Spira also proved a plebiscitary whiz. His choice of the 
cat experiments was deliberate, choosing a much beloved species and the suggestive nature of 
sex research. He played up “unnecessary” and implied “perverse” in his message framings, 
threatening the reputation of an institution that trades heavily on public goodwill.   
Spira also chose his target in part because the experiments were funded by the National 
Institutes of Health, which enabled Spiro to obtain detailed descriptions of the work through the 
Freedom of Information Act. Understanding the relationships between public and private 
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sectors, and using those relationships to create leverage is a type of soft-touch pluralist power 
that movements often need to deftly employ. Spira showed exactly this deft touch as he 
subsequently balanced campaigns against companies doing product testing on animals with 
campaigns to push the FDA to reform its recommendations on LD50 toxicity and Draize eye 
irritancy testing. In many ways, these campaigns resembled gay rights efforts to impact AIDS 
drug development and approval, and they utilized similar power strategies. 
What the early AMNH campaign and subsequent product testing cases primarily 
accomplished was reframing scientific, health, and economic issues as moral issues on which the 
public had a right to participate in policymaking. And in keeping with the theme of this 
dissertation, Spira’s actions were significant because they were clear exercises of power that 
produced clear victories. Building on these early wins, the animal rights movement initially 
displayed an impressive balance of the three types of power. In the late 1970s or early 1980s 
(depending upon how you classify the first events) lone activists began engaging in direct actions 
against animal laboratories, collectively coming to identify as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). 
In 1980 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) was founded and quickly became a 
plebiscitary channel for framing ALF actions in movement friendly terms. Images, records, and 
stolen animals were provided to the 501(c)3 nonprofit, which held press conferences pushing 
the frames of unnecessary suffering and investigator corruption. This disruptive/plebiscitary 
partnership began with the famous Silver Spring Monkeys case, in which 17 monkey were 
removed from a Maryland lab in 1981 and used by PETA for publicity and animal cruelty 
litigation (Rowan & Kenneth, 1996). This partnership between direct action activists and 
nonprofits was further supported by the founding of the Animal Legal Defense Fund in 1981, 
which provided legal support for activists prosecuted for civil disobedience, trespassing, and 
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other crimes. During this first era the three power strategies were largely aligned and the 
movement was very effective.   
The ALF-PETA partnership peaked with a 1984 break-in at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s primate head injury laboratory.364 Activist stole countless hours of experimental 
footage, footage that also captured investigator misbehavior, which PETA edited into a 
devastating video entitled “Unnecessary Fuss,” named in reference to head researcher Thomas 
Gennarelli’s previous public dismissal of protests against the head injury clinic. The media 
release of the video was coordinated with a three-day sit-in by PETA activists inside the National 
Institutes of Health’s Washington, DC offices. The protesters were not forcefully removed in 
large part because media coverage was sympathetic and driven by a PETA-produced video 
narrative of the lab footage provided to media. The sit-in eventually resulted in Health and 
Human Services Secretary Margret Heckler being shown the video and shutting down the lab 
under the oversight authority the accompanies NIH funding (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992). The closure 
was a clear result of effective disruptive and plebiscitary power, but more importantly, activists 
were able to parlay this victory into national legislative reform. 
 In 1985, Senator Bob Dole brought his considerable political influence to bear in support 
of amending the Animal Welfare Act of 1966, a largely symbolic law that covered only animal 
suppliers and had no jurisdiction over the actual use of animals in research and testing. The ‘85 
Amendment, while an incrementalist welfare measure, legitimated movement input upon the 
use of animals in research, establishing animal advocates as members of that policy community. 
Although many activist would come to be disillusioned with the implementation and impact of 
                                                           
364 Because of my interest in animal rights, a faculty member at Penn warned me at the beginning of my 
graduate study that she could not associate with me if I intended to break into any animal laboratories. 
Clearly there is a strong institutional memory of this event! 
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the 1985 legislation, it remains arguably the movement’s most significant exercise of power, and 
serves as a key example of the advantage of balancing the three power types.365 
 
The Institutional Era (1986-2001) 
Animal rights ideology has been applied to a wide variety of public and private issues, 
but the successful concentration on vivisection in the 1970s and early 1980s suggests that 
movements may need narrow their focus in order to function effectively. After its success on the 
national stage in 1985, the animal rights movement diversified its focus to include animal 
agriculture, fur, circuses, and other institutional uses of animals. These fresh campaigns allowed 
the movement to keep itself consistently in the public’s consciousness and to attract resources 
for institutional growth. Moreover, as the movement shifted focus to issues of fur, meat, 
circuses, product testing and other issues, consumer boycotts increasingly became a dominant 
movement strategy. While there are certainly power dynamics involved in boycotts of 
companies and product classes, it is a tactical approach that minimizes the importance of 
political power, particularly pluralist power. 
Here we come to a trend touched on briefly in Chapter 6, but particularly relevant in the 
animal rights case: the privatization of movement targets. Following the 1985 AWA 
Amendment, movement organizations such as the ALDF and HSUS became bogged down in a 
                                                           
365 I would actually argue that the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 is the most impressive animal 
rights law in the federal code because it provides blanket protection for a wide class of species, without 
reference to the rarity of those species as in the Endangered Species Act. The MMPA, in my view, protects 
individual animals under the view that each should not be harmed, whereas the ESA is more explicitly 
concerned with preserving types of animals for ecological diversity. But both of these sweeping laws were 
passed by the environmentalist movement with the goal of conserving wildlife. Each predates the modern 
animal rights movement.  
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protracted and largely unsuccessful implementation process. The legislation directed the USDA 
to draft rules to implement the legislation’s broad goals, a process involving public comment 
from activists and industry alike, which over years produced severely watered down standards 
and requirements.366 HSUS and ALDF subsequently sued the USDA in federal court over rules 
that violated the statutory intent of Congress, winning in the lower courts only to have the cases 
dismissed upon appeal due to lack of standing (Carbone, 2004, pp. 69, 71, 98, 212, 227).367 By 
                                                           
366 A regular pattern involved the USDA producing specific requirements for housing, enrichment, and 
other welfare concerns that involved detailed requirements in terms of size, time, and other measurable. 
As rulemaking dragged on these specific enforceable standards were consistently replaced with vague 
flexible language that allowed facilities to make their own interpretations as to animal needs and largely 
self-regulate their own practices. It is worth detailing these shifts in rulemaking to show just how 
important and underappreciated policy implementation can be. The following summarizes the six years of 
USDA rulemaking that followed the 1985 legislation: 
•The USDA abandoned firm “engineering standards” for welfare, such as larger cages, in favor of 
“performance standards” like the ability assume “normal laying postures”, which allowed industry to 
largely interpret these requirements for themselves. The Reagan/Bush administration favored this 
approach as a form of executive deregulation in multiple policy areas (Carbone 2004, pp.104). 
•Performance standards rendered the job of USDA inspectors virtually impossible, shifting animal care 
decisions to the regulated institutions, and leading to USDA reports focusing on maintenance and 
sanitation issues such as dirty floors and peeling paint (still the bulk of citations). USDA performance 
standards similar to those in the UK translated to cage sizes roughly 1/3 to 1/5 the size used by the British 
(Carbone 2004, p.108).   
•Institutional self-regulation was concentrated in Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUC) 
mandated by the 1985 Amendments (like IRB for humans). The USDA mandated at least three IACUC 
members, including a member “unaffiliated” with the institution. Activists expected one of their own to 
hold this seat, but institutions almost never gave the seat to a critic on animal research, and the 
committee typically marginalized the community member (Carbone 2004, p.175, 181). The 1985 Health 
Research Extension Act, passed just months before the AWA was amended, mandated five person IACUCs 
at institutions receiving NIH funds, further marginalizing the single unaffiliated member. 
•The Congressional mandate to provide exercise for dogs was stripped of socialization and enrichment 
components, and its performance standard is now satisfied by actions like putting the dog in pen while 
cleaning his cage (Carbone 2004, p.227). 
•The Congressional mandate to provide for the psychological well-being of primates, was reduced to 
performance standards were vague and unenforceable. Revised standards providing detailed species 
specific enrichment standards were proposed but never finalized (Carbon 2004, p.228). 
•Finally, the USDA regulations continued to exempt rats, mice, and birds from the definition of “warm-
blooded animal, as the Secretary [of Agriculture] determined is being used, or is intended for use, for 
research, testing, experimentation…”. These species accounted for approximately 90% of animal used in 
U.S. labs at that time, and that percentage has continued to climb. (Carbone 2004, p.70-71). To stress the 
perversity of the incentives created by this exclusion, IACUCs are essentially directed to consider 10 rats 
as a “non-animal alternative” to the use of a single guinea pig or hamster.   
367 Key point, no standing presents a structural deficit that undermines pluralist action. Importantly, it is a 
structuralist constraint to pluralist power that is created by government. In the 1971 National 
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most measures the animal rights movement saw their most significant pluralist victory dissolve 
in front of their eyes. Moreover, with the AWA now applied to laboratory animals, the 
movement was unable to successfully frame future exposés of individual laboratories as 
representing systemic problems. The push for large scale policy reform on experimentation 
issues was done, played out, and the results were lackluster.  Unsurprisingly, many activists 
concluded that political engagement was pointless because even when you win, you still lose. 
Consequently, the movement found itself in a moment where participants wanted to directly 
engage the parties using and abusing animals, while simultaneously finding the issue attention 
cycle for animal experimentation—the issue with the least direct connection to the public—had 
played itself out. Corporations and their customers replaced Congress and the bureaucracy as 
the movement’s primary targets across all issues. 
How did the movement tackle fur farming? It did not seek USDA regulations on cage 
sizes, enrichment, or bans on taking specific animals. Instead disruptive activists threw paint on 
fur coats, disrupted fashion shows, released animals from fur farm cages, and even burned 
down facilities. SMOs in the mid-to-late 1980s began demonstrating outside of furriers and 
department stores like Macy’s, which sold furs as a minor part of their clothing lines. These 
protests often featured graphic depictions of skinned animals, in similar fashion to the shocking 
images used in anti-abortion protests. In addition, in 1991 PETA began its “I’d rather go naked 
than wear fur” campaign, originally featuring nude photos of the female pop group, The Go-Go’s 
(Jasper & Nelkin, 1992). Media coverage of PETA’s nude celebrity campaign was prodigious, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Environmental Protection Act Congress specifically granted standing to environmental nonprofits to sue 
for non-enforcement of the Act and subsequent environmental protection measures. The fact that 
Congress had previously addressed this standing issue in a related regulatory area should lead us to 
consider not granting animal organizations standing under the AWA is a deliberate structural constraint 
(the same applies to other movements in which the participants are not defending/advancing their own 
rights).  
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arguably framed opposition to fur as “cool” in direct opposition to traditional conceptions of 
furs as glamorous. The movement made a successful plebiscitary push to associate fur with 
gruesome death and opposition to fur with youth and style, along with a disruptive push that 
created costs for buying, selling, or wearing fur. Together these tactics significantly suppressed 
fur sales by the mid-1990s. This was an exercise in power in the pursuit of political goals. But it 
wasn’t political power. It did not bank movement gains in the form of political institutions that 
are durable, self-sustaining, and can be easily utilized by future activist absent continued 
plebiscitary or disruptive power. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the rise of realistic faux 
fur and spread of fur in unusual colors and as trims undercut movement’s plebiscitary and 
disruptive advantages. What was real? What was faux? With public shaming undercut and new 
youth centered trim styles making fur cool, companies and consumers returned and fur sales 
rebounded dramatically. Fur seems a prime example of the perils of relying on apolitical market 
power in the absence of political power.368 
As stressed in Chapter 4, the animal rights movement is notable in that it not only failed 
to build pluralist-oriented C4 organizations in the 1990s and early 2000s, but it actively 
dismantled the C4 organizations that were prominent in the late 1980s. The movement shunned 
pluralist organizing, lobbying, and electioneering during this period and focused almost 
exclusively on disruptive and plebiscitary strategies backed by increasingly well-funded C3 
SMOs.  
                                                           
368 Circuses perhaps provide a counter-point, but that tiny niche industry is dominated by a handful of 
companies that may be more vulnerable to direct attack. Moreover, a major driver of circuses like Ringling 
Bros. phasing out elephants from their shows has been city ordinances that have made such 
performances either explicitly prohibited or impossible do to regulating the use of training equipment or 
methods. 
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PETA continued to play a linkage role, bridging the activities of the radical disruptive 
fringe and an institutional core with strong roots in the era of moderate animal welfare politics. 
But this core concerned itself in large part with direct service provision through animal control 
and sheltering. As explained in chapter 3, PETA provided plebiscitary cover and assistance to the 
ALF and other underground activists by publicizing their activities and framing them in terms of 
America’s tradition of civil disobedience.369 PETA also engaged in its own undercover 
investigations, which blended disruptive and plebiscitary power in ways similar to the unofficial 
ALF partnership. But following Huntingdon Life Science’s RICO suit against PETA, the 
organization severed its public relationship with the ALF and approached undercover work with 
a newfound caution.370 So while disruption continued, the most threatening forces were left 
isolated, and FBI programs like Project Biteback were able to systematically repress the 
movement fringe (Best, Nocella II, & editors, 2004). 
As PETA was losing much of its disruptive leverage on the vivisection issue, it was 
simultaneously pushing forward with farmed animal campaigns that targeted corporate 
restaurants, starting with its “Murder King” campaign against fast food giant Burger King. The 
image heavy campaign relied on dramatic but minimally disruptive protests aimed at securing 
steady stream of local media coverage, which in 2001 convinced the corporation to adopt basic 
animal welfare standards for its meat suppliers. A slew of other major corporations, from 
Wendy’s to McDonald’s, would make similar concessions after copycat campaigns or simply at 
                                                           
369 PETA also provided legal assistance to activists, including Rod Coronado, who would be convicted of 
arson and cause PETA decades of legal and public relations problems.  
370 As covered in Ch. 3, RICO’s “pattern of criminal activity” charge made crimes like trespassing or fraud 
existential threats for major organizations, who could not afford to even associate with activists engaged 
in these activities. The settling of the HLS Rico suit against PETA was a turning point in movement 
dynamics. 
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the treat of such a campaign.371 The same basic strategy would become a template for other 
issues and campaigns by other groups, often in conjunction with undercover footage. Once 
again it is worth noting that the movement is clearly exercising power here, but it is a marginal 
power aimed at private interests, and its use is diffused across many corporate targets 
functioning in disparate issue areas. Such actions tend to make activists and their organizations 
look especially active and productive, but such gains are quickly eroded when the spotlight shifts 
to the next target, as discussed above in terms of fur farming. 
The same year that PETA was making headlines with its win over Burger King, 2001, 
Congress was quietly passing an Amendment to the AWA formally exempting mice, rats, and 
birds—which are somewhere between 90-99% of the animals used in research and testing—
from coverage (Carbone, 2004, p. 26).372 The Amendment, introduced by Senator Jesse Helms, 
undercut a decade long push by advocates to get the USDA to cover these animals under the 
1985 mandate. Just as it looked like the USDA was going to draft rules for that would fix one of 
the central implementation problems with the AWA, Congress quietly pulled the rug out from 
under the movement’s feet. And apart from the objections of vegan congressman Dennis 
Kucinich, the Amendment produced no organized push-back from the movement or its allies 
(Carbone, 2004, pp. 71-72). There was no public outcry and no electoral consequences. A 
                                                           
371 A favorite PETA tactic is to create mock-ups of potential campaign materials to help targets envision 
the damage to their brands. 
372 Larry Carbone estimates the number of mice involved in genetically altered animal models reached 
between 80-100 million by 2002, and has continued to steadily increase (Carbone 2004, p.26). The current 
number is likely significantly higher than 100 million. By contrast, just over 1 million regulated animals 
were used annually around the turn of the century. Numbers are compiled from the yearly USDA APHIS 
AC, Animal Care Annual Report of Activities, Fiscal Year 2007.  See also Madhusree Mukerjee’ s review, 
“Speaking for the Animals: A Veterinarian Analyzes the Turf Battles That Have Transformed the Animal 
Laboratory,” Scientific American, Aug. 2004. 
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movement that was not organized or oriented toward pluralist politics was pushed around and 
found the results of its protests and marches vulnerable to retrenchment.  
The 2001 AWA defeat brings us to the ultimate critique of movement power strategies 
that shun pluralist activity and target private sector decision-makers: gains are quickly 
undermined by policy drift in the public or private spheres, or by outright reversals in public or 
private policy that is no longer in the public spotlight. More specifically, power strategies that 
seek to entrench change by shifting social attitudes are unlikely to achieve lasting success when 
their targets are inextricably wed to opposing motives, particularly profit motives.  
 
The Pluralist Era (2002-present) 
In 2002, the animal rights movement began an important shift to reintegrate pluralist 
power into its strategic repertoire. Local and national activists teamed up to pass a Florida ballot 
measure banning the use of gestation crates in hog farming.373 Notably, groups like PETA 
provided professional and financial resources without attaching their names to the effort, thus 
preserving local framings and excluding broader publics with greater interests in animal 
agriculture. The effort was similar to some state abortion restriction efforts covered in Chapter 
6. The Florida ban benefited from targeting an extremely cruel industry practice in a state with 
only a minor hog farming industry. The immediate regulatory impact was minor, but the 
precedent was significant. The Florida law was the first US agricultural practice regulated based 
                                                           
373 Gestation crates largely immobilize pregnant and nursing sows for a number of reasons, chief among 
them preventing the mothers from crushing their piglets on the floors of their concrete enclosures. 
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solely on animal welfare concerns.374 The statute sent shockwaves through the animal 
agriculture industry, with top brass choosing to no longer invest in constructing multimillion 
dollar gestation crate facilities that could be outlawed come the next election.375 This industry 
reaction shows the power of government regulation to lock in and spread reforms that industry 
cannot simply wait-out or skirt.  
Since 2002, the movement has passed or attempted pass a number of state agriculture 
regulations, most notably the passage of sweeping humane legislation in a 2008 California 
initiative. The battle over 2008’s Proposition 2 saw the animal rights movement mobilizing 
resources for a pitched battle in America’s largest agricultural state, and as noted in Chapter 5, 
the movement began its first push to utilize C4 nonprofits since abandoning that organizational 
form two decades earlier. All indications are that these new organizational forms will persist and 
give the movement new muscle in federal and state politics. At this point in time, the state 
legislation approach has focused on welfare reforms, and the movement’s internal critics have 
argued that these incremental reforms hold little chance of producing the kind of abolitionist 
advances we have seen in recent anti-abortion politics. Such critics point to the failures of 
laboratory animal efforts under the 1985 AWA Amendments and suggest that farm animal 
welfare campaigns are likewise securing minor improvements while facilitating more intensive 
use of even larger numbers of animals. Part of this internal critique suggests that incremental 
pluralist measures necessarily undercut plebiscitary attempts to push effective movement 
                                                           
374 The federal Humane Slaughter Act could be considered the first such law, but arguably it concerned 
the processing and not the raising of animals.  
375 I had personal correspondence with animal welfare scholar Bernie Roland, who attended industry 
trade conferences 2005 in which representatives reported all the major pork producers had decided to no 
longer invest in gestation crate infrastructure that was design to be used over multiple decades. The 
Florida law and similar mounting legislative efforts had convinced the industry that new facilities would be 
too risky and a shortened lifecycle for major infrastructure would cut deeply into profits. All this is not to 
say that industry wasn’t deeply committed to preserving the practice for use in existing facilities. 
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frames, as well as public toleration for disruptive measures. These empirical questions require 
further study, but the path of the anti-abortion movement seems to confirm that 
incrementalism and abolition are at least compatible.376  
Critics of movement institutionalization, in the tradition of Piven, have argued that the 
animal rights movement has engaged the system at the expense of its own disruptive power. 
There is certainly some evidence of this, particularly the media skewering and federal 
prosecution of the aggressively disruptive Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) campaign. As 
detailed in Chapter 3, the movement’s disruptive fringe was largely isolated from the 
movement’s mainstream pluralist and plebiscitary resources, which allowed the government to 
squash what had previously been a highly successful campaign.377 The pluralist era has mostly 
seen disruption confined to undercover exposés, and even these have shifted their function to 
serve mainly plebiscitary strategies. Returning to the observations from the previous two cases, 
what does the animal rights case add?  
First, do opportunities for movement power persist? Clearly they do, with the 1985 
AWA being a classic exercise of movement power and the more recent state initiatives pointing 
toward an effective strategy that we have also seen with the anti-abortion movement. That said, 
the animal rights case brings up important examples of how victories can be undone and how 
status quo interests can outlast and outmaneuver the piecemeal efforts of activists. 
                                                           
376 However, it should be noted that I argue in Chapter 5 that we should expect plebiscitary tactics to lose 
impact over time simply because novelty is a key component of saliency, and so repeated exposes with 
similar images will usually produce diminishing returns. As such we should be wary about attributing 
declining public attention to judgments that a problem has improved beyond the point where further 
action is pressing.    
377 The SHAC campaign sought to put HLS out of business by raising costs and making it impossible for the 
company to get insured, maintain basic supply and service contracts, and attract and retain personnel. 
The strategy seemed to be working, and arguably might have radically recast the possibilities of corporate 
targeting.  
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Retrenchment seems almost inevitable if movements do not put in place the interest group 
resources to defend policy gains. 
Second, are movements more vulnerable when using a single type of power? Again we 
find evidence supporting this proposition. In particular, the HLS direct action campaign, which 
was one of the more powerful sustained displays of disruptive power in contemporary 
movement politics, was readily repressed by the FBI and the courts without any plebiscitary or 
pluralist protection. Another example is the failure of the movement to ensure proper 
implementation of the 1985 AWA Amendments. In the absence of any pluralist or disruptive 
checks, the movement was steamrolled during rulemaking and litigation. Similarly, advocates 
were left powerless in the face of the 2001 Helms Amendment, although this instance might be 
best characterized as an across-the-board power failure.  
Third, do different types of power sometimes undermine each other? Well, the current 
period has seen disruption isolated by a focus on other types of power, as just discussed, but I 
do not believe the evidence is in the disruption has been undermined by insider approaches.378 
However, there is evidence that ALF, SHAC, and other direct action activity has served to burden 
insider efforts with “extremist” or even “terrorist” frames, as evidenced by the rebranding of 
the Animal Enterprises Protection Act of 1992 as the Animal Enterprises Terrorism Act of 2006. 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the focus on animal activists as domestic terrorists clearly 
undermined the movement’s pluralist potential and dominated the frames that captured 
policymaker attention. So we have yet another example that suggests disruptive power poses 
the most direct threat to other forms of power. Perhaps more interesting is the impact of PETA’s 
                                                           
378 One interesting wrinkle is that while disruptive activity continues, it may be receiving less attention, 
limiting the reach of disruptive power beyond its immediate targets.  
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plebiscitary strategy on pluralist efforts during the same period. As detailed in Chapter 5, PETA 
embraced the concept of attention based activism and developed an extreme strategy that 
privileged quantity of media attention over quality of the media frames produced. Critics from 
diverse backgrounds have persuasively argued that much of this coverage has been framed in 
terms of the extreme, shocking or silly nature of the tactics employed, and that substantive 
issue frames have been relegated to a distant second. Apart from questioning if such an 
approach is self-defeating from a plebiscitary standpoint, it seems obvious that it makes serious 
work with policymakers more difficult.  
Fourth, do major victories require inside access? Here we get a strong yes, but with an 
important caveat. The 1985 AWA Amendment process clearly owes much of its success to the 
support rising Republican star, Senator Bob Dole. Just two years later Dole would become 
minority leader, on his way to eventually being the Party’s candidate for president in 1996. The 
value of having a politician of that stature willingly sponsor your legislation cannot be 
overstated. Conversely, having no supporters, short of the dynamic but marginalized Dennis 
Kucinich, allowed the disastrous 2001 AWA Amendment to sail though unchallenged. So the 
animal rights movement achieved its sole major federal legislative achievement with inside 
leadership. On the other hand, recent state legislation from Florida to California has succeeded 
primarily through outside independent organizing. While state politicians have signed onto 
these issues, activists did the heavy lifting in taking their policy positions straight to the voters. 
So while federal legislation does seem to be tied to insider support, state efforts do offer a more 
flexible alternative in which activists play the role of legislative sponsor. 
Fifth, how important is the nature and strength of the opposition? Here I think the 
animal rights case teaches us something the other cases only hint at. Opposition is crucial, and 
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industry opposition is a whole different beast than social opposition.379 The animal rights 
movement’s disparate issues confront agribusiness, the academic and pharmaceutical 
industries, the fashion, cosmetic and home good industries, the movie and live entertainment 
industries, a host of smaller business interest, and even its erstwhile ally the pet industry (That 
doggie in the window? The one with the waggly tail? He’s from a puppy mill).380 On each issue, 
specific industries invest heavily in pluralist resources to fight regulation that might impact the 
bottom line, and once an issue leaves the public agenda, business works tirelessly to undermine 
or circumvent new rules. This is not a condemnation of businesspersons, but instead a simple 
description of human behavior given market forces, or corporate behavior given the basic 
institutional form of the corporation.381 The undermining of the AWA’s animal research 
regulations is a key example, but perhaps more profound, is the fact that federal agricultural 
animal care regulation has never come close to passing, despite the fact that the farm bill keeps 
agricultural regulation a constant part of the congressional agenda.382 Issues surrounding fur, 
veal, and other practices that seemed largely settled in public discourse in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s have returned largely because industry maintains on a constant search to reopen 
                                                           
379 Additionally, since the 1970s, “business” has begun to function as unified interest across industry 
sectors. Threats to beef profits are treated as threats to agriculture, which are treated as threats to 
American business. The lobbying and electioneering forces put into action on these circumstances are 
immense. See Hacker and Pierson 2011. 
380 I’ll call academia an industry in this sense because while the pursuit of knowledge remains a central 
goal in academic animal research, it is also a segment of the university system that brings in significant 
revenue in the forms of grants and pharmaceutical contracts. There are complex layers of incentives that 
make academic animal use difficult to classify.  
381 For all his predictive shortcomings, Marx was basically correct in his description of capitalism as a 
system that demands exploitation when it is profitable, with kind employers going out of business in the 
face of more pragmatic competition. When it comes to animal exploitation, one of the underlying 
dynamics is that adequate facilities, caretakers, and enrichment raise costs in virtually all cases across 
virtually all industries. See Bob Torres’s Marxist take on animal exploitation.  
382 It is worth noting that the Humane Slaughter Act, a relic of the Eisenhower era, does not cover 
chickens or Turkeys, who account for over 95% of the animals slaughtered in the US (excluding fish, who 
also are not covered). Industry has quietly maintained this exclusion, which has no real basis other than 
cost. 
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market spaces. I would argue that where religious conservative opposition to gay rights is able 
to shift away from increasingly unpopular views on gay rights, industry targets face a more 
existential threat from animal and environmental activists.  
Sixth, is history progressive? This one is interesting for animal rights. Certainly, the 
movement of the 1970s and 1980s seemed to take on an air of inevitability, one which many 
participants believe is rooted in the sound moral philosophy that underlies the modern 
movement. But the account of the animal research and testing issue, once the movement’s 
most promising front and now largely abandoned, certainly suggests that nothing is 
inevitable.383 Similarly, issues like fur and veal, once viewed as inevitable victories, have suffered 
significant reversals. Once again I am drawn to the idea that victories over industry are neither 
inevitable nor irreversible, which makes questions of effective movement power raised in this 
project all the more pressing.384 
Seventh, do a movement’s origins matter? Yes. The animal rights movement was clearly 
shaped at its outset by a number of factors. First, the US had developed a strong system of 
humane societies, SPCAs, and moderate animal charities run by people of means (often 
derisively referred to as the “little old ladies” running things). This institutional base provided 
significant resources for the young movement, but also drained potential resources from more 
radical channels. The humane movement of the mid-20th century was both ally and challenger 
rolled into one. The animal rights movement also drew significant membership from the 
                                                           
383 Here as elsewhere it can be challenged that the goal of this movement is not progressive, yet I would 
counter that at the very least, reductions in the use of animals in medical and product testing is a 
generally recognized good. That little money, regulation, or public pressure are pushing that goal forward, 
is a clear failure of the movement to exert significant power. 
384 The labor movement is perhaps the premier example of a 20th century mass movement that saw its 
progress stalled and reversed in the latter half of the century. It is also the American movement, along 
with its more far-reaching socialist counterpart, that most directly confronts industry.  
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environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, which contained overlapping ideologies and 
policy goals. In some cases, radical direct action animal rights groups like Sea Shepard emerged 
from splits over tactics and ideology within environmental groups, in this case Greenpeace. Still 
another influence was the British animal rights movement, which formed earlier and built on a 
more disruptive tradition that was imported as the ALF. Finally, the movement was jump started 
by academic philosophers, with a large percentage of movement leaders and participants 
reading their works, giving intellectual arguments an unusually strong hold on the movement 
from inception. These disparate influences account for a movement that was born with an 
organized underground disruptive element, a small set of ideologically driven groups, and a 
larger set of conservative charities struggling to adapt to an ideological shift. Mixed into all these 
segments were well educated middle class white activists drawn into the movement by the 
philosophical discourse. This constellation of influences, I argue, allowed the movement to 
harness multiple types of power from the start, but also foreclosed opportunities to build more 
radical political organizations from the ground up.  
Eighth, are movement tactics profoundly shaped by insider decisions? Here we’re 
looking for more than the soft-handed influence of tax law or police SOPs. We are looking for 
government actions that encourage one avenue of activism, while strangling another. The anti-
abortion case was particularly striking, but there are similar elements with the animal rights 
movement. Animal rights disruptions have been targeted at all levels of government, from the 
AEPA/AETA to a heavy FBI focus on ALF and SHAC activity. But where is the encouragement of 
alternate channels? One area might be the willingness of federal, state, and local lawmakers to 
address fringe issues that impact relatively few animals and do not effect significant industries. 
Animal cruelty laws have been slowly and surely strengthened, but also continue to exempt 
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standard industry practices. Dog fighting and cock fighting are cruel practices primarily 
associated with poor communities of color, and is telling that these issues have come under the 
harshest attack from politicians of all stripes. But perhaps the clearest example is the willingness 
of local government to pass-off sheltering and animal control responsibilities to private groups, 
including such notable advocacy groups as the ASPCA. America’s first, best known, and nearly 
best funded advocacy group broke its back for decades attempting to handle an animal control 
contract with the city of New York. That grueling financial, administrative, and psychic burden 
has played a large role in removing the ASPCA from national conversations on animal issues.385 I 
think what we see confirmed in this case, is that while “government” writ large does not 
conspire to control activist decision-making, there are clear impacts from actively discouraging 
some avenues while encouraging others.  
Ninth, are incremental approaches compatible with abolitionist goals? As discussed 
earlier, this is very much a (the?) open question concerning the animal rights movement. 
Certainly there is some initial evidence that welfare victories and increased exploitation are fully 
compatible. Just from a numbers standpoint, animal use has measurably increased in agriculture 
and testing as activists have fought the worst industry practices and pushed for new regulatory 
regimes. But on the other hand, the push to eliminate fur farming never relied heavily on 
incrementalism, and that area has suffered very similar setbacks. So the animal rights case does 
not offer anything decisive on this point.386 
                                                           
385 I think the animal rights case is perhaps the best example of how government can kill two birds with 
one stone (excuse the metaphor) by slashing government services and counting on private individuals to 
pick up the slack, who would otherwise be amongst the most likely individuals to challenge government 
policy and decision maker power.   
386 My own opinion is that the sharp line between reform and abolition is often a false one, and the 
framing of reforms is often crucial. Does the elimination of experimentation of Chimpanzees, a recent 
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Tenth, can movements shift their fortunes by shrinking the scope of conflict? Certainly 
the animal rights movement provides more strong evidence that movements can succeed by 
shifting from a nation discourse to state and local legislation. However, one might reasonably 
counter that unlike the high profile abortion debate, bringing animal rights issues to a state vote 
still counts as expanding the audience for the issue beyond the activists and industries that are 
typically involved. Still, I find this case supports Baumgartner and Jones’s views on venue 
shopping, which identify important opportunities not addressed in Schattschneider’s model. 
Another interesting wrinkle in the animal rights case is the tactic of shrinking the scope of 
protest in order to convince local media of the novelty of the action, and thus its 
newsworthiness. PETA most clearly employs this tactic in its campaigns against chain stores and 
restaurants, where cadres of activist travel around the country staging the same events over and 
over in front of stores in each media market. The result is dozens, and eventually hundreds, of 
small media pieces that aim at producing a plebiscitary impact that is more sustained than a 
single national piece.387  
 
So are there any additional insights we can glean from the animal rights case? A key one 
is the role of globalization, which Tarrow identifies as the second major contemporary trend in 
social movements, alongside institutionalization (Tarrow, 2011). While the animal right 
                                                                                                                                                                             
victory, reform or abolish a practice? Certainly, other primates will be substituted for the protected ones, 
but at the same time activists have succeeded in securing the end of a specific practice that their 
opponents wished to continue. I see it as an incremental abolition, which helps maintain movement 
frames that do not endorse disputed practices that remain legal.  
387 These tactics are often combined in practice, with a push at national media with the release of an 
investigation or the start of a campaign, followed by a series of local demonstrations. PETA even uses the 
local/regional media strategy when running contests like “Most Vegan Friendly Ballparks” or “Cutest 
Vegan Kids,” selecting finalists and winners that tap different media markets and multiply the amount of 
likely coverage.  
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movement has made significant progress in setting up transnational activist networks, the 
darker side of globalization is the erosion of power within the state. Specifically, movement 
power is undercut by the ability of industry to outsource ethically problematic practices to 
countries with few regulations and little activist presence. China, for example, is a rising center 
for animal testing with corporations and academic institutions partnering with Chinese 
laboratories. Particularly controversial practices, such as primate experimentation, appear 
especially likely to follow this migration.388 In general, the patterns of business migration are the 
familiar ones we have watched for decades concerning labor and environmental costs. An 
evolving area of interest is role of free trade agreements and institutions, which have a long 
treated activist supported domestic regulations as illegal forms of trade protectionism. For 
example, the US famously lost its WTO bid to ban the importation of dolphin unsafe tuna from 
Mexico. As multi-country agreements like the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) increasingly supplant the role of the 
WTO, it will be important to watch how old movement victories are incorporated and what 
doors are open or shut for new regulation.389 
 
The Disability Rights Movement 
Disability Rights provides a final case that at first appears to be a curious fit with my 
focus on movement power. The disabled have achieved a remarkable level of political success, 
                                                           
388 China has also become the world’s largest fur producer. Interestingly, China also requires a thick 
battery of animal testing on all cosmetics sold in the country, which has led a number of American and 
European companies to abandon longtime pledges not to test on animals in order to sell their products in 
China. 
389 Europe bans cosmetic testing on animals or the import of tested products. China does the opposite. 
How the US manages new trade deals with both countries may be a canary in the coal mine for these 
issues. 
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including major civil rights legislation, despite exerting relatively little power on the political 
system. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the ADA 
Amendments of 2008 are legislative achievements of significant importance, and yet none of 
them were the product of sustained actions by the disability rights movement. Certainly the 
movement was active in the processes that produced each measure, and shaped the elite 
understandings of disability that underlie each law, but each case also lacks the element of arm 
twisting that we associate with genuine power. In American politics we simply do not expect 
groups with little power to get their way, particularly when the group’s interests do not seem to 
align with those of government agencies or the business community. To put it simply, my 
project assumes power is sort of important in politics, so how do we explain this case? 
My clearest answer is that the movement did apply some significant power early on in 
the 1970s, relied heavily on insider support, benefited from some lucky breaks, and avoided 
burdening business or government with overly onerous costs or regulations. In a sense, almost 
everything seems to have broken in the movement’s favor, and power has been less at issue 
than in other causes. But what I would point out is that the disability rights movement will still 
be required to exercise power if it hopes to achieve goals with significant costs, for example in 
closing gaps in health care coverage or reducing the sky-high unemployment rate amongst 
disabled Americans. Moreover, the movement remains vulnerable to reversals, particularly on 
issues like education mandates, where federal “unfunded mandates” for special education are 
an increasingly large percentage of cash strapped state and local education budgets. Given the 
trend in granting exemptions to federal education mandates in programs like Race to the Top, 
and the push for charter schools, there is reason for concern that services in these and other 
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areas could on the chopping block. Marginalized groups only don’t need to be powerful until 
they do. 
  
Independent living (62- 1972) 
The modern disability rights movement is generally seen as beginning when Ed Roberts 
enrolled as an undergraduate at the University of California, Berkley. Roberts, who had been left 
a quadriplegic from polio at the age of 14, required a heavy motorized wheelchair and had to 
sleep with an iron lung. Despite admitting him, Berkley claimed it could not (and would not) 
accommodate Roberts’s housing needs, but Roberts pushed to make his own arrangements and 
thrived as a student. With his support other disabled students enrolled and began calling 
themselves the rolling quads. The group went on to found the US Berkeley Physically Disabled 
Students Program, which eventual would become the Center for Independent Living, which 
would lead the shift in disabled advocacy from a focus on medical care to one that included 
social functioning and self-advocacy (Shapiro, 1993, p. Ch.2).390  
Roberts and CIL, along with its New York counterpart Disabled in Action (DIA), would 
make the dual move of putting disabled advocates at the center of disability advocacy and 
                                                           
390 Roberts and his allies recognized that America had a modest infrastructure of disability support dating 
back to WWI and the 1918 Veterans Rehabilitation Act and the 1920 Civilian Rehabilitation Act. These 
laws set up federal-state partnerships focused on vocational training for Americans with physical 
disabilities, and were expanded with passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, and still further expanded 
during WWII with the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1943. Rehabilitation clearly road the 
coattails of the veteran’s lobby, which is particularly potent during times of war. And over the course of 
the first half of the 20th century the care givers and social service providers supported by rehabilitation 
funding, along with private charities funding treatment and research, became the de facto 
representatives of the disabled community. These representatives understandably focused on securing 
funding to address the medical and health needs of those they cared for, but this perspective increasingly 
chaffed with able minded disabled adults who were also concerned about their independence and social 
and economic opportunities. 
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stressing that social needs were as important as physical ones. This shift in composition and 
focus was the beginning of a modern movement, but from a power standpoint there was no 
dramatic shift in the 1960s. There was nothing analogous to the Stonewall riots, Roe v. Wade, or 
the American Museum of Natural History cat experiment campaigns. Federal and state laws 
continued to be passed, including Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments in 1965, 1967 and 
1968, but they relied on older alliances, including increased veteran lobbying accompanying the 
Vietnam War.391 Indeed, while the independent living movement had directly transformed the 
lives of countless disabled Americans, and in doing so had pushed people with disabilities and 
their caretakers to reevaluate their goals and values, the movement still remained only 
minimally political.  
 
Civil Rights (1973-1990) 
Everything changed for the disability rights movement in 1973.392 That year, the 
Democratic Congress and President Nixon negotiated a modest $1.55 billion two-year spending 
bill to fund the governments various disability related functions, with Nixon vetoing the first two 
versions of the bill. This legislation was more-or-less business as usual, with neither decision-
makers nor disability advocates pushing a transformative agenda. However, in the fiscal horse-
trading all the parties apparently overlooked Section 504, a provision added relatively late in the 
process, which read, in part,  
                                                           
391 The 1968 Architectural Barriers Act and the 1970 Urban Mass Transportation Act also pushed forward 
with accessibility demands that would become central to the movement.  
392 In 1972, Representative Charles Vanik and Senator Huber Humphrey tried to amend the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act to cover people disabilities, but the effort lacked strong support, and was opposed by many 
supporters of black civil rights who worried changes might water down their own movement’s most 
important political victory.  
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No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in 
section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded 
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any 
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal 
Service. 
This largely ignored provision was the first federal civil rights protection for people with 
disabilities, an enormous achievement, but one which can hardly be attributed to movement 
power.393 Senate liberals led by Harrison Williams added the provision, modeled on language 
from the 1964 Civil Act and Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments (Scotch, 1984). Despite 
the weight of the language, the addition was low profile to the point where there remains some 
uncertainty who specifically drafted and added the provision. 394 It seems that most 
congresspersons who voted for the bill and the president who signed it were simply unaware of 
what they were doing. This cannot be considered an exercise of activist power, but rather a 
stroke of luck or chance, combined with deep dependence on political insiders. The flip side to 
this observation is that no institutional interests that receive government funding picked up on 
the provision and raised red flags, which ironically is probably the case because there was no 
                                                           
393 Disabled in Action had blocked traffic in front of Nixon’s 1972 NYC campaign headquarters to protest 
his initial veto of the Rehabilitation Act, but as stated, this was a dispute over support funding, not 
disability rights. DIA protests were media friendly, but their small numbers lacked force, and did not stop 
a second Nixon veto in 1973. However, these were important seeds in the eventual growth of a more 
political movement.  
394 In fact, sociologist Richard Scott conducted extensive interviewers with policymakers and staff involved 
with the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and reports that no one involved was sure who even added the 504 
provision. Given the parallels to black civil rights laws concerning services like housing and education it 
seems inconceivable the author of the provision was unaware of the weight of his or her language. This 
uncertainty about origins and intentions adds noise to any analysis such as mine, but I feel confident 
concluding that the provision aspired to be taken seriously as mandating civil rights. 
 305
organized movement lobby behind its insertion. I am hesitant to endorse the idea that the 
absence of movement power is an effective means to political victory, but this remains an 
important counterfactual to consider.   
Activist support would play a more significant role in the 1975 passage of the All 
Handicapped Children Act (AHCA), which guaranteed all children a “free and appropriate 
education” regardless of special needs, but that key legislation was also an inside job, if one 
done with more visible public and political support. In neither case did the movement play a 
leadership role, let alone do any arm-twisting. However, while disability rights activists did not 
play a direct role in pushing Section 504 or the AHCA, they played a major role in their 
implementation. The Nixon administration had no intention of pushing a new civil rights agenda, 
particularly one that was potentially costly to both government and business, and failed to draft 
necessary regulations with key agencies. Activists began to organize, and set their sights on the 
1976 election, in which Jimmy Carter was pushed to explicitly promise to put in place much-
delayed 504 regulations. But as the first year of the Carter presidency arrived and passed it 
looked like Carter was in no rush to push the disability issue on a business community already 
skeptical of his domestic agenda. The main burden of implementation fell of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), which had spent years drafting and redrafting rules that 
were now presented to incoming Secretary Joseph Califano. Califano was surprised by the reach 
of 504, considered the department’s interpretation too expansive, and asked for time to rewrite 
the proposed regulations in a narrower and more limited way. This was the moment when the 
disability rights movement coalesced and first flexed its political muscle. 
The American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities (ACCD) staged a candlelight vigil 
outside Califano’s home, followed by demonstrations at HEW’s DC and eight regional offices. 
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300 protesters took over office for over 24 hours and the occupation in San Francisco lasted for 
25 days (Shapiro, 1993, pp. 66-7). Califano finally relented and signed the current versions of 
504 and AHCA regulations into effect.395 It was a major movement victory and a clear use of 
disruptive power backed by strong plebiscitary images of sympathetic but determined disabled 
protesters putting their health and safety on the line.396 In a sense, the ready imagery of 
wheelchairs, amputations, and other visible signs of physical disability offered disabled 
protesters a direct channel to the frames of protester suffering that were so effective during the 
push for desegregation.  
Ensuring implementation is one of the key tests of movement power, but it is rarely a 
one and done situation. Consequently, disruptive power alone is often undone in the pluralist 
long-game. In the case of section 504, movement victories under Carter were threatened by the 
election of Ronald Reagan, who made deregulation a centerpiece of his domestic agenda. The 
job of slashing 504 coverage was left to vice president George H.W. Bush, who ran the 
Administration’s Task Force for Regulatory Relief. Bush received over 40,000 cards and letters 
asking that he protect existing disability provisions and met with disability groups across the 
country to curb any potential political fallout. In the process Bush became convinced of the 
justice of the cause, the threat posed by a movement backlash, and the potential political 
advantage of courting an untapped segment of the voting public. The Task Force subsequently 
dropped all objections to 504 and AHCA regulations. Bush and Reagan would also go onto 
                                                           
395 In an effort to prevent future standoffs over disability policy implementation, the Carter Administration 
would go onto established the National Council on the Handicapped within the Department of Education, 
charged with reviewing disability policy and making future recommendations. The NCH was authorized in 
the 1978 Amendment to the Rehabilitation Act. In attempted to pass the buck on future decisions, Carter 
almost casually put in place a bureaucratic agency that would drive much of the progress in disability 
rights for decades to come. 
396 Many of the protesters suffered from medical complications without proper medical equipment and 
care. 
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transform the National Council on the Handicapped into an independent agency, the National 
Council on Disability, which would go on to play a crucial role in securing disability rights. 
Moreover, Bush made friends and allies during the process that would stay with him throughout 
the remainder of his political life, most notably disability activist Evan Kemp, Jr. It remains an 
open question whether Bush would have become an ally to the movement without his Task 
Force experience, but it certainly raises the specter of Fortuna yet again in this narrative.  
Shortly after section 504 was protected, the push for more expansive civil rights 
protections began. But once again, it did not begin with the movement. Or more precisely, it 
began with disability rights advocates inside the federal government. The newly independent 
NCD would be the catalyst and initial architect of what became the 1990 Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). In 1986, the NCD would recommend comprehensive civil rights legislation, 
and drafted a first version of the ADA, which was introduced to Congress in 1988. In many ways 
what is most interesting about the story is that the 13 Reagan appointees on the NCD pushed 
the disability agenda in a direction Reagan himself neither expected nor endorsed. How could 
such a coup happen? Was Reagan simply asleep at the wheel, so to speak? It seems that a latent 
desire for civil rights protections was present in many of the Council members, a desire that 
clearly cut across party lines. The principle author of the 1986 report Toward Independence, 
which recommended comprehensive civil rights legislation, as well as the first draft of the ADA 
was disability attorney Robert Burgdorf, Jr., who had sought his appointment with a long held 
private agenda of enacting a law like the ADA. Along with Burgdorf was another disability rights 
ideologue, Justine Dart, Jr. whose appointment was likely helped by his father’s strong ties to 
Reagan and the California Republican Party. (Shapiro, 1993, pp. 106-111) The two activist 
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Council members united their colleagues behind Burgdorf’s work and the NCD, now an 
independent agency, moved forward without Reagan’s knowledge or approval.   
The NCD bill introduced at the end of the 100th Congress in 1988 had virtually no chance 
of passing for a number of reasons, not the least of which was Reagan’s lack of interest in, or 
even awareness of, the bill. The 1988 bill found sponsors in Connecticut Senator Lowell Weicker 
(R) and Representative Tony Coehlo (D) of California. Unfortunately, Weicker would lose his 
1988 reelection bid and Coehlo would resign his seat over a savings and loan scandal, requiring 
new sponsors for the ADA to get another shot. Fortunately, Representative Steny Hoyer (D) and 
Senators Ted Kennedy (D) and Tom Harkin picked up the bill and then received a boost of 
Republican support from Senators Bob Dole and Orrin Hatch. Equally important, 1988 saw ally 
George H.W. Bush take the White House after making disability rights part of his platform at the 
RNC nominating convention. Suddenly the bill was packed with heavy hitters from both sides of 
the aisle, ensuring relatively easy passing for the 1990 Americans with Disability Act.397 Bush 
promptly signed the legislation and issued regulations implementing it (Shapiro, 1993, pp. 118-
119). While the disability rights movement did mobilize to play a roll of pushing the legislation 
forward, in the end, we are confronted with another largely inside job.398 
                                                           
397 The House presented more of a challenge than the Senate, but even there the debate concerned more 
the shape of the bill than the broader question of whether or not to pass the civil rights legislation. Bush’s 
support was ultimately decisive in winning over House Republicans. 
398 180 national disability organizations endorsed the legislation. Some groups bused in members to speak 
with members of Congress. The legislation’s supporters harnessed this grassroots lobbying to grab new 
sponsors and win over fence sitters. ADAPT staged a series of sit-ins in front of the White House and in 
the Capitol Rotunda (Senator Dole famously chastised the protesters as “not helping” those working for 
passage). While striking images of wheelchair users dragging themselves up the Capitol steps produced 
some nightly news coverage, the movement’s largest demonstration attracted only around 700 persons, 
and was not even covered by the Washington Post. Another notable instance of disruptive power that I 
have not focused on in this narrative came in 1988 when Gallaudet University students demanded a deaf 
president be appointed and shut down the school until the board relented. This successful protest raised 
the national profile of the movement. 
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What explains ability of the movement to draw such significant insider support? The key 
answer here is that just about everyone involved had a disability or a close family member with 
a disability. Bush had grown up with an uncle left quadriplegic by polio, had one son with a 
learning disability, one with part of his colon removed, and had lost a daughter to leukemia. 
Coehlo has epilepsy. Weicker had a daughter with Down’s Syndrome. Hoyer was best friends 
with Coehlo, had a deaf brother, and his wife was a prominent disability advocate with epilepsy. 
Kennedy’s son lost a leg to cancer, his sister Rosemary was mentally retarded, and his other 
sister, Eunice, was a renowned disability advocate and founder of the Special Olympics. Dole 
was wounded in WWII and left with a paralyzed arm. Hatch’s brother-in-law suffered a number 
of disabilities after contracting polio. Harkin’s brother was deaf. These were the key players, but 
many other decision-makers were also personally touched by disability. Coehlo was known to 
say there was a “hidden army” of disability advocates everywhere one turned, including 
government (Shapiro, 1993, p. 118). The hidden army was especially fortunate to include 
Republican leadership in President Bush and Senate Minority Leader Dole, as well as Democratic 
heavy hitter Ted Kennedy.  
Burgdorf and Dart got the process rolling through the NCD and recruited Coehlo and 
Weicker. Coehlo then recruited Hoyer, who was pivotal in attracting other members of 
Congress. On the executive side, Bush’s friendship with Kemp was perhaps most crucial. So 
while disability advocates did play a key role in activating latent insider support, they did it by 
cultivating personal connections and securing positions inside of government. One might 
reasonably call this a pluralist approach to power, but it is a soft touch that depends on good 
fortune and weak opposition.  
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The litigation Era (1991- ) 
While business interests did not push hard against the ADA during the legislative 
process, they quickly took to the courts to hollow out much of its impact. By most accounts, the 
central loophole in the original ADA is that it underspecified the definition of “disabled.” 
Lawmakers and disability rights advocates intended the ADA to function as a piece of civil rights 
legislation, and assumed the category “disabled” would not be interrogated by judges, just as 
categories of gender and race have not been (racial discrimination cases don’t typically begin by 
challenging the plaintiff’s status as “black”). By contrast, the courts chose to interpret 
“disability” in a manner more consistent with Social Security Disability Insurance, which defines 
disability as the inability to work due to impairment. For SSDI cases, establishing disability is the 
whole game. The Supreme Court’s definition of disability creates an ADA “paradox” in which 
disabled status is reserved only for those individuals too disabled to work, and thus offers no 
substantive protection from discrimination for disabled individuals in the workplace (Fleischer & 
Zames, 2011, pp. 102-105).399400 This is not to undersell the significance of the ADA, only to 
stress that narratives around movements are often condensed to a single victory—the 1964 Civil 
                                                           
399 SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).  
The Court held that mitigating measures could be considered in the definition of “disabled.” The airline 
had a policy against employing pilots with uncorrected vision below a certain threshold. Sutton and her 
sister were refused employment under this policy and sued under the ADA. The Court held that the 
plaintiff was not disabled because corrective lenses mitigated the impairment. It’s the catch-22 case. 
There are two related cases: Murphy v. United Parcel Service (1999) and Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingberg 
(1999), and the three are sometimes referred to as the “Sutton Trilogy.”  
400 In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams 534 U.S. 184 (2002), the Court offered a 
narrow construction of the key phrases “substantially limits” and “major life activity,” which dramatically 
limited the types of conditions qualifying for disability. In the case, Williams was terminated because she 
was unable to do certain manual labor requiring her to raise her arms to shoulder level for several hours a 
day. The task was not deemed a major life activity (most people don’t need to do it), nor was her 
condition seen as a substantial limit on any more general life activity (she could still do many other 
manual tasks).  
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Rights Act (or Brown v. Board of Ed.), Roe v. Wade, etc.—that ignore the long hard years of 
contestation and legislation that follow. 
The public narrative around the ADA has largely been one of the public patting itself on 
the back, which while not altogether undeserved, leaves activists with few options beyond 
litigation. In the time since the ADA, the disability rights movement has not built significant 
political organizations. It has not maintained a disruptive tradition. It has not wielded 
plebiscitary agenda power, in no small part thanks to the public perception that the ADA solved 
the problem and persistent public concern about SSDI disability fraud. The coalition of groups 
that came together around passage of the ADA dissolved following its passage and quick 
implementation and what was left is a barebones movement with little appreciable power, 
apart from significant new pluralist access to the Courts.   
But in 2008 the ADA was amended in a comprehensive attempt to address its 
inadequacies.401 Where did this second legislative push come from? The answer is similar to the 
one for the 1990 legislation. Specifically, the NCD issued a report in 2004 titled “Righting the 
ADA” that largely guided a bipartisan legislative response. That response took a modest two 
years from its 2006 start, and gained near unanimous support from the House, Senate, and 
President, as well as business and disability rights communities. A key to the ADAAA seems to be 
the fact that the original congressional architects of the 1990 ADA (on both sides of the aisle) 
have kept their seats and gained seniority. The process was shepherded along by Steny Hoyer, 
who had risen to House majority leader. Harkin and Hatch had gained seniority and Ted 
                                                           
401   My account is drawn primarily from documents from Georgetown Law’s ArchiveADA project 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/archiveada. Along with the text of the law, the article, “The ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008” by Feldblum, Barry, and Benfer was far and away the most useful source. 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/archiveada/documents/ADAAmendmentsActArticle.pdf 
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Kennedy was the Democratic Party’s elder statesman looking to protect a key piece of his civil 
rights legacy.  
New faces also emerged for reasons that mirror the 1990 process. On the Republican 
side, the ADA Restoration Act of 2006 was first introduced by conservative Republican Rep. Jim 
Sensenbrenner, whose wife Cheryl is Chairman of the board of the American Association of 
People with Disabilities (AAPD). Cheryl was partially paralyzed in a car accident at age 22, and 
took a lead role lobbying and testifying for the ADAAA. The public and private push by the 
Sensenbrenners rekindled much of the bipartisan agreement achieved in the 1990 legislation. 
Rep. Jim Langevin, who is paralyzed from the waist down and is accommodated on the House 
floor by a special chair that raises him to speak, was an important supporter of the ADAAA, and 
colleagues mentioned him and former member Tony Coelho numerous times while speaking in 
support of the bill. Coelho and Dole were key supporters of the legislation from outside 
Congress. It seems that Coelho’s silent army had grown, and I believe the relatively high levels of 
diagnosis, treatment, and functioning of disabled persons in wealthy and well educated families 
means that the ADA disproportionately touches many congressional families of both parties.402 
And perhaps the biggest boon to ADAAA passage was the support of lame duck President 
George W. Bush, who while being a great friend of the business community, desired above all to 
preserve a centerpiece of his father’s domestic legacy. These individuals were personally and 
professionally committed to the ADA, and were genuinely angered by the perceived failures in 
ADA implementation. The bill’s sponsors credibly spoke for the Congress of 1990, and 
                                                           
402 Policy feedback is likely at work in how the ADA (and IDEA/504) strengthen identity and opportunity 
for the disabled, increasing their cohesion as a single group and turning them towards politics. Before 
these policies were in place, disabled persons were more likely to identify with the subgroup sharing their 
particular impairment, and linkages between dissimilar populations like autistic individuals and the 
hearing impaired were loose and weak. 
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successfully framed the bill as a “restoration” of congressional intent. When framed like that, 
who wants to stand in the way of restoring landmark civil rights legislation? In the end, the 
ADAAA was more or less a pluralist and plebiscitary slam dunk. 
 
Given a 2007 House bill starting with 143 co-sponsors (including a significant minority of 
Republicans), gaining more than 100 additional co-sponsors during the process, and heading to 
the desk of a sympathetic President, the business community was fighting a losing battle. After 
initially opposing the legislation, business groups wisely accepted the invitation by 
Representative Hoyer to enter into negotiations on the bill’s final content. In those negotiations, 
the business community succeeded in securing language that would ensure the ADAAA would 
not expand the ADA much beyond 1990 levels. Specifically, language exempted eyeglasses and 
contact lenses as acceptable mitigating circumstances and temporary or minor impairments (like 
the flu) were exempted for the definition of disabled. Moreover, specific language was retained 
from the ADA that individuals must be “qualified” for their positions and that disabilities must 
“substantially limit” major life activities (not completely rejecting Williams v. Toyota). In the end, 
the business/HR community had more to gain by establishing moderate but stable definitions of 
disability than by fighting costly legal battles over narrow but ever-shifting definitions.403 
                                                           
403 Notably, objections to the ADAAA (and its precursors) were always premised on the claim that the 
legislation would significantly expand the ADA beyond its 1990 intent. Genuine or not, this framing by the 
opposition meant that proponents of the bill were able neutralize opposition by specifically addressing 
their most extreme examples (i.e. eyeglasses and colds). These issues were hammered out ahead of time, 
and when the bills reached the House and Senate floors there was no real debate. Everyone who spoke 
praised the legislation and the process. In the battle over “issue definition,” the proponents very popular 
“restoration” frame proved resistant to their opponents more controversial “expansion” frame. 
Beyond the merits of broadening ADA coverage, Congress embraced the ADAAA as an assertion of 
institutional prerogative over an “activist” judiciary. The legitimacy of this framing was supported by the 
NCD’s involvement, a body involved in drafting the original ADA, as well as the support of a number of 
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The disability rights movement vocally supported the ADA Amendment process, but the 
larger coalition behind the original ADA push did not re-emerge. Even more than in 1990, this 
was an insiders’ gambit, and again raises complicated questions about the role of movement 
power. The political agenda was set by a federal agency. The bill was both framed and advanced 
by party leadership. The NCD and the bill’s sponsors were clearly reacting to information from 
within the disability community, but this is not necessarily the portrait of movement power I 
have been painting. It is difficult to know what to make of a movement winning without 
exercising power, but I will look briefly out how these facts mesh with my previous 
observations.404  
In the absence of effective arm twisting by the movement, it is difficult to confirm or 
deny that opportunities for power persist, that isolated power types are vulnerable, or that 
different power types can undermine each other. We do find exceptionally strong evidence that 
insider support is crucial. We also find that opposition commitment is crucial, as there was no 
real organized opposition to business rights other than a somewhat apprehensive business 
community. Still the lack of business opposition calls for further examination. While this account 
may seem to suggest liberal causes progress steadily, a closer look shows long periods of 
stagnation and retrenchment. It remains an open question whether the current period of 
stagnation gives way to progress or retrenchment. The origins of the movement are important 
in that the vast network of service provision organization has clearly pushed the movement to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
legislators who were involved in the 1990 bill (notably, original ADA sponsors Senators Tom Harkin, Ted 
Kennedy, and Orrin Hatch, and Representatives Steny Hoyer and Jim Sensenbrenner provided direct 
continuity). Moreover, Disability Rights groups were largely able to unify around the “restoration” frame. 
Under the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, the umbrella group behind the original 1990 
legislation, the disability rights community shelved complaints unrelated to the definition of disabled. 
404 It is worth noting that a different definition of power from the one adopted in Chapter 2 might 
consider these developments a form of consensual power, but I reject that approach because I think it 
papers over the real and important difference between this case and those in Chapter 6. 
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organize charitably and not focus on politics. Additionally, we find that insiders in Congress and 
the Executive have played a very large roll in channeling movement activity away from 
confrontation and towards insider strategies like litigation. Concerning incrementalism, we do 
find small advances paving the way for broader gains, particularly in the field of education. In 
fact, we find a policy feedback mechanism at work where small policy victories have worked to 
mobilize the disabled and their families as a constituency and produce sweeping advances like 
the ADA. Finally, we find an interesting bit of confirmation for the scope of conflict, as the ADA 
succeeded in large part by flying under the radar of most of the Reagan Administration. Stealth 
can clearly be a virtue in some venues. Beyond these existing observations, what further insights 
can we draw? 
First, luck matters. In talking about open and closed political opportunity structures, it is 
tempting to try and force all the relevant factors into patterns and types. But there remains an 
irreducible element of political chance, the kind lead John Kingdon to conclude that many policy 
windows would open at unpredictable times for unpredictable reasons. Often this means an 
agenda setting event like a natural disaster or an international terrorist incident. But with 
movements focused on narrow policy questions, such events can be a little considered 
bureaucratic appointment or a well-placed politician with an unexpected personal tie to an 
issue.  
Second, critical junctures can produce path dependence. Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act was essentially an afterthought, with no activist participation, and no public 
mandate. But 504 laid the foundation for the civil rights model that has dominated disability 
advocacy ever since, as well as focusing policy attention disproportionately on education and 
public access, with little attention paid to employment, poverty, and other serious socio-
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economic deficits. In addition, the largely accidental (or perhaps incidental) partnership 
between Democrats and Republican in the mid-1980s, especially George H.W. Bush’s 
involvement has led to the persistence of disability rights as a rare bi-partisan issue. The 2008 
ADAAA is largely a legacy of these unexpected partnerships decades earlier. 
Third, bureaucratic representation is a powerful agenda setter. The role of the NCD is 
particularly striking in the disability narrative. Although created initially as a largely symbolic 
advisory committee, the NCD repeatedly shouldered the burdens of problem definition and 
agenda setting, and to use Kingdon’s language, they repeatedly coupled problems to solutions 
that legislators subsequently adopted. The mandate of the NCD was to represent and advocate 
for a disadvantaged population, like the NLRB, the EPA, or the Civil Rights division of the DOJ. 
Having an institutional advocate is clearly one of the best ways to advance a movement’s 
agenda in an age of constrained opportunities.  
Fourth, business interests may prefer new regulation to an uncertain status quo. When 
movements manage to problematize the business environment through mismatched state 
regulations, lawsuits, and the threat of ever evolving standards, business may prefer to 
participate in a more comprehensive federal effort to produce common standards, even when 
those standards are not their preferred ones. Disability policy in employment, public 
accommodation, and discrimination was able to win over an initially resistant business 
community. So while business opponents may be potentially the fiercest opposition a cause can 
face, we should not paint business as universally hostile to progressive causes. Moreover, 
strategic advances at the state and local level can be leveraged to coopt a business community 
that values stability and clarity in regulation.  
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Fifth, insider access is above all personal. As with LGBTQ rights or cruelty protections for 
dogs and cats, being part of the family is decisive. When we speak of movements and luck, there 
is no bigger advantage than accidents of birth, injury, or illness transforming powerful insiders 
into deeply committed allies. Power is not always necessary if your interests align with those of 
the powerful. 
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“At this moment, I would like to thank the 
evangelical community who have been so good 
to me and so supportive. You have so much to 
contribute to our politics, yet our laws prevent 
you from speaking your minds from your own 
pulpits. 
An amendment, pushed by Lyndon Johnson, 
many years ago, threatens religious institutions 
with a loss of their tax-exempt status if they 
openly advocate their political views. 
I am going to work very hard to repeal that 
language and protect free speech for all 
Americans.” 
-Donald Trump, 2016 Republican National 
Convention Acceptance Speech 
 
"Sometimes there are days like this when that 
slow and steady effort is rewarded with justice 
that arrives like a thunderbolt," 
-President Barack Obama, 2015 comments on 
the Obergefell v. Hodges gay marriage ruling 
 
Conclusion: So It’s Come to This… 
 
 This dissertation has occupied me for the better part of the past decade. The funny 
thing about a project of that length is that while you work the world continues to change. New 
evidence presents itself. Institutions evolve even as you attempt to pin them down and 
crystalize them at the point of first analysis. Some of your analysis proves misguided. Some 
proves prescient, or rather, it would have had you published before events unfolded. And some 
proves dated, as fate and fortune alters the political landscape in unexpected ways. All these 
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developments have happened as the project slowly moved toward completion. And on balance, 
these developments seem to bear out merits of this dissertation. 
  In the earliest versions of my work, back in 2010, I noticed that LGBTQ Rights 
organizations had spent the last 20 years investing in politically oriented C4 and PAC 
organizations at a truly phenomenal rate. My tentative conclusion was that more than any other 
movement, LGBTQ Rights groups had pursued power strategies that should maximize their 
influence. At that moment in time, Proposition 8 in California had just banned same-sex 
marriage by popular vote in one of the nation’s most progressive and diverse states. It was 
difficult to see LGBTQ activists as particularly powerful right then. But what followed were a 
series of sweeping victories in states, courts, Congress, and the Federal Executive that allowed 
for open military service, made gay marriage the law of the land, and sent politicians scrambling 
to prove their gay-friendly bona fides.  By the 2016 election season, Democrats were scrambling 
to assert LGBTQ rights as a wedge issue one final time before the GOP can rebrand itself as gay-
friendly. In my mind, political organization clearly paid off for the movement, supporting my 
framework. 
 To a lesser extent, the explosion of state level restrictions on abortion access seemed to 
validate my early observations that antiabortion activists were avoiding C3 organizational forms 
more than most other movements and investing heavily in state and local political activity. 
Antiabortion activists have also remained on the cutting edge of disruptive tactics, particularly 
direct action harassment of abortion providers. Their movement has had remarkable success 
given the constitutional barriers they face. Conversely, the rather apolitical Disability Rights and 
Animal Rights movements have failed to translate significant public support into much in the 
way of public policy. All this fits with my early expectations. 
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 In 2011, Occupy Wall Street was widely heralded as a new era of activism, which seems 
to fly in the face of my own proclamations that trends in political development were increasingly 
constraining activist possibilities. But with little organizational staying power, little conflict with 
generally restrained police forces, and media cycles flooded with competing stories, Occupy lost 
steam and quickly sputtered out. In many ways, the Occupy story might be my best fit. And 
while some reasonably credit Occupy with priming the pump for Bernie Sanders’s improbably 
presidential campaign, it never-the-less remains true that the traditional repertoire of 
contention did not produce results, and activists were forced to innovate new methods aimed at 
hijacking a major party nomination. Is this a hint at the future of power innovation? I will return 
to this question at the end of the chapter. 
 Is the Occupy pattern playing out again with the Black Lives Matter movement? 
Commentators have been quick to dub BLM the most significant development in race activism 
since the decline of peak activity in the 1960s and 1970s. But it seems a bit early to crown this 
movement a game changer. While their core issue of police violence has been thrust onto the 
national stage, there has been surprisingly little movement on policy and no indication that 
results are imminent. Moreover, the 2016 election cycle seems to have largely eclipsed a 
movement that may lack organizational staying power, and revived thinly veiled racial appeals 
to “law and order” against a movement whose aggressive tactics leave it open to negative 
framing.405 It seems to be BLM is likely to be ignored, waited out, repressed, or symbolically 
appeased, but only time will tell. 
                                                           
405 Of course the movement’s most serious framing problem is outside their control, with the murder of 
police officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge striking what may be a fatal blow for the young movement. 
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 Other trends have been more ambiguously supportive of my arguments. Citizens United 
did indeed release an avalanche of money into the political system, which arguably supports my 
political inflation argument. Yet early evidence seems to suggest that this money is not buying 
elections, as candidates supported by vast SuperPac money have not fared especially well. This 
observation does seem compatible with the position that political inflation undermines activist 
resources, but the reality also suggests that perhaps infusions of money serve primarily to 
dysregulate the system and undermine the control of major institutional players. It remains 
possible that such a loss of equilibrium could advantage radical change. The situation certainly 
bears watching. 
 Finally, there are those events that were unpredictable, but which dramatically alter the 
purchase of some conclusions. In my case, the death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
looms largest. First Amendment analysis is a major aspect of my work, and Scalia’s absence from 
the Court could have far reaching impact. Citizens United the most obvious central case that 
could face reversal with a new Obama or Clinton appointment to the Court, but other cases and 
trends will be deeply altered as well. The Court has been poised to extend its protection of 
campaign expenditures to campaign contributions. That shift may be derailed. Scalia’s push to 
protect antiabortion sidewalk counseling had gained majority support on the Court, but the logic 
Scalia pushed that threatened the doctrine of time, place, and manner restrictions probably died 
with its chief proponent. Already Scalia’s absence has prevented a ruling in Friedrichs v. CA 
Teachers Association that would have expanded the First Amendment in a way that would 
dramatically undercut public union finances by ruling nonmember fees to be forced political 
speech. Such a ruling would have fit perfectly into my claim that an expanding First Amendment 
is not always good for movement power, but perhaps this trend has been arrested for now. 
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While these developments render some of my analysis and predictions still-born, my work also 
gains relevance in helping us navigate an uncertain judicial future. Dramatic First Amendment 
developments are likely on the horizon.  
  
 Turning back to the project at hand, just what have I shown in the preceding seven 
chapters? What are the accomplishments and limitations? 
 Chapter 2 lays out a theoretical groundwork for the project as a whole. In it, I make the 
case that a healthy democracy is best achieved when social movements are relatively powerful. I 
ground this claim in the Madisonian tradition, tracing it forward through American theorists like 
Dahl, Rawls, and Iris Young. This American focus is important to me because Chapter 2 also lays 
out the case that movement power needs to be analyze based on the specific political 
institutions and culture of each policy. I argue that a proper understanding of movement power 
requires a broader perspective on power in the American political system, but also that analysis 
of mainstream political institutions and processes is profoundly incomplete if it ignores the role 
of movements. If my argument is correct, movement innovation is the primary source of new 
power strategies and resources in American political development, and we should look to 
movement activists to discover the politics of the future.  
 Chapter 3 argues that disruptive power is the original power of outsiders, the power to 
disrupt the institutions, norms, and routines that serve the powerful; the power to break things. 
Disruptive power can be viewed as a temporary withdrawal of cooperation from the social 
contract, and as such it has a special role in democratic theory. I argue that disruption is 
generally immune to cooption because by its nature it is inconsistent with the mantel of 
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governance and undermines the authority of insider actors. Yet recent politics leaves this 
immunity suspect, as Donald Trump has staked his bid for the presidency on disruption, threat, 
and fear. On the other side of the isle, Democratic congresspersons staged a 2016 sit-in on the 
floor of the House, demanding a vote on a series of gun control measures. It would seem that 
even disruptive power may be potentially diffusing through the political system, which is a 
somewhat troubling development for a system built of the rule of law.  
 The most obvious threat to disruptive power is repression through structural barriers, 
which though enduring, ebb and flow in strength as the system adapts to changing times with 
new institutional constraints. The two most significant structural barriers involve policing 
strategies that limit confrontation with protesters and anti-terrorism activity that quietly 
suppresses extreme forms of activism. The latter is a trend that should only intensify in the wake 
of mass shootings in San Bernardino and Orlando, as the US government shifts its antiterrorism 
focus towards preventing online radicalization and sniffing out potential “lone-wolf” terrorists. 
Such law enforcement tactics provide a ready model and rationale for undermining ideological 
radicalization at the fringes of movements of all stripes, and I think my analysis of First 
Amendment trends surrounding time, place, and manner restrictions, hate speech, and true 
threats suggests that the Supreme Court will allow the war on terror to spill over into broader 
government control of speech activities. But perhaps more interesting than antiterrorism policy 
is the trend in state and local policing tactics. 
 I provide significant evidence in Chapter 3 that the policing of protest has shifted away 
from confrontational tactics, and that this shift has undermined some of the disruptive potential 
of contentious protest. Fewer arrests, less aggressive crowd dispersal, and limited police 
violence are all apparent over the past several decades. But this brings us back to the question 
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of Black Lives Matter, a movement that is specifically making claims about rampant police 
violence. How do we square the trend I describe with the experiences giving rise to this 
movement and the flashpoints of conflict in cities like Ferguson and Baltimore? The short 
answer is that BLM is perhaps the perfect example of the constraints I describe. First, police 
harassment and violence against African Americans is a very real problem, and one that seems 
obvious to those who experience it personally in their own lives. Second, the vast majority of 
BLM protests have been peaceful and police have by-and-large exercised restraint. Third, the 
episodes of severe disruption that have occurred have primarily been defined by protester 
aggression and rioting, with cases like Baltimore showing police opting to pull back from conflict 
zones in order to avoid violent confrontations with protesters.406 The end result of these three 
factors is that even in the face of systemic police violence, BLM has been denied widespread 
opportunities to disrupt the peace without taking actions that produce harshly negative 
plebiscitary frames. State violence is confined to confrontations with individuals, while 
organized dissent is “protected” but police projecting themselves as defenders of both speech 
and order. While the BML example gave me pause at first, I am increasingly convinced it only 
serves to strengthen my case. 
 Chapter 4 argue that pluralist power is an essential part of movement repertoires, and 
not simply a path to co-option. I take a rather firm stance against the Piven line of critique that 
largely dismisses organization building and resource mobilization. Organization matters, a lot. 
And I think that the recent developments surrounding gay marriage, Occupy, and elsewhere 
                                                           
406 It must also be noted that as conflict flared in Ferguson and Baltimore, politicians across the country 
pushed for the adoption of body cameras. While at best a partial solution, this development does seem to 
show disruptive power actively at work. 
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support this position.407 I further believe that the data I present on non-profit organizing 
provides strong evidence that, broadly speaking, activism is being channeled into the least 
political forms available.  
 The fact that Donald Trump, a major party candidate for the presidency, has made 
repeal of the ban on political activity by 501(c)3 organizations one of his only concrete policy 
pledges is astounding. I think the chances are small that Trump both wins the 2016 election and 
follows through on his promise, but I think the circumstances surrounding his pledge are telling. 
Specifically, a candidate whose biography and behavior is at sharp odds with the values of 
religious conservativism has seemingly made a deal with major evangelical leaders. These 
leaders appear willing to essentially make a deal with the devil to secure their ability to preach 
politics from the pulpit. Clearly religious activists believe that escaping the IRS constraints of C3 
status is the best way to achieve major policy victories on issues like abortion. I feel this 
development validates much of my argument. On the other hand, Trump’s pledge also exposes 
a major weakness of my analysis in Chapter 4. I do not adequately address constraints of 501(c)3 
status on religious organizations. In some areas, unburdening the faithful would strengthen 
movements, most clearly the antiabortion movement. On the other hand, many movements 
would be confronted by new organized voices supporting stasis on social issues and further 
constraining opportunities for movement power.  The results may not be the net increase of 
power I suggest, but something more complicated and less predictable. 
                                                           
407 I also think the decline of unions is the central story behind the collapse of left politics and the shifting 
of both parties to the right starting in the late 1970s. See Hacker and Pierson’s Winner-Take-All Politics for 
an extended version of this agreement. One limitation of my project is the absence of labor from my 
analysis. Labor often straddles the boundary between insider and outsider interests, which leaves its 
relationship to my framework somewhat ambiguous. I hope to clarify this dynamic further in the future. 
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 Chapter 5 argues that plebiscitary power is the most recent type of movement power 
and is crucial to agenda setting in the policy process. In many ways this chapter is the most 
counter-intuitive, as the average citizen likely sees movement organizations constantly splashed 
across the media. But the chapter argues that these splashes are often just that, with 
movements vying against each other and a constant stream of sports, entertainment, and social 
media. Our media is increasingly fragmented and our attention increasing short. When politics 
does hold our interest for an extended time, it is typically a spectacle like Donald Trump’s 
candidacy, a hard fought election, or a legislative showdown. The evidence is clear that the 
statements and actions of the system’s major institutional actors are the main drivers of media 
attention to politics and policy. So even when activists grab public attention, it is difficult for 
them to hold it. Black lives Matter and Occupy Wall Street both appeared to capture national 
attention, as did gun control after repeated mass shootings, but none held public attention to 
the degree required by policy process. And as institutional thickening renders policy change a 
more and more complex process, the public’s shortened attention span becomes more and 
more problematic. 
 It is certainly worth considering what the vastly changing media landscape means for 
the future of plebiscitary politics. In particular, a media landscape driven by social media 
platforms and consumer generated and/or spread content may hold new movement 
opportunities. Certainly the ubiquity of cell phone video is the impetus behind a BLM movement 
addressing a very old social problem. Animal and environmental activists have also begun using 
drones to video previously inaccessible industrial sites. And globalization has increased the 
international audience for domestic political activism. But at the same time, it seems the spread 
of media technology is only serving to numb us further to this flood of images. Can we sustain 
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the outrage and mobilization as videos of black men shot, beaten, and killed become common 
place in our lives, or will we begin to numbly scroll past their appearance in our digital lives? And 
our international audience challenges us with issues of its own, often including horrific footage 
of war-zone violence and a steady stream of terrorist attacks. Domestic political narratives are 
regularly overshadowed for weeks at a time as Americans pause to assert symbolic support for 
France, Turkey, Belgium, or elsewhere (though we are generally already numb to violence in 
Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and other active war zones). Overall, I am not at all convinced these 
trends are a net positive for movements, but they certainly create an evolving media landscape 
for the exercise of plebiscitary power. 
 Across chapters 3-5, I presented analysis of the First Amendment that ended up 
occupying far more of this project than originally intended. The more I dug into the case law the 
more I became convinced that while America may have among the most robust speech and 
assembly protections in the world, they are not as robust as they have been, or could be. I 
believe the dissent model laid out in Chapter 2 is normatively preferable to the Court’s content 
neutral approach, and would both advantage movements and disadvantage business and other 
status quo players. But even the Court’s content neutral doctrine has been more dissent friendly 
in the past. Content neutrality is fully consistent with narrower use of time, place, and manner 
restrictions, protections from IRS speech regulation, the Austin standard on regulating corporate 
speech, mandatory public access to media channels, limits on hate speech and true threat laws, 
and other dissent-friendly Court positions. The cumulative effect of these numerous issues is 
significant, and I believe my analysis here is a central contribution of this study and a useful 
point of departure for future work. 
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 Chapters 6 & 7 are in many ways exploratory and theoretical. They do not include much 
in the way of original research, but instead attempt to show that the preceding four chapters 
provide a useful framework for analyzing movement activity. They do provide some important 
speculative conclusions about the relationship between power types, in particular that types of 
power can work in synergy or can undermine each other, with the former relationship 
associated with movement success. One of the biggest challenges I see for movements is 
utilizing disruptive power in ways that do not undercut pluralist alliances and plebiscitary issue 
frames. Plebiscitary power rarely seems enough on its own, but when it is turned against a 
movement, policymakers are quickly shielded from the costs of inaction or repression. The way 
the antiabortion movement has used state and local conflicts to avoid poisonous national 
frames is perhaps one of the most interesting development in this regard over the past several 
decades. But each of the four movements I look at offers lessons, each deserves more precise 
study, and each bears watching in the future.  
 All this brings us to the question of future trends. Does the analysis through Chapter 7 
help us predict what comes next for American social movements? Well, yes and no. I am clearly 
predicting that movement opportunities will not expand to rival the peak mobilizations of the 
1960s. I see the trends in American political development as largely linear, and I have severe 
doubts about the coming opportunities for movements to stop climate change, decrease class, 
race, and disability based economic inequality, or achieve other major political objectives that 
cut against entrenched interests. But not all is doom and gloom for outsiders. First off, chapters 
6 & 7 show that there is plenty of room for movements to achieve policy victories when there is 
little organized opposition, when there are existing policy footholds to build upon, when good 
fortune smiles, or when activists deftly apply power to achieve specific limited objectives. These 
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are real opportunities, and when movements are organized to sustain themselves, little victories 
can add up to real change. Second, I do believe that activists will find new sources of power to 
mitigate some of the power deficit that has accrued in recent decades. What might those 
sources look like? 
 The globalization and the internet revolution are likely possible drivers of new 
developments in movement power. Certainly these factors create new opportunities to apply 
existing power strategies. Social media allows for the organization of disruptive flash mobs or 
global boycotts. Activists can reach out to international counterparts for sources of money, 
expertise, or for policy models. Media images reach foreign publics and leaders, amplifying 
plebiscitary leverage. Moreover, international governance offers opportunities for activists to 
bypass domestic pluralist politics. Despite the recent troubles of the European Union, the EU has 
served as a vehicle for bypassing domestic constraints on some issues for some European 
activists.408 Trade agreements, the United Nations, and international courts may someday offer 
some similar opportunities for US activists. Certainly, we can imagine a future world where the 
US gives up political autonomy to organizations like the UN, IMF, or World Court, but for now 
these seem like institutional venues for the US and US activists to spread their visions globally 
with little skin in the game for US domestic politics. So what more likely sources of power might 
be on the horizon in US domestic politics?  
 One possible answer is presented by the 2016 presidential primaries. Donald Trump’s 
candidacy has certainly exposed the weakness of GOP party control, but far more interesting is 
the activist coalition behind Bernie Sanders’s challenge to the Democratic establishment. 
                                                           
408 Of course, it is also a vehicle for powerful interests in countries like Germany and Britain to suppress 
movements in other countries, including those with more vibrant socialist movements. 
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Movement activists appear to have realized that Washington gridlock and the internet’s 
capacity for fundraising, messaging, and organizing have created space for insider insurgencies 
within the party apparatus. While Senator Sanders was by many counts himself an insider force, 
his candidacy was built primarily on the resources of those at the margins or outside the 
Democratic party. Of course, one might argue that a leftist shift in the Democratic Party is not in 
itself an example of movement influence, so much as a realignment of the polity’s major 
political cleavages. Perhaps this is so. Yet it seems to me that the Sanders campaign could also 
be considered a political alliance between movements addressing climate change, income 
inequality, single payer health care, and other activist elements of the left. Whether or not these 
elements can be considered an alliance of leftist movements, I see this campaign as revealing 
the opportunity for movements to organize such campaigns to hijack America’s major political 
parties.  
 As noted in Chapter 2, during the era of party machines movements often attempted to 
organize their own alternative parties to compete in elections. This was an acknowledgement of 
the fundamental control that parties wielded during the era of patronage. What we might 
potentially see in the future is something far different, where the weakness of parties invites 
activists to attempt coups from within. Of course, as Bernie detractors note, winning a 
presidential election is not the same thing as winning hundreds of congressional and thousands 
of state and local elections. I am not raising this objection to suggest a party takeover is 
impossible, but simply to suggest that the ultimate form of leverage it would take could be 
unexpected. Moreover, such a development would require movements to gain greater electoral 
loyalty amongst their supporters, who would then pool their support behind specific candidates 
or party factions. Single issue voters are somewhat difficult to recruit, as most activists tend to 
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be on the far right or left, and tend to fall into line with the major party candidates come 
general elections. Still, primaries are the wild west of electoral politics and we should not 
discount the opportunities offered by these low participation contests. I think a development to 
watch is whether formal or informal sub-party organizations will develop to house and sustain 
coalitions of activist officials within the umbrella parties, as caucuses do in congressional 
governance.  
 The difficulties of securing governing coalitions by occupying party primaries brings us to 
a much more workable alternative: direct democracy. Twenty-six states and the District of 
Columbia offer some form of direct democracy through voter initiatives and referendum. 
Movements have long taken advantage of one-off electoral activity in strategic states. Animal 
rights activists leveraged a Florida vote to push the pork industry to phase out the use of 
gestation crates nationally. They have used city circus bans to financially undercut traveling 
animal circuses. They have used a major California initiative to push for an end to battery cages 
of laying hens. Drug legalization advocates seem on the verge to national marijuana legalization 
after successful votes on recreational use in Alaska, Oregon, Colorado, and Washington, as well 
as many other medical marijuana victories. Single payer is on the 2016 ballot in Colorado. Using 
states and localities as the leading edge to secure diffusion and eventual nationalization seems 
like more than a useful tactic than pursuing national office. It seems like potentially the prime 
venue for movement power, and eventually for power more generally in the American system. 
In a world where electoral politics often produces gridlock, perhaps movements are on the 
leading edge of a transformation of where political change occurs. Will other states amend their 
constitutions to allow for more direct democracy if it becomes the clearest path to national 
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influence? Are we 20 years away from Presidents leading primarily through intervention is state 
and local initiatives? It certainly seems possible.409  
  
 As I bring this project to close I find myself excited about the next steps in my research. I 
am convinced there is a broad question about the relationship between the First Amendment 
and political dissent that requires more sustained and systematic attention. Additionally, I 
believe the Supreme Court bears close watching in the coming decade as both seats and 
doctrines look to be resettled. I am excited to look closely at the potential new avenues of 
power explored in the previous few paragraphs, and believe keeping a close watch on 
movements is a good way to keep ahead of the curve in understanding American political 
development more broadly. Finally, I look forward to digging into individual movement and 
applying my framework more precisely. I feel there is much to be said about the vast network 
that is the American environmental movement, and specifically the movement to fight climate 
change. The size and complexity of that movement limited its treatment in this work, something 
I hope to remedy. I also feel the disability rights movement remains somewhat understudied in 
political science, and both my personal and professional passions are increasingly pushing me to 
concentrate in this area. In sum, while I feel this project has been a good first step, there 
remains much work to be done. 
  
                                                           
409 Though Achen & Bartels have recently argued in Democracy for Realists that direct democracy is even 
more susceptible to capture by well organized and financed business interests. Assuming they are correct, 
movements would need to fundamentally alter their approach to these venues and innovate new 
strategies beyond the types of campaigns we have seen up to this point. 
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